The United States and North Korea stand once again at the precipice of a renewed military escalation. Frustrated by the Trump administration’s negotiation tactics, Kim Jong Un has threatened the United States with a “Christmas gift.” Any escalation between Washington and Pyongyang can spiral into a devastating war between two nuclear-armed countries. In response to this threat, President Trump has hinted at the use of military force against North Korea, stating that “If we have to [use our military], we will do it.” By imposing unrealistic demands, arbitrary timelines, and openly antagonizing one another, leaders in Washington and Pyongyang are returning to the same playbook of hostility and aggression — except now there is a real possibility for an escalation in the next eight days.We are at this point primarily because the Trump administration refused to be specific about what it was willing to offer Kim. To address this problem, the Trump administration should provide a proposal with three specific elements to compel Pyongyang to cancel its “Christmas gift” and return to the negotiating table. Contrary to conventional thinking in Washington, issuing more threats will not compel Pyongyang to recommit itself to diplomacy. Rather, what is needed is clarity regarding the positive inducements Washington is willing to offer. North Korea needs to know what we are asking them to say yes to.Specifically, the U.S. should offer partial sanctions relief, declare the end of the Korean War, and offer to open a liaison office in Pyongyang in exchange for concrete steps by North Korea to suspend all weapons-related nuclear activities over a period of 12 months.Urgent Need for Concrete ActionAn escalation of tension between Washington and Pyongyang could trigger a nuclear war that would kill millions, unleashing generations of environmental and horrific health issues at a scale unseen since Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Even without using nuclear weapons, an estimated 250,000 people would die in Seoul alone from a mix of conventional artillery and chemical weapons unleashed by North Korea. The 28,500 Americans who are stationed in South Korea and 50,000 in Japan would immediately be at the frontlines of any military conflict.North Korea also possesses nuclear weapons that can now reach the mainland United States, potentially placing 300 million Americans’ lives at risk. In 2018, the U.N. Command, Combined Forces Command, and the U.S. Forces Korea confirmed that Pyongyang has successfully developed an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) that can reach the entire continental United States as well as a thermonuclear device miniaturized to fit onto an ICBM, elevating North Korea from a regional challenge to a direct threat to the U.S..Despite these costs, there are some in Washington who advocate for more escalation. For instance, the Foundation for Defense of Democracies called for a campaign of “maximum pressure 2.0” against North Korea in a recent report, which is the same strategy that led us to the current stalemate. If what we seek is a different outcome, why repeat the same mistakes?A 12-Month DealA short-term deal is urgently needed to jumpstart diplomacy between Washington and Pyongyang. Fortunately, the willingness to make a deal is already there. For example, Kim Jong Un has publicly agreed to “work toward complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” and pledged “permanent dismantlement” of nuclear facilities in Yongbyon in exchange for “United States tak[ing] corresponding measures.” North Korea and the United States also agreed to build a “peace regime” by formally ending the Korean War and discussed exchanging liaison offices to open channels of communication. But North Korea has since stepped away from these commitments because of a lack of clarity on what exactly the United States is offering in exchange for its cooperation on denuclearization.Below are three concrete steps that the United States can offer North Korea in exchange for suspending all weapons-related nuclear activities for 12 months:1. Partial sanctions relief North Korea is one of the most sanctioned countries in the world. There are nearly a dozen U.N. Security Council resolutions preventing the country from buying arms, natural gas, coal, minerals, textiles, seafood, and certain luxury goods. In addition, the U.S. has a set of unilateral sanctions and executive orders against North Korea as well. During the first year of his presidency, Trump imposed financial sanctions on North Korea and added sanctions targeting its “construction, energy, financial services, fishing, information technology, manufacturing, medical, mining, textiles, and transportation industries.” To jumpstart diplomacy, the United States should put on hold sanctions against non-military goods for a 12-month period, with automatic snap-back measure if North Korea does not hold its end of the bargain. The U.S. financial sanctions against North Korea have had severe consequences for humanitarian activities with North Korea, cutting off access to capital for international aid organizations. A suspension of sanctions on items that do not directly contribute to the nuclear or missile program would help ordinary North Koreans while retaining pressure that prohibits illicit activities by the North Korean government.2. Declare an end of the Korean WarNorth Korea and the United States have technically been at war with each other since 1950. Though the fighting ended in 1953 -— after some five million soldiers and civilians were killed — the two countries never reached a formal peace agreement. They only signed a Military Armistice Agreement to “insure a complete cessation of hostilities and of all acts of armed force in Korea until a final peaceful settlement is achieved.” The absence of a formal end to the war has fueled North Korea’s insecurities and desire for a nuclear deterrence against the United States. To chart a new path toward peace, President Trump should state that the United States is no longer engaged in a war with North Korea and that it is willing to take steps to formalize a peaceful bilateral relationship. Ending the war would address Pyongyang’s perennial insecurities against external threats that has driven it to embrace weapons of mass destruction in the first place. It would also show that the United States is serious about transforming bilateral relations.Insisting that no such declaration can be made until Pyongyang fully denuclearized and ends its chemical and biological programs has proven futile and counter-productive. Washington cannot expect to achieve its end-goal at the outset of a diplomatic process. This step already enjoys support among members of Congress, thanks to years of grassroots advocacy by constituents, nuclear experts, veterans, and advocacy groups who have called for a nonmilitary solution to North Korea’s nuclear threat. H.Res.152, which currently has more than 40 cosponsors, expresses congressional support for a statement from President Trump to end the Korean War and calls on the President to create a roadmap for achieving permanent peace in the Korean Peninsula. 3. Open liaison offices in Washington and Pyongyang. Last June, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo stated that the U.S. “ wants to achieve a fundamentally different strategic relationship with our two countries.” Indeed, the Korean War framework that has defined U.S.-North Korea relationship for nearly 70 years is obsolete and restricts the ability of both countries to build trust. Absence of state-to-state relations handicaps Washington and Pyongyang’s ability to identify common interests and potential areas of cooperation. People-to-people exchanges at the governmental and nongovernmental levels would increase room for mutual understanding, remove cultural barriers, and overcome geographic distance.Liaison offices provide a mechanism by which more frequent interactions and discussions can take place, which increases the prospects for progress. As noted North Korea expert Suzanne DiMaggio stated, “We need vigorous diplomacy to test [Kim Jong Un’s] intentions, shape an outcome toward a less contentious relationship and make progress toward disarmament and denuclearization.” In exchange for these steps, North Korea should begin dismantling some of its nuclear facilities in Yongbyon within the next 12 months. It should also come forward with proposals to “establish new U.S.–DPRK relations in accordance with the desire of the peoples of the two countries for peace and prosperity” as agreed to at the Singapore Summit.
Two years ago, a mistakenly-sent emergency alert about an incoming ballistic missile attack to Hawaii received national media attention and captured the public’s imagination about the horrors of a potential war with North Korea. It is no wonder that Americans support diplomacy, not war. Last summer, a poll commissioned by RealClearPolitics and the Charles Koch Institute showed that 70 percent of Americans supported President Trump’s diplomacy with North Korea. Less than ten days after the Singapore Summit in June 2018, President Trump announced that North Korea has begun “total denuclearization" without providing any detail on what that actually means in practice. Maximum ambiguity has brought the United States to the path of minimal gain. What we need now is maximum clarity backed by concrete actions.By laying out in specific terms what the United States is willing to offer, President Trump and Chairman Kim can defy the 70 years of inertia and begin in earnest the process of achieving peace.
UPDATE: Watch Jessica Lee discuss these issues here.
Jessica J. Lee was formerly senior research fellow on East Asia at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft. She is an expert in U.S. foreign policy toward East Asia, legislative affairs, and transpartisan coalition-building.Jessica’s analysis has been featured in The Wall Street Journal, Washington Post, Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, The National Interest, USA Today, the Washington Times, The Nation, Arms Control Today, and Quincy Institute’s news platform Responsible Statecraft. She has testified before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission and co-authored several Quincy Briefs and Reports, including Toward an Inclusive & Balanced Regional Order: A New U.S. Strategy in East Asia, Beyond Deterrence: A Peace Game Exercise for the Korean Peninsula,, The Folly of Pushing South Korea Toward a China Containment Strategy, and Active Denial: A Roadmap to a More Effective, Stabilizing, and Sustainable U.S. Defense Strategy in Asia.Jessica is a non-resident senior associate fellow at the Asia Pacific Leadership Network, a term member of the Council on Foreign Relations, a member of National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, a member of the National Committee on North Korea, and a 2021-2022 Arms Control Negotiation Academy Fellow with the Negotiation Task Force at Harvard University. She serves on the board of the U.S. nonprofit exchange program between U.S. and East Asian college students called International Student Conferences.Previously, Jessica led the Council of Korean Americans, a national leadership organization for Americans of Korean descent. Prior to CKA, Jessica was a Resident Fellow at the Pacific Forum and a senior manager at The Asia Group, LLC. She began her career on Capitol Hill, where she served as a professional staff member handling the Asia region for the chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, and as a senior legislative assistant on international security and trade for a member of Congress on the Ways and Means Committee. Jessica holds a B.A. in Political Science from Wellesley College and an A.M. in Regional Studies-East Asia from Harvard University. She has advanced proficiency in Korean.
With no ceasefire in the war between Israel and Hamas in sight and Houthi forces in Yemen still firing missiles and drones at commercial shipping in the Red Sea, the EU’s efforts at addressing conflict in Gaza and its broader regional ramifications keep flailing.
After weeks of discussions, the EU officially launched its naval operation in the Red Sea on February 19 to protect international commercial shipping from Houthi attacks. The Houthis claim they wantto force a ceasefire in Gaza. Yet, while the ceasefire remains elusive, the attacks impose real costs on EU members: the EU commissioner for economy Paolo Gentiloni recently estimated that the rerouting of shipping from the Red Sea has increased delivery times for shipments between Asia and the EU by 10 to 15 days and the consequent costs by around 400%.
Around 40% of the EU’s total trade with the Middle East and Asia passes through the Red Sea.
Protecting that shipping route thus is an important collective economic and security interest for the EU. Yet only four countries — France, Germany, Italy and Belgium — out of the 27 member states have agreed to provide warships for the new operation. Spain, which refrained from using its veto power to block the initiative, nonetheless declined to participate, having expressed concerns from the outset that any armed operation would reduce pressure on Israel to agree to a ceasefire in Gaza.
A bigger question is how effective this new EU operation will be in countering the Houthi threat given its purely defensive mandate to provide “situational awareness, accompany vessels and protect them against possible attacks at sea.” Accordingly, the participating EU warships will be authorized to fire on Houthi targets only if they themselves or commercial vessels they are to protect are attacked. That rules out pre-emptive action against Houthi missile batteries or related targets.
The defensive nature of the operation, however, may not be enough to convince the Houthis to refrain from attacking the European ships. In fact, Houthi leaders warned Italy, one of the new operation’s chief promoters, that it will become “a target if it participates in attacks on the Houthis.”
If this threat comes to fruition, will the EU authorize offensive action against the Houthis, potentially drawing itself into a wider conflict? Will it rely on U.S. hard power for protection given that Washington is already engaged against the Houthis through “Operation Prosperity Guardian,” in which a few EU nations – Denmark, Netherlands and Greece, as well as non-EU NATO members Britain and Norway -- are also participating?
Would such developments not lead to a de facto merging of the U.S. and EU-led operations under Washington’s lead — an outcome Europeans sought to avoid and which is the very reason why they launched their own mission in the first place?
That these are not abstract questions is underscored by the failure, so far, of scores of U.S.- and UK-led strikes to degrade the Houthis’ capabilities to the point where they would no longer pose a significant threat. Indeed, just as the EU announced its mission, the Houthis hit a British cargo ship which was at risk of sinking in the Gulf of Aden in what the Yemeni rebels claimed was their biggest attack yet. The United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations confirmed the incident, though it did not name the ship.
Ironically, the safest way for the EU to avoid a direct military engagement with the Houthis, apart from testing their vow to stop attacking shipping if Israel ends its Gaza offensive, would be to reduce the number of targets in the Red Sea by encouraging ships to reroute. But such an outcome would, of course, vindicate the Houthi strategy to impose costs on the Western powers for the failure to stop the war in Gaza.
And that brings us back to the mother of all conflicts in the Middle East: the continuing war in Gaza. The EU’s approach so far has been to delink Gaza from the crisis in the Red Sea and the broader escalation in the region, including clashes between Israel and Lebanon’s Hezbollah. Yet mounting tensions on that front show that its approach is not working.
Some actors in the EU understand the urgent need for a ceasefire in Gaza as a necessary condition for regional de-escalation. The EU high representative on foreign policy Josep Borrell has been particularly vocal in his criticism of Israel. He suggested limiting arms sales to Tel Aviv on the grounds that such transfers violate EU guidelines that ban sales to countries accused of violations of the international humanitarian law.
A Dutch appeals court recently ordered a halt to exports of F-35 jet parts to Israel on the same grounds. However, it is highly unlikely that the EU as a whole would adopt such a position, given that a number of countries – especially Germany, Austria, Czech Republic, Hungary – strongly support Israel.
A stronger point of leverage could be to suspend fully or partially the association agreement between the EU and Israel. The EU is Israel’s largest trading partner. In 2023, that agreement enabled 46.8 billion euros worth of bilateral trade. The prime ministers of Spain and Ireland, Pedro Sanchez and Leo Varadkar, respectively, asked the president of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, to “urgently review” whether Israel is violating the human rights clauses included in that agreement. On February 19, the Spanish foreign minister, Jose Manuel Albares, insisted that the review should be completed in time for the next EU foreign ministers meeting on March 18.
A full suspension of the agreement seems very unlikely even if the Commission finds Israel to have violated its human rights obligations because that would call for a unanimous decision by all member states. A partial suspension would require a qualified majority: 55% of member states (or 15 out of 27) representing 65% of the EU’s total population.
Notably, the only precedent for taking such an action came in 2011 when the EU suspended an association agreement with Syria in response to mass violations of human rights by the Bashar al-Assad regime.
Meanwhile, the EU proved unable last week to issue even an official appeal to Israel not to follow through with its plans to carry out a ground invasion of Rafah, the southernmost city in Gaza, which has become the last refuge of nearly a million refugees from elsewhere in the enclave. In the face of a veto threat by Hungary, the other 26 member states instead issued a joint statement warning of the catastrophic humanitarian consequences should Israel move ahead with such an invasion.
Notably, however, Hungary was isolated in its opposition to the appeal as Germany and other member states that have traditionally been reluctant to criticize Israel’s conduct of war were on board. That is a step forward, but it’s too little and it comes too late. As long as the EU keeps avoiding imposing real consequences on Israel for its conduct, it will keep losing influence in the Middle East.
keep readingShow less
Mike Shoemaker VP F35 customer programs, FMS, Domestic and Partners talks during the inauguration ceremony of Sabca's new production hall for the horizontal tailplane of the F-35 fighter aircraft, in Lummen, Thursday 10 March 2022. T BELGA PHOTO JOHN THYS.
Instead of reevaluating its maximalist national security strategy, the Biden administration is doubling down. It is proposing a generation of investment to expand an arms industry that, overall, fails to meet cost, schedule, and performance standards. And if its strategy is any indication, the administration has no vision for how to eventually reduce U.S. military industrial capacity.
When the Cold War ended, the national security budget shrank. Then-Secretary of Defense Les Aspin and deputy William Perry convened industry leaders to encourage their consolidation in a meeting that later became known as the “Last Supper.” Arms makers were to join forces or go out of business. So they ended up downsizing from over 50 prime contractors to just five. And while contractors needed to pare down their industrial capacity, unchecked consolidation created the monopolistic defense sector we have now — one that depends heavily on government contracts and enjoys significant freedom to set prices.
In the decades since, contractors have leveraged their growing economic power to pave inroads on Capitol Hill. They have solidified their economic influence to stave off the political potential for future national security cuts, regardless of their performance or the geopolitical environment.
Growing the military industrial base over the course of a generation would only further empower arms makers in our economy, deepening the ditch the United States has dug itself into for decades by continually increasing national security spending — and by doling about half of it out to contractors. The U.S. spends more on national security than the next 10 countries combined, outpacing China alone by over 30%.
Ironically, the administration acknowledges in the strategy that “America’s economic security and national security are mutually reinforcing,” stating that “the nation’s military strength depends in part on our overall economic strength.” The strategy further states that optimizing the nation’s defense needs typically requires tradeoffs between “cost, speed, and scale.” It doesn’t mention quality of industrial output — arguably the biggest tradeoff the U.S. government has made in military procurement.
Consider, for instance, the B-2 bomber, the F-35 fighter jet, the Littoral Combat Ship, the V-22 Osprey, and many other examples of acquisition failures that have spanned decades. More recently, the Government Accountability Office has reported that while the number of major defense acquisition programs has fallen, both costs and average delivery time have risen.
So what is the military really getting from more and more national security spending? Less for more: Fewer weapons than it asked for, usually late and over budget, and, much of the time, dysfunctional. Acquisition failures are a major reason the Congressional Budget Office projects that operations and maintenance spending will significantly exceed the rate of inflation for the next decade — a considerable budgeting issue for a military that seemingly has no plans to reduce either its force structure or its industrial capacity. Quite the opposite, in fact.
Biden’s new National Defense Industrial Strategy specifically states there is a need for the U.S. to “move aggressively toward innovative, next-generation capabilities while continuing to upgrade and produce, in significant volumes, conventional weapons systems already in the force.” Ironically, the military has spent over two decades developing the F-35, next-generation technology that the Pentagon still hasn’t greenlit for full-rate production.
Throwing more money at an industrial base comprised of businesses too big to fail won’t increase the quantity or quality of its output. But that’s exactly what the strategy urges. One of the priorities is to “institutionalize supply chain resilience.” It’s an important goal, but one the administration proposes the Pentagon tackle, in part by investing in “spare production capacity,” what the strategy defines as “excess capacity a company or organization maintains beyond its current production needs.”
But building factories to sit empty is not supply chain resilience. It’s wasting money on unnecessary infrastructure, creating a profit motive for arms makers to make more weapons. And for an industry constantly sounding the alarm about the need for consistent “demand signals” from Congress, the Pentagon’s plans to invest a generation of U.S. taxpayer money in “spare production capacity” sounds a lot like throwing the demand-supply principle out the window. In that case, the U.S. might as well consider nationalizing the defense industry, which already lacks competition and relies almost entirely on the government. Why not eliminate the profit motive? It’s not like making money drives contractors to produce quality products on time or within budget.
Besides supply chain resilience, another priority laid out in this strategy is “flexible acquisition.” The stated goal is to reduce costs and development times while increasing scalability. In pursuit of that goal, the administration proposes “a flexible requirements process” for multiyear contracts, and the expansion of multiyear contracting writ large. It reasons that as priorities shift in an “evolving threat environment,” so too should contractors’ deliverables. But pairing flexible requirements with an increasing number of multiyear contracts is a recipe for disaster.
Before Russia attacked Ukraine, multiyear contracts were relatively rare — limited to major aircraft and ships. The Congressional Research Service notes that estimated savings on these programs have historically fallen within the range of 5% — 10%. But those are estimates, and they may not apply to other munitions now produced under multiyear contracts. The report also confirms that actual savings are “difficult to observe,” in part because the Pentagon does not track the cost performance of multiyear contracts.
Just because multiyear contracting is more common doesn’t mean it’s cheaper. And while the Pentagon argues that multiyear contracts give contractors the so-called demand signal they need to ramp up production, contractors don’t usually spend their extra money on identifying efficiencies or making capital investments to increase output at a lower cost — and the Pentagon isn’t checking.
The strategy also proposes “aggressive expansion of production capacity.” It notes that during peacetime, weapons acquisition tends to focus on “greater efficiency, cost effectiveness, transparency, and accountability.” Taking caution not to assert that the United States is in wartime, the strategy contrasts peacetime acquisition policy with “today’s threat environment,” calling for “crisis period acquisition policy” that revitalizes the industrial base and shifts focus from efficiency and effectiveness to ensuring that military contractors are “better resourced.” But contractors don’t have a resource problem, and “crisis acquisition policy” puts the United States on a “permanent war footing.”
Lawmakers must challenge the administration’s maximalist national security strategy by interrogating its push to expand military industrial capacity so drastically. It’s critical that they do, not only because the U.S. is limited in what it can produce and provide to other countries but also because arms industry greed is boundless — and without off-ramps or constraints, the U.S. government may find in 20 or 30 years that it’s in a ditch it can’t get out of.
keep readingShow less
Israeli soldiers operate next to the UNRWA headquarters, amid the ongoing conflict between Israel and the Palestinian Islamist group Hamas, in the Gaza Strip, February 8, 2024. REUTERS/Dylan Martinez
The U.S. intelligence community has found Israel’s claims that employees of a U.N. aid agency took part in Hamas’s Oct. 7 attack to be plausible, but it cannot conclude more definitively because it has not been able to independently verify the charges, according to new reporting from the Wall Street Journal.
The Israeli government charged last month that 12 staffers at the United Nations Relief Works Agency (UNRWA) — which facilitates humanitarian aid to Palestinains throughout the region — either participated or assisted in the Hamas-led atrocities and that others have close ties to the terror group.
UNRWA fired the 12 employees and donor counties, including the United States, have since paused funding, moves that have increasingly become more controversial as the Israeli government has yet to provide clear evidence for its claims. The agency says it will soon run out of money amid the humanitarian crisis in Gaza.
According to the Journal, the U.S.’s National Intelligence Council assessed with “low confidence” that a small group of UNRWA staffers participated in the attack. The intel assessment, the Journal reports, “doesn’t dispute Israel’s allegations of links between some staff at Unrwa and militant groups” and that, according to U.S. officials, “Israel hadn’t shared the raw intelligence behind its assessments with the U.S., limiting their ability to reach clearer conclusions.”
"This assessment casts further significant doubt on the veracity of Israel's claims against UNRWA, which remain allegations without confirmed substantiating evidence,” Chris Gunness, a former UNRWA spokesman and now Director of the Myanmar Accountability Project, told RS. "If Israel has allegations against UNRWA, it should hand them over to the internal and external investigations currently underway: one by the U.N.'s Office of Internal Oversight and the other headed by a former French minister. Only when the information has been authoritatively assessed should anyone draw conclusions.”
For years, factions on the right in Israel, along with their supporters in the United States, have been working to close down UNRWA with the apparent belief that the U.N. agency lends credibility to Palestinians' assertions of ownership over land Palestinians argue was taken by Israel. UNRWA also regularly submits a roster containing the names of its staff to the Israeli government, which in turn signs off.
“Those donors who based their decisions to defund UNRWA on unconfirmed information should restore funding and only take a decision when they have a proper understanding of what took place,” Gunness added.