The U.S., guilty by association in the launch of the war in 2015, has failed to fully engage its diplomacy in the service of peace, continuing instead to fuel the fighting with huge arms sales.
The internal war and outside intervention in Yemen appear to go on unabated under the neglectful eye of the Arab world and the international community. The recent armed struggle for Socotra has left the Southern Transitional Council (STC), supported by the United Arab Emirates, in charge of the island. A UNESCO-declared world heritage site, Socotra has been trampled by troops, armored trucks, and tanks, much to the detriment of its fragile ecosystem and historically peaceful population. Battles continue to rage just east of Aden, where STC fighters remain in a stand-off with troops loyal to President Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi’s government for control of neighboring Abyan province—as part of the overall struggle for the entire south of Yemen. Farther north of Abyan, Houthi/Ansarullah troops are pursuing a months-long attempt to enter the capital of Marib and secure all oil and gas facilities there. To the west of Marib, a tense front still exists around the city of Hodeida, a strategic port for the importation of humanitarian assistance and potential export of oil via the Red Sea.
Of course, all this is aside from the main war between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis, which is being conducted by air, land forces, and rocketry over the capital Sanaa, the Houthis’ capital Saadah, and Saudi Arabia’s southern border at al-Jawf governorate. Added to that complex geopolitical picture is a pandemic that is sweeping over all without distinction as to party or regional affiliation. Indeed, there is a clear and full tragedy unfolding in Yemen.
Enter COVID-19
The devastating impact of war, disease, and poverty on the people of Yemen has been compounded by a now widespread epidemic for which the country was ill-prepared. At first, COVID-19 looked like it had somehow spared the country as one Middle Eastern country after another fell prey to the virus in early March. Although lacking reliable information from Yemen itself, international agencies now report that virus-related deaths have very likely exceeded the death toll from the war raging in the country since 2015.
Although lacking reliable information from Yemen itself, international agencies now report that virus-related deaths have very likely exceeded the death toll from the war raging in the country since 2015.
The alarming spread of COVID-19 in Yemen is cause to seriously doubt the sincerity—and even the sanity—of those who pursue victory through war instead of negotiations. This critique includes all sides to the conflict as they continue to give priority to improving their strategic positions on the ground. Numbers vary widely depending on the source of information, but a million infections is not an unreasonable estimate at this point. One thing is certain however: the spread of diseases has overwhelmed the country’s inadequate public health institutions. Instead of dramatically building up Yemen’s capacity and encouraging a coordinated regional and international effort to mitigate the spread of the deadly virus, the Arab coalition fighting the Houthis continues to prosecute the war directly from the air and via proxy forces on the ground. The vast sums being spent on the war primarily by the Arab coalition, if diverted to public health, could save millions of lives currently at risk. The fault, however, belongs to all those trying to fill the void at the center caused by the 2011 revolt, which led to the departure and ultimate demise of the late president, Ali Abdallah Saleh, and his replacement by a weak-to-nonexistent legitimate authority.
Yemeni, Saudi, and Emirati sins
Yemen has fallen into chaos because of the mistakes of an otherwise strong president, the late Ali Abdullah Saleh, who could not find it in himself or his advisors to listen to the protesters and invite them to help transition the country from authoritarianism and corruption into a more democratic and less corrupt system of government. War and chaos also resulted from the Houthi takeover of Sanaa in 2014, reflecting the clumsy efforts of the United Nations and the Gulf Cooperation Council to patch together a new social contract among the various Yemeni factions and regions. None of this was helped with the Saudi-led Arab coalition’s intervention in the country in 2015, ostensibly to repel the Houthi takeover, derail what the Saudis perceived as a growing Iranian menace on their southern border, and restore the internationally recognized government of President Hadi to power. Five years of this war have achieved quite the opposite: the entrenchment of the Houthis in Sanaa, a growing Iranian influence bucking up the Houthis, an increasingly divided country, and a marginalized Hadi government.
Five years of this war have achieved quite the opposite: the entrenchment of the Houthis in Sanaa, a growing Iranian influence bucking up the Houthis, an increasingly divided country, and a marginalized Hadi government.
Whatever the agenda of the Saudi and Emirati leadership, it could not have been pursued without the willing participation of Yemeni militias and armies on the ground. To start with, the Hadi government, living in the lap of luxury courtesy of the Saudi government, has been fighting for a secure foothold inside Yemen and has sought to keep control of Yemen’s central bank holdings. However, it has been unable to do that in either Sanaa (which was taken over by the Houthis) or Aden (where the STC challenges it). Hadi loyalists have been fighting in Marib, trying to fend off Houthi attacks to remain in control of oil and gas facilities in the area. The Hadi forces have also complained of inadequate support from Riyadh, especially because they have to fight on at least two fronts: north with the Houthis and south with the STC and other UAE-supported forces trying to form a separate state there. There are reports of the Saudis’ unhappiness with Hadi’s leadership, that they may be searching for alternatives. Indeed, everyone now questions the Hadi government’s legitimacy as well as the efficacy of continuing to vest this honor upon him when he, like every other major player in Yemen, is struggling to hold on to land and resources.
In fact, the Riyadh Agreement, purportedly a plan to merge the STC with the Hadi government and put an end to bloodshed and chaos in the south, has been suspect in the eyes of Hadi as well as analysts who see it as an abandonment of Hadi in favor of the STC. The hostile takeover of Socotra Island is the most recent example of the STC trying to assert southern independence with clear support from the UAE and suspected connivance from Saudi Arabia. There is no military value to the island for the STC, save that of adding territory to what it already controls in the south, in addition to how the island might help the UAE’s maritime ambitions in the Arabian Sea. It represents, however, a significant defeat for the Hadi government and a further squeezing out of their forces from the south. What is noteworthy here is the withdrawal of the small Saudi force that had gone to the island in 2018 after the UAE sent an expeditionary force, ostensibly to mediate between UAE forces and the island’s population. STC leader Aidarous al-Zubaidi had recently returned from a visit to Riyadh to confer with the Saudi leadership, leading to speculation at the time that the Saudis were lending legitimacy to his desire for an independent southern state.
If the reported Saudi offer of a Riyadh Agreement part II is true, it would shed even more doubt on Saudi intentions and add credibility to reports of their discontinuing support to President Hadi. This offer evidently suggested the STC withdraw its troops from Aden and into Abyan, with no mention of where Hadi’s forces would be deployed. If implemented—and there is no chance of that happening, in any case—it would mean an expansion of STC influence into Abyan, a contested governorate not currently under their control.
Under the best of circumstances and assuming good intentions, Saudi and Emirati leaders are under intensifying pressure to cut their losses in Yemen, given the increasing cost of the war, lower revenue due to the depressed prices of oil, and the vulnerability of their own countries to rocket attacks and land incursions in southern Saudi Arabia. The management of Yemen, as administered territory, also seems too much of a challenge for the Arab coalition, unless one wants to assume the worst and conclude that the prevalent chaos is exactly what they wanted to achieve.
The management of Yemen, as administered territory, also seems too much of a challenge for the Arab coalition, unless one wants to assume the worst and conclude that the prevalent chaos is exactly what they wanted to achieve.
The Houthis, whose motives in capturing Sanaa in 2014 were never transparent, stopped short of taking over Aden due to local resistance and the military intervention by the Arab coalition. They have alternated between trying to hold on to northern territory they control and pushing to expand their area. This lack of transparency has become a hallmark of Houthi rule; most recently, the Houthis were legitimately accused of hoarding information about the spread of COVID-19, brazenly declaring that revealing accurate information on the spread of the disease only causes panic among the population. Information has also been withheld on how they collect and spend their revenue. Specifically, concern has been voiced about widespread corruption within the disbursement of international aid, both by the authorities in Sanaa and by the UN agencies directing and monitoring the process.
The sins of the international community
Since 2011, three successive UN special envoys have failed to stitch together an agreement to reconcile the various parties in conflict and to get the permanent members of the UN Security Council to put their weight behind an effort to end the war. The latest of the envoys, Martin Griffiths, wasted two years trying to secure the neutrality of the vital Hodeida port while the real war raged elsewhere in Yemen and Yemeni and regional parties continued to fundamentally disagree on what a final agreement would look like.
The United States, guilty by association in the launch of the war in 2015, has failed to fully engage its diplomacy in the service of peace, continuing instead to fuel the fighting with huge arms sales, training of fighter-pilots, and putting in place a missile defense system in an extensive but futile effort to guard against rocket attacks against sensitive targets inside Saudi Arabia. Democrats in Congress have repeatedly urged the Trump Administration to suspend arms sales to the region, arguing that peace and stability in Yemen are in the best national security interests of the United States. The latest legislative effort, by Senator Chris Murphy (D-Connecticut), does not seem any more promising than previous attempts—at least while the Republican majority continues to block such moves.
Yemen needs Yemenis
Young men and women from Yemen are now spread far and wide across Europe, the United States, and Asia. Through their various engagements and contributions, they have demonstrated the ability of a new Yemeni generation to launch a rebuilding of their country and lead it into the future. Oil and gas potential is very promising and could well support such efforts once the war ends. If the international community seems incapable or unwilling to stop the bloodletting, it remains incumbent on Yemeni leaders themselves to use the good counsel of their youth to patch up their differences and enable a positive and constructive transition into the future.
Nabeel A. Khoury is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East. A retired foreign service officer, he most recently served as director of the Near East South Asia office of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research.
Now that President Joe Biden has made the unprecedented decision to end his reelection campaign and endorse Vice President Kamala Harris for president, we need to ask: what will be her foreign policy if she wins in November?
It is safe to assume that there will be broad continuity with the Biden administration’s overall approach to the world, but there is some evidence that Harris might guide U.S. foreign policy in a somewhat less destructive direction than where it has been going under Biden.
First off, Harris did not run for president in 2020 on foreign policy and has relatively little foreign policy experience from her short time in the Senate and her tenure as vice president. While she has cast a number of tie-breaking votes in favor of Biden’s domestic agenda in the Senate, she has played a smaller role in foreign policy by representing the U.S. at international meetings that the president has been unable to attend. She was tasked by Biden to focus on the “root causes” in Latin America leading to the undocumented migrant issue at the nation’s southern border, drawing mixed reviews at best.
Meanwhile, her voting record in the Senate offers some bright spots, including her opposition to U.S. backing for the Saudi coalition war on Yemen, and her early opposition to arms deals with Riyadh. She joined with her Democratic colleagues in objecting to Trump’s withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) and she has been generally supportive of arms control and nonproliferation measures.
During her 2020 presidential run, she signaled openness to “rewrit[ing] the Authorization for Use of Military Force that governs our current military conflicts.” And while Harris has a history of close tiesto AIPAC, she called Trump’s Iran nuclear deal exit “reckless” during the 2020 campaign and vowed to re-enter the JCPOA as president.
But no one should expect any radical overhauls under Harris. She is a conventional liberal internationalist for better or worse. There are some hints that she might have a different approach to the war in Gaza than Biden, but these have mostly been differences in tone rather than major disagreements over policy so far. In contrast to the president, Harris has shown more genuine empathy for the suffering of Palestinians in Gaza. She also called for a ceasefire earlier than Biden did, but on the whole she has followed the administration’s script as one would expect from a vice president.
Harris has indeed been required by her position as vice president to be a vocal supporter of the president’s policy agenda, so to some extent we will have to wait to find out what Harris’s own views are and how much they might differ from Biden’s. This is definitely the case for the Ukraine War where she has been in absolute lockstep with the president if she talks about it at all. In her remarks at the Munich Security Conference, she echoed the administration’s framing of this as a war between democracy and autocracy:
"No nation is safe in a world where one country can violate the sovereignty and territorial integrity of another where crimes against humanity are committed with impunity; where a country with imperialist ambitions can go unchecked.
"Our response to the Russian invasion is a demonstration of our collective commitment to uphold international rules and norms. Rules and norms which, since the end of World War Two, have provided unprecedented security and prosperity not only for the American people, not only for the people of Europe, but people around the world…
"Again, the United States will continue to strongly support Ukraine. And we will do so for as long as it takes."
Her previous opposition to backing the Saudi coalition in Yemen suggests that she might be more open to curtailing or ending U.S. support for the war in Gaza, but that remains to be seen. Given all of Biden’s political headaches in swing states like Michigan, the war in Gaza is clearly one issue where Harris would stand to benefit by breaking with current administration policy.
Some of the former government officials that resigned in protest over U.S. support for the war in Gaza are cautiously optimistic about Harris. After Biden’s unconditional backing for the war, any alternative is an improvement in their eyes. Josh Paul, the first State Department official to resign in protest, told Politico, “I would say I have cautious and limited optimism — but also a deep sense of relief that the Democratic party will not be nominating for the Presidency of the United States a man who has made us all complicit in so much and such unnecessary harm.”
The vice president reportedly depends heavily on her foreign policy advisers, so it is worth looking more closely at the thinking of her current national security adviser, Philip Gordon, who would presumably serve in that capacity if Harris is elected.
Gordon is a Clinton and Obama administration veteran with a background in working on European and Middle Eastern issues. He was one of the U.S. negotiators responsible for securing the JCPOA. After leaving government, he became one of the deal’s most vocal defenders.
Gordon has demonstrated that he understands the Iranian government better than a lot of his colleagues, and that could be very useful in reviving negotiations with Iran under its new reformist president Masoud Pezeshkian.
Gordon has absorbed some of the important lessons from U.S. foreign policy failures, including the disastrous interventions in the Middle East and North Africa and has written about those lessons at length in his book, “Losing the Long Game: The False Promise of Regime Change in the Middle East.” The book reviews the history of major U.S. regime change policies of the last 70 years and in each case Gordon shows how the policies ended up leaving both the U.S. and the affected countries worse off.
It is notable that he criticized destructive Obama administration interventions just as sharply as he did the policies of other presidents. Some analysts see Gordon’s role as Harris’s top adviser as an encouraging sign that her foreign policy could be an improvement over Biden’s. Bourse & Bazaar CEO Esfandyar Batmanghelidj commented, “[Gordon] would be a big upgrade on Sullivan, especially when it comes to thoughtful approaches to the US role in the Middle East.”
There probably wouldn’t be many departures from Biden administration foreign policy under Harris. As Biden’s vice president and would-be successor, Harris has strong incentives to continue with his agenda. That said, there are a few reasons to hope that U.S. foreign policy could be smarter and more constructive if Harris takes Gordon’s best advice to heart.
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Israel's Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu (C) talks to reporters with U.S. House Majority Leader Eric Cantor (R-VA) (L), Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-KY) (2nd L), House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) (2nd R) and House Speaker John Boehner (R-OH) (R) after Netanyahu's speech before Congress at the Capitol in Washington May 24, 2011. REUTERS/Jonathan Ernst
On September 12, 2002, Benjamin Netanyahu — then a private citizen — was invited to Congress to give “an Israeli perspective” in support of a U.S. invasion of Iraq. Netanyahu issued a confident prediction: “if you take out Saddam, Saddam’s regime, I guarantee you that it will have enormous positive reverberations on the region,” adding, “and I think that people sitting right next door in Iran, young people, and many others, will say the time of such regimes, of such despots is gone.”
In 2015, Netanyahu returned to Congress — this time as Israel’s prime minister — to undermine the Iran nuclear deal (JCPOA) negotiations led by the Obama administration along with key U.S. allies the United Kingdom, Germany, and France. After a tepid acknowledgement of President Obama’s support for Israel — Obama ultimately gave Israel $38 billion, the largest military aid package in history — Netanyahu spent the remainder of his speech attacking what would become one of the sitting president’s signature foreign policy achievements.
In both cases, Netanyahu’s advice was catastrophically wrong. America’s invasion of Iraq was a bloody disaster that killed hundreds of thousands and displaced millions more, creating massive instability in the region and paving the way for ISIS’s rise.
Meanwhile, Obama’s deal with Iran had succeeded in rolling Iran’s nuclear program back and blocking its pathways to a bomb — that is until the Trump administration followed Netanyahu’s advice and backed out of the deal in 2018, thus forfeiting our capability to contain Iran’s nuclear program while torpedoing prospects for productive engagement with Tehran on reducing regional tensions.
When Trump withdrew from the JCPOA, Iran was at least one year away from being able to produce enough enriched uranium to produce one nuclear weapon. Thanks to that withdrawal, Iran can produce a nuclear weapon in less than two weeks.
Tomorrow, Netanyahu is set to address Congress again — this time, as he prosecutes a campaign of mass carnage and destruction in Gaza that has killed more than 39,000 Palestinians — to ask for continued support for his efforts to “defeat Hamas.” Meanwhile, the Israeli Defense Forces themselves call Netanyahu’s pursuit of “total victory” against Hamas impossible and “misleading to the public.”
By now, Netanyahu is used to coming to Washington, telling U.S. leaders what to do, and seeing them oblige. The consequences of abiding his arrogant approach have been nothing short of disastrous. So will Washington allow itself to be bullied by Bibi again? Will Congress and the administration put his selfish demands ahead of the American people’s interests in avoiding a regional war, and ending our complicity in the destruction of Gaza?
Unfortunately, U.S. leaders appear ready to do just that. Meanwhile, Netanyahu likely plans to repeat the same playbook from his last Washington visit: offering the Biden administration nominal praise for their nearly unconditional support of Israel’s war in Gaza before pivoting to put his thumb on the scale for hawkish U.S. politicians during an election year, in a bid to quash any criticism of Israel’s actions in Gaza.
If the last nine months have taught us anything, a large, bipartisan majority in Washington will be happy to oblige Netanyahu’s request for silence on Gaza — even as scores of Americans descend on the Capitol complex to protest Netanyahu and continued U.S. support for this war.
To be clear, the problem neither starts nor ends with Netanyahu’s far-right government. The Knesset's recent overwhelming vote to reject a two-state solution underscores the major political challenges that remain to any Israeli role in securing Palestinian self-determination. There are systemic roadblocks throughout the Israeli government and military which consistently entangle the U.S. in regional conflicts and erode any prospects for a viable Palestinian state; however, by continuing to provide unconditional support, the U.S. only undermines the conditions necessary to resolve the conflict.
America must use its considerable leverage with Tel Aviv to push for both an end to this war and for security and peace for Israelis and Palestinians.
Instead, the Biden administration has aided and abetted Israel’s reckless behavior during this war at every turn, from approving more than 100 arms sales to Israel and vetoing various efforts to push for a ceasefire at the United Nations, to rejecting legitimate findings that Israel violated international law during its war in Gaza. This unconditional support for Israel — a public “bearhug” meant to open space for difficult conversation in private — has utterly failed to restrain Israel in its war, while making Americans a party to the slaughter of Palestinian civilians.
This approach has not just been a moral failure — it’s a serious strategic mistake. Netanyahu has repeatedly proven that he is not a reliable partner for the United States. He has been a major obstacle to a ceasefire with Hamas; he is deeply divisive and it is widely accepted, even within Israel, that Netanyahu needs the Gaza conflict for his political survival.
As Netanyahu prolongs the war in Gaza while ramping up conflict with Hezbollah in Lebanon, he has made it abundantly clear that he is willing to drag the U.S. into yet another unnecessary war in the Middle East: a war that would not serve American or even Israeli interests, but only his continued pursuit of power.
The prime minister’s visit offers the White House and Congress an opportunity to turn the page on this failed strategy, to press Israel to end its war, and to prevent a wider regional war that would put U.S. troops in the line of fire. U.S. leaders must use their time with Netanyahu to deliver a clear message: enough is enough. Reach a deal, bring the hostages home, and end the bloodshed before it spirals into a wider war.
Washington likes to talk a lot about America’s power and prestige on the world stage. It is well past time to bring these assets to bear to end the assault on Gaza and begin building a durable peace. Israel’s government should not be able to count on a blank check from Washington for more war.
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Gen. Laura Richardson, the commander of Southern Command, speaks at an Atlantic Council event on March 19, 2024. (Screengrab via atlanticcouncil.org)
Gen. Laura Richardson, the commander of Southern Command, speaks at an Atlantic Council event on March 19, 2024. (Screengrab via atlanticcouncil.org)
A top U.S. military general wants a "Marshall Plan" for Latin America but is likely more concerned about China's encroachment into America's backyard with "dual use" infrastructure than about what poor people in the Global South actually need.
But then again, Gen. Laura Richardson, SOUTHCOM commander, is a military officer,not a diplomat or humanitarian program lead at USAID.
Richardson told an audience at the Aspen Security Forum last week that the U.S. has been MIA in the region while Russia and especially China has been exploiting the post-COVID economic downturn with both military outreach (Russia recently in Cuba) and development projects (Beijing's Belt and Road). That is why Washington needs to offer its own "Marshall Plan" to Latin America, which it views as it its own sphere of influence.
She said 22 of the 31 countries in the region have signed on to the Belt and Road development program.
“How are we competing Team USA and Team Democracy with the tenders that are coming out from [other] countries? How are we getting our U.S. quality investment and talking about our U.S. companies investing in the region? We have a lot of companies in the region. I don’t think we’re branding Team USA as we should. It should be better. We’ve got to be bragging about what U.S. quality investment does,” she said.
The Marshall Plan, proposed by Secretary of State George C. Marshall in a speech at Harvard University in 1947, was launched by President Harry S. Truman in 1948 to help Europe rebuild after World War II. The plan provided $13.3 billion in aid to 16 countries through 1951, about $150 billion in today's dollars.
“I really believe that economic security and national security are going hand-in-hand here in this hemisphere,” she said.
Security of course, is the optimal word here. "If (Belt and Road is) for doing good in the hemisphere, then I’m all for it. But it makes me a little suspicious when it’s in the critical infrastructure … deep water ports, 5G, cybersecurity, energy, space … I worry about the dual use nature of that,” Richardson said.
“These are state-owned enterprises by a communist government and I’m worried about the flipping of that to a military application very quickly if something were to happen, maybe in the Indo-Pacom region,” she said.
Therein lies the crux of the situation. On one hand she is absolutely right. As in Africa, Global South countries are reacting to economic outreach from China and Russia because a) they need it and America (private nor public) isn't in the game and b) help from China and Russia doesn't appear to come with as many strings as U.S. assistance might demand. She may also be on point that there are a dearth of high-level visits and attention to the region, giving the very real impression that Latin America is an afterthought.
But we should also ask why the military is taking the lead on asking the real questions here. Where are the diplomats? Is this just another argument for putting more military eyes and assets in the region?
Richardson is right to raise the issue: it is past time that Washington stop whining about China's influence and apply some elbow grease to nurturing productive relations with its neighbors that aren't just about military or political ideological influence. In other words, a two-way street, that if paved well, will mean security and prosperity for everyone. But we should also ask why the military is taking the lead on asking the real questions here, and who, in the end will be providing the answers.
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