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US foreign policy making needs to ‘look like America’

U.S. foreign policy making has been dominated by white men. While that's starting to change, more needs to be done.

Analysis | Washington Politics
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“Make the government look like America” has been a slogan used by presidential candidates for many years. And rightly so. But where it does not sufficiently apply is in U.S. foreign policy. Does that matter? In terms of the application of power and serving basic security interests, probably not. But in promoting American diplomacy and the country’s values and reputation, it matters a great deal. The United States cannot continue arguing (as Gov. John Winthrop did, drawing on Matthew 5:14) that it should be “as a city upon a hill, the eyes of all people are upon us,”  if what “people” see is systemic indifference to people left out.

Notably, along with the recent Black Lives Matter mass demonstrations, evidence has come tumbling out that there are very few people of color involved in the making and carrying out of U.S. foreign policy, as well as in analysis of it in the non-governmental sector. The most striking statistic is that, of the United States’ 189 ambassadors, only 3 career officers are Black (and 4 are of Hispanic heritage).  The representation of minorities still falls short in the other ranks in the State Department. 

By contrast, the military side of the Pentagon has a higher percentage of Black officers: this derives in part from the fact that more than 30 percent of serving men and women are African-American or other minorities.

It is true that two national security advisers have been Black women, Condoleezza Rice and Susan Rice, and the former went on to become secretary of state while the latter had previously been U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations.

There has also been one Black male secretary of state, Colin Powell, who had been President Reagan’s national security adviser. He came out of the military and he very likely could have become president of the United States. But beyond the evident qualities of these people, their appointments are the exceptions.

The State Department is promising to clean up its act, by creating a “departmentwide task force” to provide input for plans “to facilitate a determined, coordinated approach to recruiting and retaining diverse talent.” That is long overdue, but its actions don’t match the rhetoric as State Department leadership recently ordered the U.S. Embassy in Seoul to take down a “Black Lives Matter” banner.

This overdue policy should not just apply to Foreign Service Officers, the public face of the Department, but also to its large number of civil servants, where there is a higher percentage of people of color, yet without the authority, responsibilities, prestige, and in many cases, job security of FSOs.

But it’s not just a State Department problem. Lack of diversity extends throughout the so-called foreign policy establishment — which for decades has been dominated by white men. One can attend meetings and conferences on foreign policy in Washington, New York, and Cambridge, and expect to see mostly all-white audiences and a rare non-white presenter. The same is true of those who are published in the leading journals on foreign policy.

During the last three decades, the ranks of women in foreign policy have increased, both in government jobs and in universities and think tanks. But this has not been the case for people of color, who are, with some exceptions, rarely seen in both leadership and working level positions at universities and research institutions.

There are two possible explanations for this pattern. The first is that, given the deep structural inequalities in American society itself, many people of color may be more likely to focus their careers working at home to address these issues, in politics, religious communities, and non-governmental organizations. This is where immediate change must come in American society, its institutions and practices.

It’s also possible that African and Hispanic Americans don’t see financial and career-advancing possibilities in the foreign policy space. Far more useful and lucrative careers are in law, medicine, or other jobs that follow from acquiring an MBA. 

But at the same time, efforts to bring more people of color and other minorities into the foreign policy space have been ongoing for some time.

That’s at least a start, but burgeoning the ranks of U.S. foreign policy circles with more people of color will take time, and it will take larger and more sustained efforts than those already underway. It’s not just a matter of involving some of the “best of the best” Americans who have been largely left out of foreign policy, but of demonstrating to the world that its practitioners, in and out of government, come from all parts of society and, indeed, “look like America.”


Photo credit: Mark Van Scyoc / Shutterstock.com
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Analysis | Washington Politics
Dan Caine
Top photo credit: Secretary of War Pete Hegseth and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff U.S. Air Force Gen. Dan Caine conduct a press briefing on Operation Epic Fury at the Pentagon, Washington, D.C., March 4, 2026. (DoW photo by U.S. Navy Petty Officer 1st Class Alexander Kubitza)

Did Caine just announce the Morgenthau option for Iran?

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Gen. Dan Caine’s formulation of American war aims in Iran is remarkable not because it is bellicose, but because it is strategically incoherent.

In a press conference Tuesday morning, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not describe a limited campaign to suppress missile fire, blunt Iran’s naval threat, or even impose a severe but bounded setback on Tehran’s coercive instruments. He described a campaign against Iran’s “military and industrial base” designed to prevent the regime from attacking Americans, U.S. interests, and regional partners “for years to come.” In an earlier briefing he put the objective similarly: to prevent Iran from projecting power outside its borders. Rather than the language of a discrete coercive operation, this describes a war against a state’s capacity to regenerate power.

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UAE President Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed al-Nahyan receives Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman at the Presidential Airport in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates November 27, 2019. WAM/Handout via REUTERS

Is the US goading Arab states to join war against Iran?

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On Sunday, U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Mike Waltz told ABC News that Arab Gulf states may soon step up their involvement in the U.S.-Israeli war on Iran. “I expect that you'll see additional diplomatic and possibly military action from them in the coming days and weeks,” Waltz said.

Then, on Monday morning, Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.) slammed Saudi Arabia for staying out of the war even as “Americans are dying and the U.S. is spending billions” of dollars to conduct regime change in Iran. “If you are not willing to use your military now, when are you willing to use it?” Graham asked. “Hopefully this changes soon. If not, consequences will follow.”

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Top image credit: Iranian army military personnel stand at attention under a banner featuring an image of an Iranian-made unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) during a military parade commemorating the anniversary of Army Day outside the Shrine of Iran's late leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in the south of Tehran, Iran, on April 18, 2025. (Photo by Morteza Nikoubazl/NurPhoto)

Why Tehran may have time on its side

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A provocative calculus by Anusar Farrouqui (“policytensor”) has been circulating on X and in more exhaustive form on the author’s Substack. It purports to demonstrate a sobering reality: in a high-intensity U.S.-Iran conflict, the United States may be unable to suppress Iranian drone production quickly enough to prevent a strategically consequential period of regional devastation.

The argument is framed through a quantitative lens, carrying the seductive appeal of mathematical precision. It arranges variables—such as U.S. sortie rates and degradation efficiency against Iranian repair cycles and rebuild speeds—to suggest a "sustainable firing rate." The implication is that Iran could maintain a persistent strike capability long enough to exhaust American political patience, forcing Washington toward a premature declaration of success or an unfavorable ceasefire.

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