Follow us on social

2018-04-13t134114z_937344659_rc14ae1a0db0_rtrmadp_3_israel-palestinians-protests-scaled

Why MBS is keeping visit by Netanyahu and the Mossad on the down-low

Israel certainly wants the Saudis to get on the normalization bandwagon, but the monarchy has other, domestic considerations.

Analysis | Middle East

Saudi officials are vigorously denying that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Mossad director Yossi Cohen met this week with Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman in Neom, the mega-city under development on the Red Sea coast.

Saudi sources nevertheless told the Wall Street Journal, in anonymity, that the visit had taken place, and online flight tracking data indicates that a private jet flew from Tel Aviv directly to Neom and back on the evening of November 22, coinciding with Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s own meeting with the Crown Prince. 

Both the timing and the secretive nature of the visit, assuming it did occur, illustrate some of the sensitivities facing the Saudi and Israeli leadership as the Trump administration draws to a chaotic close. 

Israeli and U.S. media reports have suggested that the issues of Iran and normalization were the focus of the Netanyahu-Mohammed bin Salman meeting. Officials in both countries have expressed concerns that the Biden administration will seek to return the United States to compliance with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) once it takes office in January, and Netanyahu himself urged Biden not to return to the Iran deal (in its pre-2018 form), just hours ahead of his trip to Neom. Within hours, Saudi Arabia’s Ambassador to the United Nations, Abdallah al-Mouallimi, made exactly the same point as he told Fox News that “I don’t think anybody is going to be naïve enough” to go back to a deal which “has proven its failure to the entire world.”

The prospect of Saudi and Israeli officials coming together to push back against U.S. engagement with Iran may come as little surprise to Biden’s incoming foreign policy team, many of whom are veterans of the Obama-era State Department and the Iran nuclear negotiations between 2012 and 2015. Then, a shared concern about U.S. diplomatic outreach toward Iran led to discreet coordination of messaging between Israeli and various Gulf States’ security and intelligence officials. 

In March 2015, Saudi-owned Al-Arabiya even published an op-ed by its editor, Faisal Abbas, entitled “President Obama, listen to Netanyahu on Iran.” Now, in a post-Abraham Accord setting, such coordination is likely to be more open and higher-level, especially if the Biden administration moves to rejoin the JCPOA. Jake Sullivan, Biden’s pick for National Security Advisor, suggested rejoining would be a priority for its first 100 days in office in an August 2020 interview.

The fact that Secretary Pompeo was in Neom at the time of Netanyahu’s ostensible visit suggests that Iran may have been the primary focus of the meeting, with the recent normalization of Israeli relations with the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain a clear contextual factor. The agreement signed by the UAE and Israel at the White House on September 15 included mention of a “Strategic Agenda for the Middle East” (which did not appear in the separate document signed by Israel and Bahrain the same day). The Strategic Agenda was not limited to Israel and the UAE, and noted that “others, as appropriate” could join to “advance regional security and stability.” 

The Neom get-together may have been an early operationalization of this emerging strategic realignment just as Pompeo and the Trump administration are gearing up for a final squeeze of its maximum pressure campaign on Iran before leaving office. 

A somewhat unconvincing denial of the reported meeting by the Saudi foreign minister, Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud, adds to the impression that Netanyahu’s trip to Neom was more about coordinating policy toward Iran than about publicizing a historic first visit by an Israeli leader to Saudi Arabia. Had normalization been on the agenda, then either the meeting did not produce a breakthrough — as has since been reported in some media outlets — or it is consistent with the Saudis’ practice of maintaining a careful balancing act when engaging with Israel. Mohammed bin Salman is not yet formally in power and cannot simply bypass King Salman’s decades-long support for the Palestinian cause. 

Although the UAE, Bahrain, and Sudan opened relations with Israel this year, Saudi Arabia faces more constraints. One factor is the size of the Saudi population. The UAE and Bahrain have both successfully disempowered their relatively small populations of nine million and 1.5 million inhabitants, respectively. The UAE disburses oil wealth to its citizens, while violently suppressing dissent. Bahrain, with Saudi help, successfully smashed its opposition movement during the Arab Spring almost ten years ago, and cracked down again in 2016. Many of the protest’s key figures remain imprisoned

In contrast, Mohammed bin Salman must contend with a population of more than 20 million Saudi citizens. A history of popular mobilization against the state, such as the Sahwa movement of the 1990s, may undermine Mohammed bin Salman’s confidence that he could force through such a controversial decision.

Sudan’s decision to establish relations reflected the transitional government’s desperation to get off the U.S. state sponsors of terrorism list in order to gain substantial assistance to deal with a collapsing economy. The fact that Sudan’s population of 41 million people only engaged in sporadic demonstrations against this move may have encouraged MBS as to the possibility that Saudis might also exhibit a muted reaction. However, Sudan does not have the same history of leadership in trying to resolve the Israel-Palestinian conflict that still resonates powerfully with Saudi Arabia’s 84-year old King Salman. 

The Arab Peace Initiative, which was adopted by the Arab League in 2002, asserts that no Arab country will normalize with Israel unless significant progress has been made on resolving the conflict, including Israel’s withdrawal from the Occupied Territories and the establishment of a Palestinian state. The API is also known as the Saudi Initiative, for then-King Abdullah’s role in developing it and hosting the Riyadh Summit to reaffirm its principles in 2007. In contrast, the countries that agreed to normalize with Israel do not have the same history of commitment to the Palestinian cause.

Another constraining factor is that MBS has already imposed numerous changes on the Saudi population, from loosening long-standing restrictions on gender separation to imposing and then tripling the country’s first taxes this year. Although MBS has brutally repressed dissent, he has yet to face mass opposition to his policies, as many young Saudis continue to support his efforts to diversify the economy. To add normalization with Israel to the many other controversial changes he has imposed could be the final trigger for mobilizing political dissent at a time of economic precarity.

Despite their authoritarian character, the Gulf monarchies remain sensitive to popular opinion, generally preferring to avoid policies likely to anger large portions of their citizenry. Mohammed bin Salman has demonstrated that he is willing to implement more substantial changes than many Gulf rulers, yet his primary concern is becoming king. Once his position is secure, MBS may be willing to move forward with normalization, but until that time he is unlikely to risk it.


Palestinian demonstrators burn a banner showing a representation of an Israeli flag Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Israeli Defence Minister Avigdor Lieberman, U.S. President Donald Trump and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman during a protest demanding the right to return to their homeland, at the Israel-Gaza border, in the southern Gaza Strip, April 13, 2018. REUTERS/Ibraheem Abu Mustafa
Analysis | Middle East
Trump Zelensky
Top photo credit: Joshua Sukoff / Shutterstock.com

Blob exploiting Trump's anger with Putin, risking return to Biden's war

Europe

Donald Trump’s recent outburst against Vladimir Putin — accusing the Russian leader of "throwing a pile of bullsh*t at us" and threatening devastating new sanctions — might be just another Trumpian tantrum.

The president is known for abrupt reversals. Or it could be a bargaining tactic ahead of potential Ukraine peace talks. But there’s a third, more troubling possibility: establishment Republican hawks and neoconservatives, who have been maneuvering to hijack Trump’s “America First” agenda since his return to office, may be exploiting his frustration with Putin to push for a prolonged confrontation with Russia.

Trump’s irritation is understandable. Ukraine has accepted his proposed ceasefire, but Putin has refused, making him, in Trump’s eyes, the main obstacle to ending the war.

Putin’s calculus is clear. As Ted Snider notes in the American Conservative, Russia is winning on the battlefield. In June, it captured more Ukrainian territory and now threatens critical Kyiv’s supply lines. Moscow also seized a key lithium deposit critical to securing Trump’s support for Ukraine. Meanwhile, Russian missile and drone strikes have intensified.

Putin seems convinced his key demands — Ukraine’s neutrality, territorial concessions in the Donbas and Crimea, and a downsized Ukrainian military — are more achievable through war than diplomacy.

Yet his strategy empowers the transatlantic “forever war” faction: leaders in Britain, France, Germany, and the EU, along with hawks in both main U.S. parties. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz claims that diplomacy with Russia is “exhausted.” Europe’s war party, convinced a Russian victory would inevitably lead to an attack on NATO (a suicidal prospect for Moscow), is willing to fight “to the last Ukrainian.” Meanwhile, U.S. hawks, including liberal interventionist Democrats, stoke Trump’s ego, framing failure to stand up to Putin’s defiance as a sign of weakness or appeasement.

Trump long resisted this pressure. Pragmatism told him Ukraine couldn’t win, and calling it “Biden’s war” was his way of distancing himself, seeking a quick exit to refocus on China, which he has depicted as Washington’s greater foreign threat. At least as important, U.S. involvement in the war in Ukraine has been unpopular with his MAGA base.

But his June strikes on Iran may signal a hawkish shift. By touting them as a decisive blow to Iran’s nuclear program (despite Tehran’s refusal so far to abandon uranium enrichment), Trump may be embracing a new approach to dealing with recalcitrant foreign powers: offer a deal, set a deadline, then unleash overwhelming force if rejected. The optics of “success” could tempt him to try something similar with Russia.

This pivot coincides with a media campaign against restraint advocates within the administration like Elbridge Colby, the Pentagon policy chief who has prioritized China over Ukraine and also provoked the opposition of pro-Israel neoconservatives by warning against war with Iran. POLITICO quoted unnamed officials attacking Colby for wanting the U.S. to “do less in the world.” Meanwhile, the conventional Republican hawk Marco Rubio’s influence grows as he combines the jobs of both secretary of state and national security adviser.

What Can Trump Actually Do to Russia?
 

Nuclear deterrence rules out direct military action — even Biden, far more invested in Ukraine than Trump, avoided that risk. Instead, Trump ally Sen.Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.), another establishment Republican hawk, is pushing a 500% tariff on nations buying Russian hydrocarbons, aiming to sever Moscow from the global economy. Trump seems supportive, although the move’s feasibility and impact are doubtful.

China and India are key buyers of Russian oil. China alone imports 12.5 million barrels daily. Russia exports seven million barrels daily. China could absorb Russia’s entire output. Beijing has bluntly stated it “cannot afford” a Russian defeat, ensuring Moscow’s economic lifeline remains open.

The U.S., meanwhile, is ill-prepared for a tariff war with China. When Trump imposed 145% tariffs, Beijing retaliated by cutting off rare earth metals exports, vital to U.S. industry and defense. Trump backed down.

At the G-7 summit in Canada last month, the EU proposed lowering price caps on Russian oil from $60 a barrel to $45 a barrel as part of its 18th sanctions package against Russia. Trump rejected the proposal at the time but may be tempted to reconsider, given his suggestion that more sanctions may be needed. Even if Washington backs the measure now, however, it is unlikely to cripple Russia’s war machine.

Another strategy may involve isolating Russia by peeling away Moscow’s traditionally friendly neighbors. Here, Western mediation between Armenia and Azerbaijan isn’t about peace — if it were, pressure would target Baku, which has stalled agreements and threatened renewed war against Armenia. The real goal is to eject Russia from the South Caucasus and create a NATO-aligned energy corridor linking Turkey to Central Asia, bypassing both Russia and Iran to their detriment.

Central Asia itself is itself emerging as a new battleground. In May 2025, the EU has celebrated its first summit with Central Asian nations in Uzbekistan, with a heavy focus on developing the Middle Corridor, a route for transportation of energy and critical raw materials that would bypass Russia. In that context, the EU has committed €10 billion in support of the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route.

keep readingShow less
Syria sanctions
Top image credit: People line up to buy bread, after Syria's Bashar al-Assad was ousted, in Douma, on the outskirts of Damascus, Syria December 23, 2024. REUTERS/Zohra Bensemra

Lifting sanctions on Syria exposes their cruel intent

Middle East

On June 30, President Trump signed an executive order terminating the majority of U.S. sanctions on Syria. The move, which would have been unthinkable mere months ago, fulfilled a promise he made at an investment forum in Riyadh in May.“The sanctions were brutal and crippling,” he had declared to an audience of primarily Saudi businessmen. Lifting them, he said, will “give Syria a chance at greatness.”

The significance of this statement lies not solely in the relief that it will bring to the Syrian people. His remarks revealed an implicit but rarely admitted truth: sanctions — often presented as a peaceful alternative to war — have been harming the Syrian people all along.

keep readingShow less
The 8-point buzzsaw facing any invasion of Taiwan
Taipei skyline, Taiwan. (Shutterstock/ YAO23)

The 8-point buzzsaw facing any invasion of Taiwan

Asia-Pacific

For the better part of a decade, China has served as the “pacing threat” around which American military planners craft defense policy and, most importantly, budget decisions.

Within that framework, a potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan has become the scenario most often cited as the likeliest flashpoint for a military confrontation between the two superpowers.

keep readingShow less

LATEST

QIOSK

Newsletter

Subscribe now to our weekly round-up and don't miss a beat with your favorite RS contributors and reporters, as well as staff analysis, opinion, and news promoting a positive, non-partisan vision of U.S. foreign policy.