Follow us on social

49476584322_54a57dd4a8_o

U.S. Faces Headwinds Pushing Central Asian Integration

A visit to Central Asia by U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo underscored how Washington sees the region defined by its own rivals.

Analysis | Washington Politics

U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo has whisked through Central Asia spreading caution about what he describes as the dangers of relying too heavily on traditional partners, Russia and China.

He made his point most explicitly in Kazakhstan’s recently renamed capital.

“We fully support Kazakhstan’s freedom to choose to do business with whichever country it wants, but I am confident that countries get the best outcomes when they partner with American companies,” Pompeo said at a February 2 joint press conference in Nur-Sultan with his Kazakh counterpart Mukhtar Tleuberdi.

The groans could be heard from Moscow. Russian reporters grumbled that when Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev received Pompeo, he spoke in English, rather than in his native Kazakh, which they insisted was a violation of protocol. Some pointed out that those same people seem less bothered when Central Asian leaders speak in Russian, however.

Pompeo’s visit has come ahead of the imminent unveiling of the Trump administration’s new U.S. strategy on Central Asia, which Washington’s foreign affairs chief said would put “independence and prosperity at the core of [its] approach."

The anti-Beijing agenda was revealed even more boldly when Pompeo made time to meet with ethnic Kazakhs from China who have been campaigning to raise attention to the plight of relatives being held in so-called re-education camps in China’s Xinjiang province.

The secretary of state brought up the matter at the press conference with Tleuberdi, when he urged U.S. partners to assist in ending what he called China’s repressions. In a tweet, Pompeo reiterated the point by commending Kazakhstan for “not forcibly returning members of Muslim minority groups to an uncertain fate in China and protecting those who seek asylum.”

This is a mostly inaccurate description of the real situation. In its eagerness to avoid displeasing Beijing, Kazakhstan has typically pursed the deportation of people seeking asylum, although such efforts have routinely met with protest. Activist groups trying to keep this issue on the agenda, meanwhile, have faced harassment.

In the second and concluding leg of his Central Asia tour, Pompeo was in Uzbekistan to take part in the C5+1 ministerial summit, a format bringing together the foreign ministers of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan – all overseen by a U.S. State Department representative. The thinking in Washington is that a more connected, integrated and collective region will be better positioned to negotiate in the face of the overweening influence of large nearby partners.

Critics charge that this approach is outmoded and insufficiently ambitious, however.

“Would be helpful to start by outlining U.S. objectives for the region *itself*, then work our way to Russia and China,” tweeted Evan Feigenbaum, a former senior State Department official. “It is a poor message fully 29 years after independence to define the U.S. agenda, first, in reference to external powers. *Nobody* in the region is naive about them.”

America’s correlated agenda is for Central Asia to engage more actively with Afghanistan, a nation whose future Washington is eager to get off its hands. While in Tashkent, Pompeo announced a $1 million initiative to increase cross border trade between Uzbekistan and Afghanistan.

Uzbekistan poses the most significant peril to the U.S. vision as it vacillates over whether or not it intends to join the Moscow-dominated Eurasian Economic Union trade bloc. Washington is adamantly opposed to any such move.

Tashkent has made repeated noises about accession, although President Shavkat Mirziyoyev kicked the whole question into the mid-height grass last month by announcing at this state-of-the-union address that Uzbekistan’s relations with the EAEU are still being reviewed.

“Parliament and the government must study the issue of cooperation between Uzbekistan and the EAEU and present its conclusions, providing reasoning for its position,” he said.

Pompeo’s visit to Tashkent produced familiar-sounding bromides about bilateral cooperation becoming “systematic and regular” and reaching the “peak of their development,” as Uzbek Foreign Minister Abdulaziz Komilov put it.

If language is a metric though, Moscow may have the edge.

When Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov came visiting in mid-January, Uzbek officials spoke about an “unprecedented intensification of exchanges” and the “enhancement of multilayered cooperation, primarily in trade, economic, investment, energy, transport and communication, cultural and humanitarian, educational spheres.”

Kremlin-owned news website Sputnik cited Lavrov as saying Russia had to date invested $9 billion in the Uzbek economy (but provided no timeframe) and that over 1,700 companies operate in Uzbekistan with Russian capital.

The future of U.S.-Uzbek ties hinge on the extent to which President Donald Trump’s grand promises, made while Mirziyoyev was visiting Washington in May 2018, come to pass.

Trump spoke at the time about how Uzbekistan had “signed over 20 major business deals with United States companies, which, if fully implemented, will be worth more than $4.8 billion and could sustain more than 10,000 U.S. jobs and open opportunities for billions of dollars in future U.S. contracts.”

It is for this reason that the rate of progress in Uzbekistan’s political reforms are seen as so crucial. Pompeo made that link explicitly in his comments at a joint press event with Komilov.

“Uzbekistan’s reform agenda … has already started to generate new foreign investments and jobs,” Pompeo said on February 3. “We discussed ways, too, to further improve the business climate, strengthen the rule of law, and provide sustainable economic opportunities for all citizens all across Uzbekistan. We want private investment, American private investment sector, to flow between our two nations.”

Just how high the Trump administration intends to hold its standards bar is another matter.

Tashkent is in a tight position. Russia will chivvy it relentlessly on the EAEU front. Resisting those overtures will be difficult unless warming relations with the United States deliver firm results soon.

The wider C5+1 agenda could as easily be derailed by Washington’s clumsy failure to coordinate policy.

In a woeful piece of timing, the Trump administration announced last week that it was including Kyrgyzstan among six nations targeted by a travel ban that will block prospective immigrants from receiving visas. The U.S. Embassy in Bishkek explained that the restriction was imposed on the countries over concerns at “deficiencies in the security of their travel documents following an extensive review.”

“These deficiencies include the lack of an electronic biometric passport, failure to report lost and stolen passports, and inadequate information sharing on suspected terrorists,” the embassy’s statement said.

This has gone down poorly in Kyrgyzstan, whose foreign ministry has decried the move as wholly unjustified and warned of the “notable damage” to Kyrgyz-American relations.

This article has been republished with permission from Eurasianet.


U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and Kazakh Foreign Minister Mukhtar Tileuberdi in Nur-Sultan, Kazakhstan on February 2, 2020 (State Department photo via Flickr)
Analysis | Washington Politics
Trump and Keith Kellogg
Top photo credit: U.S. President Donald Trump and Keith Kellogg (now Trump's Ukraine envoy) in 2017. REUTERS/Kevin Lamarque TPX IMAGES OF THE DAY

Trump's silence on loss of Ukraine lithium territory speaks volumes

Europe

Last week, Russian military forces seized a valuable lithium field in the Donetsk region of Ukraine, the latest success of Moscow’s grinding summer offensive.

The lithium deposit in question is considered rather small by industry analysts, but is said to be a desirable prize nonetheless due to the concentration and high-quality of its ore. In other words, it is just the kind of asset that the Trump administration seemed eager to exploit when it signed its much heralded minerals agreement with Ukraine earlier this year.

keep readingShow less
Is the US now funding the bloodbath at Gaza aid centers?
Top photo credit: Palestinians walk to collect aid supplies from the U.S.-backed Gaza Humanitarian Foundation, in Khan Younis, in the southern Gaza Strip, May 29, 2025. REUTERS/Hatem Khaled/File Photo

Is the US now funding the bloodbath at Gaza aid centers?

Middle East

Many human rights organizations say it should shut down. The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) have killed hundreds of Palestinians at or around its aid centers. And yet, the U.S. has committed no less than $30 million toward the controversial, Israel-backed Gaza Humanitarian Foundation (GHF).

As famine-like conditions grip Gaza, the GHF says it has given over 50 million meals to Palestinians at its four aid centers in central and southern Gaza Strip since late May. These centers are operated by armed U.S. private contractors, and secured by IDF forces present at or near them.

keep readingShow less
mali
Heads of state of Mali, Assimi Goita, Niger, General Abdourahamane Tiani and Burkina Faso, Captain Ibrahim Traore, pose for photographs during the first ordinary summit of heads of state and governments of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) in Niamey, Niger July 6, 2024. REUTERS/Mahamadou Hamidou//File Photo

Post-coup juntas across the Sahel face serious crises

Africa

In Mali, General Assimi Goïta, who took power in a 2020 coup, now plans to remain in power through at least the end of this decade, as do his counterparts in neighboring Burkina Faso and Niger. As long-ruling juntas consolidate power in national capitals, much of the Sahelian terrain remains out of government control.

Recent attacks on government security forces in Djibo (Burkina Faso), Timbuktu (Mali), and Eknewane (Niger) have all underscored the depth of the insecurity. The Sahelian governments face a powerful threat from jihadist forces in two organizations, Jama‘at Nusrat al-Islam wa-l-Muslimin (the Group for Supporting Islam and Muslims, JNIM, which is part of al-Qaida) and the Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP). The Sahelian governments also face conventional rebel challengers and interact, sometimes in cooperation and sometimes in tension, with various vigilantes and community-based armed groups.

keep readingShow less

LATEST

QIOSK

Newsletter

Subscribe now to our weekly round-up and don't miss a beat with your favorite RS contributors and reporters, as well as staff analysis, opinion, and news promoting a positive, non-partisan vision of U.S. foreign policy.