Foundation for the Defense of Democracies CEO Mark Dubowitz is best known for his leadership in promoting “economic warfare” against Iran as a means to foment regime change in Tehran or outright war with the Islamic Republic.
Part of that campaign requires spreading a lot of mis- or disinformation, and Dubowitz himself has been a ferventparticipant in those efforts.
Over the weekend, Dubowitz tweeted a passage from a Wall Street Journal article that noted an IMF report that “predicts Iran’s economy will return to 3.2% growth in 2021, following a 5% contraction in 2020, on the back of expanded oil sales and a stronger domestic industry.” Dubowitz blamed President Biden’s failure to maintain his predecessor’s “maximum pressure” campaign for the IMF’s alarming forecast.
“The Biden [administration] is already giving major concessions,” he tweeted. “That’s why this is occurring.”
But that’s not true, as Sune Engel Rasmussen — the Journal reporter who wrote the piece Dubowitz cited — later pointed out.
“This is not accurate, Mark. The IMF estimate is from last year, months before Biden took office,” Rasmussen tweeted at Dubowitz. “The growth prediction is mostly based on Iran’s own economic performance under sanctions.”
Esfandyar Batmanghelidj, the founder of Bourse & Bazaar and a visiting fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, also noted the rather glaring misdirection of blame, tweeting that the IMF’s estimate was issued last October before the elections. “These figures don’t reflect concessions by Biden — there haven’t been any,” he said. “They reflect that Iran’s economy began to shrug off maximum pressure while Trump was still aimlessly pursuing that policy.”
Yet Dubowitz has yet to issue a correction or delete his tweet.
And that’s how it works: Iran hawks have created their narrative for the path to regime change or war — in this case to make it as politically difficult as possible for Biden to ease sanctions and restore U.S. compliance with the JCPOA. And no amount of facts or empirical evidence demonstrating what a bad idea that is will get in the way.
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On Wednesday, a Ukrainian delegation led by Defense Minister Rustem Umerov met with South Korean officials, including President Yoon Suk Yeol. The AP reported that the two countries met to discuss ways to “cope with the security threat posed by the North Korean-Russian military cooperation including the North’s troop dispatch.”
During a previous meeting in October, Ukrainian President Volodomir Zelenskyy said he planned to present a “detailed request to Seoul for arms support including artillery and air defense systems.”
So far, South Korea has participated in sanctions against Moscow, has sent Kyiv financial aid, and supplied vehicles and de-mining equipment. However, Seoul has declined to provide weapons to Ukraine, even as North Korean forces are confirmed to be supporting Russian troops on the frontlines of the war.
South Koreans have been resistant to sending weapons to Ukraine. According to a Gallup poll, 82% of the public opposed such measures. While the government has not ruled out sending weapons to Ukraine, experts question whether Seoul is likely to provide weapons at this stage, as President Yoon’s approval ratings are very low, and South Korea has little to gain from such an escalatory action, even when considering North Korean involvement in the conflict.
“This kind of alleged collaboration between Russia and the DPRK only poses a concern for Seoul insofar as it is being used by Western leaders to rope South Korea into taking a more active role in aiding Ukraine,” says the Quincy Institute’s Mark Episkopos. “The ROK must balance any such pressure from the White House with the looming transition to a Trump administration that approaches the Ukraine war in a fundamentally different way.” He adds, “under the circumstances, Seoul has little to gain from radically upending its cautious, passive Ukraine policy in the waning days of the Biden administration.”
For its part, Moscow has responded harshly to the possibility of South Korea supplying Kyiv with arms. “Seoul must realize that the possible use of South Korean weapons to kill Russian citizens will fully destroy relations between our countries,” said Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Andrey Rudenko.
Neither Seoul nor Kyiv have commented on whether any agreements were made concerning weapons sharing but agreed to continue sharing security information related to North Korea and Russian cooperation.
Other Ukraine News This Week:
Reuters reports that Ukraine launched American-supplied ATACMS twice in the last week. Both strikes targeted Russian operations in Kursk. The Russian Defense Ministry said that “retaliatory measures are being prepared.”
A record-breaking 188 drones were launched by Russia on Tuesday. The AP reports that most of the drones were intercepted, but that damage was done to civilian infrastructure, with no reported casualties. The drones were launched all at once, targeting 17 of Ukraine’s regions.
An analysis of Russia’s Oreshnik missile indicates that it was potentially not loaded with any explosives, or possibly a very small amount. According to the New York Times, the missile launched last week caused less damage than would have been expected had it been heavily armed. Jeffery Lewis, a nuclear nonproliferation expert at the Middlebury Institute for International Studies, said that “the damage to the facility is quite specific — no large explosions, just big holes punched in the roofs.”
Even though the missile was seemingly minimally armed, the Times reported that “Nick Brown, an analyst at Janes, the British-based defense intelligence firm, said it was the longest-range weapon to ever have been used in conflict in Europe.”
Russian state media claims that the Kremlin complied with a 1988 ballistic missile agreement by warning the United States of the launch 30 minutes in advance.
According to Reuters, North Korea has begun to expand a plant that makes Russian-used missiles. The plant makes short-range missiles that are assumed to be used in Russia, but Moscow and Pyongyang have both denied the transfer of North Korean weapons into Russia.
The Financial Times reported that Russia has recruited potentially hundreds of Yemeni nationals to assist in its war against Ukraine. The Houthi-connected recruits were apparently promised well-paying jobs and even Russian citizenship, before being coerced into military service.
The Houthi government and Moscow have been working to deepen relations and secure contracts, according to U.S. special envoy for Yemen Tim Lenderking. Additionally, a member of the Houthi movement told Russian media that the Houthi government was in “constant contact” with Moscow.
According to FT, many of the recruits had no military training and were tricked into service by signing contracts that they could not read.
Spokesperson Matthew Miller said reports about Yemeni nationals being recruited to fight alongside Russian forces in Ukraine were concerning and reflected the desperation that Moscow was experiencing at this point in the war.
Miller also said that any deterioration of relations between North and South Korea and Russia would be the fault of the Kremlin, not the West or Ukraine. Additionally, he could not confirm whether Russia had begun to supply North Korea with missile defense systems or not.
Miller did not have any comment on the reports that some European officials were discussing the possibility of deploying forces to Ukraine.
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Top photo credit: Trae Stephens of Anduril Industries’ at the Stanford Seminar: Silicon Valley & The U.S. Government (You Tube/Screenshot)
According to WSJ, President-elect Donald Trump is eyeing Trae Stephens, a close affiliate of venture capitalist and Pentagon contractor Peter Thiel, as his incoming administration’s Deputy Secretary of Defense.
The deputy secretary, a position now held by Kathleen Hicks, is the second-highest-ranking civilian in the Pentagon, with the primary responsibility of “managing the defense budget and executing the priorities of the secretary of defense.”
A longtime partner at Thiel’s Founders Fund and co-founder and Executive Chairman at Anduril, a defense industry company with myriad government contracts, Stephens is an influential player at the intersection of venture capital and defense tech. To say that being in charge of the defense budget could pose a potential conflict of interest, would be an understatement.
Previously, he worked for Thiel’s Palantir Technologies, which for years has received contracts from across the federal spectrum, including the Department of Defense, FBI, and Department of Homeland Security.
Striving for political influence in a perpetual quest for business-sustaining government contracts, Anduril has become a prominent Washington lobbyist, especially regarding AI regulations. Palantir has likewise secured positions in high places like the U.S.-China Economic Security and Review Commission, which advises lawmakers on the U.S.-China relationship. And now, the possible Stephens appointment represents the undeniable influence of defense tech, and especially venture capital-backed defense tech in Washington politics after years of work getting a seat at the table.
Zooming out, Peter Thiel, a serial funder of congressional campaigns, bankrolled fellow venture capitalist and now-VP elect J.D. Vance’s successful 2022 Senate Campaign in Ohio to the tune of $15 million — the most anyone has given to a Senate candidate. Thiel and Vance are in fact long term associates, where Thiel previously assisted Vance’s own venture capital career. Not to miss an opportunity, powerful members of tech's inner core jumped into action via Elon Musk’s Super PAC, America PAC, upon Vance’s VP-nomination, giving $200 million to the Trump campaign overall.
Even if the Stephens nod doesn’t happen, the other possible Deputy Secretary of Defense pick, billionaire financier Stephen Feinberg, is just as much of an industry mainstay. The previous Trump administration’s intelligence advisory board head, Feinberg in the past owned once-prominent national security contractor DynCorp (now part of Amentum) and is the CEO of Cerberus Capital Management, which launched a defense-focused venture capital arm this year. A Feinberg spokesperson, however, said that he has not been offered a position.
As electronic warfare startup CX2 co-founder Nathan Mintz explained to Forbes, “the close relationships between (vice president-elect) Vance, Elon and the defense VC and startup ecosystem will create a huge opening for real defense acquisition reform and widening of the number of players.”
On the other hand, possible Trump picks like Stephens and Musk showcase the further entrenchment of a techno-patriot class in Washington politics, a class of tech elites apparently eager to bolster American military might in exchange for top-dollar government contracts.
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Russia's President Vladimir Putin attends a parade marking Navy Day in Saint Petersburg, Russia July 31, 2022. Sputnik/Mikhail Klimentyev/Kremlin via REUTERS
On Nov. 21, Vladimir Putin presented a huge escalation challenge to the West: are you ready for Russia to strike NATO facilities anywhere in Europe with hypersonic munitions that you don’t possess?
Until Monday, Nov. 18, media outlets brimmed with pro-war activists urging Biden and other Western leaders to free Zelensky’s hand to use longer-range weapons deep inside Russia. Since the summer, bombastic British ex-military saber rattlers have been talking up the decisive impact that Storm Shadow missiles — and by implication, US ATACMS — could make on the battlefield in Kursk, with a range of 300 kilometers or around 185 miles.
They got their wish on Nov. 19, when the first salvo of ATACMS was lobbed at a military facility in Bryansk — outside the area in which Ukrainian forces are battling in Kursk. The following day, British Storm Shadow missiles were fired into Kursk, with the jubilant approval of Prime Minister Keir Starmer, no less. These strikes elicited widespread attaboy jingoism from the Western media, with hardly a word of caution.
However, those who call for the use of deeper strikes into Russian territory fundamentally misunderstand Russian strategy.
I have seen at critical points over the past decade that Russia seeks escalation dominance, a Cold War concept holding that a state can best contain conflicts and avoid escalation if it is dominant at each successive rung up the “ladder of escalation,” all the way to the nuclear rung.
Since the onset of the Ukraine crisis in 2014, Russia has sought to dominate each step up the escalation ladder. The annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 were major escalations that NATO didn’t meet head-on. This strategy is also seen in the diplomatic sphere, for example, Russia escalated a dispute with the U.S. in 2017 when it kicked 755 American diplomatic staff out of Russia. When Moscow over-escalates, it makes a gamble that its adversary will not be willing to step another rung higher on the escalation ladder.
There is a hard-wired view in Moscow, bolstered no doubt by Biden’s incrementalism, that Russia will always overmatch a divided and morally weak Western alliance when push comes to shove. Russia has something that the West does not have — the sovereign power and the political will to act unilaterally. Putin had been subject to criticism from hardliners in Russia that he hasn’t responded to the slow ratcheting up of military support to Ukraine from the West.
As indicated previously, Ukraine receiving permission to use ATACMS deep into Russia would leave Putin with no choice but to respond, having said in September that he would.
So, on Nov. 21, Russia launched a hypersonic Oreshnik missile at a well-fortified Ukrainian weapons facility in Dnipropetrovsk. This is the first time an Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile has been used in combat.
Its use was significant for several key reasons.
First, it offered a major escalation in destructive capabilities. Russia had been trying unsuccessfully to destroy the Yuzhmash weapons facility since 2022 using the battlefield weapons at its disposal. Built during the Soviet era, Yuzhmash has workshops buried deep underground to protect them from attack. Among other purposes, the facility is thought to be where Rheinmetall has set up a plant to repair German Leopard tanks. It is also used in missile and long-range drone production.
According to eye-witness reports from Russian sources, the damage caused was considerably more extensive than after previous conventional strikes.The video footage of the strike was astonishing, with molten shards of light erupting out of the clouds to strike the factory. It was a studied demonstration of shock and awe tactics.
Second, carefully described by Putin as a “test” the Oreshnik is now a deployed capability far beyond those that Western powers have allowed Ukraine to use, namely ATACMS and Storm Shadow missiles. And also beyond the capabilities that Zelensky had requested in his so-called “Victory Plan” — namely Tomahawk cruise missiles — that the U.S. has refused to sanction. Putin has left the door open for further “tests” of the Oreshnik.
The U.S., UK, and others now face placing Ukraine in a position where a more devastating weapon may be used against strategic or battlefield targets that would overmatch the use of ATACMS or Storm Shadow inside of Russia, with their shorter range and more limited payload. The potential future use of Oreshnik will render ATACMS and Storm Shadow as battle-losing capabilities. And Ukraine is still losing the battle for Donetsk, slowly and in a grinding fashion, even with the more limited arsenal Russia has deployed so far.
Third, the claimed range of Oreshnik is 16 times greater than ATACMS and Storm Shadow missiles. That puts any NATO targets within Europe in the scope of a conventional strike. The capability displayed and the potential destruction of valuable Western repair facilities at Yuzhmash will have satisfied Kremlin hawks that Oreshnik has taken Russia two steps up the escalation ladder. Putin has also sent a clear message to military planners from the U.S. and UK who supported the deployment of the ATACMS, that a more specifically NATO target may be next.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the pro-ATACMS advocates have largely fallen silent since the deployment of Oreshnik. There have been two further declared U.S. ATACMS uses, although specifically within the Kursk region itself, where Ukrainian forces are clinging on to the land they captured in August.
It had already taken the U.S. and the U.K months finally to agree to deploy ATACMS and Storm Shadow missiles in a limited fashion within Russia. The scope appears to have been tightened further in recent days. In the twilight of his presidency, Biden must now decide whether he is willing to over-escalate Putin. That would require him to expand, massively, the scale and scope of U.S. weapons systems that can be used in Ukraine, knowing that American forces don’t currently have an in-service equivalent to the Oreshnik. And with a Trump presidency looming larger each day, it is questionable that he will.
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