Retired four-star Marine general John R. Allen resigned his position as president of the Brookings Institution just days after reports emerged that Federal investigators accused Allen of secretly lobbying for Qatar.
“John Allen has resigned to ensure Brookings can continue to pursue its mission without distraction,” a Brookings spokesperson told Responsible Statecraft.
Allen — the former commander of NATO and allied forces in Afghanistan — had allegedly obstructed the investigation into his lobbying activities, provided a “false version of events” to federal agents, and used his Brookings email account to conduct secret lobbying work at the height of an economic embargo against Qatar by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.
“I request that [sic] Board of Trustees of the Brookings Institution accept my resignation from the presidency of the institution as the Chief Executive Officer,” Allen wrote in a letter obtained by Responsible Statecraft dated June 12, 2022. He made no direct mention of the warrant accusing him of his illegal lobbying activities but said he was proud of his work at the think tank.
His resignation letter concluded:
While I leave the institution with a heavy heart, I know it is best for all concerned in this moment. I also know the institution will be wisely guided by the Brookings Board of Trustees and will be admirably and competently led by the management that remains. The Brookings Institution is a national and international asset, and always will be. I wish the Board and every member of the Brookings family the very best in the challenging days ahead.
Allen’s letter of resignation can be viewed here. He has denied the allegations made by Federal investigators.
Federal investigators have not claimed that anyone at Brookings, other than Allen, was involved in the alleged secret lobbying for Qatar. But his alleged use of Brookings’ resources to conduct his work for Qatar raises questions about Brookings’ lucrative relationship with Qatar and the ethical implications of maintaining close ties to a foreign government. Qatar contributed tens of millions of dollars to Brookings over 14 years before the funding relationship ended last year.
“The integrity and objectivity of Brookings’s scholarship constitute the institution’s principal assets, and Brookings seeks to maintain high ethical standards in all its operations,” the co-chairs of Brookings' board of trustees said in an email to the “Brooking Community'' confirming Allen’s resignation. “Our policies on research independence and integrity reflect these values.”
Eli Clifton is a senior advisor at the Quincy Institute and Investigative Journalist at Large at Responsible Statecraft. He reports on money in politics and U.S. foreign policy.
ISAF Commander in Afghanistan Gen. John Allen (C) waits to testify before the House Armed Services Committee about "Recent Developments in Afghanistan" on Capitol Hill in Washington, March 20, 2012. REUTERS/Larry Downing (UNITED STATES - Tags: POLITICS MILITARY)
The ceasefire in Gaza is not yet a week old, and Washington is already sending private U.S. security contractors to help operate checkpoints, a decision that one former military officer told RS is a “bad, bad idea.”
This will be the first time since 2003 that American security contractors have been in the strip. At that time, three private American contractors were killed by a roadside bomb while providing security for a diplomatic mission in Gaza.
Axios reports that two U.S. security companies will operate as part of a multi-national group, as laid out in the Gaza cease-fire deal, and Israel and Hamas have already approved them, as required by the deal.
The contractors will be inspecting vehicles that are moving into northern Gaza via the Netzarium corridor to ensure that no heavy weapons enter that part of the territory.
Israel had previously considered using security companies to distribute aid to Palestinians in Gaza last year as the Knesset was discussing banning the United Nations relief organization, UNRWA.
The Qatari government will likely fund the security forces. An Egyptian security company has also been selected for the mission. Safe Reach Solutions is one of the American companies providing security assistance and is credited with drawing up the plan. The other company, UG Solutions, is known for employing former soldiers from American and foreign special forces, according to Axios.
As part of the deal, these contractors will likely remain in Gaza during the first phase of the cease-fire, which is expected to last six weeks. Critics are already raising alarms about the potential safety issues.
“This is a bad, bad idea. This is a cauldron of angry people who are quite hostile towards Americans because most of the bombs that have fallen on Gazans have been U.S. provided,” said Lt Col. (retired) Daniel L. Davis.
“Gaza has been turned into a moonscape by Israeli Defense Forces actions, and thus any operation inside the Strip going forward should be IDF, not American,” Davis added. “The chances that angry Palestinians may target and kill Americans are uncomfortably high, in my view. Nothing good will come of this.”
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Top image credit: President Slobodan Milosevic of Serbia (L), President Alija Izetbegovic of Bosnia-Herzegovina (C) and President Franjo Tudjman of Croatia sign the Dayton Agreement peace accord at the Hope Hotel inside Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in this November 21, 1995 file photo.REUTERS/Eric Miller/Files
In December 1995, the Dayton Accords brought the horrible, nearly four-year long Bosnian War to an end. Thirty years on, 2025 will likely bring numerous reflections on the “Road to Dayton.” Many of these reflections will celebrate the unleashing of NATO airpower on the Bosnian Serbs in 1995, which supposedly forced them to “sue for peace.”
The truth, however — which has only become clearer as more documentation has become available — is that the United States forced the Muslim-dominated Bosnian government to the negotiating table at Dayton and granted large concessions to the Serbs that were unthinkable in Washington when the Clinton administration entered office in 1993. The Dayton Agreement was, in essence, a belated admission of American failure.
‘A tough and resourceful foe’
The clearest and most rigorous expression of the foreign policy establishment’s narrative about Dayton is probably Derek Chollet’s 2005 book, “The Road to the Dayton Accords”. Chollet, who worked as an adviser to key Clinton administration diplomats Richard Holbrooke and Strobe Talbott, argues that “the United States had initially encouraged the Europeans to take the lead in Bosnia,” but “as time went on, Europe’s response proved feckless, and the introduction of European troops under a United Nations mandate did little to stop the horrendous bloodshed.”
Finally, “in the course of six months between June and November 1995, President Clinton and his team dramatically reversed months of indecision by setting a bold course, defying expectations both in the risks they undertook and the success they achieved.” Ultimately, Chollet concludes, “the Bosnia experience has taught many lessons, but the most important one is this: when it comes to solving global problems, American leadership remains indispensable.”
The first catastrophic U.S. error was widely predicted at the time: the decision to recognize the new state of Bosnia-Hercegovina in April 1992. This decision, which was, in many ways, prompted by German recognition of Croatia in December 1991, was disastrous because Bosnia’s secession from Yugoslavia was spearheaded by a short-lived alliance between Bosnian Muslim (later called “Bosniak”) and Croat political leaders against the Bosnian Serbs. The CIA predicted, in a December 1991 report ominously titled “Bosnia-Hercegovina: On the Edge of the Abyss,” that recognition would “prompt the Serb and Croat areas [of Bosnia] to attach their respective areas to Serbia and Croatia,” which would then “set a chain reaction of violence in motion as local groups seek to promote or prevent annexation.”
When the “abyss” arrived, Bosnian Serb forces, with assistance from the Yugoslav National Army, took control of Bosnian territory with large Serb populations and “ethnically cleansed” this territory of Muslims. In a December 1992 memo summarizing the views of the intelligence community for the Clinton Transition Team, two intelligence officials wrote that “attempting to reclaim all of the territory the Bosnian Serbs now occupy would require massive Western military intervention.” The Bosnian Serbs — who were not foreign conquerors but had been living in Bosnia for centuries — could be beaten back by such an intervention, but “once recovered from the initial shock,” they “would prove a tough and resourceful foe.”
“A more manageable objective,” the memo concluded, “would be the survival of a fragmented Muslim-majority state following a partition of Bosnia-Hercegovina.”
‘Legitimizing ethnic cleansing’
“De facto partition” is essentially what the Dayton Accords ended up achieving. While Dayton formally upheld the territorial integrity of Bosnia-Hercegovina and allotted 51% of Bosnian territory to a Muslim-Croat Federation, it allotted the remaining 49% to a contiguous Bosnian Serb state-within-a-state and gave this “entity” almost total autonomy over its internal affairs, as well as the right to “special parallel relationships” with Serbia. These were significant concessions to Serb interests that the Clinton administration had, until 1995, been unwilling to make.
While Albright’s memo has often been celebrated (including by Chollet and by Albright) for its call to unleash NATO on the Bosnian Serbs, the memo also suggested that the U.S., in a settlement of the conflict, “could be more forward-leaning on the Serbs’ right to secede peacefully from Bosnia and join a potential ‘Greater Serbia.’”
Albright added that “it may be necessary to consider proposals to trade Federation territory for Serb-held territory, especially if the Federation agrees and if the exchange makes the Federation more durable. This means population transfers that we have previously been unwilling to countenance.”
Albright, who was probably the biggest hawk in the Clinton administration, went from refusing any “legitimization” of ethnic cleansing through even minor concessions to the Bosnian Serbs in 1993 to not only “legitimization” of ethnic cleansing, but support for further “population transfers” and even a Serb right to secede.
In this context, while the administration publicly condemned the Serb takeover of Srebrenica and Žepa in July 1995, a July 17 National Security Council discussion paper optimistically suggested that this development “may open the way to more realistic territorial solutions,” facilitating “a heart-to-heart discussion with the Bosnians aimed at eliciting greater flexibility on the map, constitutional arrangements, and possibly the Bosnian Serbs’ right to secede from the Union after an initial period.”
Although a right to secession was not, ultimately, included in the Dayton Accords, and the Serbs fulfilled their earlier promises to make territorial concessions, the new U.S. push for compromises on all sides infuriated the Bosnian government. “The Bosnians still wish us to believe that they are getting a lousy deal,” Holbrooke, Clinton’s chief negotiator at Dayton, wrote in a memo to Secretary of State Warren Christopher on November 17, 1995. “But they know it is not only a good deal but the very best they will ever get.”
Holbrooke, who had privately advocated for bombing the Serbs as a means to “strengthen our image” with the government in Sarajevo, then accused Bosnian President Alija Izetbegović of showing “remarkably little concern for the suffering his people have endured.”
Holbrooke, for his part, showed “remarkably little concern” for the fact that Izetbegović and his government had been led to believe that America would help them defeat, rather than “appease,” the Bosnian Serbs. Clinton’s team said as much during the 1992 presidential campaign and in office, while their actions — such as air strikes, brutal sanctions against the civilian population of Serbia, and deliberate failure to enforce a U.N. arms embargo against anyone other than the Serbs — reinforced the impression that the “cavalry is coming.” The U.S. Congress’s repeated efforts to lift the arms embargo only piled on more false hope.
The “Road to Dayton,” in the final analysis, is a cautionary tale about false hope. The Bosnian government was strung along by an administration that struggled to admit that it had promised more than it could deliver. Dayton, at least, recognized this reality. A similar reality may soon be recognized in Ukraine — or even again in Bosnia if the current façade of a unitary Bosnian state, which is only sustained by Western money and threats of force, collapses. The lesson, here, is not about the virtues of American firepower, but the need for American leaders to learn, from time to time, how to swallow their pride.
Honduran President Xiomara Castro recently announced that she is prepared to remove American troops from the country’s Soto Cano Air Base if President Donald Trump implements his proposed mass deportation policies.
She is the first Latin American head of state to threaten the new American president over his deportation plans, which could expel up to 250,000 Hondurans from the U.S. this year according to Deputy Foreign Minister Tony Garcia.
“In the face of a hostile attitude of mass expulsion of our brothers, we would have to consider a change in our cooperation policies with the United States, especially in the military arena,” Castro said.
Honduras is not well prepared to re-absorb the deportees, most of whom left due to a combination of widespread poverty, climate disasters, and the persistent threat of gang violence. But what would kicking the U.S. military out of Honduras mean for Washington?
If Castro follows through with her pledge, she will leave the United States without access to its largest military base in Central America. Soto Cano hosts Joint Task Force-Bravo, an arm of the U.S. Southern Command that works to provide humanitarian aid, counter drug trafficking, and coordinate regional security operations across Central America. It houses more than 500 U.S. troops and 3 different units: the Army Forces Joint Support Battalion, the 288th Aviation Regiment, and the 612th Air Base Squadron.
When the U.S. first began using the base in the 1980s, it did so for a narrower set of objectives.
Fearing the spread of communism in Latin America during the Cold War, Ronald Reagan made the toppling of Nicaragua’s left-wing Sandinista government a key priority when he came to office in 1981. Reagan’s administration spent millions of dollars arming anti-communist Nicaraguan militias which the U.S. military helped train at its bases in neighboring Honduras.
The U.S.-backed rebel militias went on to commit serious human rights abuses in a conflict that fueled instability throughout much of Central America and led to a substantial exodus of migrants to the United States. In Honduras, some villages along the border with Nicaragua were caught in the crossfire.
Soto Cano is a relic from when Washington viewed Honduras as a key instrument of American foreign policy (some U.S. government officials at the time called the country “U.S.S. Honduras”). For President Castro, the legacy of America’s military presence in the country is also personal. Her husband Manuel Zelaya served as president of Honduras from 2006 until 2009, when he was deposed in a coup by U.S.-trained officers. The State Department, then under Secretary Hillary Clinton, refused to call it a “coup” and actively prevented restoring Zelaya’s authority. In her 2014 memoir “Hard Choices” she wrote that energy was instead directed “to restore order in Honduras and ensure that free and fair elections could be held quickly and legitimately, which would render the question of Zelaya moot.”
There is no evidence that the Obama administration was directly involved in planning the coup, but Honduras’s military forcibly brought Zelaya to the Soto Cano base before putting him on a plane to Costa Rica. According to David Vine, a professor at American University who studies U.S. bases abroad, this action has raised suspicions that the United States was indeed involved.
Although top U.S. officials condemned Zelaya’s ouster, Clinton quickly recognized the new military government as legitimate and eventually increased funding for its security forces despite allegations that they were engaged in “death-squad style killings.” From there, a 13-year period of corrupt right-wing governance in Honduras began, characterized by civil unrest, increased privatization, repression of political activists, and corruption.
“My understanding is that the country became more violent, more unequal, and less just,” said Vine.
Washington supported Castro’s predecessor, Juan Orlando Hernandez, until it didn’t. After leaving office, the U.S. Department of Justice charged Hernandez in 2022 in a massive cocaine trafficking scheme that had been ongoing during his tenure. He was convicted and sentenced to 45 years in prison in June 2024.
Xiomara Castro ran for president on a democratic socialist platform and was elected in 2022, marking a new chapter of political leadership. If her recent announcement is any indication, Honduras might also now be entering a new chapter in its relationship with the United States.
Castro’s pledge is not without risks. For one, it potentially puts Honduras at odds with its biggest trading partner. According to the U.S. Embassy of Honduras, the country exports $5.2 billion worth of goods annually to the United States and U.S. foreign direct investment in Honduras totals more than $1 billion per year. President Trump has already threatened to impose tariffs on Canada and Mexico over immigration disputes, and it’s possible he could do the same in this case.
The U.S. military also argues that it needs Soto Cano to provide disaster relief in a country where the effects of poverty and climate change are deeply felt. While the U.S. government has recently used the base to deliver humanitarian aid, Vine pointed out that America routinely delivers aid in other countries where it does not control a military base.
Compounding this poverty in rural areas is the looming threat of climate change. In 2020 a pair of category 4 hurricanes made landfall within days of each other, displacing hundreds of thousands of people, flooding entire towns, and destroying vital transportation infrastructure connecting remote regions with the rest of the country.
Honduran emigrants also cite widespread violence as one of their main reasons for leaving. Honduras has the second highest homicide rate among nations in Latin America and the Caribbean. Extortion is widespread and citizens are routinely killed for refusing to pay money to street gangs such as MS-13.
Trump has given no indication so far that the prospect of military expulsion will stop him from carrying out mass deportations. In response to Castro’s statements, Trump transition team member Brian Hughes offered few specifics.
“The Trump administration looks forward to engaging our Latin American partners to ensure our southern border is secure and illegal immigrants can be returned to their country of origin.”
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