Retired four-star Marine general John R. Allen resigned his position as president of the Brookings Institution just days after reports emerged that Federal investigators accused Allen of secretly lobbying for Qatar.
“John Allen has resigned to ensure Brookings can continue to pursue its mission without distraction,” a Brookings spokesperson told Responsible Statecraft.
Allen — the former commander of NATO and allied forces in Afghanistan — had allegedly obstructed the investigation into his lobbying activities, provided a “false version of events” to federal agents, and used his Brookings email account to conduct secret lobbying work at the height of an economic embargo against Qatar by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.
“I request that [sic] Board of Trustees of the Brookings Institution accept my resignation from the presidency of the institution as the Chief Executive Officer,” Allen wrote in a letter obtained by Responsible Statecraft dated June 12, 2022. He made no direct mention of the warrant accusing him of his illegal lobbying activities but said he was proud of his work at the think tank.
His resignation letter concluded:
While I leave the institution with a heavy heart, I know it is best for all concerned in this moment. I also know the institution will be wisely guided by the Brookings Board of Trustees and will be admirably and competently led by the management that remains. The Brookings Institution is a national and international asset, and always will be. I wish the Board and every member of the Brookings family the very best in the challenging days ahead.
Allen’s letter of resignation can be viewed here. He has denied the allegations made by Federal investigators.
Federal investigators have not claimed that anyone at Brookings, other than Allen, was involved in the alleged secret lobbying for Qatar. But his alleged use of Brookings’ resources to conduct his work for Qatar raises questions about Brookings’ lucrative relationship with Qatar and the ethical implications of maintaining close ties to a foreign government. Qatar contributed tens of millions of dollars to Brookings over 14 years before the funding relationship ended last year.
“The integrity and objectivity of Brookings’s scholarship constitute the institution’s principal assets, and Brookings seeks to maintain high ethical standards in all its operations,” the co-chairs of Brookings' board of trustees said in an email to the “Brooking Community'' confirming Allen’s resignation. “Our policies on research independence and integrity reflect these values.”
Eli Clifton is a senior advisor at the Quincy Institute and Investigative Journalist at Large at Responsible Statecraft. He reports on money in politics and U.S. foreign policy.
ISAF Commander in Afghanistan Gen. John Allen (C) waits to testify before the House Armed Services Committee about "Recent Developments in Afghanistan" on Capitol Hill in Washington, March 20, 2012. REUTERS/Larry Downing (UNITED STATES - Tags: POLITICS MILITARY)
Top photo credit: General Michael “Erik” Kurilla, commander of U.S. Central Command, visited Israel in July 2022 to meet with Israeli Defense Force (IDF) leadership, to include the IDF Chief of Staff, Lt General Aviv Kohavi. (U.S. Central Command public affairs)
Did the Israelis strike Iran when it did because Michael Kurilla is still commander of U.S. Central Command and a “window” for a prospective joint operation with the U.S. might be closing?
Some are speculating that because Kurilla is expected to retire from the military this summer that the Israelis saw their chance. The Army general, 59, has been widely reported to be on one side of a split in the Pentagon over whether the U.S. should support and even be part of Israeli strikes against Iran’s nuclear program.
In April, Israel news outlet Ynet coined him as “The U.S. general Israel doesn’t want to strike Iran without.”
“Israeli defense analysts say the window for a successful attack on Iran’s nuclear program is rapidly closing,” wrote Alon Strimling on April 19. “That window could narrow dramatically once Kurilla steps down, as his successor’s stance remains unclear.”
Kurilla is retiring this summer after a nearly 40-year career that dates back to the first Persian Gulf War. Ynet noted that Kurilla “is seen as one of Israel’s staunchest allies in the American defense establishment,” and his relationship “runs deep” dating back to his time as a young officer in his 20s.
“He’s a hawk of hawks,” noted Curt Mills, executive director of the American Conservative. “(The Israelis) knew they were losing an ally soon. They knew the negotiations (with Iran) were ongoing. The Iranians had signaled that they were close to accepting a deal days before the strike. So all of these things were a factor.
"And then meanwhile, I think there's every piece of evidence that Kurilla would at least start the conflict and pop his cork on it before he leaves.”
Kurilla, according to the New York Times, had been open to Israeli strike plans earlier this spring, “that would have combined an Israeli commando raid on underground nuclear sites with a bombing campaign, an effort that the Israelis hoped would involve American aircraft.”
“Gen. Michael E. Kurilla, the head of U.S. Central Command, and Michael Waltz, the national security adviser, both discussed how the United States could potentially support an Israeli attack, if Mr. Trump backed the plan.”
Sources who spoke to RS since Friday’s attacks on Iran suggested that Kurilla wasn’t just “open” to such plans, he was actively promoting them inside the DoD. That’s not a surprise, said Justin Logan, director of Foreign Policy and Defense Studies at the Cato Institute.
“He has been pushing for war with Iran and away from diplomacy since before Trump took office in ways that run over civilian officials,” Logan told RS. The CENCTOM commander reports directly to the Secretary of Defense.
Dan Caldwell, former adviser to Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, told the Breaking Points podcast Monday that he didn’t think the timing of the strikes were a “coincidence.”
“I think it's been reported, and you know, based on my experience with him, that he takes a fundamentally different view of the importance of the Middle East than a lot of other people in the administration. And he also, I think, believes that a military campaign against Iran will not be as costly as others,” Caldwell said.
“So I think there are a lot of folks that want to see some type of military action occur before he retires as a result of that,” he added. "So he retires in the middle of July. And I don't think it's a coincidence you see a lot of pressure ramping up to do something prior to his retirement time.”
To understand the authority the CENTCOM commander wields is to understand that the combatant command oversees an AOR (Area of Responsibility) that spans 21 countries — including Israel now — across the Middle East, Central Asia, and parts of South Asia. It directs five "service component commands" of Army, Navy (including the Fifth Fleet), Air Force, Marines, Space Command, as well as a joint special operations command (SOCCENT).
Kurilla has pursued a highly elaborate system of military integration with Israel and partners in the region in what he has called a “strategy to deter Iranian aggression.” It has been referred to as a “security umbrella” or “Kurilla’s umbrella.”
Even as Iranian proxies in the Palestinian territories, Lebanon, Syria, and Iran itself were taking blows and losing influence after Oct. 7, 2023, Kurilla was telling Congress that it was important to that U.S. not be the “security guarantor” but the “security integrator” in the region because essentially Iran is still an existential threat to everyone.
“Iran and its expansive network of proxies and partners saw a once-in-a generation opportunity to reshape the region to its advantage. They have accelerated their efforts to expel Western presence and neutralize our influence in the region, enabling a long-term strategic goal to further their revolution and establish regional hegemony,” he told the House Armed Services Committee in March 2024. “Iran knows that its decades-long vision of dominating the region cannot be realized if the region’s states continue to expand integration with each other and deepen partnership with the United States.”
He spoke of the importance of the GCC (Gulf Cooperation states), the contributions and joint training with Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Qatar. The U.S. boasted that Arab states played a role in a “coalition” to help thwart Iran’s retaliatory attacks against Israel in April 2024.
“Israeli military officials dubbed this system ‘Kurilla’s umbrella,’ noting that U.S. radar systems in the UAE and Qatar can now aid Israeli defense,” Ynet’s Strimling reported. “According to foreign reports, that umbrella also included quiet cooperation from Saudi Arabia and Jordan during Iran’s failed missile and drone barrage in April 202(4).”
That coordination also kicked in during Iranian retaliatory strikes against Israel in Oct. 2024, where experts say without the U.S. and its partners, more missiles would have hit inside Israel’s territory.
According to reports, Kurilla had wanted a more aggressive approach to the Iran-backed Houthis in the last year of the Biden administration but didn’t get his chance until Trump took over in January.
He pushed for sustained attacks in March. He got his wish, according to the Times, but then Trump imposed a 30-day test. When the 30 days were up, Kurilla and team had little to show for the millions in munitions dropped on the Yemeni militant group and Yemen civilian infrastructure, and Trump proceeded with making a deal to end the direct fighting.
In that time the Houthis had shot down seven MQ-9 Reaper drones and two F/A-18s went tumbling off the flight deck of the USS Truman aircraft carrier. The operation cost the U.S. over a billion dollars, adding to the billion already spent fighting the Houthis during the Biden administration.
Nevertheless, Kurilla was successful in getting more military equipment moved into the Middle East during that period, including a second aircraft carrier, the USS Carl Vinson, to join the carrier USS Harry S. Truman, two Patriot missile batteries and a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system (THAAD), plus B-2 bombers capable of carrying 30,000-pound bombs were sent to Diego Garcia, a U.S. base in the Indian Ocean.
Meanwhile according to reports, he’s been engaging in a full court press behind the scenes for a joint operation with the Israelis in Iran. That pressure campaign may have gotten Waltz fired from his top job at the National Security Council back in May. He apparently had private “intense discussions” about it with Benjamin Netanyahu before the prime minister’s meeting with Trump in the Oval Office.
In a trip to Israel in April, Kurilla discussed "continued efforts to deepen the military partnership between the United States and Israel and increase interoperability between our forces," according to a CENTCOM statement, adding, "Gen. Kurilla reiterated the ironclad military-to-military relationship between the U.S. and Israel."
On the other side of the ledger are other voices, including Undersecretary for Policy Elbridge Colby, Vice President J.D. Vance, and Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard, who have counseled the president to focus on the diplomatic pathway instead of indulging plans for aggressive military action.
Semafor reported the split this week, citing tensions between Kurilla and Colby.
“US military leaders, including the chief of US Central Command, Gen. Michael Kurilla, have requested more resources to support and defend Israel,” wrote Semafor's Ben Smith. “But their requests have drawn resistance from undersecretary of defense for policy Elbridge Colby, who has long opposed moving US military assets from Asia to the Middle East, people sympathetic to each side of the argument told Semafor.”
This is true said Caldwell, who was let go from Hegseth's office in a very public imbroglio in April. “We're in an environment where the United States military resources are constrained. We've had 20 years-plus of wars in the Middle East. We have emptied many of our magazines of ammunition and our arsenals to support Ukraine as we have an environment where our resources are not limitless, so trade offs are real,” Caldwell told Breaking Points.
“So every asset we move into CENTCOM comes at the expense of another Combatant Command like the Indo-Pacific, where we have a real threat, a real challenge, in China; we trade off against things we're trying to do in the Western Hemisphere.” Caldwell said. He added that Colby and others were trying to stress this, seeing diplomacy with Iran as the priority, which Trump was committed to, too, and still may be today.
No doubt there are voices on the inside and out that want Trump to greenlight full U.S. intervention, the joint operation that Kurilla and others had envisioned. Caldwell said many of the political appointees and also members of the uniformed military know the risks such an intervention would bring. “But there are a lot of people …(who) are still bought in on this idea that this is largely a risk-free proposition, but let me tell you if the U.S. gets involved there is a risk that it could be one of the biggest national security catastrophes we have seen in the last 20 to 30 years.”
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Top image credit: Baqubah, Iraq, March 30, 2007 (Stacy L. Pearsall USAF photo)
Like all things in the Middle East, the U.S.–Israeli war on Iran can seem complicated. It’s not. The unprovoked Israeli attack on Iran is the 2003 Iraq War 2.0, except it has the potential to be far, far more catastrophic than the absolute catastrophe that was Iraq.
Like President George W. Bush’s 2003 war on Iraq, the war on Iran is an unprovoked, illegal, offensive, unilateral war of aggression, potentially aimed at regime change, and sold to the public based on lies about nonexistent weapons of mass destruction.
Just as the administration of Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney lied about a bogus threat of Iraqi “mushroom clouds,” Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is lying about a nuclear threat from an Iran that has no nuclear weapons and was in negotiations to avoid getting them.
This time the lies are even uglier because Netanyahu is weaponizing the memory of the Nazi Holocaust and 6 million dead Jews (including some of my family members), by trying to scare people with talk of a “nuclear holocaust” and “never again is now.”
Israel is the country with nuclear weapons, along with the United States. Iran has none. Iranians are the only ones now at risk of a nuclear holocaust.
Despite Donald Trump’s election night promise not to “start wars” and instead to “stop wars,” the United States is alreadyfighting Iraq War 2.0 by defending Israel militarily, by armingIsrael, by sharingintelligence with Israel, and by failing to stop Israel despite having advance notice of the war. President Trump called Israel’s attacks “excellent” last week and more recently said the U.S. military “could get involved.” Referring to Iran, Trump told ABC News, “There’s more to come, a lot more.”
People are sick of endless U.S. wars. People are sick of endless Israeli wars.
As Israel’s predominant patron, Trump has the power to stop Iraq War 2.0 by cutting off all weapons and assistance, including missile defense and intelligence sharing. If Trump doesn’t do these things, the war looks set to escalate further. Netanyahu has promised “weeks” more of fighting. Every passing day brings new opportunities for the U.S. military to get drawn further into the war, as Netanyahu has long hoped. How will Trump respond if an Iranian missile even accidentally kills U.S. soldiers in the region? The danger of a wider regional or even world war is equally real.
The longer term consequences could be equally catastrophic in unpredictable ways. Bush and Cheney’s 2003 war began with similar “shock and awe” attacks that quickly overthrew the Saddam Hussein regime only to birth an incredibly violent insurgency and civil war and the militant organization that became the Islamic State.
The total death toll in Iraq (alone) will never be known but is conservatively estimated at 1.2 million people killed from direct and indirect causes. The war displaced an estimated 9.2 million Iraqis. Injuries surely reach into the millions. The cost to U.S. taxpayers of 20 years of fighting in Iraq and against the Islamic State in Syria reaches nearly $3 trillion.
Too many have been killed already in Iran and Israel thanks to the Israeli government’s unprovoked war. How many more Iranians, Israelis, and perhaps, soon, Americans must die before Trump stops Iraq 2.0 (as Iranian leaders are also requesting)? How much more taxpayer money must be squandered, on top of the tens (perhaps hundreds) of millions of dollars the U.S. military has surely spent to date?
Netanyahu and neoconservative warmongers in the U.S. have long dreamed of seeing U.S. troops marching on Tehran. We cannot risk the U.S.-Israeli war on Iran becoming the full-blown sequel to the Iraq War that Trump has long claimed he opposed.
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Top photo credit: Soldiers in Ansongo, Mali (Fred Marie/Shutterstock)
On June 6, a Wagner-affiliated Telegram channel announced the Russian private military company’s (PMC) withdrawal from Mali, declaring “mission accomplished.”
After continuing operations in Mali nearly two years after the deaths of its founders, Yevgeny Prigozhin and Dmitry Utkin, the Russian state has finally subsumed Wagner’s structures under the Russian Ministry of Defense-subordinate, Africa Corps.
The news of Wagner’s withdrawal was not surprising, as the handover process began almost immediately after Prigozhin’s death in August 2023. But much of the “withdrawal” is closer to a bureaucratic reorganization. Whole Wagner units with their structure, staffing and logistics have been retained, many employees and commanders continue to serve in the Sahel.
Still, Africa Corps’ official status as a Ministry of Defense (MoD) unit means there will be changes. Africa Corps employs a strict hierarchy. Wagner’s operational autonomy and the freedom of its commanders to make decisions on the ground will take a backseat to multi-stage approvals and red tape. The shift from Wagner’s direct participation in combat operations against the region’s jihadists and separatists to a more risk-averse Africa Corps is also at odds with the Malian military leadership’s expectations.
In late 2020, amid a rebel offensive against the Central African Republic’s (CAR) capital, Bangui, Wagner’s mission switched from training to combat operations. Around 1,500 additional contractors landed in the city with Dmitry Utkin. Their successful and brutal counteroffensive returned significant territory to the state and convinced Prigozhin and Russia’s leadership of the efficacy of military solutions to Africa’s varying insurgencies.
Impressed with Wagner’s operations in CAR, the Malian government signed an agreement with Prigozhin’s structures in 2021. Unlike in CAR, where Wagner largely operated independently, MoD military planners and advisors played a role in the intervention from the start. Formally, Wagner was to operate alongside the Malian military (FAMa) and answer to FAMa command and Russian MoD advisors. In practice, Wagner commanders had a high degree of autonomy in the field and often conducted military operations unaccompanied.
From the Kremlin’s perspective, the appearance of a PMC structure in Mali had little to do with “plausible deniability.” Prigozhin operated in an environment in which only private individuals could be responsible for failure, while success is shared with the state. Prigozhin’s efforts to escape these restraints in his March on Moscow, followed by his death, only accelerated the inevitable officialization of Wagner’s structures in Africa.
With the exception of its operation in CAR, the commercial component of Prigozhin’s African empire has either been divvied up or disappeared, while the group’s political advisory and information wings were divorced from military operations. The officialization of Wagner through Africa Corps, therefore, has only affected the PMC. The process of that officialization, however, has differed in each country where Wagner operated.
In Libya, Wagner’s operations were completely subordinated to Africa Corps and reinforced with new units, military equipment, and weapons. Following the fall of Bashar al-Assad in Syria, the territory of Libya controlled by Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar became a regional hub for Russian aviation. Libya’s port at Tobruk is now a de facto Russian logistics base.
In Sudan, where the Russian MoD now supports General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) in the civil war against the Rapid Support Forces, Africa Corps is not formally present. However, anonymous sources note military specialists do take part in special operations.
In Burkina Faso, Niger, and Equatorial Guinea, Russian intervention post-dates Prigozhin’s demise. Burkina Faso’s sociopolitical context is still an obstacle to foreigners’ direct participation in combat, and Africa Corps specialists train personnel and service weapons and military equipment. Missions in Niger and Equatorial Guinea are similar.
In Mali, however, the handover from Wagner to Africa Corps was far more difficult. Unlike in Libya, where a ceasefire between Haftar and Tripoli has largely held, Russian advisors and Wagner units in Mali found themselves engaged in complex, overlapping security, humanitarian, and political crises. With resources largely trapped in Ukraine, it was impossible to immediately replace Wagner units with a new structure. Nor were all Wagner fighters ready to sign new contracts.
As a result, Wagner assault groups retained partial independence from the MoD and Africa Corps. At the same time, they increasingly replaced FAMa formations in the bush and were further drawn into local conflicts and prerogatives. The announcement of Wagner’s withdrawal from Mali implies that an agreement between these units and the MoD in Bamako has finally been reached. It is less a physical retreat than a conclusive submission of these units to a more established chain of command.
This leaves the Central African Republic as the last holdout for legacy Wagner. And Wagner’s military and political leadership in CAR continues to lobby for retaining their unique structure. Wagner’s military, commercial, and political services are greater than the sum of their parts, they argue. Stripped of risk taking, on-the-ground decision making, and commercial incentives—in other words, Africa Corps— Wagner differs little from the European Union training missions it ousted. “We are confident,” a source in Wagner’s military leadership says, “that we will stay in CAR. And the government is of the same opinion.”
For now, at least, the Kremlin and MoD seem to agree with Wagner in Bangui, though a superficial name change may still be imposed. But Wagner’s commanders in CAR bring up points that spark continued debate within Russia’s military circles, particularly on the Sahel: how should Africa Corps, or Russia more generally, engage in the region’s complex, overlapping crises? And who is going to pay for it?
Budget for far-flung operations tends to decrease over time, a fact Prigozhin understood well. His commercial enterprises were an effort to make Wagner’s interventions in Africa self-financing and not reliant on ad hoc subsidies from the center. And while Africa Corps is, to a certain extent, designed to prevent the creation of another Prigozhin in Africa, the political economy of Russia will still foster the arrival of new, mini-Prigozhins to the continent.
Indeed, the growing geopolitical importance of Africa to Russia will foster a new crop of patriotic, entrepreneurial oligarchs to help fill budgetary gaps in places like the Sahel. Even bigger players contemplate entering the game. Russia’s state-owned nuclear energy giant, Rosatom, for example, has the budget and ambition necessary to play a larger role in Sahelian security.
Building nuclear power plants in fragile environments would require significant investment in security; and fixed-site protection is an ideal mandate for the less dynamic Africa Corps. Moreover, if Russia and Ukraine ever reach a ceasefire deal, there will be serious pressure on the state to provide employment opportunities for returning soldiers at home and abroad.
For now, though, Africa Corps in Mali finds itself a participant in a deteriorating conflict. The exigencies of today will invariably take precedence over the long-term strategies of tomorrow.
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