Follow us on social

Shutterstock_1688164231-scaled

Surprise: China COMPETES bill is boon for military spending

Legislation set for debate this week goes way beyond semiconductors and uses paranoia over not 'keeping up' to get more money for defense.

Analysis | Reporting | Military Industrial Complex

This week, the House of Representatives considers legislation that would authorize hundreds of billions of dollars in new federal spending on supply chains, research, foreign affairs initiatives, and more.

Though this bill, the America COMPETES Act, has been framed as an alternative to similar legislation passed by the Senate last year to address domestic semiconductor manufacturing, the massive America COMPETES bill could actually pave the way for increased military spending in the years ahead.

National security and competition with China are a major part of the messaging around the bill, with both President Biden and key Congressional Democrats framing America COMPETES as a way to "combat" or “outcompete” China. Now to be clear, China’s “state-led efforts to develop an indigenous, vertically integrated semiconductor industry, unprecedented in scope and scale” may be of legitimate concern to Members of Congress and the Biden administration. But it is worth noting that in 2019 China ranked only fourth in the world in semiconductor fabrication capacity, according to the Congressional Research Service (CRS). Three U.S. allies — South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan — combined to compose 5.5 times the “fab” capacity of China.

Nevertheless, Division A of the America COMPETES Act — and its parent legislation, the CHIPS for America Act, which was included in the fiscal year (FY) 2021 defense policy bill — is framed around “national security” and the threats posed by China. Rep. Michael McCaul (R-Texas), top Republican on the House Foreign Affairs Committee, warned upon introduction of the CHIPS for America Act in June 2020 that the “Chinese Communist Party aims to dominate the entire semiconductor supply chain.”

Lawmakers have been sufficiently spooked to authorize $54 billion in semiconductor (or ‘chip’) spending under the America COMPETES Act, for domestic semiconductor incentive programs already approved by law under CHIPS for America. That may be small compared to the likely FY 2022 military budget of $740 billion, but it’s no small potatoes.

The military also directly benefits from the chips largesse in America COMPETES. The Department of Defense, a likely beneficiary of significant budget increases this fiscal year, receives $2 billion under America COMPETES to “establish a public-private partnership” to “incentivize the formation of one or more consortia” to “ensure the development and production” of “secure microelectronics.” (I’ll pause while you wrap your head around the layers of bureaucracy Congress is setting up here; it took me awhile.)

For some, that additional $2 billion for the military (on top of the $25 billion budget boost they’re likely to receive when Congress finally figures out appropriations for FY 2022) is actually not enough. Rep. Pat Fallon (R-Texas) has a proposed amendment to the legislation that would have the Secretary of Defense identify “additional military funding [needed] to effectively respond” to China’s military. Rep. Fallon’s amendment would also include a “certification” — a professional and Congressional word for “complaint” — that America COMPETES provides no funding for the Department of Defense “to carry out military operations to counter the People’s Republic of China.”

Despite complaints from Rep. Fallon and other House Republicans that the bill doesn’t include enough funding for the military, these defense hawks may get their wish in due time. Multiple sections of the bill, and at least one proposed amendment, could pave the way for more military spending down the road. Allow me to take you on a brief tour of this military-adjacent language:

Section 10224 contains no funding but requires the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) to establish a “program for AI [artificial intelligence]-enabled defense research.”

Section 30210 asks the Secretaries of Defense and State to “present a plan for strengthening the community of civilian defense professionals in Taiwan” (this is the section Rep. Fallon would amend, asking the military to tell Congress how much money the military wants to respond to China’s military).

Section 30222 authorizes $225 million over five years for State Department international military education and training (IMET) programs.

Section 30224 asks the Secretaries of State and Defense to expand programs that “provide capabilities to allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific region” (this includes support for providing “air and missile defense systems,” “anti-ship cruise missiles,” “land attack cruise missiles,” and “long-range precision fires” missiles to Indo-Pacific allies).

Section 30247 authorizes $67.5 million over five years for the “International Military Education and Training Program” in Latin America and the Caribbean.

Section 30261 calls for “deepen[ing] bilateral defense consultations” with India.

Section 30263 asks the Secretaries of Defense and State to “develop a multi-year strategy” for supporting “U.S. interests” in the Indian Ocean.

Section 30299E calls on the Secretaries of Defense, State, and Homeland Security to report on how the U.S. can “provide assistance” and build “capacity” of civilian and national security institutions in the Pacific Islands.

Furthermore, a proposed amendment from Rep. Josh Gottheimer (D-N.J.) would authorize $655 million in five-year funding for foreign military financing assistance in the Indo-Pacific region and $40 million for a “pilot program” that would have countries enter into foreign military financing compacts with the U.S.

I don’t include any of the above provisions to suggest they are wholly good or wholly bad. Many of the countries referenced above have important economic, diplomatic, and/or security relationships with the United States, and several (like Taiwan) have to deal with aggression and interference in their affairs from China.

But beware when the reports and requests outlined above are submitted by military officials to members of Congress in the months and years ahead. The common thread through all could be requests for more funding, more programs, more personnel, more weapons, and more goods for the U.S. military. And in that way, the America COMPETES bill is more than just a monster bill that will cost taxpayers hundreds of billions of dollars now. It may increase the military budget far into the future.


(fotogrin/shutterstock)
Analysis | Reporting | Military Industrial Complex
POGO The Bunker
Top image credit: Project on Government Oversight

Bombers astray! Washington's priorities go off course

Military Industrial Complex

The Bunker appears originally at the Project on Government Oversight and is republished here with permission.


keep readingShow less
Trump Zelensky
Top photo credit: Joshua Sukoff / Shutterstock.com

Blob exploiting Trump's anger with Putin, risking return to Biden's war

Europe

Donald Trump’s recent outburst against Vladimir Putin — accusing the Russian leader of "throwing a pile of bullsh*t at us" and threatening devastating new sanctions — might be just another Trumpian tantrum.

The president is known for abrupt reversals. Or it could be a bargaining tactic ahead of potential Ukraine peace talks. But there’s a third, more troubling possibility: establishment Republican hawks and neoconservatives, who have been maneuvering to hijack Trump’s “America First” agenda since his return to office, may be exploiting his frustration with Putin to push for a prolonged confrontation with Russia.

Trump’s irritation is understandable. Ukraine has accepted his proposed ceasefire, but Putin has refused, making him, in Trump’s eyes, the main obstacle to ending the war.

Putin’s calculus is clear. As Ted Snider notes in the American Conservative, Russia is winning on the battlefield. In June, it captured more Ukrainian territory and now threatens critical Kyiv’s supply lines. Moscow also seized a key lithium deposit critical to securing Trump’s support for Ukraine. Meanwhile, Russian missile and drone strikes have intensified.

Putin seems convinced his key demands — Ukraine’s neutrality, territorial concessions in the Donbas and Crimea, and a downsized Ukrainian military — are more achievable through war than diplomacy.

Yet his strategy empowers the transatlantic “forever war” faction: leaders in Britain, France, Germany, and the EU, along with hawks in both main U.S. parties. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz claims that diplomacy with Russia is “exhausted.” Europe’s war party, convinced a Russian victory would inevitably lead to an attack on NATO (a suicidal prospect for Moscow), is willing to fight “to the last Ukrainian.” Meanwhile, U.S. hawks, including liberal interventionist Democrats, stoke Trump’s ego, framing failure to stand up to Putin’s defiance as a sign of weakness or appeasement.

Trump long resisted this pressure. Pragmatism told him Ukraine couldn’t win, and calling it “Biden’s war” was his way of distancing himself, seeking a quick exit to refocus on China, which he has depicted as Washington’s greater foreign threat. At least as important, U.S. involvement in the war in Ukraine has been unpopular with his MAGA base.

But his June strikes on Iran may signal a hawkish shift. By touting them as a decisive blow to Iran’s nuclear program (despite Tehran’s refusal so far to abandon uranium enrichment), Trump may be embracing a new approach to dealing with recalcitrant foreign powers: offer a deal, set a deadline, then unleash overwhelming force if rejected. The optics of “success” could tempt him to try something similar with Russia.

This pivot coincides with a media campaign against restraint advocates within the administration like Elbridge Colby, the Pentagon policy chief who has prioritized China over Ukraine and also provoked the opposition of pro-Israel neoconservatives by warning against war with Iran. POLITICO quoted unnamed officials attacking Colby for wanting the U.S. to “do less in the world.” Meanwhile, the conventional Republican hawk Marco Rubio’s influence grows as he combines the jobs of both secretary of state and national security adviser.

What Can Trump Actually Do to Russia?
 

Nuclear deterrence rules out direct military action — even Biden, far more invested in Ukraine than Trump, avoided that risk. Instead, Trump ally Sen.Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.), another establishment Republican hawk, is pushing a 500% tariff on nations buying Russian hydrocarbons, aiming to sever Moscow from the global economy. Trump seems supportive, although the move’s feasibility and impact are doubtful.

China and India are key buyers of Russian oil. China alone imports 12.5 million barrels daily. Russia exports seven million barrels daily. China could absorb Russia’s entire output. Beijing has bluntly stated it “cannot afford” a Russian defeat, ensuring Moscow’s economic lifeline remains open.

The U.S., meanwhile, is ill-prepared for a tariff war with China. When Trump imposed 145% tariffs, Beijing retaliated by cutting off rare earth metals exports, vital to U.S. industry and defense. Trump backed down.

At the G-7 summit in Canada last month, the EU proposed lowering price caps on Russian oil from $60 a barrel to $45 a barrel as part of its 18th sanctions package against Russia. Trump rejected the proposal at the time but may be tempted to reconsider, given his suggestion that more sanctions may be needed. Even if Washington backs the measure now, however, it is unlikely to cripple Russia’s war machine.

Another strategy may involve isolating Russia by peeling away Moscow’s traditionally friendly neighbors. Here, Western mediation between Armenia and Azerbaijan isn’t about peace — if it were, pressure would target Baku, which has stalled agreements and threatened renewed war against Armenia. The real goal is to eject Russia from the South Caucasus and create a NATO-aligned energy corridor linking Turkey to Central Asia, bypassing both Russia and Iran to their detriment.

Central Asia itself is itself emerging as a new battleground. In May 2025, the EU has celebrated its first summit with Central Asian nations in Uzbekistan, with a heavy focus on developing the Middle Corridor, a route for transportation of energy and critical raw materials that would bypass Russia. In that context, the EU has committed €10 billion in support of the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route.

keep readingShow less
Syria sanctions
Top image credit: People line up to buy bread, after Syria's Bashar al-Assad was ousted, in Douma, on the outskirts of Damascus, Syria December 23, 2024. REUTERS/Zohra Bensemra

Lifting sanctions on Syria exposes their cruel intent

Middle East

On June 30, President Trump signed an executive order terminating the majority of U.S. sanctions on Syria. The move, which would have been unthinkable mere months ago, fulfilled a promise he made at an investment forum in Riyadh in May.“The sanctions were brutal and crippling,” he had declared to an audience of primarily Saudi businessmen. Lifting them, he said, will “give Syria a chance at greatness.”

The significance of this statement lies not solely in the relief that it will bring to the Syrian people. His remarks revealed an implicit but rarely admitted truth: sanctions — often presented as a peaceful alternative to war — have been harming the Syrian people all along.

keep readingShow less

LATEST

QIOSK

Newsletter

Subscribe now to our weekly round-up and don't miss a beat with your favorite RS contributors and reporters, as well as staff analysis, opinion, and news promoting a positive, non-partisan vision of U.S. foreign policy.