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‘Imminent Threat’? Trump Killed Soleimani Because Iran is Perceived as Weak

Would Trump ever assassinate a Chinese military leader?

Analysis | Middle East
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Qassem Soleimani, affectionately called Haj Qassem in Iran, is dead. The touted Middle Eastern superstar has been made no more. And, so far, beyond the initial shock, we are only left with numerous commentaries about the potential impact of his assassination. Soleimani will be smiling in his soon grave-to-be in his hometown of Kerman. The general who had reportedly already willed his resting place to be in the martyrs’ cemetery with his name mentioned without his military titles, only as soldier, has been made even more of a superstar in death than life. To be sure, Trumpists say his assassination was long overdue, and deterrence against checking Iran’s malign regional behavior has been established. Some really optimistic souls even go as far as saying that the killing of Tehran’s “uber-terrorist” may put “another potential carrot on the bargaining table beside the eventual lifting of economic sanctions — namely, a commitment from the United States not to use military force to threaten other top leaders or the regime’s survival itself.”

But there are even more commentaries that — while making sure to always point out that Soleimani “had blood on his hands” (as though other on the ground military leaders don’t) — are worried, and say the decision was not wise and will lead to further escalation to another undesired and unnecessary war. Meanwhile, Tehran has vowed revenge, but so far various Iranian politicians and military folks seem to be relishing the thought of keeping everyone in anticipation while prodding the President of the United States into making even more bellicose statements that smugly suggest potential war crimes.

Despite the rush to comment, though, it is difficult to say anything beyond speculative regarding implications and consequences. The only thing we know for sure is that U.S. foreign and security policy in the Middle East has been replete with unintended consequences. We also know for sure that a military officer respected and liked by the majority, not all, of his countrymen and women was assassinated by the order of an impeached politician who is despised at least by half, if not more, of his countrymen and women for his vulgarity, America-first bravado, and cruelty; even if few who loath him are willing to go as far as saying that he, like previous U.S. presidents who have ordered killings abroad, also has blood on his hands.

What is left out in the conversation regarding whether Trump was strategic or not, wise or dumb, are the circumstances that made him order what he did with an arrogance that comes with power. So, let me hazard a guess in this regard.

Despite all the grandiose claims and accusations about Tehran’s power, aspirations, and malign conduct in the region, it is its perceived weakness that made the assassination thinkable. If the Islamic Republic of Iran was considered a “normal” adversary (to borrow one of Mike Pompeo’s favorite idioms), the United States would not even think about killing one of its prominent generals in broad daylight and take responsibility for it. Come to think of it, Washington would not even entertain the possibility of putting its military, with which it had cooperated in Afghanistan in early 2000s and then just a couple of years ago in Iraq, on the terrorist list. It would not pursue a policy of “maximum pressure” to bring the country’s leadership to its knees by economically pressuring its population.

I am not making a judgement about whether this presumption of weakness is wise or accurate. I am highlighting a reality. All the various policies that have been pursued by successive U.S. administrations, from dual containment to maximum pressure, with the exception of the decision to engage with Iran in nuclear talks, have been based on an understanding that Iran can be threatened, bullied, and cowed because, well, it can be. To be sure, justifications abound otherwise, namely that the Islamic Republic of Iran is uniquely run by a murderous bunch of thugs as though it is particularly abnormal in this regard; it is a threat, now apparently imminent; it has hegemonic aspirations, and so on.

Nuclear talks were the only recent instance that this presumption was temporarily set aside. It was grudgingly done and accepted. And, now the disdain that is directed at President Obama’s supposed “appeasing" of Iran is a scorn directed at a leader of a powerful — self-declared “exceptional” — country who was not sufficiently strong enough to understand that weaklings should be only man-handled and not placated lest they become even more of a burden and/or uppity.

Tehran is caught is a difficult situation. If it does not respond to Soleimani’s assassination in ways that hurts, it will have confirmed the presumption of weakness. And, if it does, it may further stir an adversary that believes only arrogant power and brute force counts.


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Analysis | Middle East
Dan Caine
Top photo credit: Secretary of War Pete Hegseth and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff U.S. Air Force Gen. Dan Caine conduct a press briefing on Operation Epic Fury at the Pentagon, Washington, D.C., March 4, 2026. (DoW photo by U.S. Navy Petty Officer 1st Class Alexander Kubitza)

Did Caine just announce the Morgenthau option for Iran?

QiOSK

Gen. Dan Caine’s formulation of American war aims in Iran is remarkable not because it is bellicose, but because it is strategically incoherent.

In a press conference Tuesday morning, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not describe a limited campaign to suppress missile fire, blunt Iran’s naval threat, or even impose a severe but bounded setback on Tehran’s coercive instruments. He described a campaign against Iran’s “military and industrial base” designed to prevent the regime from attacking Americans, U.S. interests, and regional partners “for years to come.” In an earlier briefing he put the objective similarly: to prevent Iran from projecting power outside its borders. Rather than the language of a discrete coercive operation, this describes a war against a state’s capacity to regenerate power.

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Mbs-mbz-scaled
UAE President Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed al-Nahyan receives Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman at the Presidential Airport in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates November 27, 2019. WAM/Handout via REUTERS

Is the US goading Arab states to join war against Iran?

QiOSK

On Sunday, U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Mike Waltz told ABC News that Arab Gulf states may soon step up their involvement in the U.S.-Israeli war on Iran. “I expect that you'll see additional diplomatic and possibly military action from them in the coming days and weeks,” Waltz said.

Then, on Monday morning, Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.) slammed Saudi Arabia for staying out of the war even as “Americans are dying and the U.S. is spending billions” of dollars to conduct regime change in Iran. “If you are not willing to use your military now, when are you willing to use it?” Graham asked. “Hopefully this changes soon. If not, consequences will follow.”

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Why Tehran may have time on its side
Top image credit: Iranian army military personnel stand at attention under a banner featuring an image of an Iranian-made unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) during a military parade commemorating the anniversary of Army Day outside the Shrine of Iran's late leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in the south of Tehran, Iran, on April 18, 2025. (Photo by Morteza Nikoubazl/NurPhoto)

Why Tehran may have time on its side

QiOSK

A provocative calculus by Anusar Farrouqui (“policytensor”) has been circulating on X and in more exhaustive form on the author’s Substack. It purports to demonstrate a sobering reality: in a high-intensity U.S.-Iran conflict, the United States may be unable to suppress Iranian drone production quickly enough to prevent a strategically consequential period of regional devastation.

The argument is framed through a quantitative lens, carrying the seductive appeal of mathematical precision. It arranges variables—such as U.S. sortie rates and degradation efficiency against Iranian repair cycles and rebuild speeds—to suggest a "sustainable firing rate." The implication is that Iran could maintain a persistent strike capability long enough to exhaust American political patience, forcing Washington toward a premature declaration of success or an unfavorable ceasefire.

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