Despite the fact that the global gross domestic product fell by nearly 5 percent because of the COVID-19 pandemic, military spending worldwide increased by almost 3 percent, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.
SIPRI’s annual assessment released on Monday once again found the United States to be the world’s biggest spender, accounting for nearly 40 percent of overall expenditures. U.S. military spending in 2020 increased by 4.4 percent from 2019.
“The recent increases in U.S. military spending can be primarily attributed to heavy investment in research and development, and several long-term projects such as modernizing the U.S. nuclear arsenal and large-scale arms procurement,” said SIPRI’s Alexandra Marksteiner, a researcher with its Arms and Military Expenditure Program. “This reflects growing concerns over perceived threats from strategic competitors such as China and Russia, as well as the Trump administration’s drive to bolster what it saw as a depleted U.S. military.”
Marksteiner’s statement is illustrative of the flimsy arguments used in Washington to justify increasing the U.S. defense budget.
For one thing, the modernization of the U.S. nuclear arsenal does not have to come anywhere close to the proposed $1.3 trillion over the next 30 years. Part of that plan involves spending nearly $300 billion on nuclear armed missiles, or ICBMs, that we don’t even need (and may even make nuclear war more likely).
And these “perceived threats” that Marksteiner refers to are just that: perceived — perceived by those who have an interest in creating threats and then selling weapons to counter them with.
Ben Armbruster is the Managing Editor of Responsible Statecraft. He has more than a decade of experience working at the intersection of politics, foreign policy, and media. Ben previously held senior editorial and management positions at Media Matters, ThinkProgress, ReThink Media, and Win Without War.
Top photo credit: Ukraine president Volodymyr Zelensky pictured at a visit to Neder-Over-Heembeek military hospital, Thursday 17 October 2024, in Brussels. Belgium welcomed three Ukrainian soldiers since September 2024 in the military hospital, specialized for burn patients. BELGA PHOTO DIRK WAEM.
This week, Politico scooped the news: German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, before meeting NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte in Berlin, informally voiced opposition to Ukraine’s prospects for an alliance membership, suggesting instead a “Finlandization” option — a neutral status like Finland maintained between NATO and the Soviet Union during the Cold War and for the subsequent three decades between NATO and Russia.
According to the report, his suggestion was mulled amid talk in Berlin of setting up a “contact group” together with China, India, and Brazil in search of a negotiated end to the war in Ukraine. This idea was not raised during the meeting with Rutte as it does not yet represent a consolidated position of the German government — an unwieldy coalition of Scholz’s war-weary Social Democrats, ardently pro-Ukraine Greens, and fiscal hawks in the liberal Free Democrats party (FDP).
The fact, however, that the Finlandization option is even discussed now shows how far the debate in Europe has shifted from the “whatever it takes for Ukraine’s victory” mantra to a more sober assessment of the realities on the ground: even The Economist, a staunch supporter of Ukraine’s cause from the outset, now accepts that it’s not a victory but mere survival as an independent state that is at stake for Ukraine.
For Ukraine, “Finlandization” would mean giving up its NATO membership aspirations — something that Moscow claimed was such an intolerable threat to its national security that felt compelled to invade Ukraine to prevent it. The concept first acquired negative connotations during the debates on the Baltic states’ prospective NATO membership in 1990s — it was perceived then by supporters, both in the U.S. and the Baltics, as artificially creating zones of influence in Europe. By being left outside of NATO, the Baltics feared they would be relegated to Russia’s zone of influence, if not worse.
The Baltics, of course, joined NATO during the George W. Bush administration, and there is no point now in relitigating the debates that led up to the decision. It, however, was always odd to use “Finlandization” as a bogeyman considering that Finland managed to build a resilient democracy and a top-performing, innovative economy while remaining neutral.
But these days, even Finland seems to repudiate that remarkably successful legacy; its ambassador to Berlin dismissed the notion because “it is not in our interest to restore any artificial spheres of interest” and “we are obliged to respect the freedom of choice of Ukraine, as well as its territorial integrity.”
Finland, as well as Sweden, joined NATO after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, even though the ground for such a step had already been prepared for decades by hawkish Atlanticists in both countries, including Alexander Stubb, the current president of Finland, and Carl Bildt, a former prime minister and foreign minister of Sweden.
There are, however, still examples of successful neutral countries in Europe, like Austria, where even now none of the mainstream political parties are pushing for NATO membership. That underscores the limited utility of using a NATO/Russia dichotomy as the exclusive lens for discussions on security and stability in eastern Europe.
The fact that Berlin seems to be willing to look beyond that artificial dichotomy and warm to the idea of Ukraine’s permanent neutrality reflects the shifting popular mood in Germany. Chancellor Scholz has for some months voiced ideas that were until recently considered taboo, such as direct talks with Russia at a next peace summit on Ukraine. The rise in a string of local elections of the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) and the left-populist Sahra Wagenknecht party (BSW) at the expense of the ruling coalition’s parties is explained in part by their opposition to a further war in Ukraine. In June 2024, the AfD and BSW boycotted a Bundestag address by Volodymyr Zelenskyy, Ukraine’s president, for his “uncompromising views,” even though Wagenknecht condemned Putin’s invasion.
Of the two parties, the BSW in particular is poised to reap the political benefits from its anti-war stance. As a far-right party, AfD is subjected to a “cordon sanitaire,” or firewall, meaning that no other party has agreed to form a coalition with it, either at a local or national level. That gives BSW additional leverage to negotiate coalition deals. It already used it in Thuringia, a state in Germany’s east, forcing the two potential partners, the state’s center-right Christian-Democrats (CDU) and center-left Social Democrats (SPD) to issue a call for Germany to lead efforts for a diplomatic settlement of the war.
The BSW, which at 9% currently, far outperforms in the national polls the liberal FDP (which would not clear the 5% threshold if elections were held today) and runs neck and neck with the declining Greens (around 10%) emerges as a viable alternative for coalition-building with both the CDU and SPD -- the new legislative elections in Germany are currently scheduled for autumn 2025 but could take place much earlier if the current federal coalition collapses, as seems increasingly likely. – On November 6, the Chancellor Scholz sacked Finance Minister Christian Lindner (FDP) over the latter’s calls for early elections due to disagreements over the budget. That sets the stage for a confidence vote on the government to be held on January 15, and then snap elections in March. In any early elections, both BSW and AfD are likely to perform well given the recent state election results, and BSW will almost certainly leverage its pro-peace stance in any potential negotiations.
The problem is that even if “Finlandization” of Ukraine becomes the official line of a hypothetical new German government, it may simply be too late to use it as an incentive for Russia to end the war. It was a realistic option in the still-born peace agreement negotiated in Istanbul in April 2022 but that collapsed over Russia’s overbearing demands and the West’s promises to escalate support for Ukraine on the battlefield.
Sensing that the tide has turned in his favor, Russian President Vladimir Putin may be tempted to press for greater advantage before he acquiesces to serious negotiations. Russian hardliners, such as the former president and current deputy chairman of the Security Council, Dmitry Medvedev, are pushing further west and talking about the destruction of Ukrainian statehood as a war aim. Tragically, “Finlandization,” even if Ukraine and its Western backers like Germany, would agree to it, may no longer be enough to end the war.
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Top image credit: Itamar Ben-Gvir, Minister of National Security of Israel, shouts at the opening of the 25th Knesset session marking the anniversary of the “Iron Swords” war on Monday, in Jerusalem, October 28, 2024. DEBBIE HILL/Pool via REUTERS
Israel’s parliament, the Knesset, approved a piece of legislation on Thursday that gives the government permission to deport family members of those who Israel labels as “terrorists.” This law affects Israelis, as well as Palestinian citizens.
The law was sponsored by Hanoch Milwidsky, a member of the right-wing Likud party. If the legislation goes unchallenged by the courts, it would allow the interior minister to deport parents, siblings, or spouses of anyone labeled as a terrorist, if that person has “expressed support or identification” or failed to report information concerning an act of terror, or terror organization. Al Jazeera’s Nour Odeh points out that one potential issue with this policy is that “all Palestinian factions are labeled as terrorist organizations by Israel.” Additionally, expressing sympathy for the humanitarian situation in Gaza has previously been labeled as being sympathetic to terror.
Annalle Sheline, research fellow at the Quincy Institute, agrees, saying “the proposed legislation is horrifying, both for expanding Israel's existing policy of holding individuals accountable for the actions of members of their family, and for the extremely broad definition of so-called 'terrorism' that they intend to apply.”
Israeli national security minister Itamar Ben-Gvir expressed support for the new law on X: “today we passed a law deporting families of terrorists. It seems to me that the left has come under pressure, let's continue!”
The expulsions would range from 7-20 years depending on the legal status of the defendant. The law may be challenged in court, however, with a senior researcher at the Israel Democracy Institute, Eran Shamir-Borer, saying that the Supreme Court will likely strike down the law. “The bottom line is this is completely nonconstitutional and a clear conflict to Israel’s core values,” he said.
Israel does recognize a basic protection of freedom of speech and expression, but it is notably limited. Expression is restricted when it is likely to cause public harm. Speech that could insight racism, terrorism, Holocaust denialism, or insult to public servants is also restricted.
During the same session, the Knesset approved a temporary measure that allows for minors under the age of 14 to be imprisoned following a murder conviction that is connected to a terrorist act or organization.
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Top photo credit: Arab Americans gather at a restaurant for a presidential election watch party In Dearborn, Michigan, U.S. November 5, 2024. REUTERS/Rebecca Cook
Foreign policy was way down on the list of voters' concerns in Tuesday's election, according to the exit polls, something that was expected.
It is not entirely clear, however, whether President Biden's Israel policy hurt the Democratic vote in swing states, particularly in Michigan, where returns Tuesday night indicated that Vice President Harris's performance in key Arab-American/Muslim counties like Wayne County (home to Dearborn) and Washtenaw County (home to University of Michigan) — were not rising to the level of President Biden's performance four years earlier.
Unofficial results in Dearborn reported overnight showed 27% for Harris and a stunning 46% for Trump and 22% for Jill Stein. The Mayor of Dearborn did not endorse Trump, but would not endorse Harris either, mainly because of the administration's Israel policy.
As of 7:30 a.m. ET today, Harris was winning Washtenaw County by 71% with 95% of the vote in; Biden won it by 72% in 2020. Meanwhile, Trump was getting 26% of the vote in Washtenaw, compared to 25% in 2020, so not so far off from 2020 results. However, in Wayne County, Harris was winning by 63%, which is lower than Biden's 68% in 2020, and third party candidate Jill Stein was getting nearly 1.5% — over 12,600 votes — which was much more than what she was showing in other Michigan counties. Trump was at 33% in Wayne, outperforming his 30% vote total of 2020.
In the Associated Press's VoteCast exit polls, foreign policy came in less than 8%, compared to 39% for the economy. In Michigan, foreign policy came in around the same percentage, while 41% of voters said the economy was most important to them.
In exit polling by a consortium of news organizations, including NBC, CBS, ABC, and CNN, foreign policy came in at 4% nationally, far behind the economy at 27% and 35% who said the state of democracy was their most important issue.
What did these exit polls say about Israel? It's not a crystal clear picture.
In Michigan, 30% of voters polled said U.S. support for Israel is "too strong" (62% of Harris voters said so, as did 36% of Trump voters). Some 26% said U.S. support wasn't "strong enough" and 37% said it was "just right." This basically reflects the national polling on the Israel question.
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