President Biden’s decision to withdraw from Afghanistan ended an unsustainable U.S. military intervention with no end in sight. Over the last two decades of the war in Afghanistan countless Afghans assisted the American mission by working as interpreters and in civil society and human rights.
Right now, Washington is undertaking a massive evacuation of U.S. citizens and permanent residents, special immigrant visa applicants (SIVs), and other refugees with priority statuses. Kabul’s airport only has one runway and the Taliban have set up checkpoints outside some of its gates and along routes to the airport. Now is not the time for bureaucracy or delay. The United States will only get one opportunity to evacuate as many vulnerable people as possible. Below find four steps the Biden administration can take immediately to accomplish this goal.
Establish a through line between U.S. government agencies and civil society. There are several organizations that have worked around the clock for months on the issue of Special Immigrant Visas (SIVs) and refugees with priority statuses. These organizations are staffed with subject-matter experts who have continuous contact with at-risk individuals and often have significant military or government experience. The Pentagon and Department of State should take advantage of this resource through an organized joint effort. It is also critical that information from U.S. government agencies is distributed through an established pipeline. Ad hoc releases of information and rumor mills have only induced panic.
Secure the airport. With the Taliban in control of Kabul it is increasingly difficult to secure the airport and its immediate surroundings. Nevertheless, a more orderly process would decrease chaos and entry points could be made more efficient to avoid trapping vulnerable individuals who are turned away or asked to wait and find themselves stuck in limbo between airport gates and Taliban checkpoints. Increasing consular staff and services inside the airport will also help.
Stop fixating on the paperwork. There should not be reports of C-17s departing from Kabul half filled. A fixation on prioritizing certain categories of evacuees over others, minutiae of paperwork, and whether an Afghan national is in contact with a U.S. based organization is slowing down the evacuation process. U.S. soldiers are not trained to serve as customs officials. A minimal set of details should be verified and then individuals should be evacuated to a third country. Details can be worked out in third countries and individuals who do not qualify for entry into the United States can be referred to the UNHCR or third countries. President Biden himself appeared to endorse this approach in an interview with ABC’s George Stephanopoulos when he said, “I had a meeting today for a couple hours in the Situation Room just below here. There are Afghan women outside the gate. I told 'em, ‘Get 'em on the planes. Get them out. Get them out. Get their families out if you can.’"
Use backdoor diplomacy where possible. The Taliban have set-up checkpoints, discharged their weapons, and harassed and beat individuals attempting to make their way to the airport. The United States has limited control over these actions, but keeping the communication lines open could prove critical to preventing the situation from deteriorating even more. A clear message should be delivered to the Taliban that slowing down the evacuation is not in their interests.
Adam Weinstein is Deputy Director of the Middle East program at the Quincy Institute, whose current research focuses on security and rule of law in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq.
A boy is processed through an Evacuee Control Checkpoint (ECC) during an evacuation at Hamid Karzai International Airport, Kabul, Afghanistan August 18, 2021. Picture taken August 18, 2021. U.S. Marine Corps/Staff Sgt. Victor Mancilla/Handout via REUTERS THIS IMAGE HAS BEEN SUPPLIED BY A THIRD PARTY./File Photo
Johnny Harris, a popular
YouTuber with nearly 6 million subscribers, published a video on Thursday that sought to answer an enormous question: “Why does the U.S. spend so much on its military”? He answers that question in extreme detail and ultimately arrives at uncovering why, in large part, the Pentagon budget is so high: the corrupt process of how lawmakers and big defense contractors and their lobbyists are all on the take.
The first half of Harris’s deep, 28 minute long dive into the U.S. military budget focuses on what the Pentagon is actually paying for, things like troops’ salaries and health care, operations and maintenance, bases, construction, and research and development. He notes that the Defense Department is so big and complex, it has
never been able to pass a financial audit.
“The U.S. is not a normal country with a regular military,” Harris says, by way of offering a kind of explanation as to why the Pentagon spends so much on all these things. “The U.S. is a global hegemon who uses its military to assert control and order over every corner of the globe,” he adds, in effect, flagging American primacy as a culprit.
“But there’s another reason why this budget is so high and this reason is much more infuriating to me,” Harris says. ”Most of this money is going to private corporations.”
Harris then spends the rest of the video breaking down our country’s corrupt procurement processes, starting with weapons companies. “We’ve got kind of a monopoly issue on our hands,” he says, noting how dozens of weapons contractors consolidated themselves down to 5 big corporations. “For this reason the prices can get pretty out of control.”
Dr. Heidi Peltier, Senior Researcher at the Watson Institute at Brown University and Director of the Costs of War Project, then tells Harris about how, because of their monopoly, weapons contractors can engage in severe
price gouging practices. “The Department of Defense has found routinely that there’s overcharging through corruption and waste and fraud,” she said, which, in part, has resulted in 40-50% profit margins.
For example, the Pentagon, Harris notes, paid Boeing $3,357 for one ball bearing, a part it could have gotten for $15. Harris then details how all the corruption works:
The big 5 contractors — Boeing, Lockheed Martin, General Dynamics, Raytheon (now RTX) and Northrop Grumman — are “doing whatever they can to make sure the money keeps flowing to their companies” with lobbying and campaign contributions.
The revolving door: “In 2022 top defense companies hired 672 employees directly out of the Pentagon to work as lobbyists, board members and executives,” Harris says. According to Peltier: Contractors “promise a good, high paying job after that government official is out of government and so the government official has an incentive to give a generous contract to the contractor.”
Lawmakers’ profit: “To add insult to injury here, some of the lawmakers who approve the Pentagon’s budget own stocks in the defense contracting companies,” Harris says. “The lawmakers get richer if we spend more money on defense,” he adds, noting that this is a clear conflict of interest: “We should not do this. This is not a thing we should do.”
Lawmakers’ incentive for re-election: Harris then explains how defense contractors “intentionally allocate their operations all across the country” so “lawmakers are incentivized to keep these contractors making stuff in their district to provide jobs for their people so they can keep getting elected.”
Harris then highlights Sen. Roger Wicker as an example of a member of Congress who often pushes for more money for the Pentagon, which in turn goes to weapons companies, who then lobby Congress and make campaign contributions so lawmakers can tell their constituents they’re diverting federal funds to their districts to protect (or create) defense jobs:
“It is this system that has created an environment where there is very little political pushback to the endless ratcheting up of our military budget,” Harris says. Watch:
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Top image credit: Diplomacy Watch: A peace summit without Russia (RS)
The Ukrainian Defense Contract Group (UDCG or Ramstein) meeting in Germany this week has been officially postponed as President Biden bowed out to instead focus on the fallout from Hurricane Milton.
Initially planned for October 12, Ukrainian President Volodomir Zelensky was supposed to share his plans with Western policy makers and defense contractors at the meeting, saying “we will present the victory plan, clear, specific steps for a just end to the war.”
While the Ramstein summit has been postponed, Ukraine’s Western allies seem to be shifting their stances on how the war can, or should end. Former NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg recently indicated that Ukraine may have to give up some territorial integrity in exchange for peace or even NATO membership. Stoltenberg had previously explicitly ruled out any land for peace deals.
Western allies may be coming to a decision point on how they will move forward with the Ukraine-Russian war. Zelensky is regularly meeting with NATO allies, and said they are consistently affirming support, but still refusing to cross certain lines. For example, UK Prime Minister Kier Starmer reaffirmed the United Kingdom’s support for Ukraine after a meeting with the Ukrainian president on Thursday.
But when asked about allowing Ukraine to use British-made long range missiles deep into Russian territory, a spokesperson said, “We obviously want to put Ukraine in the strongest position. But no war has ever been won by a single weapon. And on Storm Shadow specifically, there has been no change to the UK government’s position on the use of long-range missiles.”
Further weapons packages and NATO assurances were likely to be approved at the Ramstein meeting, according to U.N. Secretary General Mark Rutte. ”What we need to do is to focus on what NATO can do,” he said. “What NATO can do is help to strengthen Ukraine's hands by providing enough military support. That's why I'm so happy that next Saturday we will participate in the Ramstein meeting.” Additional weapons packages were guaranteed at the previous meeting in 2023.
The postponement of this important confab is surely disappointing for Zelensky as it is preceded by Russian successes on the battlefield and a shift in opinion amongst Ukrainian soldiers and civilians around the war. Vice President Kamala Harris also recently refused to say if she would support a Ukrainian ascension into NATO if elected. Additionally, fiscal realities in Europe are shifting German and French support for Kyiv.
In other Ukraine are new this week:
On Tuesday Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban said that Ukraine is not able to beat Russia on the battlefield and called for a ceasefire. Reuters reports that Hungary has also decided to place a hold on a pending $50 billion G7 loan to Ukraine until after the American election. “We don't want to block anything, we just want to convince European leaders to change their strategy (on Ukraine) because the current strategy does not work,” Orban said.
Ukraine claims to have hit a North Korean weapons cache in Russia. On Wednesday Al Jazeerareported that a Ukrainian spokesperson announced that a drone attack in Bryansk successfully destroyed this strategic weapons cache. The Ukrainian General Staff said, “the arsenal stored ammunition for missile and artillery systems, including those delivered from North Korea, as well as glide bombs.” This comes as North Korean engineers and officers are reported to be assisting Russia in the conflict.
Russia continues to make territorial gains. Last week it captured Vuhledar in Ukraine's southeast, and this week Russian troops have now entered Toretsk, a city about 50 miles north, according to the New York Times. A Ukrainian Army spokeswoman, Anastasia Bobovnikova, confirmed late Monday that Russia had entered the city.
In this week’s October 7th State department briefing:
State Department Spokesperson Matthew Miller was asked about Moscow’s recentsentencing of an American citizen to prison for allegedly fighting as a mercenary in Ukraine. Miller said the United States has limited information as of now, and urges Moscow to grant consular access to him for Washington.
Miller did not answer a question concerning the report that North Koreans were killed fighting for Russia.
Another Azerbaijani war against Armenia with potential for significant regional destabilization is imminent. Yet, it is preventable.
Azerbaijan, supported by Turkey and Russia, claims the right to an extra-territorial “corridor” through Southern Armenia. Following the United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP29 — November 11-22, 2024) in Azerbaijan’s capital Baku, when the world attention is elsewhere, the risk of an Azerbaijani offensive to grab the “corridor” by force will increase significantly.
Armenia could preempt this violent outcome by urging comprehensive negotiations with Azerbaijan, also engaging regional and global powers.
The September 2023 Azerbaijani offensive against the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (NKR) and the ethnic cleansing of the Armenians there fundamentally altered the geopolitical landscape and terminated the November 9, 2020 tripartite ceasefire agreement that ended the 44-day Azerbaijani war against the unrecognized NKR. The agreement was signed by Armenia, Azerbaijan and Russia, based on which Azerbaijan claims the right to a “corridor” through southern Armenia’s Syunik Province, which Azerbaijan calls “Zankezur.”
With the tripartite agreement, labeled as a “statement,” the parties pledged to “a complete ceasefire and termination of all hostilities in the area of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict” (Article 1). Further, they agreed to deploy Russian “peacemaking forces … along the contact line in Nagorno-Karabakh and along the Lachin Corridor,” connecting NKR to Armenia (Article 3).
The purpose of the tripartite agreement formulated in Article 1 ceased to exist with the complete breakdown of the ceasefire when Azerbaijan launched an all-out offensive against NKR on September 19, 2023. The nine-month Azerbaijani blockade of the Lachin Corridor preceding the offensive breached Article 3. And the premature withdrawal of the Russian “peacemaking forces” from NKR in April 2024, also breaching Article 3, confirmed the end of the agreement. With the material breaches of these three fundamental clauses, the tripartite agreement could be considered terminated in accordance with Article 60 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
Moreover, unlike the reference to the “Lachin Corridor” in Article 3, the tripartite agreement does not use the term “corridor” for the transportation link through southern Armenia. Instead, the agreement stipulates four obligations in Article 9: (a) “economic and transport connections in the region shall be unblocked;” (b) “Armenia shall guarantee the security of transport connections” between Azerbaijan and its Nakhichevan exclave for “unobstructed movement of persons, vehicles and cargo in both directions;” (c) the Border Guard Service of Russia “shall be responsible for overseeing the transport connections;” and (d) subject to agreement between the Parties, the construction of new transport communications to link Nakhichevan with the western regions of Azerbaijan will be ensured.
Consequently, the “economic and transport connections” foreseen are not limited only through southern Armenia for Azerbaijan’s use, but also must be “unblocked” throughout the region, including for Armenian transport through Azerbaijan to Russia and elsewhere (a). The transport connections through Armenia must be under Armenian sovereignty, otherwise it could not “guarantee the security” (b), and it must be “subject to agreement between the Parties” (d), meaning further negotiations will be required, if not requiring a new agreement between Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Russia, the signatories of the tripartite agreement.
For strategic considerations and goodwill, Armenia may decide not to consider terminated the November 9, 2020 tripartite ceasefire agreement, and instead may prefer to negotiate the terms of the communication links in accordance with the agreement. While resisting concessions demanded by Azerbaijan, Armenia could consider offering secure and guaranteed transit rights between Azerbaijan and Nakhichevan, a core Azerbaijani need, regardless of the label used, “economic and transport connections” or “Zangezur Corridor.” The transit rights must be under clearly defined terms and subject to strict Armenian sovereignty and control, but with international monitoring. The agreed transport connection must not interrupt Armenia’s border and communication links with Iran.
Additionally, Armenia and Azerbaijan must agree on customs, border security, and inspections, if any. Reciprocal rights for travel through Azerbaijan must be considered as well. The agreement must also safeguard against the specter of any territorial claims from Armenia.
Last month, Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi warned Russia and Azerbaijan that any corridor through southern Armenia must not block the border between Armenia and Iran — “territorial integrity of our neighbors or redrawing of boundaries is totally unacceptable and a red line for Iran.”
To sweeten the offer, Armenia could consider a joint Armenian, Azerbaijani, and international community financed infrastructure development consisting of rail, highway, bridges and tunnels for the benefit of both countries and to promote regional integration. Azerbaijan has already commenced the development of a rail and highway infrastructure on its side of the border to connect with the “economic and transport connections” through southern Armenia yet to be agreed.
Armenia and Azerbaijan could also consider demilitarizing certain border areas linked to the corridor infrastructure development based on reciprocity and security guarantees, thus creating a buffer zone and reducing future military confrontation risks. Whether military personnel and equipment will be allowed across the corridor should be part of the agreement to be negotiated.
De-escalation of mutual hostile rhetoric to build trust could be part of the negotiations for an agreement on the corridor, including the release of the 23 Armenian prisoners now held in Baku. Border delimitation and delineation, and the renunciation of the threat or use of force by Azerbaijan must be part of any corridor agreement.
Regional powers, including Iran and India, could be instrumental in persuading Russia to deter Azerbaijan from a military seizure of the “Zangezur Corridor” and instead to pursue the peaceful alternative outlined in this article. Once on board, Russia in turn could convince Turkey to support the peaceful alternative for the corridor linking Azerbaijan mainland with its Nakhichevan exclave, Turkey and beyond.
Strong, coordinated messaging from the U.S. and Europe to Azerbaijan could go a long way that the threat and use of force is unacceptable, and that any economic and transport connection arrangement must be negotiated peacefully and must respect Armenia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Sanctions must be on the table if Azerbaijan escalates tensions or threatens the use of force again.
The U.S. and EU could have an active involvement in the peace process, providing a neutral platform for negotiations and ensuring that an agreement is implemented in good faith. The U.S. and Europe must be mindful not to undermine Russian and Iranian support for an agreement on the peaceful resolution of the Azerbaijani claim of a corridor. Without input from both Iran and Russia, the current rhetoric over “Zangezur Corridor” is likely to lead to renewed Azerbaijani aggression against Armenia.
It is imperative that Armenia act proactively to prevent a new war in the South Caucasus. By leveraging diplomatic pressure, economic incentives and disincentives, and security guarantees, powers in the region and beyond can assume a crucial role in averting a new crisis and supporting a peaceful resolution. Armenia, while maintaining its sovereignty, can offer carefully crafted compromises to create a win-win outcome for all.
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