President Joe Biden said Thursday that he “can’t picture” U.S. troops remaining in Afghanistan by next year, but it is “going to be hard to meet the May 1 deadline” for withdrawal under the Doha peace agreement.
“It is not my intention to stay there for a long time,” the president told reporters at a press conference. “We will leave. The question is when we leave.”
Under a peace deal signed with the Taliban in Doha last year, U.S. forces are supposed to depart Afghanistan by May 2021. No U.S. troops have been killed in battle since the Doha agreement was signed, even as the war between the Taliban and the Afghan government has intensified in recent months.
House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Adam Smith (D–Wash.) suggested on Wednesday that the Biden administration would ask the Taliban for a temporary extension, as first reported by Responsible Statecraft.
“It’s a general feeling that May 1 is too soon, just logistically,” he said, citing conversations with National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan and Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin. “Job one is to try to get back in to talk to the Taliban about at least giving us more time.”
Smith said that the Biden administration wanted to explore its options for a longer-term counterterrorism deployment but was “skeptical” that the Taliban or a future Afghan unity government “could be comfortable with our presence” in the long run.
Matthew Petti is an assistant editor at Reason Magazine. He worked for various Jordanian news outlets as a 2022-2023 Fulbright fellow. Previously, he worked as a reporter at Responsible Statecraft and a national security reporter at The National Interest. His work has appeared in the BBC, The Intercept, The Daily Beast, and New Lines magazine.
President Joe Biden speaks to members of the Defense Department during a visit to the Pentagon along with Vice President Kamala Harris, Feb. 10, 2021. Photo By: White House photo
Top image credit: Sudan's army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan gestures to soldiers inside the presidential palace after the Sudanese army said it had taken control of the building, in the capital Khartoum, Sudan March 26, 2025. Sudan Transitional Sovereignty Council/Handout via REUTERS
In the final days of Ramadan, before Mecca's Grand Mosque, Sudan's de facto president and army chief, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan knelt in prayer beside Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman. Al-Burhan had arrived in the kingdom just two days after his troops dealt a significant blow to the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), recapturing the capital Khartoum after two years of civil war. Missing from the frame was the United Arab Emirates (UAE), the Gulf power that has backed al-Burhan’s rivals in Sudan’s civil war with arms, mercenaries, and political cover.
The scene captured the essence of a deepening rift between Saudi Arabia and the UAE — once allies in reshaping the Arab world, now architects of competing visions for Sudan and the region.
For two years, Sudan has been enveloped in chaos. The conflict that erupted in April 2023 between the Sudanese Armed forces (SAF) and the RSF, led by General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo "Hemedti," has inflicted immense suffering: an estimated 150,000 killed, allegations of mass atrocities staining both sides but particularly the RSF in Darfur, 12 million displaced, and over half the population facing acute food insecurity.
Khartoum, once a symbol of confluence, bears deep scars — widespread destruction, looted homes, and streets haunted by the unburied dead. It was against this backdrop of devastation and military gains that al-Burhan made his trip across the Red Sea.
Early in the conflict, Saudi Arabia played a prominent role by facilitating the evacuation of thousands of foreigners via Port Sudan, an effort that garnered significant goodwill. Building on this, and alongside the United States, the kingdom stepped into the role of mediator hosting the Jeddah ceasefire talks in May 2023.
This mediation aligned with Riyadh’s broader strategic pivot toward de-escalation, evident in its rapprochement with Iran and its transformation from aggressor to peacemaker in Yemen. Instability across the Red Sea poses a direct threat to the kingdom’s ambitious Vision 2030 economic overhaul — particularly its crown-jewel projects like NEOM and the Red Sea tourism megaprojects along its western coastline, as well as the Yanbu Terminal expansion, which aims to diversify oil export routes away from the Strait of Hormuz. Such turmoil also risks undermining Saudi Arabia’s critical food security investments in Sudan, where vast agricultural ventures had become a linchpin of bilateral ties.
However, the Jeddah process withered and the commitments signed on paper dissolved under the reality of continued fighting. A subsequent U.S.-led effort in Geneva, pivoting to humanitarian access after the Jeddah talks collapsed, faltered when the SAF boycotted the talks entirely. By 2025, the return of President Donald Trump’s “America First” doctrine gutted what remained of American diplomatic capital. USAID’s funding slashes — which shuttered 77% of Sudan’s emergency food kitchens — not only deepened famine but stripped Washington of a key lever it could use to compel concessions. With the U.S. retreating inward, the vacuum proved irresistible to Saudi Arabia.
The tipping point arrived in February 2025. As the RSF and its allies formalized their charter for a parallel administration in Nairobi, Saudi Arabia, alongside Qatar and Kuwait, issued a firm public rejection. The Saudi Foreign Ministry unequivocally stated its opposition to "any illegitimate steps taken outside Sudan’s official institutions that threaten its unity.”
Al-Burhan’s recent visit to Saudi Arabia and its timing solidified this alignment. The agreement announced by both nations during the visit to establish a “coordination council to strengthen relations” signaled long-term engagement, moving beyond the neutral arbiter role. Crucially, this meeting directly followed a high-level Saudi delegation's visit to Port Sudan days earlier, focused squarely on reconstruction.
While Riyadh actively cultivates the role of regional stabilizer, Abu Dhabi faces mounting scrutiny regarding its alleged role in fueling the RSF’s war effort.
In March 2025, Sudan filed a case at the International Court of Justice, accusing the UAE of violating the Genocide Convention through its alleged military, financial, and political support for the RSF, thereby facilitating atrocities, particularly the ethnic cleansing of the Masalit in West Darfur. While the UAE’s foreign minister dismissed the case as "feeble media maneuvers," the charges echo findings from a U.N. Panel of Experts report, which deemed evidence of UAE arms supplies (including drones and air defenses) to the RSF as "credible."
This alleged support has triggered significant political fallout in Washington. U.S. lawmakers Sen. Chris Van Hollen (D-Md.) and Rep. Sara Jacobs (D-Calif.) publicly confirmed in January, citing administration briefings, that the UAE was indeed arming the RSF, directly contradicting prior assurances it gave the Biden administration. Rep. Gregory Meeks (D-N.Y.), ranking member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, also placed holds on arms sales to the UAE over its role in Sudan.
The UAE's actions in Sudan appear consistent with a wider regional modus operandi. Abu Dhabi’s playbook involves empowering non-state actors, often with secessionist leanings, to secure access to resources and strategic geography. We see this pattern in Libya with its backing of Khalifa Haftar, and in Yemen through its enduring support for the Southern Transitional Council (STC), whose push for independence directly counters Saudi efforts to maintain Yemeni unity under the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC).
Somalia offers another vivid example, where the UAE circumvented Mogadishu to directly arm and fund regional entities like Puntland (reportedly using its Bosaso base for RSF resupply), Somaliland, and Jubaland, thereby fragmenting the country while securing coastal footholds. The announcement of the RSF's parallel government in Nairobi last month seemed a direct application of these tactics. The UAE finalized a $1.5 billion loan to Kenya the same week, prompting speculation that its influence played a role in Nairobi hosting the event.
The widening gulf over Sudan, therefore, is not an isolated disagreement but symptomatic of a deeper strategic divergence between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. Where they once coordinated closely, particularly in countering the perceived threat of the Muslim Brotherhood and attempting to reshape the GCC during the Qatar blockade, their paths now diverge sharply.
Economically, they compete fiercely, with Saudi Arabia challenging Dubai's business hub status through policies requiring regional HQs in Riyadh and launching rival mega-projects. Within OPEC+, tensions have simmered between the two over production quotas, reflecting differing priorities and misaligned projections on the proximity of the decarbonized future. Even maritime borders near the Yasat Islands has become a point of contention, with Riyadh lodging complaints at the U.N. against Abu Dhabi's unilateral demarcation of the potentially oil-rich area.
This rivalry now spills into the public domain via social media. Recent online clashes saw well-known and widely followed Saudi commentators brand Emirati counterparts as "outcasts," describing them as being "hated by Arabs and Muslims." In tightly controlled media environments, such sharp exchanges often reflect official displeasure.
Ultimately, Sudan is paying the price for this fractured Gulf relationship. Saudi Arabia, driven by its Vision 2030 imperatives and a desire to reassert regional leadership through stability and state institutions, has placed its bet on the SAF. The UAE, focused on resource access and countering perceived ideological threats, continues its alleged support for the RSF despite the mounting condemnation.
As long as the rivalry persists, Sudan will remain tragically caught in the crossfire, its future held hostage by a geopolitical struggle reshaping the contours of power across the region.
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Top image credit: Steve Witkoff, the special envoy to the Middle East, makes an appearance moments before President Donald J. Trump holds a joint news conference at the White House with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on February 4, 2025. This is Trump’s first joint news conference with a foreign leader in his second term. (Photo by Joshua Sukoff/MNS/Sipa USA) VIA REUTERS
While Donald Trump has repeatedly bragged that he can end international conflicts in days, he is clearly frustrated that global leaders are not bending to his will. Only last week, he said that he is “angry” that Moscow has not offered a Ukraine deal and that he might impose secondary “tariffs” on Russian oil sales. He also warned that if Iran doesn’t “make a deal, there will be bombing.”
This lashing out is not part of some grand “madman” strategy. Rather, it is a product of Trump’s apparent need to project power. The trick is to know how to reward that projection: Putin’s commissioning of a portrait of Trump — which his personal Middle East envoy, Steve Witkoff, claims the Russian leader asked him to deliver to the president — paints a vivid example of the nature and perhaps limits of such strategic flattery.
Iran’s Supreme Leader would never stoop to such antics. Still, it is possible that Ayatollah Khamenei understands that his negotiators might use Trump’s abiding need to display his global acumen to get American concessions on a nuclear deal. Because Trump’s volatility can open doors or blow them up just as quickly, international leaders — and his own advisers — are constantly struggling to manage (or exploit) an approach to the world that lacks any coherent strategy or even tactics.
Thus, it is hardly surprising that while Iran’s President Masoud Pezeshkian insisted after Trump’s latest threat that “th[e] path for indirect negotiations remains open,” an Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps leader warned that American troops deployed “at least ten bases -around Iran” are “sitting inside a glass room.” Grappling with his impulse-driven foreign policy, Trump’s rivals find it difficult to get any sense of his bottom line.
Hope and confusion in Tehran
U.S.-Iran relations are a case in point. It is worth recalling that in November Elon Musk met with Iran’s U.N. ambassador, Saied Iravani. Commenting on the surprise encounter, a conservative Iranian website declared that, “It appears that Trump has genuinely decided to adopt a different approach…perhaps, as (Foreign Minister) Abbas Araghchi put it, moving from 'maximum pressure' to 'maximum rationality.’” This observation echoed Araghchi’s previous statement that “maximum rationality” would “probably get a different result” and seemed calculated to test Trump.
Trump’s decision in mid-January to remove security details for former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and former U.S. Special Representative for Iran Brian Hook — both men key architects of Trump’s first-term “maximum pressure” policy against Iran — encouraged Tehran’s cautious optimism. When Hook was summarily dismissed from a top position on Trump’s transition team after complaining about the Biden administration’s “appeasement” of Iran, the hardline Tehran Times quoted Trump’s announcement on Truth Social (“Brian Hook from the Wilson Center for Scholars... YOU'RE FIRED!") while the Islamic Republic News Agency speculated that Trump’s actions “could be sending signals to Iran that he may be willing to engage with Tehran diplomatically,” even if it is “unclear whether the moves signal a shift in tactics, strategy, or attitude.”
Trump’s mysterious letter to Khamenei
The drama revolving around the letter that Trump sent Khamenei on March 5 shows that striking this balance won’t be easy. While not revealing the letter’s contents, Trump alluded to it during his March 6 Oval Office remarks.
“I’d rather negotiate a peace deal…but we can make a deal…just as good as if you won militarily,” he said. Two days later on Fox News, he acknowledged that “I’ve written them a letter saying I hope you’re going to negotiate because if we have to go in militarily, it’s going to be a terrible thing.” His assertion that the U.S. seeks a deal that would be “just as good as if you won militarily” suggests that Trump is telling Khamenei that, by dint of either talks or brute force, the administration will compel Iran to totally dismantle its vast enrichment facilities.
This is a demand that no Iranian leader, including Khamenei, can possibly accept. As he and Araghchi made clear, they will not accept U.S. ultimatums. As Khamenei put it, the “negotiations” that “some bully governments” seek “are not aimed at solving issues, but to…impose their own expectations.” If his depiction of the letter’s take-it-or-leave-it tone is accurate, the U.S., Israel and Iran may well be on a path to military confrontation.
A Trump-Netanyahu partnership without limits?
While Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu would welcome a U.S.-Israeli assault on Iran, it is striking that only six weeks ago the Israeli press was full of reports speculating that, as one Haaretz writer put it, Netanyahu might “go head to head with Trump on striking Iran.” But everything changed with Trump’s February 4 remark that two million displaced Palestinians must leave Gaza. While world leaders strained to make sense of this statement, Netanyahu praised Trump’s “revolutionary, creative approach,” arguing that it created “many possibilities,” one of which, it now appears, was Israel’s renewed assault in Gaza. It is also very likely that Netanyahu construed Trump’s words as telegraphing U.S. support for an eventual attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities.
But such an attack will not be easy given the domestic upheaval that Israel’s renewed assault on Gaza has sparked. Wading into the political waters, President Isaac Herzog declared that “thousands of citizens…are…crying out to prevent the widening of rifts and divisions….It is unthinkable to ignore these voices and not seek consensus.”
Coming amid the controversy over Netanyahu’s March 20 firing of the head of Israel’s Shin Bet security service, Herzog’s statement points to a constitutional crisis that could send Israel into a kind of civil war. Undeterred, Netanyahu’s Likud Party asserted that “Herzog has joined the ‘deep state.’” Clearly, Netanyahu and his allies believe that he has much to gain by emulating Trump’s paranoia and thus intimating that he and the U.S. president are on the same page politically and strategically.
Netanyahu cannot trust his mercurial twin
Still, Netanyahu must tread carefully because the divisions tearing Israel apart will grow as it expands the war in Gaza and ramps up military actions in Lebanon and Syria. If these actions lead to the killing of the Israeli hostages and/or spark a military confrontation on three fronts, the specter of regional mayhem reflect poorly on Trump. The last thing he can tolerate is looking like a “loser.”
In fact, Witkoff seemed to use his March 21 interview with Tucker Carlson to help his boss out. The resumption of war in Gaza, he argued, runs counter to Israeli public opinion. Moreover, he stated that Hamas is not ideological, that it must have a political role in a post-Gaza deal, and that real compromises with Hamas and Iran are vital to the stability that, according to Witkoff, is Trump’s number one goal when it comes to global affairs. And he seemed to walk back Trump’s own words when he argued that his letter to Khamenei was not an ultimatum, that he wants a nuclear deal that includes “verification,” and that the military option is not “a very good alternative.”
Spinners beware!
Witkoff’s interview provoked a storm in the Israeli press, and rightly so: a trusted envoy, he is struggling to transform Trump’s utterings into something resembling a coherent policy. Yet if the Middle East blows up, or seems to be moving that way, Trump might launch another verbal blast that will have leaders, policy analysts and pundits in Tehran, Jerusalem and Washington scurrying to fathom what it means. But if Witkoff and can temper his boss’s outbursts without embarrassing or antagonizing him, he could help Trump pull back from the brink. Such an effort will partly hinge on whether Trump can muster the emotional energy to articulate and sustain support for a real compromise. Perhaps pushing back against such a possibility, national security adviser Mike Waltz recently declared that nothing less than “full dismantlement” of Iran’s nuclear program is acceptable, thus perhaps putting him at odds with Witkoff.
The battle to spin Trump’s verbal bouts continues not only in Washington, but also in Tehran. Days before Trump threatened to bomb Iran, government sources in Tehran claimed that the president’s letter “is not exactly clear, (but) is not an ultimatum.” Indeed, Araghchi’s assertion that “indirect negotiations can continue,” was a message reiterated by another close adviser to Khamenei.
While, as noted above, Iran’s president has also repeated this message despite Trump’s recent threats, in the wake of the Signal Group Chat fiasco, senior administration officials are unlikely to risk their necks competing to influence Trump’s stance on Russia, Iran or indeed any other country. Like their counterparts in Tehran, Jerusalem, Moscow and other capitals, his security advisers must tread carefully in their attempts to manage Trump’s fiery temperament and careening impulses.
A longer version of this article originally appeared at Arab Center Washington DC.
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Top photo credit: Marine Le Pen (Claude Truong-Ngoc / Wikimedia Commons)
A political bombshell in France: the long-time leader of the right-wing National Rally party (Rassemblement National) Marine Le Pen has been banned from running for political office for the next five years after a court in Paris found her guilty of embezzling the equivalent of $4 million in EU funds to pay National Rally staffers not working for the European Parliament.
She was also handed a suspended four-year prison term and ordered to pay a €100,000 fine. It remains to be seen whether the court decision means a political death sentence for her (it can be overturned if she wins an appeal), but it is certainly a devastating blow and a major shake-up of French politics.
It matters because the latest polls showed Marine Le Pen leading in the presidential race for 2027, projecting 34-37% of the votes in the first round. That would secure her a place in the run-off, where her chances would depend on the ability of all the other parties to coalesce around her would-be opponent.
At first glance, Le Pen’s disqualification could weaken the anti-war voices in France and the EU by reducing their cohesion and visibility. Her party is a founding member of the Patriots for Europe (PfE), the third largest political group in the European Parliament, where it sits with influential like-minded parties like Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban’s Fidesz, and Italian Deputy Prime Minster Matteo Salvini’s Lega. All of them have been vocal critics of the EU’s unconditional support for Ukraine, anti-Russia sanctions, and the dogmatic refusal to engage in direct diplomacy with Moscow to end the war.
To highlight the opposition to the current militarization drive in Europe, the Patriots voted against the European Parliament resolution in early March that endorsed Commission President Ursula Von der Leyen’s equivalent of $900 billion “rearm” plan. Critics dismissed that plan as unrealistic given the fiscal dire straits in which the continent finds itself and the lack of unified threat assessment throughout Europe — if you are in Portugal, for example, your perception of the Russian threat would be vastly different from Poland’s.
Opposition to the “rearm plan” was transpartisan as the Patriots were joined by the anti-war Left faction, and some dissidents from the center-left social-democratic group, such as members of the Italian Democratic Party. On the level of the member states, national interest still trumps ideological cohesion: the conservative Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni — ideologically close to Orban and Le Pen — and the Socialist Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez both reject the “rearm” concept (even though the poorly-led Socialists in the European Parliament incomprehensibly voted to back Von der Leyen’s plan).
Le Pen’s experience and networks in Europe made her a key player in ensuring the cohesiveness of these like-minded forces. Back in France, she has consistently criticized Macron’s hyper-activism on Ukraine and dismissed his idea of sending French peacekeepers to Ukraine as “sheer madness” — cognizant of the fact that, absent a Russian agreement to such a deployment (which will not be forthcoming), these forces would become targets for the Russian army.
She also firmly opposed Macron’s ideas of diluting national sovereignty on defense matters, such as his loose talk of extending the French nuclear umbrella to the rest of Europe.
Of course, this has prompted vivid speculation over the political motivations behind the French court’s decision to ban Le Pen from running. While her allies on the right predictably stand by her, leftist Yanis Varoufakis, an unlikely ally, chastised the “mind-boggling hypocrisy” of the liberal media in denouncing Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s imprisonment of his main opponent, Istanbul’s mayor Ekrem Imamoglu, while rejoicing at the French courts “doing the same.”
Some also tried to draw parallels with Romania, where the winner of the first round of the presidential elections Calin Georgescu had his victory annulled, and himself banned from a re-run on apparently flimsy grounds. Like Le Pen, Georgescu ran as a torchbearer of anti-establishment sentiment, and similarly opposed a further war in Ukraine.
Yet one should not rush to hasty conclusions. The legal case against Le Pen appears to be robust. There is no evidence that the ruling of the court was politically motivated —France has a history of disqualifying misconducting politicians. In 2017, the mainstream conservative candidate Francois Fillon was disqualified for money diversion on a much smaller scale than Le Pen.
What raises questions in Le Pen’s case is not so much the veracity of the allegations against her as the immediate enforcement of the five-year ban, even before any appeal could be resolved. Crucially, that period covers the next presidential elections in 2027. That urgency has led critics to accuse the judges of violating the people’s right to freely choose their representatives, particularly given Le Pen’s popularity. However, it seems indisputable that the judges enjoyed the discretion to do so.
Short term, the news could be a boon for Macron and his liberal allies in France and the EU. For one thing, it may be giving some breathing space to the embattled centrist government led by Macron’s pick, Francois Bayrou. National Rally and the left have enough combined clout in the French parliament to oust the government, which they already did with Bayrou’s predecessor, another centrist. Yet doing so again, while mathematically feasible, could tempt Macron to call yet another parliamentary election, from which his most formidable foe would be excluded.
Longer term impact would depend on more factors. Would Jordan Bardella, Le Pen’s 29-year-old protégé and presumed presidential candidate (in case her appeal fails) prove to be an effective leader? Currently he is the head of the Patriots for Europe in the European Parliament, which gives him visibility and a network with the like-minded parties in Europe.
His youth and inexperience could be a challenge for keeping the anti-war faction together. However, the Patriots network has other experienced representatives, such as Orban and Salvini, to lean on in this regard.
Ultimately, the appeal and the resilience of the anti-war, pro-diplomacy voices in Europe does not depend solely on personalities, but on broader trends, such as war fatigue, changes in U.S. foreign policy under President Donald Trump, the battleground situation in Ukraine, social and economic pressures stemming from the militarization drive, and the growing perception that the European publics were not really engaged by the elites in a proper democratic debate on the nature of threats facing Europe.
These currents exist, and they will find their champions, regardless of Marine Le Pen’s personal fate.
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