The U.S., guilty by association in the launch of the war in 2015, has failed to fully engage its diplomacy in the service of peace, continuing instead to fuel the fighting with huge arms sales.
The internal war and outside intervention in Yemen appear to go on unabated under the neglectful eye of the Arab world and the international community. The recent armed struggle for Socotra has left the Southern Transitional Council (STC), supported by the United Arab Emirates, in charge of the island. A UNESCO-declared world heritage site, Socotra has been trampled by troops, armored trucks, and tanks, much to the detriment of its fragile ecosystem and historically peaceful population. Battles continue to rage just east of Aden, where STC fighters remain in a stand-off with troops loyal to President Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi’s government for control of neighboring Abyan province—as part of the overall struggle for the entire south of Yemen. Farther north of Abyan, Houthi/Ansarullah troops are pursuing a months-long attempt to enter the capital of Marib and secure all oil and gas facilities there. To the west of Marib, a tense front still exists around the city of Hodeida, a strategic port for the importation of humanitarian assistance and potential export of oil via the Red Sea.
Of course, all this is aside from the main war between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis, which is being conducted by air, land forces, and rocketry over the capital Sanaa, the Houthis’ capital Saadah, and Saudi Arabia’s southern border at al-Jawf governorate. Added to that complex geopolitical picture is a pandemic that is sweeping over all without distinction as to party or regional affiliation. Indeed, there is a clear and full tragedy unfolding in Yemen.
Enter COVID-19
The devastating impact of war, disease, and poverty on the people of Yemen has been compounded by a now widespread epidemic for which the country was ill-prepared. At first, COVID-19 looked like it had somehow spared the country as one Middle Eastern country after another fell prey to the virus in early March. Although lacking reliable information from Yemen itself, international agencies now report that virus-related deaths have very likely exceeded the death toll from the war raging in the country since 2015.
Although lacking reliable information from Yemen itself, international agencies now report that virus-related deaths have very likely exceeded the death toll from the war raging in the country since 2015.
The alarming spread of COVID-19 in Yemen is cause to seriously doubt the sincerity—and even the sanity—of those who pursue victory through war instead of negotiations. This critique includes all sides to the conflict as they continue to give priority to improving their strategic positions on the ground. Numbers vary widely depending on the source of information, but a million infections is not an unreasonable estimate at this point. One thing is certain however: the spread of diseases has overwhelmed the country’s inadequate public health institutions. Instead of dramatically building up Yemen’s capacity and encouraging a coordinated regional and international effort to mitigate the spread of the deadly virus, the Arab coalition fighting the Houthis continues to prosecute the war directly from the air and via proxy forces on the ground. The vast sums being spent on the war primarily by the Arab coalition, if diverted to public health, could save millions of lives currently at risk. The fault, however, belongs to all those trying to fill the void at the center caused by the 2011 revolt, which led to the departure and ultimate demise of the late president, Ali Abdallah Saleh, and his replacement by a weak-to-nonexistent legitimate authority.
Yemeni, Saudi, and Emirati sins
Yemen has fallen into chaos because of the mistakes of an otherwise strong president, the late Ali Abdullah Saleh, who could not find it in himself or his advisors to listen to the protesters and invite them to help transition the country from authoritarianism and corruption into a more democratic and less corrupt system of government. War and chaos also resulted from the Houthi takeover of Sanaa in 2014, reflecting the clumsy efforts of the United Nations and the Gulf Cooperation Council to patch together a new social contract among the various Yemeni factions and regions. None of this was helped with the Saudi-led Arab coalition’s intervention in the country in 2015, ostensibly to repel the Houthi takeover, derail what the Saudis perceived as a growing Iranian menace on their southern border, and restore the internationally recognized government of President Hadi to power. Five years of this war have achieved quite the opposite: the entrenchment of the Houthis in Sanaa, a growing Iranian influence bucking up the Houthis, an increasingly divided country, and a marginalized Hadi government.
Five years of this war have achieved quite the opposite: the entrenchment of the Houthis in Sanaa, a growing Iranian influence bucking up the Houthis, an increasingly divided country, and a marginalized Hadi government.
Whatever the agenda of the Saudi and Emirati leadership, it could not have been pursued without the willing participation of Yemeni militias and armies on the ground. To start with, the Hadi government, living in the lap of luxury courtesy of the Saudi government, has been fighting for a secure foothold inside Yemen and has sought to keep control of Yemen’s central bank holdings. However, it has been unable to do that in either Sanaa (which was taken over by the Houthis) or Aden (where the STC challenges it). Hadi loyalists have been fighting in Marib, trying to fend off Houthi attacks to remain in control of oil and gas facilities in the area. The Hadi forces have also complained of inadequate support from Riyadh, especially because they have to fight on at least two fronts: north with the Houthis and south with the STC and other UAE-supported forces trying to form a separate state there. There are reports of the Saudis’ unhappiness with Hadi’s leadership, that they may be searching for alternatives. Indeed, everyone now questions the Hadi government’s legitimacy as well as the efficacy of continuing to vest this honor upon him when he, like every other major player in Yemen, is struggling to hold on to land and resources.
In fact, the Riyadh Agreement, purportedly a plan to merge the STC with the Hadi government and put an end to bloodshed and chaos in the south, has been suspect in the eyes of Hadi as well as analysts who see it as an abandonment of Hadi in favor of the STC. The hostile takeover of Socotra Island is the most recent example of the STC trying to assert southern independence with clear support from the UAE and suspected connivance from Saudi Arabia. There is no military value to the island for the STC, save that of adding territory to what it already controls in the south, in addition to how the island might help the UAE’s maritime ambitions in the Arabian Sea. It represents, however, a significant defeat for the Hadi government and a further squeezing out of their forces from the south. What is noteworthy here is the withdrawal of the small Saudi force that had gone to the island in 2018 after the UAE sent an expeditionary force, ostensibly to mediate between UAE forces and the island’s population. STC leader Aidarous al-Zubaidi had recently returned from a visit to Riyadh to confer with the Saudi leadership, leading to speculation at the time that the Saudis were lending legitimacy to his desire for an independent southern state.
If the reported Saudi offer of a Riyadh Agreement part II is true, it would shed even more doubt on Saudi intentions and add credibility to reports of their discontinuing support to President Hadi. This offer evidently suggested the STC withdraw its troops from Aden and into Abyan, with no mention of where Hadi’s forces would be deployed. If implemented—and there is no chance of that happening, in any case—it would mean an expansion of STC influence into Abyan, a contested governorate not currently under their control.
Under the best of circumstances and assuming good intentions, Saudi and Emirati leaders are under intensifying pressure to cut their losses in Yemen, given the increasing cost of the war, lower revenue due to the depressed prices of oil, and the vulnerability of their own countries to rocket attacks and land incursions in southern Saudi Arabia. The management of Yemen, as administered territory, also seems too much of a challenge for the Arab coalition, unless one wants to assume the worst and conclude that the prevalent chaos is exactly what they wanted to achieve.
The management of Yemen, as administered territory, also seems too much of a challenge for the Arab coalition, unless one wants to assume the worst and conclude that the prevalent chaos is exactly what they wanted to achieve.
The Houthis, whose motives in capturing Sanaa in 2014 were never transparent, stopped short of taking over Aden due to local resistance and the military intervention by the Arab coalition. They have alternated between trying to hold on to northern territory they control and pushing to expand their area. This lack of transparency has become a hallmark of Houthi rule; most recently, the Houthis were legitimately accused of hoarding information about the spread of COVID-19, brazenly declaring that revealing accurate information on the spread of the disease only causes panic among the population. Information has also been withheld on how they collect and spend their revenue. Specifically, concern has been voiced about widespread corruption within the disbursement of international aid, both by the authorities in Sanaa and by the UN agencies directing and monitoring the process.
The sins of the international community
Since 2011, three successive UN special envoys have failed to stitch together an agreement to reconcile the various parties in conflict and to get the permanent members of the UN Security Council to put their weight behind an effort to end the war. The latest of the envoys, Martin Griffiths, wasted two years trying to secure the neutrality of the vital Hodeida port while the real war raged elsewhere in Yemen and Yemeni and regional parties continued to fundamentally disagree on what a final agreement would look like.
The United States, guilty by association in the launch of the war in 2015, has failed to fully engage its diplomacy in the service of peace, continuing instead to fuel the fighting with huge arms sales, training of fighter-pilots, and putting in place a missile defense system in an extensive but futile effort to guard against rocket attacks against sensitive targets inside Saudi Arabia. Democrats in Congress have repeatedly urged the Trump Administration to suspend arms sales to the region, arguing that peace and stability in Yemen are in the best national security interests of the United States. The latest legislative effort, by Senator Chris Murphy (D-Connecticut), does not seem any more promising than previous attempts—at least while the Republican majority continues to block such moves.
Yemen needs Yemenis
Young men and women from Yemen are now spread far and wide across Europe, the United States, and Asia. Through their various engagements and contributions, they have demonstrated the ability of a new Yemeni generation to launch a rebuilding of their country and lead it into the future. Oil and gas potential is very promising and could well support such efforts once the war ends. If the international community seems incapable or unwilling to stop the bloodletting, it remains incumbent on Yemeni leaders themselves to use the good counsel of their youth to patch up their differences and enable a positive and constructive transition into the future.
Nabeel A. Khoury is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East. A retired foreign service officer, he most recently served as director of the Near East South Asia office of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research.
Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan attend a welcoming ceremony at Baghdad International Airport in Baghdad, Iraq, on April 22, 2024. REUTERS/Thaier Al-Sudani
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan visited Iraq Monday for the first time since 2011, marking a potential thaw in relations between the two neighboring countries, which have long clashed over Turkish attacks on Kurdish groups in Iraq’s north.
“For the first time, we find that there is a real desire on the part of each country to move toward solutions,” Iraqi Prime Minister Muhammad Shia’ al-Sudani said during a recent event at the Atlantic Council in Washington, D.C.
Sudani noted that the trip comes after more than a year of talks focused on addressing the biggest issues in the bilateral relationship. “For the first time, sensitive discussions are being held on every issue that represented barriers to the relationship,” he said. “And we agreed on all of these topics after a series of meetings and bilateral trips.”
The trip is a crucial part of the Sudani government’s efforts to stabilize Iraq and move forward from years of internal strife and war — a campaign made more urgent in recent weeks by escalating tensions in the region, as Iran and Israel’s shadow war has come out into the open.
Erdogan’s visit comes as Sudani returns from a week-long trip to Washington, where the Iraqi leader pitched a “new chapter” in U.S.-Iraq relations that could include a withdrawal of American troops from the country, which have become targets for Iraqi militias since the Gaza war began last year. He also sought new economic agreements and encouraged U.S. businesses to invest in Iraq.
Back in Iraq, Sudani and Erdogan were set to discuss enhanced cooperation to counter Kurdish fighters from the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK), which Turkey and the U.S. consider a terrorist group. Turkey has for years mounted cross-border attacks on the PKK that have drawn backlash from the Iraqi government, citing sovereignty concerns.
In a notable shift, the two countries now say they are cooperating to fight the group. This will not, however, include joint military operations, according to Iraq’s defense minister. Questions remain about whether Iraqi officials are prepared to join Erdogan in his pledge to “permanently” destroy the organization in an operation later this year.
On the economic side, Sudani hopes the visit will lead to new agreements on trade to augment Iraq’s $17 billion “Development Road” project, which aims to increase Iraq’s capacity to serve as a transit hub for goods traveling between Asia and Europe.
Another deal will likely address the two countries’ shared water resources. Turkey controls the headwaters of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, which provide most of Iraq’s freshwater, and Iraqi officials are hoping to persuade Turkish leaders to increase the amount of water that reaches their country.
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Diplomacy Watch: A peace summit without Russia
Diplomacy Watch: Ukraine risks losing the war — and the peace
The RAND corporation’s Samuel Charap and Johns Hopkins University professor Sergey Radchenko published a detailed timeline and analysis of the talks between Russian and Ukrainian negotiators just after the Russian invasion in February 2022 that could have brought the war to an end just weeks after it had begun.
Much of the piece confirms or elucidates parts of the narrative that had previously been reported. In the spring of 2022, the two sides appeared relatively close to a deal, one that, according to the authors, would “have ended the war and provided Ukraine with multilateral security guarantees, paving the way to its permanent neutrality and, down the road, its membership in the EU.”
But due to a combination of changing battlefield dynamics that convinced Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky that he could win the war militarily, Western allies’ hesitance to engage diplomatically with Russia and simultaneous ramping up of military support for Ukraine, and the discovery that Russian forces had committed atrocities in Bucha, the talks eventually fell apart.
On some of these points, the authors contend that earlier accounts have been overstated. The idea that the U.S. and the UK “forced” Zelensky to back out of peace talks is “baseless,” say Charap and Radchenko, though they acknowledge that “the lack of Western enthusiasm does seem to have dampened his interest in diplomacy.”
On the suggestion that the discovery of war crimes convinced the Ukrainian president to abandon negotiations, the authors note discussions “continued and even intensified in the days and weeks after the discovery of Russia’s war crimes, suggesting that the atrocities at Bucha and Irpin were a secondary factor in Kyiv’s decision-making.”
But taken together, these factors, along with certain details of the agreement that were never finalized, were enough to imperil the negotiations.
In the two years since Ukrainian and Russian interlocutors last convened, the realities on the ground have changed. By April 2022, Vladimir Putin had likely realized that he would fail to achieve his most maximalist war aims. Now, with Western aid stalled and the war tilting in Moscow’s favor, Ukraine is in a less favorable negotiating position than it was and Russia may be less inclined to enter talks.
But, as George Beebe and Anatol Lieven detail in a recent Quincy Institute paper, all sides still have a reason to pursue a diplomatic solution, one that could both end the war and provide for a new European security architecture once the fighting ceases.
As Charap and Radchenko note in their Foreign Affairs piece, one of the reasons the original talks broke down was because the two sides were more focused on the broader endgame rather than on shorter-term solutions.
“A final reason the talks failed is that the negotiators put the cart of a postwar security order before the horse of ending the war,” they write. “The two sides skipped over essential matters of conflict management and mitigation (the creation of humanitarian corridors, a cease-fire, troop withdrawals) and instead tried to craft something like a long-term peace treaty that would resolve security disputes that had been the source of geopolitical tensions for decades.”
The two years of war have only increased distrust between Russia, Ukraine, and Kyiv’s Western backers, and diplomacy appears to be more difficult today than it was in 2022. But, say Charap and Radchenko, Zelensky and Putin surprised us once before with the concessions they may have been willing to make, and perhaps they will do so again.
The consequences of that failed first effort at diplomacy are clear, as Thomas Graham, former senior director for Russia on the National Security Council staff, argued this week.
“The great tragedy of the Russian-Ukrainian war is that it will ultimately prove to have been futile. The likely outcome — territorial adjustments in Moscow’s favor, security guarantees for Ukraine and Russia — could have been peaceably negotiated beforehand had leaders had a firmer grasp of the real balance of power or greater political courage,” he wrote in the Hill. “The cost of failed diplomacy is already hundreds of thousands of lives lost and hundreds of billions of dollars’ worth of property destroyed.”
In other diplomatic news related to the war in Ukraine:
— After months of waiting, the House may hold a vote to give Ukraine another tranche of aid over the weekend. On Wednesday, Speaker Mike Johnson (R-La.) introduced four separate bills, including one that will provide approximately $60 billion in aid for Kyiv. The House Speaker is already facing backlash from members of his own party, but the legislation is likely to have enough bipartisan support to pass if it is brought to the floor for a vote.
— There are reportedly increasing points of tension between Washington and Kyiv as Ukraine awaits more aid and its war effort falters. Zelensky was frustrated that Washington has not offered his country the same missile defense help as it provided to Israel during Iran’s strikes over the weekend. “European skies could have received the same level of protection long ago if Ukraine had received similar full support from its partners in intercepting drones and missiles,” Zelensky wrote in a post on X. “Terror must be defeated completely and everywhere, not more in some places and less in others.”
Moreover, Kyiv has expressed frustration over Washington’s recommendations that Ukraine not strike Russian oil refineries, according toThe Washington Post. Vice President Kamala Harris reportedly privately made the suggestion to Zelensky in February at the Munich Security Conference.
“The request, according to officials familiar with the matter, irritated Zelensky and his top aides, who view Kyiv’s string of drone strikes on Russian energy facilities as a rare bright spot in a grinding war with a bigger and better-equipped foe. Zelensky brushed off the recommendation, uncertain whether it reflected the consensus position of the Biden administration, these people said.” according to the Post. “Instead of acquiescing to the U.S. requests, however, Ukraine doubled down on the strategy, striking a range of Russian facilities, including an April 2 attack on Russia’s third-largest refinery 800 miles from the front.”
— Russia and Ukraine nearly struck a deal late last month to renew the agreement that allowed for the safety of shipping in the Black Sea before Kyiv suddenly pulled out, according to Reuters.
“A deal was reached in March ‘to ensure the safety of merchant shipping in the Black Sea’, and though Ukraine did not want to sign it formally, Kyiv gave its assent for Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan to announce it on March 30, the day before critical regional elections, the sources said,” reports Reuters. The reason for Kyiv’s withdrawal is unclear. Russia and Ukraine previously struck a deal to allow for safe shipping in June 2022 but Moscow withdrew from that agreement after one year.
U.S. State Department News
In a press briefing on Wednesday, State Department spokesman Vedant Patel urged the House to pass the aid bill for Ukraine quickly.
“So it certainly would not be hyperbole to say that every day matters, and the House, we believe, needs to act this week to support Ukraine and Israel as they respectively defend against Putin and the Russian Federation and the Iranian regime. And so this is something that we need Congress to provide urgently,” Patel said.
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A woman looks at the almost empty shelves while she looks for groceries and goods in a supermarket in Caracas, Venezuela March 23, 2018. (REUTERS/Carlos Garcia Rawlins)
The Biden administration has reimposed economic sanctions on Venezuela’s oil industry in response to President Nicolás Maduro's attempts to hold onto power by blocking candidates who want to run against him in the July elections.
Maduro’s government is clearly violating the conditions of the 2023 Barbados Agreement that it made with the Venezuelan opposition alliance Plataforma Unitaria Democrática in October and that stipulates that the government create conditions for free and fair elections. The U.S. conditioned its easing of oil sanctions on the Maduro government’s compliance with this agreement.
Experts say reimposing sanctions, however, is the wrong move. U.S. sanctions have already helped to cripple the ailing Venezuelan economy and exacerbated the country’s humanitarian crisis. General License 44, which lifted the sanctions, has not been in place long enough to alleviate the strain on the economy or deter Maduro’s regime, Michael Galant of the Center for Economic and Policy Research told RS.
Analysts argue that the Biden administration should instead undertake a multilateral effort to facilitate negotiations among Venezuelan political leaders so that Venezuelans can take further steps towards democratization as they head into a pivotal election year. Re-imposing sanctions will just be a step backward.
The sword hanging over Venezuela’s head
The U.S. has imposed targeted sanctions on Venezuela since 2005. But the Trump administration expanded them beginning in 2017 as part of a “maximum pressure” campaign against the Maduro government for alleged corruption and human rights abuses.
Trump’s sanctions prohibited oil sales between the U.S. and Venezuelan oil companies. Given Venezuela’s dependence on producing and exporting oil, the sanctions drove Venezuela's economy toward collapse, Galant said.
“There were already significant economic challenges, but there are very clear inflection points in Venezuela's oil output at the moment that additional sanctions are imposed,” he said.
The impact on Venezuelan society and economy has been disastrous. Shortages of basic goods and a climbing cost of living have plunged much of the population into poverty and drove more than seven million citizens to emigrate, most of them to neighboring countries and the United States.
The Biden administration eased these sanctions after the so-called Barbados Agreement between the government and the opposition coalition was signed. But while reimposing sanctions could have drastic consequences on Venezuela’s economy and people, Galant adds that the waiver’s impact should not be overstated, as the relief it has provided has always been limited. Years of sanctions have deterred foreign investment in Venezuela and hampered the country’s capacity to produce oil.
“There's always been this sword hanging over [Venezuela’s] head, the fact that sanctions could be reimposed at any time,” he said.
Certain kinds of sanctions can be effective in holding specific individuals, including government officials, accountable for corrupt practices and human rights abuses, said Carolina Jiménez Sandoval, president of the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA). But these differ from sanctions on the entire oil sector, sanctions that affect Venezuelan society as a whole, but have failed to deter Maduro’s regime from committing human rights abuses and engaging in corruption.
Reimposing all sanctions means returning to a status quo that doesn’t work, Jiménez Sandoval said. “That means you need to craft something different.”
An electoral year in Venezuela provides a window of opportunity for the U.S. to proceed with a new strategy, she said, adding that it should be one that does not return to economic coercion in hopes that Maduro will change and that instead focuses on facilitating opportunities for Venezuelans to exercise their vote freely and fairly in July.
A window of opportunity
A primary election last October suggests Venezuelans are ready for major change, with an overwhelming majority of the more than two million participants voting for the opposition leader María Carina Machado. But a new opposition candidate will need to take Machado’s place after Venezuela's highest court upheld a decision to bar her from running in the July general elections, alleging she committed fraud and supported U.S. sanctions.
The question now is whether the opposition can unite behind a single candidate, said Miguel Tinker Salas, a professor at Pomona College and non-resident fellow at the Quincy Institute. The opposition has been divided for years, making it difficult for the population to rally around a single challenger to Maduro.
Given Washington’s close ties to the opposition, the Biden administration may be able to play a role in facilitating negotiations among the various factions to settle on one candidate who can rally the support of all, according to Jiménez Sandoval. “Because [the U.S.] has been their ally, it also has leverage over them,” she said.
Selecting candidates thus far has largely been confined to the political elite in Venezuela, says David Smilde, a senior fellow at WOLA who teaches at Tulane University. He takes a similar view that the U.S. can take advantage of its influence with the opposition. But he also advocates incorporating civil society into those negotiation processes to move Venezuela in the direction of a more democratic society.
These efforts have also involved Venezuela’s neighbors. Colombian President Gustavo Petro, whose country has been most affected by the outflow of migrants from Venezuela, met with Maduro before sitting down opposition candidate Manuel Rosales in Caracas just last week, the same day that the U.S. officials sat down with members of Maduro’s administration in Mexico to discuss possible democratic reforms.
Reports indicate that Rosales has been “approved” by Maduro to run against him and that the meeting with Petro had Maduro’s blessing too. However, Tinker Salas says the culmination of diplomatic pressure from other Latin American countries carries significant weight nonetheless.
“It has become clear that the entire region has high stakes when it comes to bringing democracy back to Venezuela,” Jiménez Sandoval said, noting concerns that the U.S. and other leaders in the region have over increased migration of Venezuelans and more recently, whether Venezuela will escalate its claims to the disputed oil-rich Essequibo region in Guyana by engaging in armed conflict.
Tinker Salas adds, however, that the issue of Essequibo has long been raised by Venezuelan politicians hoping to harness nationalist sentiment to garner more political support. Maduro’s recent moves on the issue, experts say, is mostly likely politically motivated, as opposed to being a real threat of invasion.
The effects of the political crisis in Venezuela are not confined to within its borders, and how political actors in and outside of Venezuela and Venezuelan civil society will come together by July election remains to be seen. But Galant insists that Washington’s path forward should be one that focuses on facilitating diplomacy rather than proceeding with more sanctions, highlighting the importance of the humanitarian emergency above all.
“That outweighs the other questions. That needs to be what is held at the core of any discussion of broad economic sanctions, is understanding that this is harming millions of people,” he said.