Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s suggestion during his confirmation hearing that he would consider supporting Georgia’s membership in NATO has largely gone overlooked. Georgian media has since reported that Blinken also raised the Georgia issue in his first call with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov. But if the Biden administration continues to push the issue of Georgia’s potential NATO membership, it would endanger the already precarious stability of the South Caucasus and increase the likelihood of misunderstanding between Moscow and Washington.
Georgian ascension to NATO would also further damage the U.S.’s already strained relationship with Europe — where public opinion shows little support for the ongoing rivalry with Russia — thereby potentially jeopardizing European cooperation on issues ranging from the rise of China to climate change.
Russia won’t interpret any consideration of Georgia's membership charitably. Russia has already lost influence in the South Caucasus, a region Moscow viewed as its sphere of influence just a decade ago.
Just last year, Russia paid a high geopolitical price for the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia. While Moscow was able to negotiate a ceasefire, it had to deploy peacekeepers and accede to (NATO member-state) Turkey's influence in the South Caucasus. As Russia’s relative influence in the region wanes, any hint of support from the Biden administration for Georgia’s campaign for NATO membership could provoke a violent Russian response.
European leaders likely won’t support Georgia's membership in NATO. German Chancellor Angela Merkel — who has said that she does not foresee “Georgia's prompt accession to NATO” — is approaching the end of her long tenure in office, and nothing suggests her potential successors will be more willing to expand NATO eastward. Moreover, recent polling from the European Council on Foreign Relations suggests most Germans don’t want to take sides between Washington and Moscow. Meanwhile, the Eurasia Group Foundation found that Germans are deeply pessimistic about ties with the United States. Thus, pushing for Georgian membership without European support risks re-establishing goodwill among NATO allies, a key priority for the Biden administration.
The United States has been down this road before, and the result was disastrous. At NATO’s Bucharest Summit in April 2008, President George W. Bush pushed the idea of expanding the alliance to Georgia and Ukraine. Merkel led European opposition and warned that Russia would interpret any further eastward expansion of NATO as an existential threat. A compromise was eventually reached in the Bucharest Declaration which contained language that committed the alliance to consider Georgia's accession eventually, but on no specific timeline.
Moscow and Tblissi both almost immediately misinterpreted the Bucharest Declaration’s ambiguous intent. Just 20 minutes after NATO made it public, Russia announced it would provide support to Abkhazia and South Ossetia, two break-away provinces in the north of Georgia. Just four months later, Georgian President Mikhail Sakashvilli instigated an ill-advised offensive against Ossetian militia and Russian peacekeepers in Tskinvali, the capital of South Ossetia. Russian forces quickly overran the Georgian military and won the war in 12 days. In the aftermath of the war, 20,000 ethnic Georgians were unable to return to their homes in South Ossetia.
Twelve years later, Georgia is even further away from obtaining NATO membership. Abkhazia and South Ossetia both remain de-facto independent, and rigidly aligned with Moscow. Short of a sea change in Russian politics, there is no chance of Tbilisi regaining control of South Ossetia and Abkhazia peacefully. According to NATO requirements for membership, applicants must not have ongoing territorial disputes, and it’s unlikely that Georgia would be willing to let the provinces go.
The Biden administration may understand that Georgia’s campaign to join NATO is impracticable in the short term. And it may be that publicly supporting Georgia’s ascension is simply a negotiating tool, or part of the follow-through on President Biden’s vow to “punish Russia” for a series of espionage related hacks of American computer systems reportedly conducted by Moscow. But as we’ve seen, Russia and Georgia could misinterpret such ambiguity to disastrous consequences. Indeed, Georgian media has already given Blinken’s remarks morecoverage than the Biden administration might expect.
Georgia’s membership in NATO is the wrong issue for this type of diplomatic maneuvering. Blinken suggested during his confirmation hearing that Georgia would become safer by joining NATO. While it’s unclear whether that would be the ultimate outcome in Georgia’s case, what is certain is that the application process itself would endanger Georgia, the stability of the South Caucasus, and U.S. interests in the region. Pushing this issue is a gamble with no clear payoff for the United States.
Moreover, Georgia’s ascension to NATO would add yet another Article V commitment — an issue that’s already contentious among the American public — to an ally bordering an increasingly insecure Russia.
Another consequence would be increased tensions between Russia and Georgia, if not outright war, and the further fraying of American ties to Western Europe. Forcing the issue of Georgian membership in NATO right now will stress already strained relations with allies like Germany. Restoring the transatlantic relationship was a central tenet of the Biden campaign’s foreign policy platform. Now is not the time to stress those relationships further for the sake of poking Putin in the eye.
Adam Pontius is a writer on international politics based in New York. His writing and research focuses on international security and transatlantic politics. Previously, Adam worked as a graduate research assistant for the Eurasia Group Foundation (EGF) in support of the Independent America project. Prior to EGF, Adam worked as a political consultant and an advocate for democratic reform for seven years. He holds an M.A. degree in International Relations from Central European University where he wrote his thesis on ontological security and Woodow Wilson's foreign policy. Adam is an alumnus of the Bard Globalization and International Affairs program and holds B.A. in political science from Elmira College.
President Joseph R. Biden, Jr., with Vice President Kamala K. Harris and Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken, delivers remarks to State Department employees, at the U.S. Department of State in Washington, D.C., on February 4, 2021. [State Department Photo by Freddie Everett]|A soldier carries the NATO flag during German Minister of Defence Ursula von der Leyen's visit to German troops deployed as part of NATO enhanced Forward Presence battle group in Rukla military base, Lithuania, February 4, 2019. REUTERS/Ints Kalnins
Donald Trump’s recent outburst against Vladimir Putin — accusing the Russian leader of "throwing a pile of bullsh*t at us" and threatening devastating new sanctions — might be just another Trumpian tantrum.
The president is known for abrupt reversals. Or it could be a bargaining tactic ahead of potential Ukraine peace talks. But there’s a third, more troubling possibility: establishment Republican hawks and neoconservatives, who have been maneuvering to hijack Trump’s “America First” agenda since his return to office, may be exploiting his frustration with Putin to push for a prolonged confrontation with Russia.
Trump’s irritation is understandable. Ukraine has accepted his proposed ceasefire, but Putin has refused, making him, in Trump’s eyes, the main obstacle to ending the war.
Putin’s calculus is clear. As Ted Snider notes in the American Conservative, Russia is winning on the battlefield. In June, it captured more Ukrainian territory and now threatens critical Kyiv’s supply lines. Moscow also seized a key lithium deposit critical to securing Trump’s support for Ukraine. Meanwhile, Russian missile and drone strikes have intensified.
Putin seems convinced his key demands — Ukraine’s neutrality, territorial concessions in the Donbas and Crimea, and a downsized Ukrainian military — are more achievable through war than diplomacy.
Yet his strategy empowers the transatlantic “forever war” faction: leaders in Britain, France, Germany, and the EU, along with hawks in both main U.S. parties. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz claims that diplomacy with Russia is “exhausted.” Europe’s war party, convinced a Russian victory would inevitably lead to an attack on NATO (a suicidal prospect for Moscow), is willing to fight “to the last Ukrainian.” Meanwhile, U.S. hawks, including liberal interventionist Democrats, stoke Trump’s ego, framing failure to stand up to Putin’s defiance as a sign of weakness or appeasement.
Trump long resisted this pressure. Pragmatism told him Ukraine couldn’t win, and calling it “Biden’s war” was his way of distancing himself, seeking a quick exit to refocus on China, which he has depicted as Washington’s greater foreign threat. At least as important, U.S. involvement in the war in Ukraine has been unpopular with his MAGA base.
But his June strikes on Iran may signal a hawkish shift. By touting them as a decisive blow to Iran’s nuclear program (despite Tehran’s refusal so far to abandon uranium enrichment), Trump may be embracing a new approach to dealing with recalcitrant foreign powers: offer a deal, set a deadline, then unleash overwhelming force if rejected. The optics of “success” could tempt him to try something similar with Russia.
This pivot coincides with a media campaign against restraint advocates within the administration like Elbridge Colby, the Pentagon policy chief who has prioritized China over Ukraine and also provoked the opposition of pro-Israel neoconservatives by warning against war with Iran. POLITICO quoted unnamed officials attacking Colby for wanting the U.S. to “do less in the world.” Meanwhile, the conventional Republican hawk Marco Rubio’s influence grows as he combines the jobs of both secretary of state and national security adviser. What Can Trump Actually Do to Russia?
Nuclear deterrence rules out direct military action — even Biden, far more invested in Ukraine than Trump, avoided that risk. Instead, Trump ally Sen.Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.), another establishment Republican hawk, is pushing a 500% tariff on nations buying Russian hydrocarbons, aiming to sever Moscow from the global economy. Trump seems supportive, although the move’s feasibility and impact are doubtful.
China and India are key buyers of Russian oil. China alone imports 12.5 million barrels daily. Russia exports seven million barrels daily. China could absorb Russia’s entire output. Beijing has bluntly stated it “cannot afford” a Russian defeat, ensuring Moscow’s economic lifeline remains open.
The U.S., meanwhile, is ill-prepared for a tariff war with China. When Trump imposed 145% tariffs, Beijing retaliated by cutting off rare earth metals exports, vital to U.S. industry and defense. Trump backed down.
At the G-7 summit in Canada last month, the EU proposed lowering price caps on Russian oil from $60 a barrel to $45 a barrel as part of its 18th sanctions package against Russia. Trump rejected the proposal at the time but may be tempted to reconsider, given his suggestion that more sanctions may be needed. Even if Washington backs the measure now, however, it is unlikely to cripple Russia’s war machine.
Another strategy may involve isolating Russia by peeling away Moscow’s traditionally friendly neighbors. Here, Western mediation between Armenia and Azerbaijan isn’t about peace — if it were, pressure would target Baku, which has stalled agreements and threatened renewed war against Armenia. The real goal is to eject Russia from the South Caucasus and create a NATO-aligned energy corridor linking Turkey to Central Asia, bypassing both Russia and Iran to their detriment.
Central Asia itself is itself emerging as a new battleground. In May 2025, the EU has celebrated its first summit with Central Asian nations in Uzbekistan, with a heavy focus on developing the Middle Corridor, a route for transportation of energy and critical raw materials that would bypass Russia. In that context, the EU has committed €10 billion in support of the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route.
Though Central Asian nations seek to reduce their dependence on Moscow, Russia, however, retains leverage through security ties, energy routes, and migrant remittances. China, the region’s other major partner, would view Western overtures with suspicion.
Hawks may ultimately pin their hopes on destabilizing Russia internally. Ethnic fractures are a key pressure point: non-Russian minorities, such as Dagestanis, Buryats, Tuvans, die disproportionately in the war in Ukraine. Hence, bodies like the U.S. Congress Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (Helsinki Commission) and hawkish think-tanks like Hudson Institute fuel “colonial exploitation”narratives aimed at stirring unrest in the Caucasus and Siberia.
Exiled Russian opposition figures cheered the 2023 Wagner mutiny as a potential tipping point. But external efforts to destabilize and fragment Russia are more likely to trigger a nationalist backlash than collapse. If cornered, Putin or his successor won’t surrender but escalate, possibly to nuclear brinkmanship.
The irony is that Trump once rode to power mocking the architects of ‘forever wars.” Now, his own impulses — frustration with Putin, a craving for displays of strength — risk reviving the very policies he once condemned. The hawkish “blob” needs no grand conspiracy to hijack his agenda; it merely needs to exploit his instincts. The question is whether Trump recognizes the trap before this new cold war turns hot.
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Top image credit: People line up to buy bread, after Syria's Bashar al-Assad was ousted, in Douma, on the outskirts of Damascus, Syria December 23, 2024. REUTERS/Zohra Bensemra
On June 30, President Trump signed an executive order terminating the majority of U.S. sanctions on Syria. The move, which would have been unthinkable mere months ago, fulfilled a promise he made at an investment forum in Riyadh in May.“The sanctions were brutal and crippling,” he had declared to an audience of primarily Saudi businessmen. Lifting them, he said, will “give Syria a chance at greatness.”
The significance of this statement lies not solely in the relief that it will bring to the Syrian people. His remarks revealed an implicit but rarely admitted truth: sanctions — often presented as a peaceful alternative to war— have been harming the Syrian people all along.
It is difficult to deny the extent of Syria's economic devastation. The size of Syria’s economy more than halved between 2010 and 2022. Around 70 percent of Syrians live in poverty, and half the population is food insecure.
Proponents maintain that sanctions are not responsible for civilian harm. “Today's actions are intended to hold the murderous Assad regime accountable. They are not directed at the Syrian people,” reads a typical White House statement. The European Parliament similarly claims its sanctions on Syria were “designed to have minimal impact on the population.”
It’s difficult to say how much of Syria’s economic collapse is due to the civil war and Assad’s governance versus Western sanctions. However, there is overwhelming evidence that broad economic sanctions cause immense harm to civilians: slowing economic growth; hindering access to food, fuel, and medicine; and contributing to mass death. In some cases, the effects of sanctions are comparable to those of war.
Sanctions on Syria impeded humanitarian efforts, fueled food inflation, and drove the collapse of the country’s healthcare system. The overthrow of the Assad government made it politically expedient to admit what many had long ignored or denied.
Two members of Congress who advocated for sanctions prior to Assad’s fall have since reversed course, arguing that easing them would “facilitate stabilization, reconstruction, international investment, [and] humanitarian recovery,” and improve “economic and financial access for ordinary Syrians.”
Following Trump’s announcement in Riyadh, Secretary of State Rubio said that lifting sanctions would “facilitate the provision of electricity, energy, water, and sanitation, and enable a more effective humanitarian response across Syria.” He similarly told a Senate hearing that “nations in the region want to get aid in, want to start helping them, and they can't because they are afraid of our sanctions.” Rubio here highlights how U.S. sanctions function as a form of economic siege — they hinder humanitarian assistance and isolate countries economically and diplomatically. U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Dorothy Shea argued this month that, “The cessation of U.S. sanctions against Syria will give the country a chance to succeed.”
It is difficult to reconcile such statements with the claim that sanctions don’t hurt civilians. If lifting sanctions will benefit the civilian population, then their imposition must have caused harm.
The dirty secret of sanctions policy is that these harms are often intentional. Many say outright that the function of sanctions is to facilitate economic collapse. It is not collateral damage — it is the mechanism of pressure.
For example, a State Department memo from the inception of the embargo on Cuba suggested “denying money and supplies to Cuba, to decrease monetary and real wages, to bring about hunger, desperation and overthrow of [the] government.” When asked about the efficacy of the first Trump administration’s sanctions on Iran, then–Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said, “Things are much worse for the Iranian people, and we’re convinced that will lead the Iranian people to rise up and change the behavior of the regime.” He spoke with similar approval of the suffering of the Venezuelan people under U.S. sanctions — a sentiment echoed by Trump, who later gloated, “When I left [office], Venezuela was ready to collapse. We would have taken it over.”
While Trump officials have been particularly candid, policymakers in both parties regularly refer to macroeconomic factors such as GDP, oil output, foreign reserves, currency stability, and the cost of food — factors that directly affect the wellbeing of a population — as metrics of sanctions’ “success.”
Rep. Jim McGovern (D-Mass.), a critic of many U.S. sanctions, once remarked that, “Economic pain is the means by which the sanctions are supposed to work.” But there is a reason that few want to admit the reality of how sanctions work; because doing so would be an admission of violating international law. As dozens of legal organizations and over 200 lawyers wrote in a letter last year, the intentional targeting of civilians with sanctions amounts to collective punishment, which violates international humanitarian law and the U.N. Charter.
Major sanctions on Syria are on their way out. That’s good news.
But the justifications for their removal are admissions of what civil society critics and researchers have long argued: sanctions are killing the same people their advocates claim to protect. While Syria serves as a case study, this is equally true wherever there are broad economic sanctions regimes, from Cuba to Venezuela to Iran.
If sanctions depend on the suffering of civilians to function, they are not a diplomatic tool — they are a weapon of economic warfare. It is long past time to treat them as such.
For the better part of a decade, China has served as the “pacing threat” around which American military planners craft defense policy and, most importantly, budget decisions.
Within that framework, a potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan has become the scenario most often cited as the likeliest flashpoint for a military confrontation between the two superpowers.
In Washington, “China is going to invade Taiwan” has devolved into little more than a talking point these days. While it remains the essential premise underpinning defense policy, very little is generally said about Taiwan itself and its suitability as a stage for major military operations. That seems like an odd omission considering how much energy and resources American officials have expended in preparing to defend the place, including sending billions in direct military aid.
Hundreds of billions have either been spent or pledged to defend Taiwan. Yet Taiwan’s greatest defensive advantage is the main island of Taiwan itself. The island’s terrain is wholly unsuited for the kind of massive military invasion policymakers use to justify defense budget increases resulting is more than $1 trillion American annual defense budgets. A careful study of Taiwan’s geography including on-the-ground observations reveal eight significant challenges an invader would have to overcome to successfully conquer the island.
The following draws from my recent research on the island and will be fleshed out in a forthcoming report from the Stimson Center.
First, an invader would have to cross the Taiwan Strait to reach the island. An invasion force would include huge numbers of people, vehicles, and supplies. The only way to transport the bulk of such a force is with surface shipping which would be extremely vulnerable to submarines, underwater mines, long-range missiles, and now uncrewed attack vessels.
Second, Taiwan’s extensive shoreline provides few acceptable landing options. The majority of the island is covered by mountains and in most places, the mountains drop straight into the sea. An invader would have to establish a beachhead away from the cliffs, but all of these areas present two deeply troublesome military challenges.
Third, if the invader secures a foothold, it would then need to build up combat power ashore for the eventual breakout assault to capture the rest of the island. Again, Taiwan’s water-intensive agricultural land would make that difficult. The invader wouldn’t be able to stage people and vehicles in rice paddies. They would fare better doing so in developed port facilities, but they would still have to do so while fighting within the city.
Fourth, the invader would need to successfully breakout from the beachhead. Taiwan’s usable beaches lead either directly into a city or into farmland. Landing into a city creates means the invader would immediately be confronted by urban combat. Landing outside of the cities means the invader would crash across the beach only to then immediately become mired in the island’s extensive agricultural land which consists mainly of rice paddies.
Fifth, the invader would have to figure out how to fight across Taiwan’s landscape. Armored vehicles can’t drive through rice paddies. Tanks and armored personnel carriers, which would be needed in massive quantities to protect soldiers in the open terrain and cities, would need to stick to the island’s road network. Surface roads through the rice paddies provide a single lane in each direction at best.
An advancing armored force that gets stopped when the lead vehicle is destroyed by the defenders would not be able to drive around the new obstacle because the tanks would get stuck in water-logged fields. The only option would be to turn around and find another route. The defenders would be able to pull off the same trick again and again. It would be much faster for the invader to use Taiwan’s highway network, but these roads are often elevated which means the defender needs only to drop sections of the road to completely disrupt forward movement. Again, the invading force would not be able to easily bypass such an obstacle because it would require driving through rice paddies.
Sixth, the invader will have to contend with the island’s formidable natural obstacles restricting movements towards the ultimate objective in Taipei. Along the western plain of the island, the mountains reach all the way to the sea in several places creating narrow passes through which an invader would have to fight. The Yilan plain on the island’s east coast offers long stretches of inviting landing beaches, but an invader would have to fight directly through the mountains to reach Taipei along a highway that includes numerous bridges spanning deep river valleys and long tunnels bored through rock.
The island’s natural obstacles provide the Taiwanese with the ability to create a layered defense.
Seventh, Greater Taipei occupies a massive ancient lakebed in the northern part of the island. Mountains surround the city which is only accessible on the ground through narrow passes. One such pass is so narrow that the highway winding through it is elevated the entire way with opposing traffic lanes stacked vertically. Another pass is a little wider but it has been developed into essentially a long city with a winding river running through the middle creating a mile’s long obstacle protecting the approaches to Taipei.
Lastly, if an invader overcomes all of these challenges, they will still have to contend with Taipei proper. The metropolitan area covers 250 square kilometers. The city is very dense with relatively little open space at street level. A significant proportion of the city’s buildings rise above 20 stories. The scale of a contested battle over Taipei is almost impossible to comprehend.
The closest equivalent in history would be the Battle of Stalingrad in World War II. That city had a population of approximately 850,000 in 1940. During the six months the Germans and Soviets fought for control of the city, upwards of 2 million people were killed as the armies fought block by block. Greater Taipei today has a population of well over 7 million.
There are various strategic, political, and economic reasons why China’s leaders are much more likely pursue their goal of gaining political control of Taiwan through means other than a massive military invasion. But because American policymakers and military planners continue to cite the Chinese threat to Taiwan as the principal scenario around which to craft their proposals, it’s important to understand realities on the ground there.
With only a basic understanding of Taiwan’s complex terrain, it becomes immediately obvious that there are few places on Earth less suitable for what would be the largest single military operation in history. The doyens of the national security establishment may need to find a new pacing threat.
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