A return to a version of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action is “in sight,” which means that the typical chorus of opponents to the deal are launching a last-ditch effort to prevent an agreement. A letter sent to President Biden by Sen. Ted Cruz and 32 other senators claimed they will use “the full range of options and leverage available” to prevent a deal from being reached. With this context in mind, Sen. Chris Murphy made a blistering speech on the Senate floor on Wednesday making the case for the JCPOA. Murphy aimed at answering one simple question: What is the alternative?
Fortunately, we know the alternative is. Murphy made clear that the policy supported by opponents to a nuclear deal has been tried and tested; “To the extent that there was any silver lining of President Trump’s decision, it’s that it allowed us for four years to test the theory of the opponents…because president Trump implemented the strategy that the critics of the JCPOA wanted President Obama to employ.” Murphy then closely compared the policies of the previous two administrations.
First, on the nuclear issue, Murphy noted that Iran’s stockpile of enriched uranium gas is currently roughly 11 times what it was during the full implementation of the agreement. Iran also went from a “breakout time” — the time it would take to acquire enough enriched uranium for one bomb — under the agreement of more than a year to two months today, and has restarted its nuclear research program to the point that it is “stronger than it was prior to the JCPOA in some ways.” Rather than “restoring deterrence,” as some have claimed, Murphy said that the “maximum pressure” campaign was a “spectacular failure” on all accounts.
But it isn’t just on the nuclear issue. Murphy also noted that none of Iran’s other malevolent activities in the region have abated either; “Iran continues to support proxy armies in Syria, Yemen, Lebanon, in fact their connection with Hezbollah in Lebanon and with the Houthis in Yemen is probably stronger today than it was during the JCPOA.” Murphy also pointed to the fact that Iran even restarted attacks on U.S. troops after President Trump tore up the JCPOA. By all accounts, Iran hasn’t been deterred, but rather emboldened.
Murphy hammered home that diplomacy may not always be perfect, but it is far better than the alternative of maximum pressure. “Newsflash,” he said, ”occasionally there are diplomatic agreements that are in the best interests of the United States and the JCPOA was inarguably one of them.”
With the Biden administration’s time window shortening, Murphy showed that the opposition to a nuclear agreement is pure political theatrics. Diplomacy can work, and the lessons of the past decade demonstrate that.
Nick Cleveland-Stout is a Junior Research Fellow in the Democratizing Foreign Policy program at the Quincy Institute. Previously, Nick conducted research on U.S.-Brazil relations as a 2023 Fulbright fellow at the Federal University of Santa Catarina.
Following a reported push from the Biden administration in late 2024, Mike Waltz - President-elect Donald Trump’s NSA pick - is now advocating publicly that Ukraine lower its draft age to 18, “Their draft age right now is 26 years old, not 18 ... They could generate hundreds of thousands of new soldiers," he told ABC This Week on Sunday.
Ukraine needs to "be all in for democracy," said Waltz. However, any push to lower the draft age is unpopular in Ukraine. Al Jazeera interviewed Ukrainians to gauge the popularity of the war, and raised the question of lowering the draft age, which had been suggested by Biden officials in December. A 20-year-old service member named Vladislav said in an interview that lowering the draft age would be a “bad idea.”
“I would choose to be shot to death right here, in Kyiv instead of going to the frontline,” said a 17-year-old Ukrainian named Serhiy in these interviews. Serhiy’s mother shared her son’s opinion, as young people “aren’t developed mentally, they will jump on (enemy) weapons without thinking, without understanding.” Continuing with, “they don’t yet have a feeling of self-preservation, they are just flying into battle. This will be (the) destruction of the Ukrainian people.”
This idea that more young Ukrainians should be fighting may conflict with Trump’s stated goals of ending the war immediately and through negotiations. Or it might be a way to pressure Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky into talks, knowing that he does not have much manpower left to give, even with the lowered draft age.
Despite lowering the draft age from 27 to 25 in 2024, Kyiv had to resort to using patrols to enforce the unpopular measure. Desertion has been a consistent issue in the Ukrainian military, with Kyiv charging at least 100,000 under desertion laws since 2022. Desertions have continued as recently as last week, with dozens of Ukrainian soldiers under training in France being accused of abandoning their posts.
Studies show that Ukraine is facing a severe population crisis if changes aren’t made. The U.N. Population Fund estimated that 10 million, or a quarter of the Ukrainian population, have been lost to death or displacement since 2014, and a separate study claimed that a third of Ukraine’s working population would be lost by 2040. Lowering the compulsive service age to 18 would certainly exacerbate demographic and population crises, especially as Russia seemingly has seen regular successes on the battlefield.
The war in general, is no longer popular with the Ukrainian people either. A recent Gallup Poll found that, for the first time, a majority of Ukrainians preferred a negotiated settlement to continued fighting. Since over 50% of Ukrainians are opposed to this war, it would seem that the “democratic” option would include peace talks as opposed to lowering the draft age, as supported by Waltz.
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Top photo credit: U.S. Army Gen Joseph L. Votel, then-commander United States Central Command, is greeted by Gen. Joseph Aoun, commander Lebanese Armed Forces, during his visit to Lebanon June 7, 2017. (Department of Defense photo by U.S. Air Force Tech Sgt. Dana Flamer)
Lebanon finally has a president after a vacancy that has persisted for over two years.
The election of Lebanon’s army chief Joseph Aoun caps the rising role of the military following the ceasefire agreement reached between the country and Israel last November.
Appointed as commander of the armed forces in 2017, the 61-year-old led the Lebanese military’s operations against ISIS and Al-Nusra in the border areas with Syria. His emergence as the favored candidate owes largely to his military background, given the prominent role the army is set to assume under the ceasefire conditions.
These developments constitute an important victory for the United States, which has played a key role in the aftermath of the ceasefire deal. The United States had lobbied strongly for Aoun, as Washington has viewed the Lebanese military as its primary ally in the country. These efforts received a strong boost from ally Saudi Arabia, as senior Saudi officials held direct talks with Lebanese factions in Beirut just before the vote that led to Aoun's election.
With the Lebanon-Israel ceasefire, U.S. influence in Lebanon has risen considerably. The deal was brokered by the United States and includes the formation of an American-led five-member committee to oversee its implementation.
The ceasefire also stipulates that the Lebanese army is to deploy in territories stretching from the southern Lebanese border to south of the Litani river, and that Hezbollah must end its armed presence within this zone. As per the deal, Israel is also required to withdraw from southern Lebanese territories it occupied in the latest round of hostilities within 60 days.
Both sides have accused the other of violating the ceasefire, with Hezbollah telling the UN Security Council that Israel launched 816 ground and air attacks in the south from Nov. 27 when the deal was brokered and Dec. 22. Israel says Hezbollah broke the agreement hundreds of times, moving ammunition and launching rockets toward northern Israel.
The deployment of the Lebanese army in the south serves Washington’s long-standing goal of empowering this institution, which is a major regional partner. Bilateral cooperation extends into various realms including training, counterterrorism, and border security. Lebanon’s army is the world's fifth largest recipient of American military assistance, which amounts to around $3 billion since 2006, according to recent estimates.
According to the Associated Press, $95 million dollars of military aid originally earmarked for Egypt is now being diverted to Lebanon. Interestingly, news of this development came on the eve of Aoun’s election, signaling a firm commitment to empower the new president as he faces the major task of overseeing the troop deployment in the south.
It is worth noting that the increased aid to the Lebanese army has been met with disapproval by pro-Israeli voices in Washington that effectively argue that Lebanon’s military must go to battle against Hezbollah to prove itself worthy of this assistance.
Aoun has vowed to disarm Hezbollah in the south per the ceasefire agreement but pushing the Lebanese army to fight Hezbollah directly would have catastrophic repercussions, not the least for American interests. Despite being severely weakened by the Israeli onslaught, the Lebanese Shiite movement remains a capable fighting force that will pose a significant challenge to such endeavors.
More importantly, even should the Lebanese military build-up its fighting capabilities, adopting this approach will almost certainly lead to splits within its ranks given that the military is a multi-sectarian institution that includes Shiites, most of whom would revolt against any plans to resort to force against Hezbollah. This scenario would undermine the very institution which Washington sees as its main Lebanese partner, not to mention raise the specter of the country’s likely descent into chaos and potential civil war.
Should this happen, the U.S. would lose the important gains it has made in Lebanon, and the wider geopolitical benefits it has likely accrued in the process.
Instead, Washington should support an internal Lebanese dialogue to address the issue of Hezbollah’s arms.
In his swearing in speech Aoun appeared to indicate that this was the approach he intends to pursue.
“I will also work to confirm the state’s right to monopolize the carrying of weapons" he stated, further declaring that talks will be held to discuss a “complete defense strategy on diplomatic, economic, and military levels that enables the Lebanese state to remove the Israeli occupation [from the south] and deter its aggression."
Hezbollah officials, meanwhile, did not cast Aoun’s speech in a negative light.
“Did you hear him make reference to UNSC resolutions that call for the disarmament of Hezbollah” asked an official from the Lebanese Shiite movement in comments to RS.
Hezbollah — which was one of the many factions that ended up voting for Aoun — also appears ready to discuss its arms as part of the defense strategy called for by the new Lebanese president.
“What we ultimately want is for Lebanon to be capable of defending itself,” the Hezbollah official added. “If the Lebanese state comes to possess the capabilities to do this, we would be ready to step aside.”
Washington must also ensure Israel lives up to its part of the ceasefire deal and withdraws from south Lebanon by the time the agreement expires on January 26. Failure to do so will only undermine Aoun and the Lebanese military establishment and thereby America’s position in the process.
To its credit, Washington appears aware of this reality, as U.S. special envoy Amos Hochstein has reportedly pledged that Israel will complete its pull-out before the deadline.
Supporting the Lebanese army and by extension the new president also serves broader purposes within the wider realm of great power competition with rivals like China and Russia. Despite its tiny size, Lebanon is pivotal on the regional chessboard of the Middle East. It also occupies a strategic geopolitical position as the gateway between East and West.
Lebanon notably joined Beijing’s Belt and Road initiative in 2017, with China showing a keen interest in raising its profile in the country.
In a congressional testimony in late 2019, former American ambassador to Lebanon Jeffrey Feltman warned that the United States must not lose interest in Lebanon, lest its influence in that country be curtailed by rivals like China and Russia.
These broader geopolitical dynamics, along with the desire to minimize the role of Hezbollah and Iran, go a long way in explaining why team Trump 2.0, too, has backed the Biden administration’s efforts in supporting Aoun.
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Top photo credit: Ukraine President Volodymyr Zelensky (Office of Ukraine President/Creative Commons); US President Donald Trump (Gabe Skidmore/Creative Commons) and Russian President Vladimir Putin (World Economic Forum/Creative Commons)
Russia’s dismissive response to possible provisions of a Trump settlement plan floated in Western media underscores how difficult the path to peace in Ukraine will be. It also highlights one of the perils of an approach to diplomacy that has become all too common in Washington: proposing settlement terms in advance of negotiations rather than first using discreet discussions with adversaries and allies to gauge what might be possible.
To achieve an accord that Ukraine will embrace, Russia will respect, and Europe will support, Trump will have to revive a tradition of American statesmanship — balancing power and interests among capable rivals — that has been largely dormant since the Cold War ended, and U.S. foreign policy shifted its focus toward democratizing other nations and countering terrorism.
A wide range of issues will require detailed negotiation, but three principles will be key to his success:
Put American Interests First. The Biden administration has, from the invasion’s start, insisted that it is up to Ukraine to decide if and when to seek an end to the war. It has offered tactical advice but deferred to Kyiv on setting strategy. This has proved to be a recipe for unending conflict that is devastating Ukraine and perversely incentivizing Kyiv to draw the United States more directly into the war.
Trump must put America back in the driver’s seat, focusing on core U.S. national interests in negotiating a settlement. Foremost among these is the establishment of a stable balance of power in Europe that deters rather than provokes Russian aggression, while enabling the United States to focus attention and resources on renewal at home and on a more formidable challenge, China, abroad. Ukraine cannot negotiate that regional balance; only the United States has the power to orchestrate the continent-wide mix of military measures and diplomatic safeguards that will be required.
Insisting that American interests serve as our North Star in negotiations does not mean that Trump should ignore Ukrainian interests in cutting a deal with Moscow. Without Ukraine’s buy-in, no settlement will prove lasting or effective, and ensuring that Ukraine can prosper as a secure, independent state is an important American goal. But some public pressure on Zelensky could help him deal with domestic opposition by blaming Trump for some painful but necessary compromises. Although opinion polls indicate that a majority of Ukrainians favors a quick settlement, there remains a group of hardcore nationalists that strongly oppose any negotiations.
Broaden the Problem. Part of the reason that Biden has deferred to Kyiv was a widely shared belief in Washington that the war is a bilateral matter between Russia and Ukraine, and that the key to any peace settlement was to maximize Ukraine’s leverage on the battlefield. That assumption was fundamentally flawed. It failed to understand that Russia’s enormous numerical advantages in population and military production meant Ukraine’s military was bound to weaken over time in a war of attrition, even with robust Western support. And it failed to recognize that the United States has long been able to negotiate from a position of strength if it viewed the war through a wider lens.
For Russia, the war is a key theater in a larger geopolitical conflict with the United States. Its primary goal has been to block Ukraine’s membership in NATO, as well as to prevent a U.S. presence in Ukraine that would threaten Russian security. But even capturing all of Ukraine would not resolve Russia’s larger security problems with NATO. The Kremlin would still have to contend with a 32-member NATO alliance whose military and economic might far exceeds that of Russia. In particular, Russia will soon face U.S. intermediate-range missiles in Germany for the first time since the 1980s, for which it has no effective countermeasures. These larger security issues provide the United States with leverage to end the war while protecting core Western and Ukrainian interests — including a secure path toward Ukrainian membership in the EU.
Play the China Card. Recognizing that the war has deepened Russia’s dependence on China, the Biden administration pressed the Chinese to arm-twist Putin into ending the invasion, dangling the prospect of new sanctions if Beijing refused. But Beijing’s ambivalence toward the war was never going to translate into picking sides, and Biden’s with-us-or-against-us approach missed an opportunity to explore the subtleties in China’s calls for settling the war.
China certainly sympathizes with Putin’s concerns about NATO, and it does not want Russia to lose, which would leave China alone facing an invigorated U.S. bloc. But neither is it happy about Russia’s territorial conquest, which evokes painful chapters in China’s own history and increases the chances of a nuclear conflict that would have numerous negative consequences for Beijing. Moreover, facilitating a compromise settlement could pay dividends for China’s image in Europe, a market that is growing in importance to Beijing as trade with the United States comes increasingly under threat.
Trump can channel this ambivalence into a helpful Chinese role. The United States does not need and should not seek Chinese help in mediation. But inviting China’s special envoy on Ukraine to visit the United States and discuss a settlement — something Beijing sought but Biden refused to offer — would put pressure on Putin to join peace talks. And China could play an invaluable role in post-accord reconstruction of Ukraine, which would serve as a powerful disincentive for Putin to violate the terms of a settlement or reinvade.
The path toward peace in Ukraine will be arduous. Russia is deeply distrustful of American intentions and has profound doubts that Trump can wrangle the Washington establishment into support for any settlement. But with diplomatic skill and a dollop of luck, Trump could achieve what until recently seemed all but impossible: an independent Ukraine securely embedded in the EU; a Europe better able to deter and counterbalance Russia with its own resources; and a Russia and China that are less united in their hostility toward Washington. That vision is well worth pursuing, even if the odds of failure are significant.
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