Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s suggestion during his confirmation hearing that he would consider supporting Georgia’s membership in NATO has largely gone overlooked. Georgian media has since reported that Blinken also raised the Georgia issue in his first call with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov. But if the Biden administration continues to push the issue of Georgia’s potential NATO membership, it would endanger the already precarious stability of the South Caucasus and increase the likelihood of misunderstanding between Moscow and Washington.
Georgian ascension to NATO would also further damage the U.S.’s already strained relationship with Europe — where public opinion shows little support for the ongoing rivalry with Russia — thereby potentially jeopardizing European cooperation on issues ranging from the rise of China to climate change.
Russia won’t interpret any consideration of Georgia's membership charitably. Russia has already lost influence in the South Caucasus, a region Moscow viewed as its sphere of influence just a decade ago.
Just last year, Russia paid a high geopolitical price for the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia. While Moscow was able to negotiate a ceasefire, it had to deploy peacekeepers and accede to (NATO member-state) Turkey's influence in the South Caucasus. As Russia’s relative influence in the region wanes, any hint of support from the Biden administration for Georgia’s campaign for NATO membership could provoke a violent Russian response.
European leaders likely won’t support Georgia's membership in NATO. German Chancellor Angela Merkel — who has said that she does not foresee “Georgia's prompt accession to NATO” — is approaching the end of her long tenure in office, and nothing suggests her potential successors will be more willing to expand NATO eastward. Moreover, recent polling from the European Council on Foreign Relations suggests most Germans don’t want to take sides between Washington and Moscow. Meanwhile, the Eurasia Group Foundation found that Germans are deeply pessimistic about ties with the United States. Thus, pushing for Georgian membership without European support risks re-establishing goodwill among NATO allies, a key priority for the Biden administration.
The United States has been down this road before, and the result was disastrous. At NATO’s Bucharest Summit in April 2008, President George W. Bush pushed the idea of expanding the alliance to Georgia and Ukraine. Merkel led European opposition and warned that Russia would interpret any further eastward expansion of NATO as an existential threat. A compromise was eventually reached in the Bucharest Declaration which contained language that committed the alliance to consider Georgia's accession eventually, but on no specific timeline.
Moscow and Tblissi both almost immediately misinterpreted the Bucharest Declaration’s ambiguous intent. Just 20 minutes after NATO made it public, Russia announced it would provide support to Abkhazia and South Ossetia, two break-away provinces in the north of Georgia. Just four months later, Georgian President Mikhail Sakashvilli instigated an ill-advised offensive against Ossetian militia and Russian peacekeepers in Tskinvali, the capital of South Ossetia. Russian forces quickly overran the Georgian military and won the war in 12 days. In the aftermath of the war, 20,000 ethnic Georgians were unable to return to their homes in South Ossetia.
Twelve years later, Georgia is even further away from obtaining NATO membership. Abkhazia and South Ossetia both remain de-facto independent, and rigidly aligned with Moscow. Short of a sea change in Russian politics, there is no chance of Tbilisi regaining control of South Ossetia and Abkhazia peacefully. According to NATO requirements for membership, applicants must not have ongoing territorial disputes, and it’s unlikely that Georgia would be willing to let the provinces go.
The Biden administration may understand that Georgia’s campaign to join NATO is impracticable in the short term. And it may be that publicly supporting Georgia’s ascension is simply a negotiating tool, or part of the follow-through on President Biden’s vow to “punish Russia” for a series of espionage related hacks of American computer systems reportedly conducted by Moscow. But as we’ve seen, Russia and Georgia could misinterpret such ambiguity to disastrous consequences. Indeed, Georgian media has already given Blinken’s remarks morecoverage than the Biden administration might expect.
Georgia’s membership in NATO is the wrong issue for this type of diplomatic maneuvering. Blinken suggested during his confirmation hearing that Georgia would become safer by joining NATO. While it’s unclear whether that would be the ultimate outcome in Georgia’s case, what is certain is that the application process itself would endanger Georgia, the stability of the South Caucasus, and U.S. interests in the region. Pushing this issue is a gamble with no clear payoff for the United States.
Moreover, Georgia’s ascension to NATO would add yet another Article V commitment — an issue that’s already contentious among the American public — to an ally bordering an increasingly insecure Russia.
Another consequence would be increased tensions between Russia and Georgia, if not outright war, and the further fraying of American ties to Western Europe. Forcing the issue of Georgian membership in NATO right now will stress already strained relations with allies like Germany. Restoring the transatlantic relationship was a central tenet of the Biden campaign’s foreign policy platform. Now is not the time to stress those relationships further for the sake of poking Putin in the eye.
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Adam Pontius is a writer on international politics based in New York. His writing and research focuses on international security and transatlantic politics. Previously, Adam worked as a graduate research assistant for the Eurasia Group Foundation (EGF) in support of the Independent America project. Prior to EGF, Adam worked as a political consultant and an advocate for democratic reform for seven years. He holds an M.A. degree in International Relations from Central European University where he wrote his thesis on ontological security and Woodow Wilson's foreign policy. Adam is an alumnus of the Bard Globalization and International Affairs program and holds B.A. in political science from Elmira College.
President Joseph R. Biden, Jr., with Vice President Kamala K. Harris and Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken, delivers remarks to State Department employees, at the U.S. Department of State in Washington, D.C., on February 4, 2021. [State Department Photo by Freddie Everett]|A soldier carries the NATO flag during German Minister of Defence Ursula von der Leyen's visit to German troops deployed as part of NATO enhanced Forward Presence battle group in Rukla military base, Lithuania, February 4, 2019. REUTERS/Ints Kalnins
Top photo credit: Candidate for the presidency of Romania, Calin Georgescu, and his wife, Cristela, arrive at a polling station for parliamentary elections, Dec. 1, 2024 in Mogosoaia, Romania. Georgescu one the first round in the Nov. 24 presidential elections but those elections results have been canceled (Shutterstock/LCV)
The Romanian Constitutional Court’s unprecedented decision to annul the first round results in the country’s Nov. 24 presidential election and restart the contest from scratch raises somber questions about Romanian democracy at a time when the European Union is being swept by populist, eurosceptic waves.
The court, citing declassified intelligence reports, ruled that candidate Călin Georgescu unlawfully benefitted from a foreign-backed social media campaign that propelled him from an obscure outsider to the frontrunner by a comfortable margin. Romanian intelligence has identified the foreign backer as Russia. Authorities claim that Georgescu’s popularity was artificially inflated by tens of thousands of TikTok accounts that promoted his candidacy in violation of Romanian election laws.
Meanwhile, the European Commission has ordered TikTok to "preserve internal documents and information" related to its recommendation system, adding that it has not yet decided whether TikTok has violated its content moderation policies.
The ruling follows a court-ordered recount of the first round that found no irregularities or evidence of systemic voter fraud. It is not clear what new evidence emerged between the court’s decision to confirm the first round results and the subsequent annulment.
It has not been established even cursorily, let alone to a degree sufficient to pass for legally admissible evidence, that this alleged social media coordination had a specific electoral impact large enough to change or even significantly impact the results of the first round of voting.
It is, after all, not unusual for outsider candidates with little to no name recognition to reap the windfall from widespread anti-establishment sentiment in an election cycle where, as it appears, the more well-known anti-establishment candidates were too distrusted or disliked to hold on to the protest vote.
In a two-round voting system, the second round is itself a built-in corrective that gives voters a separate chance to assess the candidates.
The Constitutional Court, by upending this process, has done more to erode voters’ faith and confidence in the country’s democratic institutions than anything Moscow could have hoped to achieve through its hybrid influence operations. This move has lent credence to Georgescu’s anti-establishment, populist message in a way that is likely to further boost his electoral appeal, making it tactically ill-advised in addition to all the other procedural concerns that have been heaped on it.
It is not insignificant in light of these political considerations that Georgescu’s opponent in the second round, Elena Lasconi, has forcefully opposed the annulment.
“Today is the moment when the Romanian state has trampled on democracy,” she said. “We should have gone ahead with the vote. We should have respected the will of the Romanian people, whether we like it or not, legally and legitimately, nine million Romanian citizens, both at home and in the diaspora, have expressed their preference for a particular candidate by voting.”
There is an unmistakable geopolitical specter looming over Romania’s constitutional crisis. Georgescu is an avowed eurosceptic who — like his Slovakian, Hungarian, and to some extent Bulgarian counterparts — has been critical of NATO’s approach to the Ukraine war at a time when the French and German governments are facing major challenges of their own.
These headwinds augur not just a potential European peeling away from the Biden-led united front on Ukraine, but a larger shake-up in the transatlantic relationship both Washington and Brussels should tackle frankly and proactively, not as a fire to be put out but as an opportunity to place the U.S.-EU relations on a more sustainable strategic footing.
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Top photo credit: Palestinians take part in a "Great March of Return" demonstration, on the Gaza-Israel border, in east of Gaza city in the Gaza Strip. 07 December, 2018. Palestinian Territory, Gaza City (Shutterstock/hosny f. Salah)
The retiring United Nations envoy for the Middle East peace process has insightfully identified a major reason the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians continues to boil and to entail widespread death and destruction.
In a recent interview with the New York Times, Norwegian diplomat Tor Wennesland criticized the international community for relying on short-term fixes such as improving quality of life in occupied territory or diversions such as seeking peace deals between Israel and other Arab states. The crescendo of bloodshed during the past year underscores the ineffectiveness of such approaches.
Needed but not employed was a concerted and sustained diplomatic effort to end the occupation and create a Palestinian state. “What we have seen,” said Wennesland, “is the failure of dealing with the real conflict, the failure of politics and diplomacy.”
Much of Wennesland’s criticism was directed at the international community as a whole, but his points would apply especially to the United States, the patron of the party to the conflict that controls the land in question and resists Palestinian sovereignty.
The polar opposite of the needed diplomatic effort is what has been the dominant strategy of Israel and to a large degree also of the United States: the application of ever more military force. This was true with the 1973 war between Egypt and Israel, the first full-scale Arab-Israeli war after Israel conquered in 1967 what is now the occupied territories of the West Bank, East Jerusalem, Gaza Strip, and Golan Heights.
The central feature of Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger’s policy was a huge airlift of military supplies to Israel. Nixon and Kissinger, viewing the conflict in Cold War terms, considered their policy a success by enabling Israel to turn the tide of battle while shutting the Soviet Union out of a meaningful regional role.
Fast forward to today, and the emphasis is still on military escalation. Israel, in its vain effort to “destroy Hamas” and strike down adversaries on its northern border, is more committed than ever to increasing death and destruction as its default approach toward any security problem. The United States has abetted this approach by gifting $18 billion in munitions to Israel since October 2023.
The collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria does nothing to discourage these tendencies and may instead encourage them. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu responded to the events in Syria with celebration and self-congratulations, claiming that Assad’s fall was due to earlier Israeli airstrikes on Hezbollah and Iran. The change of regime was an occasion for Israel increasing rather than decreasing its offensive military activity in Syria, including seizure of a previously demilitarized buffer zone along the Golan frontier and airstrikes in and around Damascus on the very weekend that rebels were entering the capital.
During the intervening years since the 1973 war, a couple of U.S. presidents did make genuine efforts to advance an Israeli-Palestinian peace. But the necessary follow-up — largely the responsibility of subsequent administrations — did not occur.
After Jimmy Carter brokered the 1978 Camp David Accords, the government of Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin pocketed the resulting peace treaty with Egypt while ignoring the part of the accords dealing with the Palestinians. After Bill Clinton in 2000 laid on the table his "parameters" for a deal, the two sides came closer than ever to a peace agreement, but an Israeli election ended the negotiations and the new Israeli government did not return to the table.
The current impending change in U.S. administrations offers little or no hope for positive change on this subject. After social media posts by President-elect Donald Trump that said nothing about diplomacy and instead talked about “all hell to pay” if Israeli hostages were not released by his inauguration on January 20, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu thanked Trump for his “strong statement.”
Ignoring that Israel has both the power and the land and is inflicting many times more suffering on innocent civilians than anything Hamas has done, Netanyahu said that Trump’s statement “clarifies that there is one party responsible for this situation and that is Hamas.”
Echoes of a 1973-style Cold War mentality can be heard today in much discussion of U.S. policy toward the Middle East and overwhelmingly in Israeli rhetoric. The main bête noire this time is Iran, reducing the influence of which is a constantly invoked rationale for hawkish and military-heavy policies.
The Middle East is not the only region that has demonstrated the fallacy of the notion of de-escalating a conflict through military escalation. As Wennesland puts it, “Politics is what ends war, and diplomacy is what ends war.”
It is important to understand what diplomacy in this context does and does not mean. It does not mean routinely giving lip service to a “two-state solution” while doing little or nothing to bring about such a solution.
Nor does it mean seeking agreements for the sake of agreements, motivated in large part by a desire to wave supposed accomplishments before a domestic constituency. This was true of the so-called "Abraham Accords," which were not peace agreements at all but instead were largely about Israel not having to make peace to enjoy formal relations with other regional states, with which Israel was not at war anyway.
It was true as well of the enormous priority that the Biden administration put on seeking a similar agreement with Saudi Arabia, which, even if it had materialized in the form the administration envisioned, would not have served either U.S. interests or the cause of Middle East peace. The administration’s effort along this line was counterproductive not only in further reducing any Israeli incentive to make peace with the Palestinians but also, as President Biden himself admitted, in probably being an additional motivation for Hamas to attack Israel last October.
As for what diplomacy does mean, it includes the concerted and sustained use of diplomatic energy, policymaking bandwidth, and political capital to address directly the core issues underlying a conflict and bring about a result that makes a difference. In the Middle East context, that result needs to include Palestinian self-determination and an end to occupation.
Correct understanding of diplomacy also speaks to what a foreign policy of restraint means. It does not mean isolationism. In areas such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, it can mean an increase in diplomatic involvement and in the priority that policymakers give to the goal being sought. As the restraint-minded Quincy Institute puts it in its statement of principles, the United States “should engage with the world” and pursue peace “through the vigorous practice of diplomacy.”
Much damage from the policies that Wennesland laments has been done and cannot easily be reversed. The Israeli settlement enterprise in the occupied territories, which tsk-tsks from the United States have done nothing to stop, have led many observers — though not Wennesland — to believe that a two-state solution is no longer possible.
But even if the requirement of Palestinian self-determination could be achieved only through a one-state solution that provides equal rights for all, the same principle — that peace can be achieved only through vigorous diplomacy and not military escalation — applies.
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Top photo credit: A U.S. Soldier oversees members of the Syrian Democratic Forces as they raise a Tal Abyad Military Council flag over the outpost, Sept. 21, 2019. (U.S. Army photo by Staff Sgt. Andrew Goedl)
A surprise offensive by Islamist, al-Qaida-linked group Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) has forced President Bashar al-Assad out in Syria. In turn, the U.S. is ramping up its long-term involvement in a country already devastated by years of war.
According to a Sunday statement by President Joe Biden, the U.S. has made haste to strike a freshly post-Assad Syria 75 times, allegedly hitting ISIS targets with B-52 bombers and F-15 fighters. “We’re clear-eyed about the fact that ISIS will try and take advantage of any vacuum to reestablish its credibility, and create a safe haven,” Biden explained. “We will not allow that to happen.”
The U.S. has repeatedly struck Syria over the last year, including nine strikes on two allegedly Iran-aligned targets in November. According to U.S. Central Commend (CENTCOM), the strikes were to blunt Iranian backed groups’ capacity to attack U.S. forces combating ISIS in the region.
Meanwhile, an estimated 900 troops are currently stationed in Syria. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Middle East Daniel Shapiro said on Sunday that the military presence will be maintained in Syria to prevent an ISIS resurgence. "We are aware that the chaotic and dynamic circumstances on the ground in Syria could give ISIS space to find the ability to become active, to plan external operations, and we're determined to work with those partners to continue to degrade their capabilities," Shapiro said.
Theoretically, U.S. forces are to keep ISIS in check as Shapiro suggests; in practice, U.S. forces also collaborate with the U.S.-backed, Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). And while the U.S. insists such collaboration is limited to anti-ISIS efforts, Al Monitor reported that U.S. troops may have assisted an SDF effort to oust pro-Syrian government forces in villages near Deir ez-Zor in an incident last week, which injured two U.S. soldiers.
Altogether, complex circumstances in Syria have indirectly put NATO allies Turkey and the U.S. in contention with one another. Indeed, Turkey has long opposed the U.S. backed SDF’s quasi-independent Kurdish zone in North-Eastern Syria; the New York Times reported that Turkish forces attacked the U.S.-backed SDF troops over the weekend.
Meanwhile, the U.S. has also signaled interest in Syria’s oil. Right now, the SDF occupies Syrian territory in the northeast that incorporates the vast majority of the country's oil fields.
Then-President Donald Trump attempted to withdraw the troops in 2019 but was stonewalled and misled by his Pentagon. Later, he said in a press conference at the White House with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan that "we're keeping the oil. We have the oil. The oil is secure," which then translated into a policy of the troops staying in the country to ostensibly secure the oil for the Kurdish SDF and to keep it out of the hands of ISIS. Yesterday posting on Truth Social, he appeared to signal that the U.S. may not even have that interest, anymore. "Syria is a mess, but is not our friend, & THE UNITED STATES SHOULD HAVE NOTHING TO DO WITH IT. THIS IS NOT OUR FIGHT. LET IT PLAY OUT. DO NOT GET INVOLVED!"
Others are in agreement, suggesting it is time for the 900 U.S. military personnel to get out, particularly as ground conditions in Syria are rapidly changing and HTS works to consolidate power.
As retired Lt. Col. Daniel Davis of the Deep Dive podcast tells RS: “100% the first move the United States should make is to get our vulnerable troops out of Syria. They provide no value for the United States, but serve merely as a point of strategic vulnerability. It should’ve ended a long time ago, but definitely should end now.”
Veterans groups are also weighing in. “Instead of recognizing that there are no vital national interests at stake in Syria, President Biden indicated in recent remarks that he intends to double down on a failed strategy by unnecessarily keeping U.S. troops in harm’s way in Eastern Syria,” a joint statement by Americans for Prosperity and Concerned Veterans for America read. “Americans know too well how regime change can lead to endless wars, squandering lives and dollars on interventions that do not serve our national interest.”
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