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Zelensky's bombs and blurred lines in a big battleground state

Zelensky's bombs and blurred lines in a big battleground state

The Ukraine leader's stop in a PA ammo factory came awfully close to looking like a campaign stop for others

Analysis | QiOSK
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Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s trip to Pennsylvania on the eve of the U.N. General Assembly elicited a medley of reactions straddling the ideological spectrum.

The commentary, which encompasses everything from ebullient praise to pointed criticism, is entangled with a number of broader phenomena: namely, Kyiv’s continued prosecution of the war in the face of what even its most ardent allies acknowledge to be harsh battlefield realities, Zelensky’s increasingly beleaguered political position at home and abroad, the U.S. presidential election, and state politics. It is no surprise, given these disparate strands of inquiry, that Zelensky’s trip has become something of a rorschach test for how Americans view U.S. involvement in the Ukraine war.

Yet it is possible to rescue something approaching a lucid assessment from this muddled affair. It starts, as all dispassionate inquiries should, with a precis of the basic facts of the matter. Kyiv, as everyone up to and including President Zelensky acknowledges, overwhelmingly relies on U.S. military, financial, and diplomatic support to sustain its war effort. The Biden administration not only committed itself to the indefinite provision of this support but Vice President Kamala Harris has made a campaign issue out of it, casting former President Donald Trump’s desire to bring the war to a negotiated conclusion as a form of surrender to Vladimir Putin presaging Russia’s subsequent invasion of countries on NATO’s eastern flank.

These effusions have seeped into battleground state politics, with Harris warning Polish-Americans in Pennsylvania that deviation from the current Western approach to Ukraine invites a Russian assault on Poland. It is in this politically-tinged context that Pennsylvania’s Democratic governor, Josh Shapiro, as well as Sen. Bob Casey (D-Pa.) and Rep. Matt Cartwright (D-Pa.) — both of them running for re-election — met with Zelensky and Ukraine’s ambassador to the U.S. Oksana Markarova at the Scranton Army Ammunition Plant six weeks out from the election, proclaiming support for the administration’s Ukraine policy as Shapiro autographed freshly-produced artillery shells to warm applause.

Let us recapitulate. A foreign head of state who relies on and is actively courting continued American support to sustain his nation’s war effort was flown out on a military transport aircraft to a Scranton munitions plant that at least partially benefits from continuation of military aid to Ukraine, located in a crucial battleground state, to meet with the governor and local politicians running for reelection.

Under any circumstances, this kind of collaboration between foreign leaders, the federal government, and state politicians blurs the lines of domestic politics and foreign policy in a way that should make Americans uncomfortable regardless of the specificities surrounding the Ukraine conflict. It is especially concerning when this collaboration is officiated in the final inning of an election season where Ukraine is one of the issues being presented to voters as a potential source of contrast between the two campaigns, with Zelensky simultaneously echoing Harris campaign messaging in denouncing GOP vice presidential candidate J.D. Vance’s views on how to end the war as too “radical” and ignorant of history.

Any sort of creeping balkanization of Ukraine policy along partisan lines is not only obviously detrimental to U.S. security interests, but, in the long run, also hurts Kyiv by subjecting it, even by its leaders’ own volition, to the vicissitudes of domestic politics.


Ukraine's President Volodymyr Zelenskiy visits the Scranton Army Ammunition Plant in Scranton, Pennsylvania, U.S., September 22, 2024. ( REUTERS)

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Analysis | QiOSK
Dan Caine
Top photo credit: Secretary of War Pete Hegseth and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff U.S. Air Force Gen. Dan Caine conduct a press briefing on Operation Epic Fury at the Pentagon, Washington, D.C., March 4, 2026. (DoW photo by U.S. Navy Petty Officer 1st Class Alexander Kubitza)

Did Caine just announce the Morgenthau option for Iran?

QiOSK

Gen. Dan Caine’s formulation of American war aims in Iran is remarkable not because it is bellicose, but because it is strategically incoherent.

In a press conference Tuesday morning, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not describe a limited campaign to suppress missile fire, blunt Iran’s naval threat, or even impose a severe but bounded setback on Tehran’s coercive instruments. He described a campaign against Iran’s “military and industrial base” designed to prevent the regime from attacking Americans, U.S. interests, and regional partners “for years to come.” In an earlier briefing he put the objective similarly: to prevent Iran from projecting power outside its borders. Rather than the language of a discrete coercive operation, this describes a war against a state’s capacity to regenerate power.

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Mbs-mbz-scaled
UAE President Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed al-Nahyan receives Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman at the Presidential Airport in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates November 27, 2019. WAM/Handout via REUTERS

Is the US goading Arab states to join war against Iran?

QiOSK

On Sunday, U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Mike Waltz told ABC News that Arab Gulf states may soon step up their involvement in the U.S.-Israeli war on Iran. “I expect that you'll see additional diplomatic and possibly military action from them in the coming days and weeks,” Waltz said.

Then, on Monday morning, Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.) slammed Saudi Arabia for staying out of the war even as “Americans are dying and the U.S. is spending billions” of dollars to conduct regime change in Iran. “If you are not willing to use your military now, when are you willing to use it?” Graham asked. “Hopefully this changes soon. If not, consequences will follow.”

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Why Tehran may have time on its side
Top image credit: Iranian army military personnel stand at attention under a banner featuring an image of an Iranian-made unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) during a military parade commemorating the anniversary of Army Day outside the Shrine of Iran's late leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in the south of Tehran, Iran, on April 18, 2025. (Photo by Morteza Nikoubazl/NurPhoto)

Why Tehran may have time on its side

QiOSK

A provocative calculus by Anusar Farrouqui (“policytensor”) has been circulating on X and in more exhaustive form on the author’s Substack. It purports to demonstrate a sobering reality: in a high-intensity U.S.-Iran conflict, the United States may be unable to suppress Iranian drone production quickly enough to prevent a strategically consequential period of regional devastation.

The argument is framed through a quantitative lens, carrying the seductive appeal of mathematical precision. It arranges variables—such as U.S. sortie rates and degradation efficiency against Iranian repair cycles and rebuild speeds—to suggest a "sustainable firing rate." The implication is that Iran could maintain a persistent strike capability long enough to exhaust American political patience, forcing Washington toward a premature declaration of success or an unfavorable ceasefire.

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