A new study released on Monday found that U.S. airstrikes during the two-decade-long post-9/11 wars have killed at least 22,679 civilians in seven countries throughout the greater Middle East.
According to Airwars, which tracks civilian casualties in conflict zones, the United States declared that it had conducted at least 91,340 strikes in those seven countries — Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Pakistan, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen — and that as many as 48,308 civilians were killed as a result.
Airwars explains the difference in estimates as follows: "The gap between these two figures reflects the many unknowns when it comes to civilian harm in war. Belligerents rarely track the effects of their own actions – and even then do so poorly. It is left to local communities, civil society and international agencies to count the costs. Multiple sources can however suggest different numbers of fatalities, meaning that monitoring organisations like Airwars will record both minimum and maximum estimates."
The group also says that it “has examined only direct harm from U.S. strikes since 9/11 — with many of our sources providing conservative casualty estimates. We are therefore looking at a fraction of the overall civilian harm in these countries.”
The Airwars estimate comes on the heels of a new report from Brown University’s Costs of War Project which found that between 897,000 and 929,000 had been “directly killed” in the post-9/11 wars, and that around 365,000 of those were civilians. The Project estimated that total costs so far at nearly $8,000,000,000,000.
“As part of our research,” Airwars says, “we also sought official U.S. military estimates for the numbers of civilians killed by its own actions since 9/11. Neither CENTCOM nor the Department of Defense have published such findings.”
Ben Armbruster is the Managing Editor of Responsible Statecraft. He has more than a decade of experience working at the intersection of politics, foreign policy, and media. Ben previously held senior editorial and management positions at Media Matters, ThinkProgress, ReThink Media, and Win Without War.
A U.S. Air Force KC-10 Extender refuels an F-35A Lightning II above an undisclosed location, April 30, 2019. The KC-10 and its crew were tasked to support aerial refueling operations for the F-35A's first air interdiction during its inaugural deployment to the U.S. Air Forces Central Command's area of responsibility. (U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sgt. Chris Drzazgowski)|
The notion that AI-driven weapons will revolutionize warfare and put the country that masters them in the global driver’s seat is gospel among the new generation of techno-enthusiasts in the Pentagon and Silicon Valley.
But their claims for what emerging tech can do are unproven, and their visions of what it can achieve for the U.S. standing in the world are wildly unrealistic.
The latest addition to the AI discussion comes from Raj M. Shah and Christopher Kirchhoff in their new book, “Unit X: How the Pentagon and Silicon Valley Are Transforming the Future of War.” Shah and Kirchhoff are well qualified to speak on the topic. As former directors of the Pentagon’s Defense Innovation Unit X (hence the title “Unit X”), the two men spent countless hours building relationships between the Pentagon and Silicon Valley.
They also traveled the world to get current military personnel to share their thoughts on whether the weapons they were going into battle with were effective and user-friendly. If the book was a film, it could have been called “Raj and Christopher’s Excellent Adventure.”
Shah and Kirchhoff are right about one thing. Too often, the technology embedded in current weapons systems is far, far behind capabilities that are routine in the civilian sector. But the answer is to replace items that aren’t up to their assigned missions. The goal should not be to create an AI-driven arsenal, with AI controlling not only drones, but combat aircraft, tanks, and ships, with the objective of minimizing the use of human crews.
But just because a machine operated military can be created doesn’t mean it should be. Before going all in on an AI-driven military, Pentagon planners and the larger public should consider the danger of catastrophic accidents tied to software failures, or of a greater temptation to go to war in light of the reduced risk of human casualties.
Beyond the issue of how to integrate new technology into the armed forces lies a much more consequential question: how will a new emphasis on speed and massive data processing capabilities, deployed with little or no human involvement, shape how wars are fought? Will it make war more or less likely? Will it cause mass casualties? Is it the secret to diminishing Chinese power or the first step in an all out arms race?
These are all tough questions, but one thing is clear: just because an individual or firm has the ability to develop a revolutionary technology doesn’t mean they are the ones best equipped to decide how to use it.
But someone forgot to tell the new age militarists in Silicon Valley that. The most “visionary” leaders in the emerging tech crowd — people like Elon Musk (Space-X), Peter Thiel (Palantir), and Palmer Luckey (Anduril) — see themselves as technological saviors who know how to restore U.S. global dominance, beat China, and transform life as we know it, if only government would get out of the way and let them do the job. The new breed of Silicon Valley weapons makers doesn’t just want to make gadgets, they want to remake the world.
To their credit, Shah and Kirchhoff do not share the near delusional faith in the power of technology held by Musk and his cohorts. They’re mostly concerned about how to get the most up-to-date technology to the warfighter, and on how to avoid falling behind in the race to acquire next generation weapons. They have plenty of examples to back up their claims about the U.S. military using outmoded technology for critical functions.
A case in point is the Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC), based at al Udeid Air Base in Qatar. The authors described CAOC as “the command post for U.S. military operations across the Middle East.” When Shah visited the facility in October 2016, the CAOC looked bright, shiny and modern — at least at first glance. But upon closer inspection, Shah found the facility’s equipment to be dangerously out of date:
“[I]ts technology was woefully inadequate. Systems patched together with duct tape and band aids were making it unnecessarily difficult for our service members to do their jobs. … The technology at CAOC was holding people back, slowing things down, and it’s not too much of a stretch to say this –putting lives at risk.”
But while Shah and Kirchhnoff have done a good job of exposing the Pentagon’s technological weak points, they are on much shakier ground when they turn from talk about developing technology to weighing in on the U.S. role in the world. They are basically techno-alarmists, warning that if we lose the military tech race it will only be a matter of time until chaos reigns and the bad guys run the world.
According to Shah and Kirchhoff, this dangerous trend began in the 2010s:
“Other militaries sensed the fragility of what held together the world order — the ability of the United States to unquestionably win wars and keep the peace. Russia’s Vladimir Putin, Chinese President Xi Jinping, and North Korea’s Kim Jong Un each saw new ways to defeat the U.S. technologically.”
Unquestionably win wars? When was the last time that happened? The story of this century and prior is one of the United States taking on wars that should never have been fought, as in the Bush administration’s 2003 invasion of Iraq, or wars that went on far too long, as in America’s 20-plus year sojourn in Afghanistan. Needless to say, these conflicts did not make the world or their immediate regions more peaceful or more stable, given the hundreds of thousands of lives lost, the millions of people driven from their homes, and the installation of sectarian regimes that were either indifferent or outright opposed to taking dictates from Washington.
The problem in the above-mentioned wars was not the fault of the troops, who were by and large well-trained and well-armed. The problem was in the missions, which could not be won regardless of the technological sophistication of our forces. Even so, despite the clear evidence that technology alone will not secure America’s objectives, many of today’s military planners are looking at our biggest challenges — like how to deal with the threats posed by China — through a military-technical lens, putting diplomacy, dialogue, and reassurance in the back seat.
In the context of the recent, tragic history of American military interventions, Shah and Kirchhoff’s longing for a world where America calls the shots because of its military and technological superiority is almost quaint. The era of unsurpassed American military and economic dominance — which was never as great as advertised — is long gone, and a “revolution” in military technology will not change that. Trying to rise to dominance is a recipe for strategic and humanitarian disaster that will only hasten the decline in U.S. power and influence on the global stage.
A vigorous national conversation about how to subordinate new technology to a more realistic strategy is long overdue, and people like Shah and Kirchhoff should be part of that debate. But we need to hear more from experts and advocates outside the tech world if we are to come to a balanced conclusion.
Another key theme raised by “Unit X” is the difficulty of implementing change of any kind in the face of entrenched interests that have undue influence on the Pentagon, the Congress, and the broader public. Shah and Kirchhoff tell the story of two appropriations committee staffers who tried to zero out the budget of Unit X, for reasons unknown to either of them. Once Shah and Kirchhoff found the perpetrators, one of the staffers in question said that their boss was angry that none of the defense innovation funds were going to his home state of Indiana.
The pressure to spread the wealth from arms contracting across as many states and districts as possible is a tried and true method for keeping Pentagon dollars flowing, but it is also a deeply dysfunctional way to build a weapons system or set priorities for the future.
Advocates of new tech will continue to run into this problem as they push for a shift from big platforms like manned bombers, tanks and aircraft carriers to faster, more nimble, and more numerous systems that can be operated with or without human input. The political battle between the Silicon Valley upstarts and the old guard military-industrial behemoths like Lockheed Martin could be a decisive factor determining what kind of military America has in the decades to come.
Shah and Kirchhoff are under no illusion that the emerging tech crowd will automatically win the battle over the shape of America’s military, noting that “Advocates of innovation must keep pressing the seemingly Sisyphean task of reform. Leadership must back them to the hilt.”
There is no question that the United States needs strong, forward looking leadership if we are to navigate the coming period in world affairs in ways that promote peace and security rather than runaway arms racing and endless war. But developing new “miracle” technologies is not the answer. Technology should be a tool, not a cure for all of our ills or a driver of policy.
The sooner we abandon the hype surrounding emerging military technologies and take a cold, hard look at what strategy will be most likely to make the world a safer place in the years to come, the better off we will be.
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Umbrella for Democratic Change (UDC) supporters leave the final rally in Tlokweng, east of Gaborone, Botswana October 29, 2024. REUTERS/Thalefang Charles
In a stunning result that ran counter to much of the pre-election analysis and expectations, the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP), which had ruled Botswana since the country’s first post-independence election in 1966, lost its parliamentary majority in last Wednesday’s elections by a landslide.
The long-ruling party won only four of the 61 seats in the National Assembly, down from the 38 it won in the last general election five years ago.
The main opposition party, the Umbrella for Democratic Change (UDC), won 32 seats, surpassing the 31 needed to secure a governing majority. Under Botswana’s constitution, the majority in parliament elects the president. As a result, the UDC’s leader, Duma Boko, has ascended to the presidency, taking the place of the BDP’s Mokgweetsi Masisi, who resigned after more than seven years in power.
The election results evince the impressive growth of support in the relatively short history of the UDC, which was formed by a coalition of parties in 2012 to challenge the ruling BDP. In the latest election, the UDC ran in direct opposition to the BDP, arguing that the long-ruling party had repeatedly failed to deliver for the 2.5 million people of Botswana on issues ranging from the economy to healthcare, made worse by allegations of corruption.
Although much of the analysis heading into election day suggested that the BDP would almost certainly extend its nearly six-decade rule, it is now clear that the UDC’s arguments for a change in government resonated deeply with the people.
Botswana’s economy has faltered in recent years. The country’s relationship to the global economy is heavily dependent on diamond exports, which account for 80 percent of the country’s total exports. As the natural diamond market has suffered from a drop in global demand, in part due to the rise of lab-grown synthetic diamonds, the country has seen its premier industry shrink. The drop in global diamond demand is a major reason for the country’s drop in GDP growth, which fell from 5.5% in 2022 to 2.7% last year.
As the economy has slowed, a growing number of Batswana have struggled to find work. Unemployment in the country has risen to 27%, hitting young people particularly hard.
The ruling BDP’s reelection efforts were also hurt by internal divisions. Ian Khama, the son of the country’s first president and Masisis’s predecessor (Masisi served as Khama’s vice president), publicly criticized Masisi over a number of policy issues and accused him of authoritarian tendencies.
In the end, Khama formed a breakaway party, the Botswana Patriotic Front, which won four seats in Wednesday’s elections, equalling the number of seats won by the BDP.
The UDC released a manifesto in early September that listed its priorities, focusing heavily on improving the economy and providing new government services to Batswana. It argued that the country had to diversify its economy and pledged to add 450,000 to 500,000 jobs within the next five years, in part through investment in infrastructure projects.
The party says it will look to sectors such as agriculture, agro-processing, solar energy, and tourism as alternatives to diamond production in the years to come.
It also promised to raise the minimum wage, provide access to free internet across the country in government and community centers, and create a comprehensive healthcare system for citizens and permanent residents.
Although the country has fared quite well in global corruption surveys — especially when compared to other African states — there has been a growing perception in recent years that corruption, including nepotism, has increasingly creeped into government operations. Masisi reportedly gave a government contract worth 84 million Botswana Pula ($6.28 million) to his sister in 2022. Although such a contract alone doesn’t necessarily serve as an example of nepotism, it was widely perceived as such.
Masisi was also accused of bypassing judicial processes by interfering in local tribal land disputes.
Although stunning by themselves, Botswana’s election results are consistent with a pattern across southern Africa, in which leading and long-governing parties are struggling to retain their grip on power against a torrent of cries of corruption and weak economic performance that has successfully propelled opposition parties to grab a greater share of power.
South Africa’s African National Congress (ANC), which had secured a governing majority in every election since the end of apartheid in 1992, lost its majority in parliament earlier this year for the first time in its history, forcing it to form a coalition government.
Growing support for opposition parties in Tanzania ahead of last month’s local elections and next year’s general elections, has provoked a major crackdown against opposition protesters in recent weeks, leading to charges of human rights abuses committed by police. Among those detained in the protests have been leaders of the main opposition party, Chadema.
Namibia is similarly experiencing growing calls for a change in government. The South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), which has ruled the country since independence in 1990, fell below a two-thirds parliamentary majority in 2019 for the first time and is facing a strong challenge from numerous opposition parties in elections scheduled for November 27.
In addition to Namibia, Tanzania will hold local elections later this month and general elections next year.
These trends evince the political consequences of rising distrust among the public in countries across southern Africa. Citizens are increasingly distrustful of political elites and long-established ruling parties, which are widely seen as having failed to promote the wellbeing of all citizens, instead pushing policies that have contributed to economic stagnation, maintained social inequity, and worsened environmental conditions.
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Top photo credit: U.S. President Joe Biden meets with Chinese President Xi Jinping on the sidelines of the G20 leaders' summit in Bali, Indonesia, November 14, 2022. REUTERS/Kevin Lamarque/File Photo
Sparked by a Foreign Affairs essay proposing a “theory of victory” toward China, many prominent American analysts have joined the debate on whether the United States needs a “theory of victory” in its competition with China.
A recent report from the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) frames the debate in terms of “end state” vs. “steady state” in U.S.-China policy. The report presents a diversity of views from American observers as well as analysts from select countries in Asia and Europe. Collectively, these views reveal the central parameters of the current debate on U.S.-China competition.
Wide-ranging though it is, this debate is lacking in one crucial aspect: an interrogation of the concept of competition itself. This neglect is problematic because different conceptions of competition tend to shape different strategies of competition.
The Trump administration’s conception of “strategic competition” led to confrontational policies toward China. The Biden administration’s proposal of “managed competition” produced a more stable yet still tense relationship. As strategy is inherently interactive, Washington’s competitive strategy will also affect Chinese perceptions and responses.
For its part, Beijing is averse to using the term “competition” to characterize the relationship. Chinese officials have tried to modify it by adding adjectives such as “positive” or “healthy.” But they have yet to offer a theory — let alone concrete policy proposals — on “positive competition.”
Imagine Confucius, the ancient Chinese philosopher, joining the debate. He would have significantly expanded it by offering a radically different conception of competition. This would be the idea of “exemplary competition” (junzi zhi zheng) — and one that could transform U.S.-China rivalry into a force for mutual growth and global stability.
Consider ancient Chinese archery, which Confucius saw as a model of exemplary competition. Archers pursued excellence not by obstructing their opponents, but by perfecting their own skill and character. They engaged in parallel competition, each aiming at their own target, while adhering to elaborate rituals that fostered mutual respect and self-improvement.
The Confucian concept of “exemplary competition” presents an illuminating contrast to the U.S. approach to great power competition. At the heart of the contrast lie two different intellectual traditions: the individualist tradition that underlies Western — particularly American — thought, and the relational tradition central to Confucian philosophy. The individualist tradition, shaped by Enlightenment ideas and American history, sees individuals and nations as separate entities with their own interests and rights. In this view, competition is about different parties pursuing their own goals, often measuring success by how much they gain compared to others.
The Biden administration’s China strategy reflects this individualist pursuit of relative advantage. It encompasses a broad spectrum of policies designed to maintain American technological and economic preeminence, strengthen alliances to counterbalance Chinese influence, and frame the competition as a clash of value systems. The strategy’s ambitious scope, aiming at achieving superiority across technological, economic, political, military, intelligence, and global governance domains, reveals an underlying preoccupation with maintaining global primacy.
In contrast, the Confucian relational tradition sees people and nations not as isolated entities, but as deeply interconnected. Competition is not about pursuing relative advantage; it is a process of mutual elevation occurring within a web of relationships. The long-term health of the relationship takes precedence over short-term, narrowly self-interested gains. As exemplified in ancient Chinese archery, the goal was not merely to win, but to improve oneself and one’s competitors, thereby strengthening the social fabric.
This concept of exemplary competition casts light on the inadequacies of the current debate on U.S.-China competition. A central divide in the debate is between hawks, who want to equate “winning” with regime change inside China, and moderates, who seek to manage competitive coexistence and avoid inadvertent conflict.
The hawks, represented by former Trump administration national security official Matt Pottinger and former Rep. Mike Gallagher (R-Wis.), focus solely on maximizing U.S. interests. They assume that a U.S. “victory” necessitates China’s defeat. The moderates highlight the risks of unchecked confrontation such an approach would bring about. They emphasize the importance of stabilizing the relationship and cooperating on key issues of mutual concern.
From a Confucian perspective, the framing of this debate is misguided. Confucius would likely urge a fundamentally different conception of “winning” or “success.” Victory in an exemplary competition between the United States and China would involve both nations improving themselves and excelling in their respective strengths while maintaining a peaceful and cooperative relationship. Washington and Beijing would each strive to enhance their own capacities and address their internal challenges, rather than focusing on obstructing or undermining the other.
The goal would not be to “defeat” the other side or force a change in its political system, but to achieve the best possible version of oneself.
This conception of success presents a different set of policy imperatives for both countries. For the United States, it would emphasize reinvigorating democratic institutions, strengthening educational systems, modernizing infrastructure, catalyzing innovation, and addressing systemic social inequalities. For China, the focus would shift toward enhancing democratic governance, confronting environmental challenges, and achieving sustainable development. Both nations would be “winning” by becoming better versions of themselves, not by diminishing the other.
The foreign policy implications of this approach are equally significant. Exemplary competition does not dismiss the genuine differences and tensions between the United States and China; rather, it provides a framework for channeling competitive impulses constructively. It acknowledges the importance of safeguarding legitimate interests and encourages the fostering of enlightened, rather than narrow, self-interest.
Moreover, it would compel Washington and Beijing to assume collaborative leadership in addressing humanity’s most pressing challenges — particularly climate change, pandemics, and artificial intelligence governance.
Although the idea of exemplary competition has distinctive Confucian roots, its relational foundation is not entirely foreign to American thought and practice. The various European-descended subcultures of American society have historically valued family harmony and community cooperation.
Indeed, elements of exemplary competition are discernible in the Biden administration’s China policy, particularly in its emphasis on domestic renewal. These promising developments are nevertheless overshadowed by a threat-based competitive strategy oriented toward zero-sum outcomes.
American analysts have demonstrated a keen awareness of the importance of exemplary competition, albeit without explicitly framing their ideas in these terms. In the CSIS report mentioned earlier, various experts propose innovative approaches centered on domestic renewal.
This common ground, though modest, suggests that exemplary competition between the United States and China remains possible. At a minimum, it indicates that the U.S. policy community should expand its conception of competition.
The same imperative applies to China. Despite being the birthplace of Confucianism, China has not explored the implications of Confucian exemplary competition for contemporary U.S.-China relations. Furthermore, current Chinese foreign policy often fails to meet Confucian standards. As the wellspring of Confucian thought, China bears a particular responsibility to embody exemplary competition in its U.S. policy.
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