Retired four-star Marine general John R. Allen resigned his position as president of the Brookings Institution just days after reports emerged that Federal investigators accused Allen of secretly lobbying for Qatar.
“John Allen has resigned to ensure Brookings can continue to pursue its mission without distraction,” a Brookings spokesperson told Responsible Statecraft.
Allen — the former commander of NATO and allied forces in Afghanistan — had allegedly obstructed the investigation into his lobbying activities, provided a “false version of events” to federal agents, and used his Brookings email account to conduct secret lobbying work at the height of an economic embargo against Qatar by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.
“I request that [sic] Board of Trustees of the Brookings Institution accept my resignation from the presidency of the institution as the Chief Executive Officer,” Allen wrote in a letter obtained by Responsible Statecraft dated June 12, 2022. He made no direct mention of the warrant accusing him of his illegal lobbying activities but said he was proud of his work at the think tank.
His resignation letter concluded:
While I leave the institution with a heavy heart, I know it is best for all concerned in this moment. I also know the institution will be wisely guided by the Brookings Board of Trustees and will be admirably and competently led by the management that remains. The Brookings Institution is a national and international asset, and always will be. I wish the Board and every member of the Brookings family the very best in the challenging days ahead.
Allen’s letter of resignation can be viewed here. He has denied the allegations made by Federal investigators.
Federal investigators have not claimed that anyone at Brookings, other than Allen, was involved in the alleged secret lobbying for Qatar. But his alleged use of Brookings’ resources to conduct his work for Qatar raises questions about Brookings’ lucrative relationship with Qatar and the ethical implications of maintaining close ties to a foreign government. Qatar contributed tens of millions of dollars to Brookings over 14 years before the funding relationship ended last year.
“The integrity and objectivity of Brookings’s scholarship constitute the institution’s principal assets, and Brookings seeks to maintain high ethical standards in all its operations,” the co-chairs of Brookings' board of trustees said in an email to the “Brooking Community'' confirming Allen’s resignation. “Our policies on research independence and integrity reflect these values.”
Eli Clifton is a senior advisor at the Quincy Institute and Investigative Journalist at Large at Responsible Statecraft. He reports on money in politics and U.S. foreign policy.
ISAF Commander in Afghanistan Gen. John Allen (C) waits to testify before the House Armed Services Committee about "Recent Developments in Afghanistan" on Capitol Hill in Washington, March 20, 2012. REUTERS/Larry Downing (UNITED STATES - Tags: POLITICS MILITARY)
Top photo: U.S. Army Lt. Col. Timothy McGuire and his interpreter, right, speak with a recent Afghan National Army graduate, left, during a visit in Seghana, Afghanistan (U.S Army photo by Pfc. Michael Zuk)
Afghans who worked for the U.S. military are still fleeing the Taliban and trying to reach the United States- President Trump's ban on refugees has put their lives, literally, in limbo.
They got a hopeful sign Tuesday when a federal judge blocked President Trump’s executive order suspending the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP), a federal program that processes and resettles people fleeing dangerous humanitarian crises abroad.
But a lawyer for the Justice Department has already asked U.S. District Judge Jamal Whitehead to refrain from enforcing his block while the administration considers appealing the case. Whitehead said he will decide on that later, when he issues a formal written order.
Despite the pleas of military veteran groups, Trump’s executive order did not explicitly offer protections for the Afghan Special Immigrant Visa (SIV), a resettlement program created by Congress for Afghan citizens who aided the U.S. mission in Afghanistan — including former military interpreters, contractors, and prosecutors who put Taliban members in prison. Now stranded, these SIV applicants (many of them already vetted for resettlement by the U.S. government) risk violent retribution from the Taliban.
Created in 2006, the Afghan SIV program initially allowed for just 50 visas to be granted per year. That number was increased to around 4,000 in 2009 and then to 26,500 in 2021 after the U.S. withdrew from Afghanistan. The latest round of SIV authorizations is set to expire at the end of 2025 and will require reauthorization from Congress.
Trump’s refugee pause hasn’t stopped the processing of SIV applications, but it has cut off crucial pathways for applicants to reach the United States once approved.
Though SIV is technically a separate program from the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program, its applicants rely on many of the same offices and funding pools that have since been frozen by Trump’s executive order. These include the U.N.’s International Office of Migration and the State Department’s Coordinator for Afghan Relocation Efforts, both of which arrange relocation flights for SIV applicants.
Recent cuts have also forced the closure of resettlement agencies in Qatar and Pakistan, where many Afghans are vetted before coming to the United States. In Pakistan, local authorities are now ramping up efforts to deport refugees back to Afghanistan, which for many would be a death sentence.
Trump made President Biden’s Afghanistan withdrawal a central part of his foreign policy argument during his re-election campaign, calling Biden’s exit, “the most astonishing display of gross incompetence by a nation’s leader, perhaps at any time.” Republicans in Congress excoriated Biden for failing to ensure the safety of former military partners during the Afghanistan withdrawal process.
Now military veterans fear that Trump is now doing the same by failing to honor the SIV program.
“The word spreads and it damages our reputation overseas,” said retired Air Force Lieutenant General John Bradley, whose Lamia Afghan Foundation helps to resettle Afghan refugees.
President Trump has not made any public statements about the status of SIV since issuing his executive order, but pro-Afghan advocates hope that they can elevate the issue by raising bipartisan support. According to the bipartisan veterans PAC With Honor, 84% of Americans say they support resettling Afghan veterans in the U.S.
“Lots of members of congress understand that these people helped our military,” said General Bradley.
Rep. Michael McCaul (R-Texas), chair of the House Foreign Affairs Committee expressed concern last week that former U.S. allies in Afghanistan are being impacted by the refugee pause.
“During its chaotic and deadly withdrawal from Afghanistan, the Biden administration abandoned tens of thousands of our Afghan allies who fought and bled alongside our military,” McCaul said in a Feb. 20 press release on Trump’s cuts to the State Department.
“I urge Secretary Rubio to prioritize honoring the promises we made to those Afghan allies as he works to make State a more effective and efficient department.”
Earlier this month, a group of Democratic senators led by Sen. Amy Klobuchar (D-Minn.) called on the administration to clarify the status of SIV applicants currently in limbo.
“We write with urgent concerns about potential impacts of the Administration’s recent immigration and foreign aid orders on Afghans who supported the U.S. mission in Afghanistan,” said the senators in a letter to key Trump cabinet officials on Feb. 20. “Standing by those who stood with us is a matter of national interest and national honor.”
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Syria's de facto leader Ahmed al-Sharaa, also known as Abu Mohammed al-Golani, walks on the day he meets with Qatar's Minister of State Mohammed bin Abdulaziz Al-Khulaifi, after the ousting of Syria's Bashar al-Assad, in Damascus, Syria, December 23, 2024. REUTERS/Ammar Awad
There is no better place to begin to understand Syria after December’s collapse of the Assad dynasty than the movie "Sirocco."
The 1951 film features Humphrey Bogart as a mercenary American arms dealer supplying the Arab resistance to the French during the Druze revolt against colonial rule during the 1920s.
In a dialogue that resonates across the decades, Emir Hassan, the steely-eyed leader of the revolt, admonishes Bogart:
“Do you want to know why we Syrians fight the French? You may tell your people we fight because they have invaded our country. They want to govern us, to tell us what to do. We want to govern ourselves. We want Syria for ourselves. We fight to throw out our enemies, to recapture our freedom, and we will win because God and justice are on our side.”
Even as the British inaugurated the use of air power against the neighboring Iraqi insurgency next door, the French response to a popular revolt in a new country called Syria, carved out of the corpse of the prostrate Ottoman Empire, was to stand up an army led by French officers and recruited from the Druze, Circassian, and Alawite minorities who chafed under the rule of the majority Sunni political and merchant class.
Alongside these “Special Army of the Levant,” the French also created powerless statelets — one each in Damascus and Aleppo, as well for the Druze and Alawite minorities. Each boasted a flag — some of which were flown during the revolt that recently toppled Bashar al Assad — all part of a policy aimed at undermining popular efforts to establish a politically and territorially coherent independent nation.
This French strategy of “divide and rule” failed completely. Damascus and Aleppo were inextricably linked by trade and a shared history. The confessional communities wanted a fair deal in a newly reimagined Syria, not an ersatz independence.
Then as now, “Syria for the Syrians” resonates far more deeply than the self-interested and cynical efforts of many players — domestic and foreign — to capture Syria for their own political or sectarian interests.
Independence was won in 1946 and modern day Syria, unified into one territorial unit, joined the world stage.
However, the Sunni political elite, men (and only men), schooled in the ways of Ottoman administration and the battle for independence, were politically and ideologically exhausted by their winning effort.
Their failure left the political stage during the 1950s and 1960s to a bewildering series of coups and counter-coups led by mostly forgettable Druze or Alawi colonels — soldiers (trained by the French) determined to reinvent themselves and their country.
As in Nasser’s Egypt, Syria’s officer corps was the new incubator of political power. Unlike their Egyptian brothers, however, the Syrian colonels were endemically divided amongst themselves.
This serial bloodletting and constant political instability ended only when Hafez al Assad – the autocratic father of the recently deposed Bashir – fought his way to the top in 1970.
Challenges to his power during four decades of rule came from two sources — within the Assad family itself, and more significantly, from Islamic revivalists, militants and traditionalists who, in 1956, again in 1964 and 1984, and finally in 2011 successfully challenged the power of Alawite supremacy upon which the Assad family rule was based
Sirocco debuted 1951. The colonial powers were breathing their last — at Suez. Damascus was struggling, then as today, to establish stable and benevolent leaders willing to share power across the sectarian divide and capable of resisting the blandishments of any number of foreign powers — Arab and Western — determined to win what the noted British historian Patrick Seale aptly called “the struggle for Syria.”
Ahmed Hussein al-Sharaa, the newly crowned yet “interim” president, is the latest Syrian military leader to claim for himself the mantle of national leadership from a tight circle of ambitious competitors. At the very least, he is a symbol of the restoration of Sunni supremacy after more than seven decades in the political wilderness. His political power rests with Sunni and jihadi military commanders, who recently elevated the Golan Heights native to the Syrian presidency.
Yet it remains unclear whether al-Sharaa exercises real, preeminent power, or is simply a convenient and well-spoken place holder elevated by victorious military factions, not all of them Syrian, dominated by Sunni ideologues determined to prevail over Alawite dead-enders and Druze and Kurdish warlords in the south and northeast.
Syria’s communal and geographic divisions are real and politically potent, no less today than throughout Syria’s modern history. The effort to create a national Syrian identity that also accommodates allegiance to a confession or clan or warlord remains a work in progress, and a challenge of the first order for the Sunni militants who now rule.
Al-Sharaa sings from an acceptable script aimed at keeping friends and winning enemies. The former partisan of al-Qaeda promises to respect the confessional nature of Syrian life and to support a more “inclusive” form of governance, while negotiating to recognize, and institutionalize, if limit, the power of those who would challenge Damascus’ supremacy.
“I found in al-Sharaa a blend of revolutionary spirit and leadership,” observed former Lebanese lawmaker and minister Marwan Hamadeh recently. “He wants to quickly shift Syria from an era of factions to a republic, from the time of divisions to the time of the state. Syria is still fragmented, with issues like the Kurdish and Druze concerns that we raised, but thankfully, progress is being made. He’s cautious about the Alawites, fearing reprisals from his own people, but insists, ‘We have nothing against the Alawites.’ A significant portion of them opposed the Assad regime.”
Syrian civil society, led by a constellation of groups championed in the West, are hoping against hope, and Syria’s own history, that the victorious militants will enable them to play a leading role in charting Syria’s political future.
Not since the late 1940s, however, has the Syrian political class, exhausted by the anti-colonial struggle against the French and subsequently outplayed by a more ambitious and talented, if endemically factionalized officer corps, been a serious contender for power.
The inability of the Syrian political class to place limits on the role of the military in politics – created the necessary conditions for the ascendancy of the Assad regime — remains the foremost challenge facing the leaders of civil society today.
Al-Sharaa has made a concerted if unfulfilled effort to fashion a “zero problems” foreign policy. This includes Israel, which occupies Syrian territories conquered in1967 and 2024, a fact that Sharaa’s now discarded nom de guerre — al Jolani — recalls. Everyone, except for Sisi’s Egypt, is prepared, for the moment at least, to give him the benefit of the doubt, without investing much in his success.
The new president’s effort to create a unified security force as the anchor of the regime is understandable, as is the reluctance of the Druze and Kurdish as well as uncountable warlords to accommodate him.
Al Sharaa speaks of a “natural” — i.e. Sunni state. His supporters announce the rebirth of “the state of the Umayyads” amplifying the concerns of Christian, Druze, Alawite, and Circassian minorities anxious that they will be compromised by his success.
On the eve of deliberations meant to chart Syria’s post-Assad future, Al-Sharaa has no Syrian role model to emulate. The traditional Sunni elite offers little guidance. And the Baath Party, which promised “Unity, Freedom, and Socialism,” delivered only weakness, penury, and foreign intervention.
Al-Sharaa swept into Damascus like the hot Sirocco wind. He and his cohorts must now demonstrate that they have learned not only from those they have recently defeated, but are also able to overcome the troubled legacy of those who preceded them.
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Top photo credit: Erik Prince speaks with political commentator Gordon Chang at CPAC (Photo: Zach D Roberts/NurPhoto)
It seems that former Blackwater CEO, international war profiteer, and wannabe colonialist Erik Prince is eager to get back into the action, this time on American soil. Politico reported today that a group of military contractors led by Prince delivered a 26-page proposal to President Donald Trump’s team before the inauguration, detailing how the new administration could enlist the private sector to hit its deportation goals.
The plan states that a “600% increase in activity” is needed for the President to deport 12 million people before the 2026 midterms — an increase that Prince and his allies don’t believe government agencies are equipped to make.
Among the ideas laid out in the $25 billion proposal: a private fleet of 100 deportation planes, privately-run processing camps on military bases, expedited mass deportation hearings, and a “bounty program which provides a cash reward for each illegal alien held by a state or local law enforcement officer.”
Former Trump Advisor Steve Bannon (who still has strong ties to key advisors on the President’s team) expressed support for the plan to Politico. “People want this stood up quickly, and understand the government is always very slow to do things,” he said.
The proposal has clear moral, financial, and legal concerns — but that goes without saying when Erik Prince is concerned.
Prince’s Blackwater Security Consulting group carried out a highly publicized massacre of 17 civilians at Nissour Square in Baghdad in 2007, causing the group to lose its security contract with the U.S. government. Four Blackwater employees were convicted by a U.S. federal court for their involvement in the massacre and then pardoned by President Trump in his first term.
Neither the tragedy of the Nissour Square Massacre nor the embarrassment it represented for the military contracting industry dissuaded Prince, who has continued to push for more privatization and less oversight in military operations.
Fortunately, it seems that his latest pet project isn’t gaining much traction.
Bill Matthews, a co-author of the proposal, told Politico, “We have not been contacted by, nor have we had any discussions with, the government since the White Paper that we submitted months ago. There has been zero show of interest or engagement from the government and we have no reason to believe there will be.”
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