Why do we still have American troops in Syria and Iraq? That is the million dollar question that the Biden Administration has yet to answer — at least with any satisfaction — for the American people. Meanwhile, our service members continue to be targets of hostile forces for a Washington strategy no one can quite articulate.
On April 7 there were reports of "two rounds of indirect fire" on the Green Village Base in eastern Syria, which is housing U.S. troops as part of Operation Inherent Resolve. U.S. Central Command said four American service members were being evaluated for traumatic brain injury as a result.
On Thursday, however, U.S. Central Command quietly announced that there were no rockets, but "but rather the deliberate placement of explosive charges by an unidentified individual(s) at an ammunition holding area and shower facility."
The release was brief and with no accompanying details, but the words echoed of the kind of Green-on-Blue attacks against coalition troops in Afghanistan during the height of the war there. As of 2017, according to counts, there had been more than 95 such attacks since 2012, killing 152 coalition service members and injuring 200.
There have been numerous rocket attacks against bases on which foreign soldiers, mostly Americans, are serving in Syria and Northern Iraq over the last two years. "Iranian backed militias" have been fingered in the attacks and they don't seem to be abating, though the administration never uses the incidents to explain or even justify why our presence continues to be useful there. Is it to stave off ISIS? Bashar Assad? Iranian militias?
"The United States has no compelling national security interest in Syria to justify an open-ended ground deployment of forces," wrote Defense Priorities' Natalie Armbruster in March, taking on each of the existing arguments for keeping forces in the region. Now that our troops can't even feel safe taking showers on base, isn't it time to get a straight answer from Washington?
Kelley Beaucar Vlahos is Editorial Director of Responsible Statecraft and Senior Advisor at the Quincy Institute.
Operation Inherent Re-solve New Zealand army Sgt. Maj. Chuck Mackay, as-signed to Task Group Taji, observes Iraqi army soldiers from 3rd Battalion, 41st Brigade participate in a confirmatory exercise for senior Iraqi army personnel at Camp Taji, Iraq, Oct. 16, 2018
Top Photo: Ukrainian military returns home to Kiev from conflict at the border, where battles had raged between Ukraine and Russian forces. (Shuttertock/Vitaliy Holov)
A new Gallup study indicates that most Ukrainians want the war with Russia to end. After more than two years of fighting, 52% of those polled indicated that they would prefer a negotiated peace rather than continuing to fight.
Ukrainian support for the war has consistently dropped since Russia began its full-scale invasion in 2022. According to Gallup, 73% wished to continue fighting in 2022, and 63% in 2023. This is the first time a majority supported a negotiated peace.
Throughout the country, Kyiv City polled the highest in support of a continued fight with Russia at 47%, and the eastern regions of Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, and Zaporizhzhya all polled just 27% in support. Every region in the country polled below 50%.
Of the majority who supported a negotiated end, 52% agreed that “Ukraine should be open to making some territorial concessions as a part of a peace deal to end the war.” Additionally, of those polled who supported continuing the fight, 81% said that a victory should occur “when all territory lost between 2014 and now is regained, including Crimea.” But that number is down from 92% and 93% in 2022 and 2023 respectively.
The polling was conducted from August through October. During this period, President Volydmyr Zelensky directed troops into Russia for the first time, taking a portion of Kursk in August, followed by a string of Russian battlefield successes in October in eastern Ukraine, and news that North Korean troops would soon be present on the battlefield, fighting for the Russians.
Even before these developments, however, the Ukrainian consensus around the war was complex. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace released a poll in June, which pointed to 46% of respondents supporting an end to the war if Russia withdrew from the territories occupied since 2022, and 50% supporting an end if Russia withdrew from everywhere, save Crimea.
“These realities of Ukrainian public sentiment sadly weren't widely known until recently, but they were knowable,” said the Quincy Institute’s Mark Episkopos in a June article in The Nation. “This widespread sentiment in favor of peace provides President Zelenskyy with a powerful mandate to work with the incoming administration toward a shared strategy for reaching a negotiated settlement.”
In addition to the Ukrainian public, members of the military and government have also spoken in support of negotiation with Russia. Battery commander Mykhailo Temper told The Financial Times in an early October interview that “it’s quite hard to imagine we will be able to move the enemy back to the borders of 1991.”
According to FT, European diplomats noticed that Ukrainian officials were more open to agreeing to a ceasefire, even while Russian troops occupied parts of the country. One of the diplomats said, “We’re talking more and more openly about how this ends and what Ukraine would have to give up in order to get a permanent peace deal.”
As the war continues, life in Ukraine has gotten more difficult for the average citizen. A summer study from the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology found that 77% of respondents had experienced a loss of family members, friends, or acquaintances and two-thirds indicated that their wartime income was insufficient.
Additionally, an October report from Florence Bauer, head of the U.N. Population Fund in Eastern Europe, pointed to a population crisis in Ukraine, as 10 million (25% of the population) had either fled the country or been killed as a result of the conflict. In addition to the population loss, Bauer also highlighted a steep decline in fertility: “The birth rate plummeted to one child per woman – the lowest fertility rate in Europe and one of the lowest in the world.”
The Gallup report also found that more Ukrainians preferred that the European Union or the United Kingdom play a significant role in the peace process over the United States, with 70% preferring the EU and 63% the UK, compared to 54% supporting the United States under a hypothetical Harris presidency, and 49% under President-elect Trump.
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Top Photo: Flag of Sweden and Russia on a concrete wall (Tomas Ragina via Shutterstock)
Experts say that some European countries are exaggerating perceived security threats with recent moves to push their respective publics to prepare for worst-case scenarios.
On Monday, the Swedish government began distributing a booklet that purports to help citizens prepare for war. This 32-page pamphlet advises citizens on digital security, how to seek shelter, and how to identify warning systems.
“We live in uncertain times,” the booklet reads. “Armed conflicts are currently being waged in our corner of the world. Terrorism, cyber attacks, and disinformation campaigns are being used to undermine and influence us.”
This comes shortly after President Biden gave Ukraine permission to use American-made missiles to strike targets deep inside Russian territory. This move Russia’s foreign ministry said, would result in “an appropriate and tangible” response.
Sweden Defense Minister Pål Jonson singled out Russia as being a “principal threat to Sweden,” and said that “the risk of an attack cannot be excluded.” In response, Sweden will increase its defense spending by 10 percent starting next year, amounting to a boost to 2.4% of GDP.
Sweden also joined NATO in March of 2024 in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The pamphlet reminds its citizens of its obligations. “Sweden is part of the military alliance NATO,” it reads.“The purpose of the alliance is that the member countries collectively will be so strong that it deters others from attacking us. If one NATO country is nevertheless attacked, the other countries in the alliance will aid in its defense.”
Other regional NATO members have taken similar measures, citizens of Norway and Finland — which also joined the alliance after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine — have also received similar resources seemingly meant to prepare citizens in the case of "incidents and crises.”
However, experts say that these steps are unnecessary. “Russia has made no military deployments to threaten Finland or Sweden,” says Anatol Lieven, Director of the Quincy Institute’s Eurasia Program. “Given the way that the Russian army is tied down in Ukraine, the very idea is absurd. Nor has any Russian official threatened this.”
QI Research Fellow Mark Episkopos echoed this sentiment. “It is not reflective of the military realities of Russia-NATO relations,” he said, adding, “nor can it be taken as in any way suggestive of an impending Russia-NATO confrontation.”
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Top image credit: Russia's President Vladimir Putin shakes hands with U.S. President Donald Trump during a meeting on the sidelines of the G20 summit in Osaka, Japan June 28, 2019. Sputnik/Mikhail Klimentyev/Kremlin via REUTERS
“For every action there’s an equal and opposite reaction,” said President Vladimir Putin on the stage of his yearly economic Forum in Saint Petersburg, Russia in 2017.
I sat among the vast, mostly Russian, audience, and dwelled on Newton’s third law.
During four and a half years at the British Embassy in Moscow, I’d learned one important lesson: Russia always responds in kind, both to aggression and to engagement. President-elect Trump should think how he might trade with Putin on this basis.
Reciprocity is the most predictable tenet of Russian statecraft and Russia’s policy towards Ukraine offers the perfect illustration.
Action: on February 22, 2014, Ukraine’s pro-Russian President Viktor Yanukovych was deposed, in what Russia describes as an illegal coup d’etat, supported by the U.S. and UK governments.
Reaction: eight years and two days later, Ukraine’s pro-Western president, Volodymyr Zelensky, came within a whisker of being ousted by Russian troops.
With its tanks rolling into Ukraine from the north, east and south, Russia launched a massive airborne assault on Hostomel Airport. If they had secured the runway, Russian forces would have poured in to overwhelm Kyiv’s defences. However, a quick and clinical coup eluded Putin.
Yet, three years after the Ukraine war started, Russia has still achieved many of its objectives, albeit at a greater cost. Volodymyr Zelensky may be approaching the twilight years of his presidency; a future ceasefire would trigger calls to lift martial law and hold presidential elections. By that time, Russia will still occupy 20 percent of Ukrainian land. Ukraine’s future membership of the EU is on the very distant horizon and NATO membership is now buried deep in the pending tray.
Putin likely believes the West failed in its attempt to land a decisive strategic defeat on Russia. There are three reasons why he has maneuvered himself into a strong position to negotiate with Trump.
First, clarity.
Putin’s simple, unerring and oft expressed goal is to deny Ukraine’s aspiration to NATO. He may also hope for a longer term renewal of relations with Ukraine as post-war resentment towards the West grows in that country.
Western strategy has been complex, unclear and consistently erring. Western powers never acknowledged the legitimacy of Putin’s consistently expressed claim that NATO enlargement represented a core strategic threat to Russia’s national interest. An open door to possible Ukrainian membership of NATO, if the conditions were right and if every member could agree, was always a fudge that pleased no one. Zelensky was kept out of the tent while Putin fumed that the tent flap was open.
Second, decisiveness.
Russia has demonstrated the ability to act decisively which the collective West cannot do.
Put another way, in the great game of chess, Putin played fractious teams of 32 players in NATO and 27 players in the EU whose every move emerged out of prolonged debate and lowest common denominator ideas. It took almost a year for the UK to agree to send Challenger 2 tanks to Ukraine and 15 months for U.S. approval of F-16 aircraft.
That chess game becomes three dimensional when domestic politics get involved. In the teeth of Republican resistance, the U.S. Congress took months to agree a $61 billion package of assistance in April 2024. Germany halved military aid to Ukraine in August 2024, against a rise in popularity among antiwar political parties on the left and right. Foreign policy is always, ultimately, driven by domestic considerations.
Third, political will.
Putin has always shown the political will and had the domestic support to press his strategy, in the way that the West cannot. His calculations were rooted in a single assumption, which proved correct, that the West would not fight Russia head on to protect Ukraine.
He probably knew that the fear of escalation with the world’s largest nuclear power would prevent NATO members from agreeing to a direct military confrontation. When the fighting started in 2022, NATO offered every form of assistance except that more direct help.
Since then, a groundswell in populism has swept Donald Trump to power in the U.S. and undermined liberal coalitions in Germany and France. Alternative voices of the left and right call for engagement with Russia, squeezing the room for the hawkish policy that in the space of a decade has led us to war.
How did we get from the ouster of Yanukovych in 2014 to the attempted removal of Zelensky in 2022, and the devastating war that unfolded?
There’s little evidence that Putin had conquest in his mind all along, rather than reacting to events as they unfolded. There is no evidence that he is driven by a master plan, that includes a suicidal bid to invade the Baltics or Poland.
Putin’s grievances grew steadily in intensity across the eight years before war broke out as efforts to secure a peaceful settlement of the Ukraine conflict through the Minsk agreement failed. Indeed, it was one of the final acts of Zelensky’s pre-war government to declare the Minsk agreement officially dead. Yet, an unprecedented campaign of economic warfare against Russia through sanctions, led by the U.S. and supported by Britain, continued.
The big question remains, how much influence will Donald Trump have in bringing the war to a close? Trump can bring greater clarity to U.S. and Western aims with Russia and Ukraine that moves on from Biden’s disastrous incrementalism. He should be bold and decisive in exploring new ideas as the strength of his mandate provides him with the political bandwidth in which to act.
Which brings us back to reciprocity. In the art of the deal, Trump should prepare to make concessions if he expects Putin to reciprocate. Finally taking NATO out of the equation and a thought-through plan to leverage sanctions relief in a future peace process, would be good places to start.
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