The much-anticipated meeting between U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken and his Russian counterpart Sergei Lavrov has been canceled by the Americans, according to reports.
"Now that we see the invasion is beginning and Russia has made clear its wholesale rejection of diplomacy, it does not make sense to go forward with that meeting at this time," Blinken announced Tuesday afternoon. "I consulted with our allies and partners — all agree."
According to CNN, French Foreign Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian announced his Friday meeting with Lavrov has been canceled, too.
The Blinken-Lavrov meeting, which had been set before Putin’s fiery speech Sunday declaring independence for the breakaway republics of Donetsk and Luhasnk in Eastern Ukraine, was supposed to serve as a sort of diplomatic release valve for the tensions between the two countries, which had risen to a fever pitch in recent days and weeks.
Up until now, the White House had been hesitant to call Putin’s recent moves a full-on invasion of Ukraine — which would trigger more expansive economic sanctions and possibly additional military assistance to President Zelensky. But on Tuesday, it joined the EU in announcing a first round of financial sanctions against Russia, promising more if Putin continues to escalate. Germany also announced that it was putting a pause on the approval process for the Nord Stream 2 pipeline.
Blinken said talks would only commence if “Russia is prepared to take demonstrable steps to provide the international community with any degree of confidence it's serious about deescalating and finding a diplomatic solution." No response from Russia on the canceled meeting, yet.
Kelley Beaucar Vlahos is Editorial Director of Responsible Statecraft and Senior Advisor at the Quincy Institute.
Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken gives opening remarks at NATO in Brussels, Belgium on March 23, 2021. [State Department photo by Ron Przysucha/ Public Domain]
After a more than 2 month pause, Russia has begun striking deep into Ukraine once again, sending a reported 96 missiles and drones toward civilian infrastructure in the capital this week
Following the U.S. presidential election, Vladimir Putin has stepped up Russia’s military campaigns. In addition to resuming strikes on Kyiv, Moscow has increased its drone strikes across Ukraine by 44%. Ivan Stupak, a former Ukrainian security officer, says, “In the next few months up to Jan. 20, we are expecting a significantly increasing number of launches towards Ukraine.”
“Launches” from Russia have indeed been steadily increasing. According to Stupak, there were 818 launches in August, 1,410 in September, and 2,072 in October. Ground attacks have intensified as well, especially in the border area of Kursk, which saw a partial Ukrainian occupation in August of this year.
Russia reportedly built up around 50,000 troops in Kursk to participate in a counter-offensive, with around 10,000 North Korean troops present to assist their Russian allies. Following this build-up, the fighting in Kursk this week has yielded high casualties for Russia. In addition to the 2,000 Russians killed or injured on Tuesday alone, Moscow has also lost at least 88 armored vehicles on the roads to Kursk, as counted by a Ukrainian drone operator.
Other Ukraine War News This Week:
American military contractors will be deployed to Ukraine for the first time since the conflict started. CNN reports that the Biden administration has lifted its ban on the practice, allowing the Department of Defense to contract with private citizens to perform maintenance on vehicles in Ukraine. According to a DOD official, “these contractors will be located far from the front lines and they will not be fighting Russian forces. They will help Ukrainian Armed Forces rapidly repair and maintain US-provided equipment as needed so it can be quickly returned to the front lines.”
On Wednesday, Secretary of State Antony Blinken met with NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte in Brussels. Al Jazeera reports that Blinken pledged to increase support for Ukraine before the end of Biden’s administration, saying, “President Biden fully intends to drive through the tape and use every day to continue to do what we have done these last four years, which is strengthen this alliance.” Blinken also indicated that the United States would send a “firm response” to the use of North Korean troops in Russia’s Kursk campaign.
Ukrainian officials are beginning to value security guarantees at least as much as territorial integrity in a future peace deal. According to the New York Times, future talks would not focus as much on geographic boundaries, but on assurances around a cease-fire. A Ukrainian official speaking anonymously said, “the territorial question is extremely important, but it’s still the second question, the first question is security guarantees.” The Times report says that this comes as President-elect Trump has shown an eagerness to bring a swift end to the conflict.
Deputy spokesperson Vedant Patel confirmed that the 10,000 North Korean soldiers were sent to Kursk to assist Moscow in its attempt to take the territory back from Ukrainian forces. Patel said that “Russia’s battlefield success using these DPRK troops will in large part be dictated by how well the Russians can integrate them into their military.”
When asked about the recently formalized military treaty, and the potential of joint Russian-North Korean training drills, the spokesperson said, “the United States is consulting closely with our allies and partners and other countries in the region on the implications of this, on these developments.”
As President-elect Trump prepares to take office for a second time, he faces a world that has changed profoundly since 2020. While Russia’s invasion of Ukraine may be the most visible shift, two deeper changes in the international order demand America’s attention: the rise of multipolarity and the trend toward “multi-alignment.”
These realities provide an opportunity for the United States to rethink its approach to global affairs, adopting a grand strategy of “restraint.” This isn’t a call to retreat from the world. Instead, it’s an approach that prioritizes prudent balancing and selective blunting — moving beyond the ideal of maintaining U.S. hegemony by enforcing a so-called “rules-based order” and focusing instead on adapting to today’s geopolitical complexity.
Indeed, several regional powers hold significant influence, and their interests do not align neatly with those of Washington. China, India, Brazil, and Turkey have become increasingly assertive players, not just in their regions but on the global stage. These countries navigate their own complex priorities and pursue strategies that often reflect the needs of their citizens over the preferences of foreign powers. In this environment, the U.S. should not view itself as the world’s dominant force but as one player among many, working to balance power while managing relationships with rising and established nations alike.
A multipolar world doesn’t call for the U.S. to abandon its leadership entirely, but it does mean embracing a restrained approach that focuses on critical areas of interest, where American involvement can make a meaningful impact. The United States is no longer in a position to unilaterally set the global agenda or expect other countries to follow it without question. In this environment, the goal of American foreign policy should be to engage selectively in regions where its core interests are directly affected. In other words, it’s time to prioritize, not to police.
One of the greatest challenges will be managing the diffusion of power and influence to other great powers without falling victim to overreach or being drawn into unnecessary conflicts. America can meet this challenge by adopting a balancing strategy that empowers other regional actors to contribute to stability. For example, in the Indo-Pacific, countries like Japan, South Korea, and India have strong reasons to check China’s expansion. Rather than carrying the burden alone, Washington can support these countries’ efforts, providing economic, technological, and defense support that enables them to maintain a stable balance of power in the region. This approach allows the U.S. to pursue its interests without attempting to control the situation directly, a strategy that is both more realistic and more sustainable.
If multipolarity demands a recalibrated approach, the growing trend of “multi-alignment” both amplifies that demand and complicates it. Many countries are increasingly reluctant to commit exclusively to either the U.S. or its competitors. Instead, they pursue flexible partnerships with multiple powers, driven by pragmatic self-interest. Countries like India, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, for instance, are balancing their relationships with both the U.S. and China. They’re not playing both sides for the sake of confusion; they’re doing so to maximize their options and pursue a foreign policy that best serves their own needs.
Multi-alignment reflects a shift in global expectations about geopolitical relationships. In today’s world, few countries want to be tied down by the obligations of a rigid bloc. For the U.S., this means adapting to a reality where allies and partners may not always act as Washington would like. Yet multi-alignment also offers a valuable opportunity: it allows Washington to engage with countries on specific issues without requiring them to “choose sides” or abandon their own interests. Instead of pushing for full alignment, the U.S. can pursue issue-specific partnerships, where countries come together around shared goals without rigidly defined alliances.
By acknowledging and respecting the autonomy of multi-aligned countries, the U.S. can embrace restraint as a way to foster pragmatic, cooperative relationships. For example, India’s interests in balancing China align well with those of the United States, even as New Delhi maintains its defense ties with Russia. Rather than forcing a binary choice on India, the U.S. can work with Indian leaders where it matters most, supporting them in the Indo-Pacific without demanding that they abandon their relationships with other major players. Such an approach reflects a mature, realistic form of partnership that recognizes the complex interests driving many countries’ strategies today.
Restraint is not just a practical response to multipolarity and multi-alignment — it’s also a more sustainable way for America to engage in the world. The cost of maintaining extensive alliances and security guarantees has become increasingly difficult to justify, especially as other countries are willing and able to take on greater roles in their regions. By shifting from global intervention to prudent balancing, the U.S. can reduce its military footprint while still playing a constructive role where it counts. This means focusing on regions directly affecting American security, such as the North Atlantic and the Western Hemisphere, and allowing allies to assume greater responsibility elsewhere.
Under a restrained approach, America would prioritize diplomatic and economic levers over military tools, recognizing that influence can come from trade, technology partnerships, and cultural ties as much as from force. This strategy is more suited to a world where countries often seek flexible relationships rather than binding commitments. Instead of expecting nations to embrace an American-led order, the U.S. can work with them on mutually beneficial projects that respect both their interests and autonomy. In a world where influence flows from more than just military might and ideological dominance, the U.S. must work to secure its position through flexible collaboration and nuanced engagement.
Encouraging self-reliance among allies is another crucial aspect of restraint. Countries such as Japan, Australia, and Germany are more capable than ever of defending themselves and taking active roles in their regions. For too long, the U.S. has acted as the primary guarantor of their security, often at the cost of its own resources. By shifting to a supporting role and encouraging allies to bolster their defenses, the U.S. can foster stronger, more resilient partnerships. This approach doesn’t abandon allies — it acknowledges their growing capabilities and allows them to lead in their respective regions, ultimately creating a more balanced, multilateral world.
This strategy may strike some as a step back from global leadership, but in reality, it’s a strategic adaptation to the world as it is, not as it was – or was imagined to be – during the so-called unipolar moment. A restrained approach to foreign policy is not a call for isolationism or retreat; it’s a recognition that the U.S. must adapt to new geopolitical realities and pursue its interests accordingly. Trying to enforce a global order that no longer reflects the world’s power dynamics is neither feasible nor desirable – indeed, it is dangerous. Instead, America should focus on fostering global stability through strategic partnerships, blunting the efforts of other great powers to achieve regional or global hegemony, while avoiding overreach.
In a multipolar, multi-aligned world, restraint is not a loss of influence but a means of securing it more sustainably. The U.S. can lead by example, demonstrating that adapting to complexity requires flexibility and prudence, not dominance or hegemony. President-elect Trump’s new administration has a unique opportunity to embrace this restrained approach, enabling America to thrive in a world that no longer revolves around any single power. Through prudent balancing and selective blunting, the United States can continue to protect its interests and promote global stability without succumbing to the siren song of American global hegemony.
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Top image credit: A Kenyan man reads newspapers at a shop in Nakuru following the U.S. presidential election results, where Donald Trump won against Democrat Kamala Harris in a remarkable political comeback. James Wakibia / SOPA Images via Reuters Connect
As commentators assess the implications of Donald Trump’s election victory for the United States and the world, various publications have asked what Trump’s return will mean for their continent. In one well-informed analysis, the BBC’s Wedaeli Chibelushi highlights “trade, aid, and security” as key sectors. We can also ask what might change in terms of Washington’s political relationships with various African countries, and how such changes would affect the overall balance of U.S. primacy versus restraint.
An initial caveat is necessary – of all the world’s regions, Trump and his team will likely not be thinking much about Africa. When Professor Stephen Walt recently assessed “The 10 Foreign-Policy Implications of the 2024 U.S. Election,” for example, he did not mention Africa – and that’s because the Middle East, Ukraine, NATO, and China, among other issues, will likely consume much more of Trump’s attention than the African continent will.
If Trump ignores Africa, that would be in keeping with a bipartisan neglect of the continent from the time of Barack Obama through the present. Obama and Joe Biden each held a “U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit” (in 2014 and 2022, respectively), but across the Obama, Trump, and Biden administrations, Africa was approached mostly as a theater for counterterrorism, trade, and global influence, rather than as having intrinsic importance to Washington. Vice President Kamala Harris would likely have replicated the largely performative, status quo-friendly approach of Biden. Although Harris had a deep bench of Africa hands on her campaign, that depth more reflects the long line of aspirants who line up for foreign policy jobs in Democratic administrations, more than a now-dashed promise of transformation. Biden and Harris will leave office with little to show for their Africa policy beyond the summit and a slate of high-profile but low-substance trips, including Biden’s upcoming visit to Angola.
As Trump takes office, there will be something of an opportunity for diplomatic outreach and “reset” with Africa. So far, his victory has elicited more mixed reactions in Africa than one might expect. Despite his infamous “shithole countries” comment and his numerous racist and Islamophobic remarks, many ordinary Africans admire Trump’s entrepreneurial career, socially conservative platform, and outspokenness. Various African leaders were quick to congratulate the comeback candidate. Trump is, however, likely unaware of and relatively indifferent to whatever opportunity exists for engagement, and so it will probably slip by.
If “personnel is policy,” Trump’s first term did not bring any shocking or unusual appointments for civilian posts related to Africa, and his second term may not either; the true ideologues and hawks are likely to gravitate towards Iran policy, for example. During his first term, Trump appointed veteran diplomat Tibor Nagy as Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, think tanker J. Peter Pham as Special Envoy for the Sahel, and another veteran diplomat, Donald Booth, as Special Envoy for Sudan. The situation in the Sahel and Sudan was worse when Trump’s term ended than when it began: a massacre in Sudan in June 2019 brought no consequences for its perpetrators, and Mali witnessed a coup in 2020. Yet those outcomes cannot be laid solely at the feet of the Trump administration. Tellingly, the situation in the Sahel and Sudan in 2024 is also worse than it was when Biden took office, so neither administration earns high marks here.
Trump’s indifference to Africa could lead to continued inertia in Africa policymaking – meaning, concretely, that the military’s U.S. Africa Command or AFRICOM would continue to be the main face of U.S. policy on the continent. Although Trump is more dictator-friendly than Biden was, it’s notable that under Biden, AFRICOM Commander General Michael Langley has met, seemingly enthusiastically, with autocrats and would-be autocrats in Africa, including, for example, Libya’s Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar. Trump may show a friendly face to Russia, which could result in a more permissive environment for Russia – although it is not as though the Biden administration’s tough, anti-Russian rhetoric has yielded much actual success in rolling back Russian influence, particularly across the Sahel.
Politically, the biggest shifts could come in the Horn of Africa. It is possible that Trump’s team could recognize Somaliland, a breakaway territory that has been claiming independence from Somalia since 1991. With Somalia itself, the pendulum may swing back towards disengagement; Biden reversed a late Trump-era order to withdraw some troops. It is also possible that in Sudan, “the Trump administration will look to pick a winner” between the two factions – the Sudanese Armed Forces and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces – that are fighting for control.
At the same time, the White House’s absorption in other issues will likely mean that politics in the Horn (and in other regions of the continent) will only be considered “through the prism of Trump’s domestic fiscal policy and then on the political side, the Gulf and Israel.” On Somaliland, Trump may wish to avoid antagonizing Egypt, which has aligned with Somalia against Ethiopia, and whose President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi may be glad to see Trump’s return; on Sudan, Trump may defer to the United Arab Emirates, widely accused of backing the Rapid Support Forces, but may also simply let matters play out in Sudan while he focuses elsewhere.
In sum, Trump’s win brings mostly troubling implications for Africa and especially for ordinary Africans, whether because (as Chibelushi notes) key programs relating to aid and public health (above all the Presidential Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief and the President’s Malaria Initiative, both launched by President George W. Bush) may be cut, and/or because Trump may empower dictators even more than Biden did, and/or because inertia will leave AFRICOM to make the day-to-day decisions. Trump’s transactional approach may appeal to some African leaders, and Trump is interested in issues such as critical mineral access (although his previous administration’s “Critical Minerals Strategy” did not mention Africa). Overall, by the end of the decade, U.S. influence in Africa will likely have ebbed to an even lower point that where it stands today.
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