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Itinerary: Palestinians will get the pop-in treatment and little else from Biden trip

Campaign promises prove to be just that, as the administration prioritizes Israel-Gulf State security over dwindling prospects for peace.

Analysis | Middle East

The White House announced that President Joe Biden would visit Israel, the West Bank, and Saudi Arabia from July 13 to 16, and laid out a framework for the agendas of each planned stop. 

It should come as no surprise that the meetings with Israel and Saudi Arabia will focus on very specific subjects, while the meetings with Palestinian leaders will cover more general topics. A White House spokesperson said that Biden and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas would discuss “the ways in which we might rekindle a new political horizon that can ensure equal measures of freedom, security, prosperity and dignity to Israelis and Palestinians alike.”

That description sounds more like a phone call than a meeting, and it reflects the fact that the United States, like its allies in the region, have no idea what to do about the plight of the Palestinians, and really wish the issue could be ignored. 

The absence of any substantial motion on Palestinian rights during Biden’s tenure is glaring. The few moves the United States has made since January 2021 have largely been aimed at simply restoring communication between Ramallah and Washington, which was shattered by Donald Trump. The administration has accomplished that much but virtually nothing else, and even the re-established lines of communication are tense and cold. Biden is not prioritizing the Palestinians, and the Palestinian Authority has grown frustrated

Biden had committed to reopening the U.S. consulate in Jerusalem, which served as the point of contact for American and Palestinian leaders for over 170 years before Donald Trump shut it down and used the site for the relocated U.S. embassy in Jerusalem. As I explained in December, Biden’s promise was foolhardy, as opening a consulate is a much more complicated affair than closing one if the host country (in this case, Israel) is not amenable to the move. 

Biden has tried to mollify the Palestinians by signaling that his administration is planning to upgrade the Palestinian Affairs Unit — the diplomatic mission to the Palestinian leadership which was downgraded as a department within the Israeli embassy by Trump — to a higher status that would report directly to the State Department rather than through the embassy. 

The PA was not impressed by the news. In a meeting last weekend with State Department officials to discuss preparations for Biden’s trip, their representatives reiterated the demand that Biden reopen the consulate. They also reaffirmed their demand that the Palestine Liberation Organization’s (PLO) designation as a foreign terrorist organization be removed. This was another promise Biden made that was easier said than done. 

Since 1997, the State Department has maintained a list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO). But in 1987, it was Congress that stuck the “terrorist” label on the PLO. This was part of the pushback against moves the Ronald Reagan administration was making to explore talks  with the PLO. A year later, Reagan would open talks with the PLO, using a presidential waiver that Congress provided. That waiver was invoked by every successive president until Trump declined to do so in 2019, forcing the PLO to close its Washington offices. 

Complicating the matter of reopening that office is the fact that a 2018 law called the Anti-Terrorism Clarification Act (ATCA) would cause the Palestinians to be liable for at least $655 million in damages from lawsuits over the years. The U.S. would only have the right to demand those funds under certain circumstances, one of which is having official Palestinian offices in the United States. 

Whether the Biden administration knew about these complications when it made its promises to the Palestinians or not, the promises were made and the Palestinians expect Biden to make good on them. Indeed, from the Palestinian perspective, these demands represent a radical lowering of expectations from the days where they hoped the United States would actively pressure Israel into taking significant steps toward a two-state solution. 

Biden’s hands are not completely tied, but he is not taking steps that he could take. For example, a bill currently in the House of Representatives could go a long way to enabling the sort of steps the Palestinians are hoping for. 

The “Two-State Solution Bill” was introduced back in September by Andy Levin (D-Mich.) and has many provisions that would seem to line up perfectly with Biden’s stated policies. One of those provisions is the removal of the terrorist designation from the PLO if it is declared to be in compliance with another bill, the Taylor Force Act, which demands the PA end financial support to families of Palestinians convicted of terrorist attacks against Israelis. 

Levin’s bill would, according to the congressman, allow for the reopening of the PLO office in Washington. It would also demonstrate that the administration had Congressional backing for reopening the consulate. The bill has 47 co-sponsors, and support from a wide range of groups that are important to Biden and the Democrats, including J Street, Americans for Peace Now, Foreign Policy for America, Oxfam America and others. Biden’s support would greatly enhance that base. 

Yet, Biden has ignored the bill. How can Palestinians possibly look at this and believe their concerns are being taken seriously?

In fact, they can’t, and while Biden’s upcoming trip will give Abbas and other Palestinian leaders another chance to plead their case, the trip is likely to end with the Palestinians in an even worse political position. 

In Israel, Biden will do the usual formal meetings, but will also attend a virtual summit of the new I2U2 grouping of India, Israel, the UAE and the U.S. This new group will, according to U.S. officials, start developing a framework for dealing with food security in the Middle East and Asia. But more militaristic security concerns are sure to be a major focus, and will present some very specific challenges to the UAE, given the strained status quo between Israel and the Palestinians and the recent Indian government attacks on its own Muslim minority. 

The Saudis, for their part, remain reluctant to fully normalize with Israel without some accommodation for the Palestinians. Still, it is unknown whether that resolve will outlast King Salman, and his son, Mohammed, is now in practical charge of the kingdom. The Saudis are already getting much of what they want from Israel, as the Abraham Accords are quickly leading to the anti-Iran military bloc they crave. Pressing the Palestinian case is not on MBS’ agenda. 

Biden’s trip will, at best, leave the Palestinians with a few symbolic gains, but a clear message that, in practice, nothing is going to change in the foreseeable future. Biden has made promises he was never going to be willing or able to keep, given his aversion to even the mildest challenges. And, politically, with midterms looming and his approval ratings very low, he is not going to take steps now for the Palestinians. This trip is all about Saudi Arabia and Israel, and, in Washington’s mind, the Palestinians are more a nuisance than a cause for concern.


President Joe Biden exits Air Force One. (Shutterstock/Chris Allan)
Analysis | Middle East
Trump Zelensky
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Blob exploiting Trump's anger with Putin, risking return to Biden's war

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Donald Trump’s recent outburst against Vladimir Putin — accusing the Russian leader of "throwing a pile of bullsh*t at us" and threatening devastating new sanctions — might be just another Trumpian tantrum.

The president is known for abrupt reversals. Or it could be a bargaining tactic ahead of potential Ukraine peace talks. But there’s a third, more troubling possibility: establishment Republican hawks and neoconservatives, who have been maneuvering to hijack Trump’s “America First” agenda since his return to office, may be exploiting his frustration with Putin to push for a prolonged confrontation with Russia.

Trump’s irritation is understandable. Ukraine has accepted his proposed ceasefire, but Putin has refused, making him, in Trump’s eyes, the main obstacle to ending the war.

Putin’s calculus is clear. As Ted Snider notes in the American Conservative, Russia is winning on the battlefield. In June, it captured more Ukrainian territory and now threatens critical Kyiv’s supply lines. Moscow also seized a key lithium deposit critical to securing Trump’s support for Ukraine. Meanwhile, Russian missile and drone strikes have intensified.

Putin seems convinced his key demands — Ukraine’s neutrality, territorial concessions in the Donbas and Crimea, and a downsized Ukrainian military — are more achievable through war than diplomacy.

Yet his strategy empowers the transatlantic “forever war” faction: leaders in Britain, France, Germany, and the EU, along with hawks in both main U.S. parties. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz claims that diplomacy with Russia is “exhausted.” Europe’s war party, convinced a Russian victory would inevitably lead to an attack on NATO (a suicidal prospect for Moscow), is willing to fight “to the last Ukrainian.” Meanwhile, U.S. hawks, including liberal interventionist Democrats, stoke Trump’s ego, framing failure to stand up to Putin’s defiance as a sign of weakness or appeasement.

Trump long resisted this pressure. Pragmatism told him Ukraine couldn’t win, and calling it “Biden’s war” was his way of distancing himself, seeking a quick exit to refocus on China, which he has depicted as Washington’s greater foreign threat. At least as important, U.S. involvement in the war in Ukraine has been unpopular with his MAGA base.

But his June strikes on Iran may signal a hawkish shift. By touting them as a decisive blow to Iran’s nuclear program (despite Tehran’s refusal so far to abandon uranium enrichment), Trump may be embracing a new approach to dealing with recalcitrant foreign powers: offer a deal, set a deadline, then unleash overwhelming force if rejected. The optics of “success” could tempt him to try something similar with Russia.

This pivot coincides with a media campaign against restraint advocates within the administration like Elbridge Colby, the Pentagon policy chief who has prioritized China over Ukraine and also provoked the opposition of pro-Israel neoconservatives by warning against war with Iran. POLITICO quoted unnamed officials attacking Colby for wanting the U.S. to “do less in the world.” Meanwhile, the conventional Republican hawk Marco Rubio’s influence grows as he combines the jobs of both secretary of state and national security adviser.

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Nuclear deterrence rules out direct military action — even Biden, far more invested in Ukraine than Trump, avoided that risk. Instead, Trump ally Sen.Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.), another establishment Republican hawk, is pushing a 500% tariff on nations buying Russian hydrocarbons, aiming to sever Moscow from the global economy. Trump seems supportive, although the move’s feasibility and impact are doubtful.

China and India are key buyers of Russian oil. China alone imports 12.5 million barrels daily. Russia exports seven million barrels daily. China could absorb Russia’s entire output. Beijing has bluntly stated it “cannot afford” a Russian defeat, ensuring Moscow’s economic lifeline remains open.

The U.S., meanwhile, is ill-prepared for a tariff war with China. When Trump imposed 145% tariffs, Beijing retaliated by cutting off rare earth metals exports, vital to U.S. industry and defense. Trump backed down.

At the G-7 summit in Canada last month, the EU proposed lowering price caps on Russian oil from $60 a barrel to $45 a barrel as part of its 18th sanctions package against Russia. Trump rejected the proposal at the time but may be tempted to reconsider, given his suggestion that more sanctions may be needed. Even if Washington backs the measure now, however, it is unlikely to cripple Russia’s war machine.

Another strategy may involve isolating Russia by peeling away Moscow’s traditionally friendly neighbors. Here, Western mediation between Armenia and Azerbaijan isn’t about peace — if it were, pressure would target Baku, which has stalled agreements and threatened renewed war against Armenia. The real goal is to eject Russia from the South Caucasus and create a NATO-aligned energy corridor linking Turkey to Central Asia, bypassing both Russia and Iran to their detriment.

Central Asia itself is itself emerging as a new battleground. In May 2025, the EU has celebrated its first summit with Central Asian nations in Uzbekistan, with a heavy focus on developing the Middle Corridor, a route for transportation of energy and critical raw materials that would bypass Russia. In that context, the EU has committed €10 billion in support of the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route.

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