The U.S., guilty by association in the launch of the war in 2015, has failed to fully engage its diplomacy in the service of peace, continuing instead to fuel the fighting with huge arms sales.
The internal war and outside intervention in Yemen appear to go on unabated under the neglectful eye of the Arab world and the international community. The recent armed struggle for Socotra has left the Southern Transitional Council (STC), supported by the United Arab Emirates, in charge of the island. A UNESCO-declared world heritage site, Socotra has been trampled by troops, armored trucks, and tanks, much to the detriment of its fragile ecosystem and historically peaceful population. Battles continue to rage just east of Aden, where STC fighters remain in a stand-off with troops loyal to President Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi’s government for control of neighboring Abyan province—as part of the overall struggle for the entire south of Yemen. Farther north of Abyan, Houthi/Ansarullah troops are pursuing a months-long attempt to enter the capital of Marib and secure all oil and gas facilities there. To the west of Marib, a tense front still exists around the city of Hodeida, a strategic port for the importation of humanitarian assistance and potential export of oil via the Red Sea.
Of course, all this is aside from the main war between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis, which is being conducted by air, land forces, and rocketry over the capital Sanaa, the Houthis’ capital Saadah, and Saudi Arabia’s southern border at al-Jawf governorate. Added to that complex geopolitical picture is a pandemic that is sweeping over all without distinction as to party or regional affiliation. Indeed, there is a clear and full tragedy unfolding in Yemen.
Enter COVID-19
The devastating impact of war, disease, and poverty on the people of Yemen has been compounded by a now widespread epidemic for which the country was ill-prepared. At first, COVID-19 looked like it had somehow spared the country as one Middle Eastern country after another fell prey to the virus in early March. Although lacking reliable information from Yemen itself, international agencies now report that virus-related deaths have very likely exceeded the death toll from the war raging in the country since 2015.
Although lacking reliable information from Yemen itself, international agencies now report that virus-related deaths have very likely exceeded the death toll from the war raging in the country since 2015.
The alarming spread of COVID-19 in Yemen is cause to seriously doubt the sincerity—and even the sanity—of those who pursue victory through war instead of negotiations. This critique includes all sides to the conflict as they continue to give priority to improving their strategic positions on the ground. Numbers vary widely depending on the source of information, but a million infections is not an unreasonable estimate at this point. One thing is certain however: the spread of diseases has overwhelmed the country’s inadequate public health institutions. Instead of dramatically building up Yemen’s capacity and encouraging a coordinated regional and international effort to mitigate the spread of the deadly virus, the Arab coalition fighting the Houthis continues to prosecute the war directly from the air and via proxy forces on the ground. The vast sums being spent on the war primarily by the Arab coalition, if diverted to public health, could save millions of lives currently at risk. The fault, however, belongs to all those trying to fill the void at the center caused by the 2011 revolt, which led to the departure and ultimate demise of the late president, Ali Abdallah Saleh, and his replacement by a weak-to-nonexistent legitimate authority.
Yemeni, Saudi, and Emirati sins
Yemen has fallen into chaos because of the mistakes of an otherwise strong president, the late Ali Abdullah Saleh, who could not find it in himself or his advisors to listen to the protesters and invite them to help transition the country from authoritarianism and corruption into a more democratic and less corrupt system of government. War and chaos also resulted from the Houthi takeover of Sanaa in 2014, reflecting the clumsy efforts of the United Nations and the Gulf Cooperation Council to patch together a new social contract among the various Yemeni factions and regions. None of this was helped with the Saudi-led Arab coalition’s intervention in the country in 2015, ostensibly to repel the Houthi takeover, derail what the Saudis perceived as a growing Iranian menace on their southern border, and restore the internationally recognized government of President Hadi to power. Five years of this war have achieved quite the opposite: the entrenchment of the Houthis in Sanaa, a growing Iranian influence bucking up the Houthis, an increasingly divided country, and a marginalized Hadi government.
Five years of this war have achieved quite the opposite: the entrenchment of the Houthis in Sanaa, a growing Iranian influence bucking up the Houthis, an increasingly divided country, and a marginalized Hadi government.
Whatever the agenda of the Saudi and Emirati leadership, it could not have been pursued without the willing participation of Yemeni militias and armies on the ground. To start with, the Hadi government, living in the lap of luxury courtesy of the Saudi government, has been fighting for a secure foothold inside Yemen and has sought to keep control of Yemen’s central bank holdings. However, it has been unable to do that in either Sanaa (which was taken over by the Houthis) or Aden (where the STC challenges it). Hadi loyalists have been fighting in Marib, trying to fend off Houthi attacks to remain in control of oil and gas facilities in the area. The Hadi forces have also complained of inadequate support from Riyadh, especially because they have to fight on at least two fronts: north with the Houthis and south with the STC and other UAE-supported forces trying to form a separate state there. There are reports of the Saudis’ unhappiness with Hadi’s leadership, that they may be searching for alternatives. Indeed, everyone now questions the Hadi government’s legitimacy as well as the efficacy of continuing to vest this honor upon him when he, like every other major player in Yemen, is struggling to hold on to land and resources.
In fact, the Riyadh Agreement, purportedly a plan to merge the STC with the Hadi government and put an end to bloodshed and chaos in the south, has been suspect in the eyes of Hadi as well as analysts who see it as an abandonment of Hadi in favor of the STC. The hostile takeover of Socotra Island is the most recent example of the STC trying to assert southern independence with clear support from the UAE and suspected connivance from Saudi Arabia. There is no military value to the island for the STC, save that of adding territory to what it already controls in the south, in addition to how the island might help the UAE’s maritime ambitions in the Arabian Sea. It represents, however, a significant defeat for the Hadi government and a further squeezing out of their forces from the south. What is noteworthy here is the withdrawal of the small Saudi force that had gone to the island in 2018 after the UAE sent an expeditionary force, ostensibly to mediate between UAE forces and the island’s population. STC leader Aidarous al-Zubaidi had recently returned from a visit to Riyadh to confer with the Saudi leadership, leading to speculation at the time that the Saudis were lending legitimacy to his desire for an independent southern state.
If the reported Saudi offer of a Riyadh Agreement part II is true, it would shed even more doubt on Saudi intentions and add credibility to reports of their discontinuing support to President Hadi. This offer evidently suggested the STC withdraw its troops from Aden and into Abyan, with no mention of where Hadi’s forces would be deployed. If implemented—and there is no chance of that happening, in any case—it would mean an expansion of STC influence into Abyan, a contested governorate not currently under their control.
Under the best of circumstances and assuming good intentions, Saudi and Emirati leaders are under intensifying pressure to cut their losses in Yemen, given the increasing cost of the war, lower revenue due to the depressed prices of oil, and the vulnerability of their own countries to rocket attacks and land incursions in southern Saudi Arabia. The management of Yemen, as administered territory, also seems too much of a challenge for the Arab coalition, unless one wants to assume the worst and conclude that the prevalent chaos is exactly what they wanted to achieve.
The management of Yemen, as administered territory, also seems too much of a challenge for the Arab coalition, unless one wants to assume the worst and conclude that the prevalent chaos is exactly what they wanted to achieve.
The Houthis, whose motives in capturing Sanaa in 2014 were never transparent, stopped short of taking over Aden due to local resistance and the military intervention by the Arab coalition. They have alternated between trying to hold on to northern territory they control and pushing to expand their area. This lack of transparency has become a hallmark of Houthi rule; most recently, the Houthis were legitimately accused of hoarding information about the spread of COVID-19, brazenly declaring that revealing accurate information on the spread of the disease only causes panic among the population. Information has also been withheld on how they collect and spend their revenue. Specifically, concern has been voiced about widespread corruption within the disbursement of international aid, both by the authorities in Sanaa and by the UN agencies directing and monitoring the process.
The sins of the international community
Since 2011, three successive UN special envoys have failed to stitch together an agreement to reconcile the various parties in conflict and to get the permanent members of the UN Security Council to put their weight behind an effort to end the war. The latest of the envoys, Martin Griffiths, wasted two years trying to secure the neutrality of the vital Hodeida port while the real war raged elsewhere in Yemen and Yemeni and regional parties continued to fundamentally disagree on what a final agreement would look like.
The United States, guilty by association in the launch of the war in 2015, has failed to fully engage its diplomacy in the service of peace, continuing instead to fuel the fighting with huge arms sales, training of fighter-pilots, and putting in place a missile defense system in an extensive but futile effort to guard against rocket attacks against sensitive targets inside Saudi Arabia. Democrats in Congress have repeatedly urged the Trump Administration to suspend arms sales to the region, arguing that peace and stability in Yemen are in the best national security interests of the United States. The latest legislative effort, by Senator Chris Murphy (D-Connecticut), does not seem any more promising than previous attempts—at least while the Republican majority continues to block such moves.
Yemen needs Yemenis
Young men and women from Yemen are now spread far and wide across Europe, the United States, and Asia. Through their various engagements and contributions, they have demonstrated the ability of a new Yemeni generation to launch a rebuilding of their country and lead it into the future. Oil and gas potential is very promising and could well support such efforts once the war ends. If the international community seems incapable or unwilling to stop the bloodletting, it remains incumbent on Yemeni leaders themselves to use the good counsel of their youth to patch up their differences and enable a positive and constructive transition into the future.
Nabeel A. Khoury is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East. A retired foreign service officer, he most recently served as director of the Near East South Asia office of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research.
In an interview this morning with RS, Rep. Thomas Massie (R-KY) said there was clearly "no urgency" for U.S. military airstrikes against the Houthis in Yemen, now in their 13th day. Therefore, the administration should have gone to Congress for authorization and without it, those strikes are illegal.
Massie pointed to Vice President J.D. Vance's contribution to the now infamous signal chat which described the strikes as they were happening. "JD" as identified in the chat, which has been authenticated by the administration, among other points, said that "there is a strong argument for delaying this a month, doing the messaging work on why this matters, seeing where the economy is, etc.”
"(Vance's) contribution there was to prove that there was no urgency, and that there were no U.S. troops that were in imminent danger, that needed to be defended. Which is the instance in which you might allow the president to engage in hostilities — if it was in self-defense and urgent, and before they had time to come to Congress," Massie told RS. " But they obviously, based on that signal chat, had time to come to Congress, but they chose not to."
Massie said there may be some effort in the House to push for a War Powers Act vote or for defunding the U.S. military operations in Yemen. He's tried before, but there are hurdles: the rules committee, of which he is no longer a member, could prevent a War Powers Vote from getting to the floor, for instance. "There may be opportunities to offer amendments in the appropriations process to defund the activity as well. We've done that in the past," he said.
So far there have been no movements in Congress as all of the attention has been on the titillating details of the chat, and the fact that a conversation about bombing targets in realtime in Yemen was taking place on an unsecured app with a then-undisclosed journalist from a unsympathetic magazine (an understatement) lingering in the background, screenshotting every minute.
"Yeah, a lot of people have missed the point of the leaked signal chat. I think people are going to debate, and are debating, was that the right forum? Should they been engaged in that channel? Was it reckless? Because they included a reporter, etcetera, etcetera, but they should be looking at what was said," Massie explained. "And one thing that was said is that there's no urgency here, okay? Well, that turns off their authority if they acknowledge there's no urgency."
In reporting last week it was clear that the Houthis, who had been standing down attacks since the phase 1 of Israel-Hamas ceasefire was brokered in January, had not launched attacks against U.S. ships in the Red Sea since before Trump's inauguration. They had only begun after the ceasefire was broken and in response to the first U.S. airstrikes on Yemen on March 15.
Secondly, is the question of the American interest in the shipping interruptions caused by the Houthis, also questioned by Vance in the chat, and others, like Jennifer Kavanagh in RS last week.
"I'm starting to like this guy he said, chuckling, saying the two are already on the same page on a number of foreign policy issues, "but the point that he made ... this is mostly goods that are going from Asia to Europe and, oh, by the way, is Egypt going to pay anything for this? Because they're the ones who make billions of dollars every year off of their canal. That was in that signal chat too."
"As soon as this attack happened, I tried to make a pragmatic economic argument against it. You know, an America First argument that this is predominantly not our shipping lane. It's like 3% of the stuff going through there goes to America. Why are we subsidizing Europe and Asia in an America First Presidency?"
Meanwhile, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth has said the strikes have been "stunningly devastating" and the Wall Street Journal said Thursday they are “restoring deterrence.” But are they? The U.S. has been going after the Houthis and bombing Yemen on and off for over a year but their will and military capability, so far, appear un-thwarted.
"Long term, our meddling in the Middle East makes more enemies for us, whether it's, you know, supplying all the bombs that are being dropped on Gaza, or whether it's being in Afghanistan for over two decades, we're creating new enemies that we don't need to have," Massie said. "And so if there is some element of deterrence, you have to balance it against the motivation that you're generating for another 9/11."
Asked if the U.S. should pursue a political solution rather than a military one in the Middle East, Massie said the latter is clearly not working.
"I don't think the way they're waging this war in Gaza is the best thing for Israel."
The Bunker appears originally at the Project on Government Oversight and is republished here with permission.
Matching the U.S. military to U.S. goals
The U.S. has long engaged in Pentagon prestidigitation. That’s where it proactively pledges to commit its blood and treasure around the world, until it realizes there ain’t enough to go around (cf., the U.S. military couldn’t fight two relatively rinky-dink wars in Afghanistan and Iraq simultaneously). Short of doubling the U.S. defense budget to something like $2 trillion a year —“not gonna do it,” as President George H. W. Bush reportedly said — there’s only one other option: pick the nation’s fights, and where to fight, more judiciously.
This is a national conversation that is long overdue. That was made clear March 18, when NBC’s Courtney Kube and Gordon Lubold reported that the Trump administration might let NATO’s top general be someone other than a U.S. military officer for the first time. President Donald Trump is, to put it mildly, no fan of history’s greatest military alliance.
NATO backers were not pleased with this heavily armored trial balloon. “It would be a political mistake of epic proportion, and once we give it up, they are not going to give it back,” retired Admiral James Stavridis, who served as NATO’s top officer from 2009 to 2013, said. “We would lose an enormous amount of influence within NATO, and this would be seen, correctly, as probably the first step toward leaving the Alliance altogether.”
But Trump has succeeded in pushing NATO members to spend more to defend against a revanchist Russia. This is a burden they should be willing to bear, 80 years after the U.S. saved their bacon in World War II. If such pressure continues, east Asian nations could increasingly follow suit to counter China’s expansionist aims.
This is where the tank tread, so to speak, meets the road: If the U.S. counts on other nations to pick up the slack far from home, it will lose leverage when it comes to calling the shots, military or otherwise, far from home.
Ronald O’Rourke, an analyst at the Congressional Research Service, regularly updates his primer(PDF) on “Geography, Strategy, and U.S. Force Design.” In it, he concludes that the size and shape of the U.S. military “for the past several decades” has been driven by Washington’s “goal of preventing the emergence of regional hegemons in Eurasia.” But, in his most recent update, he adds a key coda:
A change in U.S. foreign policy, the U.S. role in the world, and U.S. grand strategy toward one that accepts or supports the emergence of a spheres-of-influence world with spheres led by countries such as Russia, China, and the United States (whose sphere would likely be centered on the Western Hemisphere) could lead to a change in the U.S. force-planning standard, the size and composition of U.S. military forces, and U.S. defense plans, programs, and budgets.
Apparently, the only thing we have to sphere is sphere itself.
Dogfight
Trump’s disdain for NATO allies could bite the U.S. arms biz’s bottom line. Turns out some of those allies are in the market for new jet fighters, and the Pentagon’s F-35 fighter is looking less desirable in light of the White House’s barely concealed contempt for its potential buyers.
Britain, Canada, Germany, and Portugal are all candidates to scale back, or not even buy, F-35s since Trump declared he might hesitate to defend or even seek to annex NATO allies. The French-built Rafale and Swedish-built Gripen fighters, among others, are far cheaper, good-enough, options. “There’s going to be long-term negative consequences to the U.S. arms-export prospects to Europe and other allies,” veteran aerospace consultant Richard Aboulafia predicted. “The F-35 was the product of an era of extreme trust, and they may never trust the U.S. again.”
“The United States priorities, once closely aligned with our own, are beginning to shift,” Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney said March 18 as he announced Canada was buying a $4.2 billion Australian radar system. The day before, he had discussed the deal with Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese, who was pleased at the outcome. “Obviously,” Albanese said, “there are issues taking place, particularly between Canada and the United States, I wouldn’t have expected to have been happening in my lifetime.” Canada has already paid for 16 yet-to-be-delivered F-35s of a planned 88-plane buy worth $19 billion, but the balance could be up for grabs.
Trump may be a savvy pol, but someone in his orbit needs to remind him of Newton’s Third Law: for every action there is an equal, and opposite, reaction.
Arms sales aren’t the only thing at stake
U.S. allies pushing for their own nuclear arsenals have largely been sidelined for two generations because those nations counted on staying dry (from atomic fallout) under the U.S. nuclear umbrella. But Trump’s “America First” agenda, and his willingness to dismiss the need for alliances where the U.S. once provided superpower protection, are giving rise to second thoughts. France — the lone NATO member with nuclear weapons not dependent on U.S. technology — has suggested its neighbors share its own A-bomb bumbershoot.
The U.S. has fought to restrict access to the nine nations known to be in the nuclear club, primarily via good-government options like the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. But such efforts are no guarantee. Most infamously, Russia joined with the U.S. and Britain in 1994 in convincing Ukraine to give up the Soviet Union’s nuclear weapons on its soil in exchange for Moscow’s pledge to respect its neighbor’s borders. Once stripped of such weapons, there was little Ukraine could do to thwart Russia’s attack on Crimea in 2014 and its full-scale invasion three years ago.
“The Trump administration’s approach to Ukraine and Russia has significantly undercut allied confidence in the United States, including on extended [nuclear] deterrence,” Eric Brewer, who pushed nonproliferation efforts at the White House during Trump’s first term, said. “Not only is [Trump] pivoting away from allies but he’s seemingly pivoting toward Russia.”
Doug Edelman and his wife allegedly failed to pay $129 million in taxes from their Pentagon contracts supporting the Afghan war, the Wall Street Journal’s Margot Patrick reported March 18.
Sharing war plans via an unclassified mobile app — as the Trump administration’s high command just did — is something expressly barred by this 2023 Pentagon directive that apparently no one read.
But despite that, thanks for reading The Bunker this week. Consider sending to allies so they can subscribe here.
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Top Image Credit: DPP Vice President Lai Ching-te Photo: jamesonwu1972 / Shutterstock.com
Speaking at a press conference on March 13, Taiwan President Lai Ching-te broke new ground in the escalating rhetoric between the island and mainland China.
While providing details on commonly heard complaints about Chinese infiltration, influence peddling, and pressure tactics, he went further by calling Beijing a “foreign hostile force,” a very specific phrase from the 2020 Anti-Infiltration Act.
That phrase, according to the wording of the Act, applies to “…countries, political entities or groups that are at war with or are engaged in a military standoff with the Republic of China…[or] advocate the use of non-peaceful means to endanger the sovereignty of the Republic of China.”
There is little doubt that China’s actions constitute a significant concern for Taiwan’s citizens and for the United States, which has a clear interest in maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. Lai was certainly correct in highlighting them. But his reference to the Act was unprecedented, effectively building on the drive launched by former Presidents Lee Tenghui and Tsai Ing-wen to put an end to the credibility of the “One China” concept with regard to Taiwan-China relations, or in the thinking of others outside Taiwan.
That concept envisions mainland China and Taiwan as belonging to a common entity, however defined. Both the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of China (ROC) acknowledged this connection for decades, and it is still reflected in the ROC’s constitution. But Lee, Tsai, and now Lai have worked hard to replace the “One China” concept with a de facto “One China, One Taiwan” notion that views the island as a sovereign, independent nation entirely unconnected with China under any circumstances.
Labeling China (and not just the PRC) a “foreign hostile force” reinforces this anti-“One China” viewpoint. At the same time, and even more ominously, it deepens the sense of hostility between the two sides of the Strait and thereby arguably appeals to those in the United States who wish not only to greatly strengthen U.S.-Taiwan political relations but also to increase the likelihood that Washington would come to the military defense of Taiwan if China were to attack the island. Despite some statements by former President Joe Biden that Washington would indeed do so, official U.S. policy has remained ambiguous on this question for many decades.
While deepening some ties with Taiwan makes sense, to avoid increasing the risks of a crisis with China over the island, most such initiatives should only take place within the larger context of an improved Sino-U.S. relationship. This is difficult to do while Lai is giving ammunition to hawks in both the United States and China. It also makes it extremely difficult to begin what is increasingly needed based on existing negative trends in U.S.-China-Taiwan relations: a serious discussion of the nature and extent of American interests regarding Taiwan.
The security of Taiwan is certainly of great interest to the United States. However, there is a real question as to whether serving that interest should extend to an American military defense of Taiwan, which would likely result in a major war with China. The limited strategic value of the island vis-à-vis Washington’s more general interests in Asia, as well as Beijing’s increasing military capabilities in the region relative to those of the United States, argues strongly in favor of a U.S. commitment to do everything possible to support Taiwan short of intervening militarily in a future cross-Strait conflict.
While it is not in Washington’s interest to engage in a war with China over Taiwan, it is in the U.S. interest to support a responsible and restrained Taiwan, while demanding similar restraint from China. Lai’s effort to end the credibility of the “One China” concept and deepen the sense of threat posed by China does not serve these U.S. interests and should be discouraged by its officials.
Unfortunately, U.S. officials have said almost nothing in response to Lai’s provocative statements. And what has been said is not helpful. For example, the Director of the American Institute in Taiwan Ray Greene appeared to publicly endorse Lai’s increasingly assertive posture toward Beijing, saying, without any reference to Lai’s “foreign hostile force” remark, that “President Lai’s initiative to crack down on longstanding Chinese espionage and influence operations will further enhance our ability to cooperate with Taiwan.”
Even more troubling, U.S. actions more broadly have continued to erode the One China policy, as witnessed most recently by the deliberate removal of a long-standing reference to not supporting Taiwan independence in the State Department’s Fact Sheet on Taiwan. Moreover, Ivan Kanapathy, the Trump administration’s Senior Asia Director in the National Security Council, has argued for the replacement of the term “One China policy” with “cross-Strait policy,” which would constitute a major, gratuitous provocation.
Washington should be strengthening the credibility of its One China policy (which has eroded considerably in recent years) and pushing back against Lai Ching-te’s provocative statements, while demanding that Beijing strengthen the credibility of its commitment to peaceful unification as a first priority. The mutual credibility of those commitments is the only basis for stability across the Taiwan Strait at present.
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