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MSNBC's China war game ends with calls for more weapons

Just over a week after the network hosted the simulated Sino-US conflict, President Biden said he'd be willing to defend Taiwan militarily.

Analysis | Asia-Pacific

On Monday, President Biden expressed a willingness to militarily intervene in a potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan — something he has done a few times over the past several months — putting into question the U.S.’s long-held so-called “strategic ambiguity” policy. A recent war game rightfully acknowledged how costly and devastating a major power war over Taiwan can be and that avoiding a conflict altogether would be in all parties’ best interests. However, the war game’s solutions on how to handle the Taiwan issue would likely encourage, rather than deter, a conflict. 

 In partnership with the Center for a New American Security, MSNBC aired the war game which was conducted by experts from CNAS and other think tanks, U.S. lawmakers, and former Pentagon officials. It simulated an armed conflict between the United States and China over Taiwan that escalated into a broad, drawn-out regional war involving a nuclear response by Beijing. 

But instead of conjuring ways to deescalate, the CNAS/MSNBC war game explored ways of pouring more military capabilities into Asia and getting the support of Asian allies and partners to contain China. Policy ideas exchanged among participants included ending strategic ambiguity and formalizing the U.S. defense commitment to Taiwan, expanding basing in the Western Pacific to redouble the U.S. military presence proximate to Taiwan, and building a NATO-like regional military alliance to enable an extensive deployment of U.S. strategic assets across the Asia-Pacific. 

To be sure, the militaristic mindset reflected in the war game is understandable. The main objective of wargaming is to identify preconditions for success in an armed conflict. It is essential for defense analysts to plan for the worst-case scenario rather than simply  avoid it. And in many cases, wargaming tends to focus on the conflict itself and pay less attention to all the conditions or actions that produce the conflict. As a result, conclusions drawn from the outcomes of a war game can tend to focus on assessing purely military wartime vulnerabilities and offering a solution for winning the hypothetical conflict rather than addressing the overall policy problem.   

Thus, the CNAS/MSNBC war game appeared to largely focus on exploring any means necessary for the United States to maximize its extended deterrence capabilities in East Asia to win a possible war with China over Taiwan, instead of preventing it. The war game’s breathtaking emphasis on militarizing East Asia overlooked how such a radical departure from the status quo can backfire and increase the likelihood of an armed conflict with China over Taiwan.

For example, Washington’s abandonment of its strategic ambiguity vis-à-vis Taiwan can exacerbate Beijing’s historical fear of external interferences and pressures at times of domestic instability and heighten the need to employ force against Taiwan. Chinese elites almost unanimously believe that reunification with Taiwan is a non-negotiable historic mission, and many Chinese citizens are educated to believe the same. China believes it has larger interests at stake than the United States over Taiwan and a stronger political will to engage in an armed conflict. And even if strategic ambiguity endures in rhetoric, an assertive U.S. forward deployment of military bases and assets in the Western Pacific will almost certainly be seen by China as an attempt to keep Taiwan separated from the mainland and trigger highly aggressive behaviors. 

Under current conditions of a deepening dependence on deterrence over reassurance, further U.S. militarization in East Asia will be met with corresponding Chinese military balancing efforts. Beijing is unlikely to abandon its longstanding goal of building a military to “defeat anyone attempting to separate Taiwan from China and safeguard national unity at all costs.” As long as China continues to develop and modernize its military and Taiwan remains 100 miles away from the Chinese shore, it will be difficult if not impossible for the United States to gain sufficient military capabilities to coerce China into giving up on seeking reunification with Taiwan by force. And within such a tense and hostile landscape featuring extreme polarization and an intense arms race, the likelihood of a conflict can escalate. 

The CNAS/MSNBC war game served the typical role of wargaming, exploring what military conditions might be needed for the United States to counter an attack on Taiwan. But such a militarist solution can be a recipe for turning a hypothetical conflict into a real one, destabilizing the longstanding cross-strait status quo, which, despite a growing sense of competition, remains in peacetime circumstances with no imminent signs of an armed conflict. 

The overriding priority for the United States regarding Taiwan should remain on managing tensions and stabilizing the status quo that has kept the Taiwan Strait in peace for decades. A certain level of deterrence is necessary for stability, but just as important is trust-building through diplomatic engagement and credible political reassurances. For now, the Taiwan issue remains primarily a political problem in which political actions that blur or reinforce the original Sino-U.S. mutual understandings to peacefully resolve the issue could increase or decrease the sense of threat involved and the likelihood of using force. China’s possible motivations for aggression and reasoning about the acceptability of options for that aggression can be heavily influenced by political miscalculations.  

Avoiding costly political miscalculations will require experts and policymakers to put as much thought into thinking through a simulation of diplomatic scenarios as they do war scenarios. Cross-strait war games are seen more frequently within the U.S. foreign policy community as of late, but peace game exercises to explore ways to normalize the ongoing dangerous erosion of political trust among Washington, Beijing, and Taipei seem to be largely missing. 


Screen shot via NBC News/YouTube
Analysis | Asia-Pacific
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Blob exploiting Trump's anger with Putin, risking return to Biden's war

Europe

Donald Trump’s recent outburst against Vladimir Putin — accusing the Russian leader of "throwing a pile of bullsh*t at us" and threatening devastating new sanctions — might be just another Trumpian tantrum.

The president is known for abrupt reversals. Or it could be a bargaining tactic ahead of potential Ukraine peace talks. But there’s a third, more troubling possibility: establishment Republican hawks and neoconservatives, who have been maneuvering to hijack Trump’s “America First” agenda since his return to office, may be exploiting his frustration with Putin to push for a prolonged confrontation with Russia.

Trump’s irritation is understandable. Ukraine has accepted his proposed ceasefire, but Putin has refused, making him, in Trump’s eyes, the main obstacle to ending the war.

Putin’s calculus is clear. As Ted Snider notes in the American Conservative, Russia is winning on the battlefield. In June, it captured more Ukrainian territory and now threatens critical Kyiv’s supply lines. Moscow also seized a key lithium deposit critical to securing Trump’s support for Ukraine. Meanwhile, Russian missile and drone strikes have intensified.

Putin seems convinced his key demands — Ukraine’s neutrality, territorial concessions in the Donbas and Crimea, and a downsized Ukrainian military — are more achievable through war than diplomacy.

Yet his strategy empowers the transatlantic “forever war” faction: leaders in Britain, France, Germany, and the EU, along with hawks in both main U.S. parties. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz claims that diplomacy with Russia is “exhausted.” Europe’s war party, convinced a Russian victory would inevitably lead to an attack on NATO (a suicidal prospect for Moscow), is willing to fight “to the last Ukrainian.” Meanwhile, U.S. hawks, including liberal interventionist Democrats, stoke Trump’s ego, framing failure to stand up to Putin’s defiance as a sign of weakness or appeasement.

Trump long resisted this pressure. Pragmatism told him Ukraine couldn’t win, and calling it “Biden’s war” was his way of distancing himself, seeking a quick exit to refocus on China, which he has depicted as Washington’s greater foreign threat. At least as important, U.S. involvement in the war in Ukraine has been unpopular with his MAGA base.

But his June strikes on Iran may signal a hawkish shift. By touting them as a decisive blow to Iran’s nuclear program (despite Tehran’s refusal so far to abandon uranium enrichment), Trump may be embracing a new approach to dealing with recalcitrant foreign powers: offer a deal, set a deadline, then unleash overwhelming force if rejected. The optics of “success” could tempt him to try something similar with Russia.

This pivot coincides with a media campaign against restraint advocates within the administration like Elbridge Colby, the Pentagon policy chief who has prioritized China over Ukraine and also provoked the opposition of pro-Israel neoconservatives by warning against war with Iran. POLITICO quoted unnamed officials attacking Colby for wanting the U.S. to “do less in the world.” Meanwhile, the conventional Republican hawk Marco Rubio’s influence grows as he combines the jobs of both secretary of state and national security adviser.

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Nuclear deterrence rules out direct military action — even Biden, far more invested in Ukraine than Trump, avoided that risk. Instead, Trump ally Sen.Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.), another establishment Republican hawk, is pushing a 500% tariff on nations buying Russian hydrocarbons, aiming to sever Moscow from the global economy. Trump seems supportive, although the move’s feasibility and impact are doubtful.

China and India are key buyers of Russian oil. China alone imports 12.5 million barrels daily. Russia exports seven million barrels daily. China could absorb Russia’s entire output. Beijing has bluntly stated it “cannot afford” a Russian defeat, ensuring Moscow’s economic lifeline remains open.

The U.S., meanwhile, is ill-prepared for a tariff war with China. When Trump imposed 145% tariffs, Beijing retaliated by cutting off rare earth metals exports, vital to U.S. industry and defense. Trump backed down.

At the G-7 summit in Canada last month, the EU proposed lowering price caps on Russian oil from $60 a barrel to $45 a barrel as part of its 18th sanctions package against Russia. Trump rejected the proposal at the time but may be tempted to reconsider, given his suggestion that more sanctions may be needed. Even if Washington backs the measure now, however, it is unlikely to cripple Russia’s war machine.

Another strategy may involve isolating Russia by peeling away Moscow’s traditionally friendly neighbors. Here, Western mediation between Armenia and Azerbaijan isn’t about peace — if it were, pressure would target Baku, which has stalled agreements and threatened renewed war against Armenia. The real goal is to eject Russia from the South Caucasus and create a NATO-aligned energy corridor linking Turkey to Central Asia, bypassing both Russia and Iran to their detriment.

Central Asia itself is itself emerging as a new battleground. In May 2025, the EU has celebrated its first summit with Central Asian nations in Uzbekistan, with a heavy focus on developing the Middle Corridor, a route for transportation of energy and critical raw materials that would bypass Russia. In that context, the EU has committed €10 billion in support of the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route.

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