Follow us on social

google cta
50249134648_db0dd9e14e_o-scaled

The Trump administration’s fantasy about snapping back sanctions on Iran

The Trump administration's snapback fiasco will weaken future nonproliferation agreements and damage U.S. power on the U.N. Security Council.

Analysis | Washington Politics
google cta
google cta

The Trump administration’s obsession with Iran degenerated some time ago into aimless hostility that has yielded nothing but negative results. With a track record of well over two years, the Trump policy of “maximum pressure” on Iran has resulted in increased, not decreased, Iranian nuclear activity. The policy has resulted in increased, not decreased, aggressive Iranian actions in the Middle East, including attacks on neighboring states’ oil facilities that Iran never had attempted before the U.S. administration’s attempt to destroy Iran’s own oil trade. The policy has increased, not decreased, the political power of hardliners in Tehran.

Amid all that counterproductivity, it is the United States, not Iran, that has become ever more isolated — at the United Nations, in other diplomatic discussions, and in world opinion.

Where the administration has gone beyond negative results and isolation and into fantasyland has been with its most recent anti-Iran ploy, which is its attempt to invoke the “snapback” provision of U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231. That resolution, adopted unanimously in 2015, is the Council’s blessing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, the multilateral agreement that limited Iran’s nuclear program and closed all possible paths to a possible Iranian nuclear weapon. 

Snapback is an ingenious bit of diplomatic engineering designed to reassure everyone that if Iran were to violate the JCPOA, prior international sanctions against it would be quickly re-imposed, without needing any arduous new negotiations and without being blocked by, say, an Iran-friendly Russia. Under the snapback provision, if any participant in the JCPOA declares Iran to be in violation, then sanctions would be automatically re-imposed 30 days later unless the Security Council kept sanctions suspended with a new resolution — which, of course, the United States or any other permanent member of the Council could veto.

What makes the U.S. move ludicrous in the eyes of most of the rest of the world is that the Trump administration is attempting to use a power reserved for participants in the JCPOA even though in 2018 it withdrew — loudly, emphatically, and unequivocally — from participation in the agreement.  Accordingly, 13 of the other 14 members of the Security Council (the Dominican Republic has stayed silent) have explicitly rejected the notion that the United States has any standing to invoke snapback.

The U.S. move is further out of order because it was the Trump administration, not Iran, that violated the agreement and did so wholesale, completely reneging on the U.S. obligations regarding sanctions relief. (Iran’s later incremental exceeding of agreed limits on enriched uranium, which it began a year after the U.S. reneging, is not even technically a violation of the JCPOA, which explicitly relieves Iran of its obligations if other parties do not live up to theirs.)

Now, in a further flight from reality, the administration is talking as if U.N. sanctions have been reimposed, even though they have not. (The 30-day waiting period after the Trump administration claimed to invoke snapback ended within the past week.) As U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres has stated, it is up to the Security Council to interpret its own resolutions, and the overwhelming majority of the Council has determined that there is no snapback.

Of course, the Trump administration will do whatever it wants regarding U.S. sanctions. It already had sanctioned just about everything Iranian-related it can think of. It also has aggressively used secondary sanctions to discourage other countries from doing business with Iran. Thus there is not much more the administration can do unilaterally, apart from intensifying the aggressiveness of the secondary sanctions.

The charade becomes more of a worry if the administration were to start taking physical actions such as intercepting Iran-bound shipments at sea. Under the current circumstances, such a move would be state-sponsored piracy, as well as risking escalation to wider military conflict.

The administration’s rhetoric about “enforcing” U.N. sanctions is as fanciful as its other rhetoric on this matter. No one has given it the authority to enforce what it says it is enforcing, and the United States itself is currently the biggest violator of the relevant Security Council resolutions.

This entire escapade is part of the Trump administration’s effort to destroy the JCPOA, which Trump never liked because it was Barack Obama’s biggest foreign policy achievement. Probably a hope underlying the administration’s latest tactic is to provoke Iran into renouncing the agreement or taking some other action that would effectively kill it. That would be bad enough regarding the cause of nuclear nonproliferation, but also worth considering is the damage the administration’s tactics are inflicting on the United States’s own diplomatic tools and options.

A snapback-type device probably is dead as an option for any future agreements with Iran, and perhaps with other states on other topics. It is hard to imagine Iran or the other JCPOA parties signing up to a repeat of this kind of diplomatic engineering given the Trump administration’s attempted abuse of the device in Resolution 2231. This consequence will make it more difficult to construct arms control or other agreements that provide sufficient confidence that violators will be punished.

One also needs to consider broader damage to the power and standing of the United States as a permanent member of the Security Council. A sure sign of the craziness of what the administration has attempted regarding snapback is that even former national security adviser John Bolton, anti-Iran uber-hawk though he is, thinks the administration’s ploy was a bad idea. Bolton’s main stated concern is to protect the U.S. veto.

The U.S. power to veto Security Council resolutions is a key ingredient of snapback, but the significance of the veto power ultimately rests more broadly on the significance of, and respect for, any of the Council’s resolutions. By flouting the will of the Council and going off in its own fanciful way on matters involving Iran, the administration is damaging that significance and respect.

Notwithstanding the Trump administration’s disdain for international organizations and multilateralism, its attempt to invoke the snapback provision of Resolution 2231 is tacit testimony to how useful those disdained institutions can be, and specifically useful to the United States. The administration is destroying that usefulness.                


Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo meets with Dominican Republic UNSC Special Envoy Ambassador Jose Singer at the United Nations in New York, New York, on August 20, 2020. [State Department photo by Ron Przysucha]
google cta
Analysis | Washington Politics
America First
Top photo credit: Gemini AI

The death of 'America First'

Washington Politics

In 2019, John Bolton described how he defined “America First."

"The idea that actually protecting America was the highest priority,” he said. A fair, though vague, point by one of the most hawkish men in Washington at the time.

keep readingShow less
nuclear weapons testing
A mushroom cloud expands over the Bikini Atoll during a U.S. nuclear weapons test in 1946. (Shutterstock/ Everett Collection)

Nuke treaty loss a 'colossal' failure that could lead to nuclear arms race

Global Crises

On February 13th, 2025, President Trump said something few expected to hear. He said, “There's no reason for us to be building brand-new nuclear weapons. We already have so many. . . You could destroy the world 50 times over, 100 times over. And here we are building new nuclear weapons . . . We’re all spending a lot of money that we could be spending on other things that are actually, hopefully, much more productive.”

I could not agree more with that statement. But with today’s expiration of the New START Treaty, we face the very real possibility of a new nuclear arms race — something that, to my knowledge, neither the President, Vice President, nor any other senior U.S. official has meaningfully discussed.

keep readingShow less
Witkoff Kushner Trump
Top image credit: U.S. Special Envoy Steve Witkoff looks on during a meeting with U.S. President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, at Trump's Mar-a-Lago club in Palm Beach, Florida, U.S., December 29, 2025. REUTERS/Jonathan Ernst

As US-Iran talks resume, will Israel play spoiler (again)?

Middle East

This Friday, the latest chapter in the long, fraught history of U.S.-Iran negotiations will take place in Oman. Iran’s foreign minister Abbas Araghchi and President Trump’s Special Envoy Steve Witkoff will meet in an effort to stave off a war between the U.S. and Iran.

The negotiations were originally planned as a multilateral forum in Istanbul, with an array of regional Arab and Muslim countries present, apart from the U.S. and Iran — Turkey, Qatar, Oman, and Saudi Arabia.

keep readingShow less
google cta
Want more of our stories on Google?
Click here to make us a Preferred Source.

LATEST

QIOSK

Newsletter

Subscribe now to our weekly round-up and don't miss a beat with your favorite RS contributors and reporters, as well as staff analysis, opinion, and news promoting a positive, non-partisan vision of U.S. foreign policy.