Why do we still have American troops in Syria and Iraq? That is the million dollar question that the Biden Administration has yet to answer — at least with any satisfaction — for the American people. Meanwhile, our service members continue to be targets of hostile forces for a Washington strategy no one can quite articulate.
On April 7 there were reports of "two rounds of indirect fire" on the Green Village Base in eastern Syria, which is housing U.S. troops as part of Operation Inherent Resolve. U.S. Central Command said four American service members were being evaluated for traumatic brain injury as a result.
On Thursday, however, U.S. Central Command quietly announced that there were no rockets, but "but rather the deliberate placement of explosive charges by an unidentified individual(s) at an ammunition holding area and shower facility."
The release was brief and with no accompanying details, but the words echoed of the kind of Green-on-Blue attacks against coalition troops in Afghanistan during the height of the war there. As of 2017, according to counts, there had been more than 95 such attacks since 2012, killing 152 coalition service members and injuring 200.
There have been numerous rocket attacks against bases on which foreign soldiers, mostly Americans, are serving in Syria and Northern Iraq over the last two years. "Iranian backed militias" have been fingered in the attacks and they don't seem to be abating, though the administration never uses the incidents to explain or even justify why our presence continues to be useful there. Is it to stave off ISIS? Bashar Assad? Iranian militias?
"The United States has no compelling national security interest in Syria to justify an open-ended ground deployment of forces," wrote Defense Priorities' Natalie Armbruster in March, taking on each of the existing arguments for keeping forces in the region. Now that our troops can't even feel safe taking showers on base, isn't it time to get a straight answer from Washington?
Kelley Beaucar Vlahos is Editorial Director of Responsible Statecraft and Senior Advisor at the Quincy Institute.
Operation Inherent Re-solve New Zealand army Sgt. Maj. Chuck Mackay, as-signed to Task Group Taji, observes Iraqi army soldiers from 3rd Battalion, 41st Brigade participate in a confirmatory exercise for senior Iraqi army personnel at Camp Taji, Iraq, Oct. 16, 2018
Top image credit: Secretary Marco Rubio meets with Philippine Secretary of Foreign Affairs Enrique A. Manalo in Munich, Germany, February 14, 2025. (Official State Department photo by Freddie Everett)
Could a recent meeting on the sidelines of the Munich Security Conference between Secretary of State Marco Rubio and his Philippine counterpart Enrique Manalo be the beginnings of a de-escalation in the troubled waters of the South China Sea?
There are only hints in the air so far. But such a shift by Washington (and a corresponding response by the Philippines and China) would be important to calm the waters and mark a turn away from the U.S. being sucked into what could spiral into a military crisis and, in the worst-case scenario, a direct U.S.-China confrontation. But to be effective, any shift should also be executed responsibly.
The State Department spokesperson’s comments on February 14 about the meeting reiterated familiar points on “bilateral coordination addressing China’s destabilizing actions in the South China Sea” and “reaffirmed U.S. commitment to the United States-Philippines Alliance.” A U.S.readout of an earlier Rubio-Manalo call on January 22 was more expansive, speaking of China’s “dangerous and destabilizing actions” undermining “regional peace and stability” and being “inconsistent with international law.” The readout also reaffirmed Washington’s “ironclad commitments to the Philippines under our Mutual Defense Treaty.”
Intriguingly however, both sets of comments did not repeat the key assertion — first made by then-Secretary of State Mike Pompeo in 2021 and subsequentlyreaffirmed multiple times by the Biden administration — of the Mutual Defense Treaty extending to “armed attacks on Philippine armed forces, public vessels, or aircraft, including those of its Coast Guard, anywhere in the South China Sea.”
The omission may simply be an oversight. But it is important to keep the overall strategic context in mind. A radical U-turn in the Ukraine theater and various other administration moves have indicated that Trump is not averse to a major reorientation of U.S. grand strategy. It would be highly premature to label the new approach as “Restraint,” but the shift on Europe is telling. A recognition of the hard realities of interests and a move away from self-defeating framings such as “democracy v. autocracy” would also be a good thing for the United States to embrace in East and Southeast Asia.
However, there is much less reason to believe that the Trump team will aim for a grand reset with China. Washington’s push to confront China economically has, if anything, only escalated. Trump has appointed several China hawks in the National Security Council and the State Department, none of whom are expected to counsel a reset.
However, the Pentagon now includes some Restraint-oriented voices. One, Andrew Byers, the new deputy assistant secretary of defense for South and Southeast Asia, recently suggested (in a paper on U.S.-China relations co-authored with J. Tedford Tyler) “removing U.S. military forces or weapons systems from the Philippines in exchange for the China Coast Guard executing fewer patrols.”
A recent Quincy Institute brief on the U.S.-Philippines alliance in the South China Sea analyzed the stand-off and recommended several specific policy actions by Washington to initiate a de-escalation, keeping the factors of vital interests, proportionality, and sustainability in mind. These include elimination of one or more U.S. military sites in northern Luzon, a withdrawal of the provocative Typhon missile system from the Philippines, a halt to pulling in U.S. allies jointly and militarily into the South China Sea, and a reversal of moves indicating the United States is pulling the Philippines into the Taiwan theater; all in exchange for corresponding de-escalatory actions by China.
But a de-escalation in the South China Sea as a part of a limited security thaw with China (even as economic and security competition intensifies elsewhere), if it indeed comes to pass, must be done responsibly. The Quincy Institute brief also counseled increased support for strengthening Philippine coast guard, naval and infrastructure capacities and continued strong diplomatic support for its lawful claims in the South China Sea.
It’s one thing to de-escalate incrementally, demanding equivalent Chinese actions at each step, but quite another to summarily abandon a weaker ally that Washington has arguably egged on. In all things, the United States ought to keep regional stability and Manila’s agency in mind while attempting an urgently-needed de-escalation.
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Top photo credit: Flags flown ahead of the summit of European leaders to discuss the situation in Ukraine and European security at The Elysee Presidential Palace in Paris, France on February 17, 2025. Photo by Eliot Blondet/ABACAPRESS.COM
European summits are not usually the stuff of poetry, but the latest one in Paris was worthy of Horace: Patrturiunt montes; nascetur ridiculus mus — “Mountains will be in labour; and give birth to a ridiculous mouse.”
President Macron of France called the summit in response to what he called the “electroshock” of the Trump administration’s election and plans to negotiate Ukraine peace without the Europeans. The result so far however appears to have been even less than a mouse — in fact, precisely nothing.
Macron presumably hoped that the leaders of the other major European states would rally behind his own proposal of French and European peacekeeping troops for Ukraine (an idea already categorically rejected by Moscow). Keir Starmer of the UK did indeed make such an offer, only shortly afterwards to say that no European guarantee of Ukrainian security would be credible without what he called a US “backstop.”
Since Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth had already publicly ruled out any such U.S. guarantee, Starmer thereby implicitly admitted that his offer of British troops was empty. British parliamentarians have also demanded a vote on the dispatch of British troops. In the meantime, on leaving the Paris meeting, Chancellor Olaf Scholtz of Germany said that a discussion of European troops for Ukraine is “completely premature” and “highly inappropriate” while the war is ongoing. Prime Minister Donald Tusk of Poland (one of Ukraine’s strongest supporters) ruled out Polish troops altogether:
"We do not plan to send Polish soldiers to the territory of Ukraine. We will ... give logistical and political support to the countries that will possibly want to provide such guarantees in the future, such physical guarantees."
Macron has also emphasized something that makes much more sense: namely that the Europeans need to build up not only their own armed forces, but also the military industries that supply them. In an interview with the Financial Times, he said that:
“We must also develop a fully integrated European defense, industrial and technological base. This goes far beyond a simple debate about spending figures. If all we do is become bigger clients of the US, then in 20 years, we still won’t have solved the question of European sovereignty.”
This is indeed extremely necessary — though it is clear that Trump expects that higher European military spending will be spent on U.S. weaponry, and is prepared to bring pressure to bear to make sure this is the case. But Macron’s interview also brought out the acute difficulty of such European integration. He urged European countries to buy the SAMP-T air defense system, which he said is better than the U.S. Patriot missiles system that several countries are presently using.
For all I know, he may be right about that; but it is surely no coincidence that the SAMP-T is made in France and Italy. The real proof of Macron’s commitment to the integration of European military industries would be if — for example — he agrees to give up production of France’s Leclerc main battle tank in favor of buying Germany’s Leopard tanks for the French army.
The UK exemplifies this problem. With one of the very few professional fighting armies in Europe, it is critical to any independent European defense. But while it has excellent soldiers, its weapons systems have been plagued with breakdowns and deficiencies, largely because the wider British industrial base is now too limited to support an efficient military sector. On the other hand, precisely because British industries have shrunk so far, military industry is critical to maintaining what is left of British technological expertise. Give this up to the Germans? Really?
The kind of radical increases in military spending being demanded by the Trump administration and advocated by Macron and Starmer will also require some combination of increased taxes and savage cuts to social welfare, health and infrastructure budgets, at a time when these are already under intense pressure from economic stagnation, and as a result the discontent of ordinary people is rising steeply.
As Stephen Bush of the Financial Times has written concerning Starmer’s military pledges:
“Politically, whatever choice Labour ends up making will be hard: to increase defence spending without breaking its pledges on tax means overseeing incredibly sharp and painful cuts everywhere else— the road to certain electoral defeat in my view. But an increase in income tax, national insurance or VAT comes with big risks attached too.”
There is however a third way, which if not chosen by the British Labour government will certainly be taken by other future European governments: not to increase military spending at all.
For this is the other problem with expensive and risky commitments by present European governments: Given the tectonic political shifts under way in Europe, it is highly unlikely that future European governments will in fact stick by such commitments. President Macron is already in effect a lame duck. The center ground of German politics is shrinking fast. Starmer’s posturing over Ukraine looks very like a conscious or unconscious attempt to distract attention from near-paralysis in domestic politics. Such diversionary messaging can work for a while, but cuts little ice in an endless queue to see a doctor.
The chaotic state of present European thinking on Ukraine and the Ukraine peace process reflects this underlying lack of public will, as well as the bewilderment of European establishments that for many years have left responsibility for their strategy in the hands of the United States, and now find themselves expected to think for themselves. It also however reflects the fact that the premises on which European policies have been based are in part radically contradictory, and these underlying contradictions are exposed whenever it becomes a question of Europeans acting for themselves.
Thus the advocates of a European force for Ukraine have fallen into a state of mental confusion for which “cognitive dissonance” is a wholly inadequate description. They have created for themselves a belief in Putin’s megalomaniac ambition, leading to the idea that in future he will “test” NATO by attacking the Baltic States, though Putin has never shown the slightest desire to do so, and this would run hideous risks for minimal gains.
Yet somehow this has led them to argue for European commitments to Ukraine that Russia would be absolutely bound to test, and the U.S. will not support. This would radically weaken the credibility of NATO security guarantees. Some of the very same analysts who have written — in part accurately — about the historical, cultural and ethnic roots of Putin’s “obsession” with Ukraine, also write as if Putin, and Russians, have the same obsession with Poland and the Baltic States — a misunderstanding of Russian attitudes that is either totally illiterate or deliberately mendacious.
The idea that Europeans would be defending the Baltic States by intervening in Ukraine is also a very strange one, that reflects the painful experiences of the Baltic States’ past rather than an objective analysis of their situation today. For the greatest threat to the Balts from Russia comes not from Russian ambitions in the Baltic, but precisely from the danger that the war in Ukraine will widen to become a conflict between NATO and Russia.
Moreover, European military commitments to Ukraine would be a direct weakening of the defenses of NATO. Given time, the British could just about cobble together one division to send to Ukraine, but only if they not only stripped out the defenses of Britain itself, but also gave up their existing commitments to Poland and the Baltic States, which the UK is bound by treaty to defend.
Let us hope that this is indeed mere theatrical posturing on the part of British and European hawks; for to judge by some of their present statements, a theatre playing make believe is where this belongs.
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Top photo credit: U.S. Marines with 7th Engineer Support Battalion, Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force 7, place concertina wire at the Otay Mesa Port of Entry in California on Nov. 11, 2018. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Staff Sgt. Rubin J. Tan)
“Guys and gals of my generation have spent decades in foreign countries guarding other people's borders. It's about time we secure our own,” Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth said during his first trip to the southern border earlier this month. “This needs to be and will be a focus of this department,” he reiterated at a Pentagon town hall days later.
Most servicemembers deploying to the southern border today never fought in the post-9/11 wars, but Hegseth is right that their commanders and civilian bosses have plenty of experience to draw on from two decades spent “securing” and “stabilizing” Iraq and Afghanistan.
However, while it’s still early days, so far, the Pentagon doesn’t seem to be making use of those hard-won lessons. Instead, Department of Defense (DoD) leaders appear to be repeating the mistakes of their predecessors with open-ended missions attached to unclear objectives and more attention to appearance and signaling than results. Active-duty forces may have a role to play in President Donald Trump’s immigration agenda, but those in charge can do much more to set this mission up for success while minimizing impacts on an already overstretched military force and budget.
The use of active-duty forces on the southern border is not new to the second Trump administration. He also turned to active-duty units during his first term, sending 1,000 troops to the border in 2018 and 3,000 in 2019. President Joe Biden, too, relied on active-duty forces to support border operations throughout his presidency, though in smaller numbers. This time, however, Trump may be planning to push active-duty presence at the border to more than 7,000 personnel according to some reports.
There are two reasons why Trump might use active-duty soldiers and marines to achieve his border security campaign promises. First, the active-duty military’s size and ability to mobilize rapidly makes it an easy and appealing option, allowing for a quick win. The U.S. Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) is understaffed and recruiting more personnel will take time and money.
National guard forces are another alternative. Indeed, many national guard units are already working along the southern border. But mobilizing national guard personnel takes longer than moving active-duty forces. Second and more importantly, Trump may relish the appearance and signaling benefits that come with the use of heavily armed and elite military personnel at the U.S.-Mexico border, seeing it as a marker of U.S. strength that can deter migrants and make neighbors take U.S. warnings seriously.
Even if there are reasons to use active-duty military forces to support border security, however, the Pentagon’s approach so far is short-sighted. First, Secretary Hegseth has assigned newly deployed military forces the unrealistic goal of achieving “100% operational control” of the U.S. border. This objective — which would effectively require sealing all 2,000 miles to eliminate unauthorized entries — is not an outcome that is within reach for a few thousand military forces without supporting political legislation and legal regimes.
This is especially true if they are restricted to surveilling and monitoring checkpoints and building barriers, like today’s active-duty soldiers. As a result, new arrivals at the southern border face a daunting mission without clear benchmarks or a fixed endpoint, conditions likely to quickly drain morale.
Second, as it plans and executes its border deployments, the Pentagon has largely ignored opportunity costs, prioritizing near-term speed over sustainability and the long-term health of the force. In its rush to respond quickly, the DoD has chosen to deploy personnel from some of the most experienced and highest readiness elite units in the Army. Specifically, five hundred soldiers from the 10th Mountain Division and 1,500 from 18th Airborne Corps have already been sent to the border and the 82nd Airborne Division could be tapped as well.
These units serve special functions within the active-duty force and already have high operational tempo. The 18th Airborne Corps, for instance, is known as “America’s contingency corps” because it is kept ready to respond on short notice to crises that threaten U.S. interests around the globe. For its part, since 2002, the 10th Mountain Division has been deployed more than any other active-duty Army unit — notably two of its brigade combat teams are currently overseas or returning from deployment, one in Europe and the other in the Middle East.
Sending these units to conduct what amounts to law enforcement operations on the U.S.-Mexico border adds burdens to their already heavy load, leaves them immediately unavailable for crises overseas, and interferes with their training, reducing their preparation over the long-term.
Critics of an historically interventionist U.S. military may welcome anything that keeps Washington from sending these servicemembers to contingencies overseas. But the relatively small deployments to the border won’t force the Pentagon to cut back on foreign activities, merely slow down and complicate U.S. responses, assuming unnecessary risk in today’s unpredictable threat environment.
Finally, as it militarizes immigration enforcement at the southern border and beyond, the Trump administration has prioritized the performative over the effective at a high cost to taxpayers. Active-duty military personnel may look formidable as they man border checkpoints or conduct aerial surveillance, but it is not clear that their unique skills and competencies are needed, especially as unauthorized crossings fall sharply. If anything, they are less well-prepared for these tasks than CBP personnel.
Similarly, the use of expensive military hardware — aircraft and armored combat vehicles for instance—may intimidate unarmed migrants, but are largely unnecessary for border security operations, and could be replaced by much cheaper, civilian alternatives or even inexpensive drones and remote sensors.
The same is true of employing military aircraft for deportation flights. Using a C-17 for deportation can cost as much as five times more per migrant as a first-class ticket on a commercial jet — quite an expensive signal of resolve.
Without changes to the mission’s goals, tactics, and execution, the use of active-duty forces at the southern border may harm U.S. national security more than help. First, active-duty forces assigned to the border should have narrow and specific objectives with realistic benchmarks — numbers of unauthorized border crossings per week or miles of border surveilled and secured.
Their deployment should be time-limited and viewed as a stop-gap measure, a bridge until national guard forces can be brought in or, even better, more CBP personnel hired. Not only are national guard and CBP personnel better suited to a border security mission, but they also have additional legal authorities that allow them to contribute more directly to Trump’s immigration mission.
Second, the Pentagon should sacrifice some deployment speed to reduce the use of high-readiness units and frequent deployers relying instead on less critical units. This will increase the timeline to get the needed active-duty forces in place, but it will be worth the wait if it means protecting scarce military assets from overuse.
Finally, the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security should work together to prioritize cost-effectiveness even where this means replacing the showiest elements of the border campaign so far with cheaper alternatives and leveraging remote and autonomous technology when possible. With Elon Musk pushing to cut costs across the government, it only makes sense that wasteful spending should be on the chopping block at the border as well.
Hegseth has described his experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan as an advantage in his new job. On the southern border, he has a chance to put what he learned to use.
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