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How bad US foreign policy blows back on its allies

How bad US foreign policy blows back on its allies

An ongoing spat between Iran and South Korea is a direct result of Trump’s failed ‘maximum pressure’ campaign.

Analysis | Washington Politics

The Joe Biden administration may be only a few weeks old, but the first challenge to the U.S.-South Korea alliance is already here, and it has nothing to do with North Korea or China.

On January 4, Iran’s Revolutionary Guard seized Hankuk Chemi, a South Korean oil tanker that was sailing in the Strait of Hormuz, ostensibly because the ship was polluting the waters. The seizure of the ship, which was headed to United Arab Emirates from Saudi Arabia with 20 sailors and 7,200 tons of ethanol, has raised tensions between Iran and South Korea.

The Korean government dispatched a naval destroyer to the Strait of Hormuz as a show of force, and also summoned Iran’s ambassador in Seoul to demand the release of the ship. In addition, the Korean government sent Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Choe Jong-geon to Tehran on January 10 to negotiate the release of the ship. After an exchange of barbed words between Seoul and Tehran, Iran agreed to release most of the sailors although it continued to hold the ship and its captain

Vice Minister Choe’s press conference upon his return confirmed to the South Korean foreign policy circles what they had suspected about the ship’s seizure: it was connected to approximately $7 billion of Iran’s money, currently impounded in South Korean banks.

South Korea and Iran historically have maintained a solid bilateral relationship, to a point that until recently, South Korea was Iran’s third largest trading partner behind only China and India, and Iran in turn was South Korea’s third largest supplier of petroleum. Based on this relationship, two South Korean banks — Woori Bank and IBK Bank — were holding Iran’s proceeds in petroleum sales in Korean won. But the $7 billion proceeds were frozen since 2018, as the United States stepped up the sanctions against Iran during the Donald Trump administration.

Although Tehran officially denied that it seized the ship to gain leverage in the negotiation, it’s easy to read between the lines.

Ali Rabiei, the Iranian government spokesman, said in a news conference held on January 5: “If there is any hostage-taking, it is Korea’s government that is holding $7 billion which belongs to us hostage on baseless grounds.”

Vice Minister Choe raised a similar theme, noting that when he demanded the release of the ship and its sailors in strong terms, Iranian officials responded with strong demands for the release of the $ 7 billion.

Seoul and Tehran are reportedly negotiating to have the money applied toward the COVID-19 vaccine and other medical supplies, which are exempt from sanctions. Iran is balking, however, because it fears that the funds might be routed through a U.S. bank where the U.S. authorities would seize the money. In the end, it may be up to Washington for Seoul and Tehran to resolve this situation.

Following the Trump administration’s killing of Iranian General Qassem Soleimani, I raised the point that U.S. actions against Iran would have consequences that reach far beyond the Middle East, as it would place a key U.S. ally in East Asia in a difficult position. Today, we are seeing the materialization of that precise risk: South Korea and Iran squaring off while holding each other’s money and ship, in a situation caused ultimately by U.S. sanctions against Iran.

This episode presents the first challenge for the U.S.-South Korea alliance for the Biden administration. This moment is not quite as dire as the days immediately following the killing of Soleimani, when a war between the United States and Iran appeared to be a realistic possibility and South Korea would face with the difficult choice of potentially joining yet another unpopular U.S.-led war in the Middle East after having sent troops to Iraq in 2003.

Yet it remains true that South Korea is facing this situation of having its ship and citizen held hostage in Iran because it is acting as a good ally to the United States and faithfully participating in its sanctions regime against Iran. The Biden administration should make good on its pledge to repair U.S. alliances by recognizing the cost that South Korea bore for being a faithful ally. Washington could be more active in resolving this standoff between Seoul and Tehran, for example by reassuring Iran that it would not attempt to seize funds that were intended for medical supplies.

This episode also offers a broader lesson: an adversarial U.S. posture in one region imposes a cost on U.S. allies everywhere in the world, including those who may not appear relevant in the first blush.

There was a time when the United States never had to think deeply about these costs, and expect its allies to simply grin and bear it when they do arise. The United States can no longer afford to take such a unilateral stance toward its alliances. If the Biden administration is serious about multilateralism, it must widen its view beyond the narrowly defined national interest of the United States, and conduct its foreign policy while also considering the implication of its initiatives to U.S. allies and the world.


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Analysis | Washington Politics
Trump Zelensky
Top photo credit: Joshua Sukoff / Shutterstock.com

Blob exploiting Trump's anger with Putin, risking return to Biden's war

Europe

Donald Trump’s recent outburst against Vladimir Putin — accusing the Russian leader of "throwing a pile of bullsh*t at us" and threatening devastating new sanctions — might be just another Trumpian tantrum.

The president is known for abrupt reversals. Or it could be a bargaining tactic ahead of potential Ukraine peace talks. But there’s a third, more troubling possibility: establishment Republican hawks and neoconservatives, who have been maneuvering to hijack Trump’s “America First” agenda since his return to office, may be exploiting his frustration with Putin to push for a prolonged confrontation with Russia.

Trump’s irritation is understandable. Ukraine has accepted his proposed ceasefire, but Putin has refused, making him, in Trump’s eyes, the main obstacle to ending the war.

Putin’s calculus is clear. As Ted Snider notes in the American Conservative, Russia is winning on the battlefield. In June, it captured more Ukrainian territory and now threatens critical Kyiv’s supply lines. Moscow also seized a key lithium deposit critical to securing Trump’s support for Ukraine. Meanwhile, Russian missile and drone strikes have intensified.

Putin seems convinced his key demands — Ukraine’s neutrality, territorial concessions in the Donbas and Crimea, and a downsized Ukrainian military — are more achievable through war than diplomacy.

Yet his strategy empowers the transatlantic “forever war” faction: leaders in Britain, France, Germany, and the EU, along with hawks in both main U.S. parties. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz claims that diplomacy with Russia is “exhausted.” Europe’s war party, convinced a Russian victory would inevitably lead to an attack on NATO (a suicidal prospect for Moscow), is willing to fight “to the last Ukrainian.” Meanwhile, U.S. hawks, including liberal interventionist Democrats, stoke Trump’s ego, framing failure to stand up to Putin’s defiance as a sign of weakness or appeasement.

Trump long resisted this pressure. Pragmatism told him Ukraine couldn’t win, and calling it “Biden’s war” was his way of distancing himself, seeking a quick exit to refocus on China, which he has depicted as Washington’s greater foreign threat. At least as important, U.S. involvement in the war in Ukraine has been unpopular with his MAGA base.

But his June strikes on Iran may signal a hawkish shift. By touting them as a decisive blow to Iran’s nuclear program (despite Tehran’s refusal so far to abandon uranium enrichment), Trump may be embracing a new approach to dealing with recalcitrant foreign powers: offer a deal, set a deadline, then unleash overwhelming force if rejected. The optics of “success” could tempt him to try something similar with Russia.

This pivot coincides with a media campaign against restraint advocates within the administration like Elbridge Colby, the Pentagon policy chief who has prioritized China over Ukraine and also provoked the opposition of pro-Israel neoconservatives by warning against war with Iran. POLITICO quoted unnamed officials attacking Colby for wanting the U.S. to “do less in the world.” Meanwhile, the conventional Republican hawk Marco Rubio’s influence grows as he combines the jobs of both secretary of state and national security adviser.

What Can Trump Actually Do to Russia?
 

Nuclear deterrence rules out direct military action — even Biden, far more invested in Ukraine than Trump, avoided that risk. Instead, Trump ally Sen.Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.), another establishment Republican hawk, is pushing a 500% tariff on nations buying Russian hydrocarbons, aiming to sever Moscow from the global economy. Trump seems supportive, although the move’s feasibility and impact are doubtful.

China and India are key buyers of Russian oil. China alone imports 12.5 million barrels daily. Russia exports seven million barrels daily. China could absorb Russia’s entire output. Beijing has bluntly stated it “cannot afford” a Russian defeat, ensuring Moscow’s economic lifeline remains open.

The U.S., meanwhile, is ill-prepared for a tariff war with China. When Trump imposed 145% tariffs, Beijing retaliated by cutting off rare earth metals exports, vital to U.S. industry and defense. Trump backed down.

At the G-7 summit in Canada last month, the EU proposed lowering price caps on Russian oil from $60 a barrel to $45 a barrel as part of its 18th sanctions package against Russia. Trump rejected the proposal at the time but may be tempted to reconsider, given his suggestion that more sanctions may be needed. Even if Washington backs the measure now, however, it is unlikely to cripple Russia’s war machine.

Another strategy may involve isolating Russia by peeling away Moscow’s traditionally friendly neighbors. Here, Western mediation between Armenia and Azerbaijan isn’t about peace — if it were, pressure would target Baku, which has stalled agreements and threatened renewed war against Armenia. The real goal is to eject Russia from the South Caucasus and create a NATO-aligned energy corridor linking Turkey to Central Asia, bypassing both Russia and Iran to their detriment.

Central Asia itself is itself emerging as a new battleground. In May 2025, the EU has celebrated its first summit with Central Asian nations in Uzbekistan, with a heavy focus on developing the Middle Corridor, a route for transportation of energy and critical raw materials that would bypass Russia. In that context, the EU has committed €10 billion in support of the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route.

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Lifting sanctions on Syria exposes their cruel intent

Middle East

On June 30, President Trump signed an executive order terminating the majority of U.S. sanctions on Syria. The move, which would have been unthinkable mere months ago, fulfilled a promise he made at an investment forum in Riyadh in May.“The sanctions were brutal and crippling,” he had declared to an audience of primarily Saudi businessmen. Lifting them, he said, will “give Syria a chance at greatness.”

The significance of this statement lies not solely in the relief that it will bring to the Syrian people. His remarks revealed an implicit but rarely admitted truth: sanctions — often presented as a peaceful alternative to war — have been harming the Syrian people all along.

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Asia-Pacific

For the better part of a decade, China has served as the “pacing threat” around which American military planners craft defense policy and, most importantly, budget decisions.

Within that framework, a potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan has become the scenario most often cited as the likeliest flashpoint for a military confrontation between the two superpowers.

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