Conditions have been getting so bad for the approximately 1,100 U.S. military personnel stationed in Niger right now that one member of the Air Force decided to write Congress.
In a letter reported by the Washington Post Wednesday night, a whistleblower complained to Congress that the U.S. Embassy in Niger, particularly Ambassador Kathleen FitzGibbon and Air Force Col. Nora J. Nelson-Richter, the defense attaché posted there, was putting troops at risk by ignoring the military junta's March demands that the military leave and insisting that a diplomatic resolution was "being worked."
The junta overthrew the president Mohamed Bazoum in July 2023 in a coup and by all accounts is still holding him and his family in the basement of the presidential palace. After a reportedly disastrous meeting between U.S. officials and Niger last month, the junta said it wanted the U.S. military footprint gone from Niger, drone base and all. Since that base is so important to the military, especially at a time when things in the Middle East are rupturing and Great and Middle Power Politics is swirling around the Sahel and North African region, Washington is doing whatever to takes to stay put.
This includes putting the troops there at risk, says the whistleblower, who claims the embassy's actions, which included suppressing intelligence to maintain the facade that diplomatic efforts were progressing, have “potential implications” for U.S. relations with other African nations “and the safety of our personnel in the region.” Importantly, the whistleblower said the junta was not approving any more visas for U.S. military members, which would include replacements for those who were supposed to go home in April after a six month mission. The full letter, published last night:
Both the State Department and Defense Department have rejected the whistleblower's claims, but the their charges are sure to inflame those on Capitol Hill who have been calling for a withdrawal of the U.S. military presence all along.
“We have Army soldiers right now in Niger who aren’t getting their troop rotations, who aren’t getting their medicine, who aren’t getting their supplies, who aren’t getting their mail and the two senior people in the United States Army are sitting before me and it’s like ‘hear no evil, see no evil, speak no evil,’” Rep.Matt Gaetz (R-Fla,) said in a hearing with U.S. Army officers on Tuesday. He said he has talked to a half a dozen service members directly about the conditions there right now.
The whistleblower complaints were reported the same day U.S. officials were meeting with the Nigerien prime minister, with follow-on discussions expected next week on the status of U.S.-Niger relations — talks that the Washington Post says "have appeared to make little headway.
Top photo credit: 2025-04-01 Vilnius Lithuania. People with flowers, candles and USA flags pay their last respect for four US Army soldiers who died in an M88 Hercules vehicle accident in Pabrade training area, near US Embassy in Vilnius on Tuesday 1 of April 2025. (BNS/Scanpix via Reuters Connect)
Last week, four young U.S. soldiers tragically died in a training exercise in Lithuania, highlighting the inherent risks faced by American forces stationed across Europe. With about 100,000 troops in the region, experts question the strategic value of America’s military presence — while President Trump says he wants a 20,000-troop reduction and European leaders urge an increase in U.S. support.
Following a week of searching, all of the bodies of missing U.S. soldiers were found in Lithuania. The soldiers’identities have been released: Sgt. Jose Duenez Jr., 25, of Joliet, Illinois; Sgt. Edvin F. Franco, 25, of Glendale, California; Pfc. Dante D. Taitano, 21, of Dededo, Guam, and Staff Sgt. Troy S. Knutson-Collins, 28, of Battle Creek, Mich.
The men were operating an armored Hercules vehicle as part of a training operation and were reported as missing on Tuesday March 25, followed by an extensive search. Their bodies, as well as the vehicle, were located in a bog in the town of Pabradė, which is around 6 miles from the Belarusian border.
While incidents like this in Europe aren’t common, it wasn’t the first time American servicemembers perished in Europe outside of combat. Four Americans were killed during the infamous 1988 Ramstein Air Show when an aircraft fell out of the sky and crashed into a crowd of servicemembers and civilian onlookers. Six American military flight crew members were killed in Croatia in 1996 when the pilots of a Boeing CT-43 carrying civilians and government officials crashed into a mountain close to the Dubrovnik airport.
Today the United States has roughly 84,000 active duty troops stationed in Europe. President Biden sent 20,000 troops there following Putin’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, saying, “In Poland, we're going to establish a permanent headquarters of the U.S. 5th Army Corps and strengthen NATO interoperability across the entire eastern flank.” The International Institute for Strategic Studies estimates that around 39,000 American forces are in Germany, 14,000 in Poland, 13,000 in Italy, and 10,000 in the United Kingdom. Lithuania hosts a rotating force of around 1,000 American soldiers.
Additionally, Washington has over 40 military bases in Europe, with Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom hosting the most installations. Most of the bases are jointly operated with NATO partners.
President Trump has expressed frustration with the uneven security relationship between the United States and its European partners. While he has suggested withdrawing troops from Europe he has disregarded the idea of withdrawing all of them, saying, “I don’t think we’d have to do that. I wouldn’t want to do that.”
Trump did remove around 12,000 American soldiers from Germany in 2020, but almost half moved to other NATO countries rather than returning home. Nevertheless, some European leaders believe Biden’s 20,000 troops surge from 2022 will eventually return to the United States. A NATO diplomat said, “I would not be surprised if at some point [those troops] go back to their home base in America, the forces were sent at a height of emergency planning, so if they leave it would be, so to speak, a return to normalcy.”
During NATO meetings in Brussels on Thursday, Secretary of State Marco Rubio assured NATO allies that “President Trump has made clear he supports NATO. We’re going to remain in NATO.” However, he explained that the Trump administration would still advocate for NATO members to increase their defense spending.
While European leaders have called for the U.S. to provide military security guarantees to Ukraine, some experts applaud attempts to push Europeans to fund their own defense.
“It is in Washington’s interest to facilitate a European takeover of NATO,” said the Cato Institute’s Doug Bandow. “They (Europeans) have an inherent right to self-defense. But a friendly push enhanced by helpful advice and practical experience could accelerate the end of European defense dependence, a process that some predict could otherwise take a decade.”
The U.S. Army said in a press release that this “this is a tragic event, but it reinforces what it means to have Allies and friends.” It also reinforces that that our troop deployments put real lives at risk and there is no shame in asking if the tens of thousands of young American men and women we are sending there are strategically necessary.
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Top Photo: Committee Chairman U.S. Sen. Bernie Sanders (I-VT) speaks during a Senate Health, Education, Labor and Pensions Committee hearing on Julie Su's nomination to be Labor Secretary, on Capitol Hill in Washington, U.S., April 20, 2023. REUTERS/Amanda Andrade-Rhoades
Committee Chairman U.S. Sen. Bernie Sanders (I-VT) speaks during a Senate Health, Education, Labor and Pensions Committee hearing on Julie Su's nomination to be Labor Secretary, on Capitol Hill in Washington, U.S., April 20, 2023. REUTERS/Amanda Andrade-Rhoades
The Senate on Thursday smacked down two measures sponsored by Sen. Bernie Sanders (I-Vt.) that were intended to block the sale of some offensive weapons to Israel.
The first, a resolution to end the sale of certain bomb components and warheads, S.J. Res. 33, had 15 votes in favor and 82 against. The second, a resolution to end the sale of Joint Direct Attack Munitions and some guidance kits, S.J. Res. 26, failed 15 - 83. All votes in favor were from Democrats.
His previous attempt at passing joint resolutions of disapproval for the sale of weapons to Israel in November 2024 also failed. Last time, he brought three JRDs forward, and they garnered slightly more support. A resolution to block the sale of some tank rounds received 21 votes in favor, and resolutions to block mortar rounds and guided Joint Direct Attack Munitions received 22 and 20 aye votes, respectively.
Israel’s war on Gaza has killed more than 50,000 Palestinians, with over 112,000 wounded, or 7% of the total population. Israel officially broke the January ceasefire and resumed military activity last week, killing at least 700 since.
Sen. Sanders noted during his remarks that all humanitarian aid had been blocked from entering Israel for over 30 days. He called what Israel is doing a violation of the Geneva Convention and the United States’ Foreign Assistance Act.
“It is no secret how these weapons have been used,” Sanders said. Strikes against civilian targets “have been painstakingly documented by human rights groups.”
Sanders pointed to a recent Economist-YouGov poll that showed only 15% of Americans support increasing military aid to Israel, while 35% supported ending or decreasing military support. Additionally, a J Street poll found that 62% of Jewish Americans supported the withholding of offensive weapons to Israel until Benjamin Netanyahu agreed to an immediate ceasefire.
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Top photo credit: A street monitor in Tokyo's Akihabara area shows on April 3, 2025, news that U.S. President Donald Trump announced reciprocal tariffs on all countries overnight, including one of 24 percent on Japanese imports. (Kyodo-Reuters Connect)
At 4 p.m. on Wednesday — “Liberation Day” — President Trump announced the details of his “reciprocal tariff” strategy. He began with a speech that described persistent trade deficits over the last few decades as a sign that other countries were taking advantage of America through tariffs, non-tariff barriers, and currency manipulation.
In an echo of the themes that powered his victory in 2016, he blamed these practices for the deindustrialization of the American heartland and the loss of manufacturing capacity in sectors critical for national security and technological advancement.
The president then unveiled a scheme of tariffs remarkable for its complexity and for its impact on the international trading architecture. The levies on each country were said to be based on a quantified estimate of the tariff equivalent of all its “objectionable practices” — tariffs, non-tariff barriers, value-added taxes (sales taxes levied by national governments on both domestic and foreign production), alleged currency manipulation etc.
However, there were suggestions, (confirmed here) that the tariffs were based on a simpler metric — the size of a country’s bilateral trade surplus with the U.S. as a percentage of exports, thus treating purportedly “missing imports” as a measure of all barriers to trade. Among other things the implication from the methodology is that in an ideal world, a country should have absolutely balanced trade not just across all its trading partners, but even with each single trading partner, perhaps an unrealistic expectation.
Finally, there is also a floor of a 10% tariff on all countries covering those that run bilateral trade deficits with the U.S. The range of tariffs runs from the minimum of 10% for many countries (that are not enumerated in the linked annex) to 49% in the case of Cambodia, 48% for Myanmar, 46% for Vietnam, 45% for Laos, 44% for Sri Lanka, and 37% for Bangladesh. Among larger trading partners, the tariffs are set at 34% for China, 24% for Japan, and 20% for the EU. This set of tariffs is also additive to those already levied, particularly significant in the case of China, whose exports will now face a minimum tariff of at least 54%.
For the global trading system, the introduction of bilateral tariffs across all products at the country level undoes a principle that has governed trade for decades. This is the idea of Most Favored Nation (MFN) status, i.e., that subject to certain limited exceptions (such as within a free trade area), a country should levy the same tariff on the same product across all its trading partners. The effect is to dynamite a cornerstone of global trade law, a system that grants formal juridical equality to countries rather than reflecting sheer size and market power.
The reciprocal tariff measures increase the distance between the U.S. and the World Trade Organization (WTO), and they come a little more than a week after America suspended its payment of dues to the entity. As the U.S. increasingly withdraws from the system, it remains to be seen whether other countries can revitalize the WTO as a dispute-resolution mechanism, perhaps by using its opt-in binding arbitration system, the MPIA, of which Brazil, Canada, China, the EU, Japan, and Mexico (among others) are members. The tariffs will likely weaken U.S. diplomatic efforts to present “Chinese overproduction” as the biggest threat to the system.
Within the U.S., the tariffs are likely to push up inflation significantly, particularly in the near term, both from price increases and from shortages resulting from the scrambling of supply chains. And even though the tariffs have been announced, it remains unclear whether they will remain where they are or function as a bargaining chip, exacerbating consumer and business uncertainty, thus feeding into subdued investment prospects.
The moves are also likely to have significant, yet differentiated, impact across the countries of the Global South. As noted above, some of the highest tariff rates are among lower income developing countries in South and Southeast Asia like Cambodia or Sri Lanka. However, tariffs on African countries like the DRC at 11%, Cameroon at 12% or Chad at 13% are significantly lower.
The high tariffs in Southeast Asia capture how countries in that region have serially pursued a successful development strategy based on inbound investment that has integrated them in global manufacturing supply chains. This is a development pathway that has had the benefits of simultaneously raising incomes and the technological complexity of the export mix in countries like Malaysia.
It has also conferred balance of payments resilience, a theme explored here, and one of critical importance in the region that suffered a deep financial crisis in 1997-98.
Conversely, many African countries get the benefit of lower tariffs but that is in many instances a reflection of their dependence on commodity exports, a factor that also accounts for the limited number of South American countries hit with high tariffs. In effect the U.S. tariffs could cut off a successful development path unless other more industrialized economies are willing to absorb imports and leave “room” for poorer exporters in more rudimentary industries.
If not, poorer countries with less technologically developed production structures could find themselves stuck in a low-income trap subject to periodic financial crises, an outcome with both humanitarian and security implications. The tariffs are also not a good omen for the African Growth and Opportunity Act, a U.S. measure that provides duty free access for an expanded range of products to poor African countries that is up for renewal later this year.
There may be a handful of (relative) winners here, like Brazil — which has been hit with only the minimum 10% tariffs and whose giant agricultural sector might benefit if countries retaliate against American farm exports.
The tariffs have also hit America’s wealthier trading partners, who face several quandaries. One is whether to retaliate and how, particularly since the White House has threatened that retaliation will lead to higher tariffs. Another is whether (and how) to treat the interconnection of security and economic linkages. This might be easier for Europe, since the U.S. has signaled repeatedly that it wishes to see the continent do more for its own security, even as the EU is being hit with slightly lower tariffs (20%) than key U.S. allies in East Asia (24-32%).
Europe’s largest economy, Germany, is increasing defense expenditures, which could act (in aggregate) as a macroeconomic offset to the impact of tariffs, thus making the security and economic response mutually consistent. Political and diplomatic calculations in East Asia could be more complex given that they are more dependent on exports to the U.S. and have high levels of interconnectedness with China, even as the U.S. pivots towards regarding the region ever more as its primary strategic theater.
Canada and Mexico have not been hit by reciprocal tariffs, however, with the latter being particularly interesting, as it has replaced China as the largest trading partner in recent years. The U.S. ran a bilateral deficit of $172 billion with Mexico last year. Trump excoriated the NAFTA agreement yesterday and he has not exempted either country from his tariff wrath. Since his inauguration, he has targeted both Canada and Mexico on the issues of migration and narcotics, and has subjected them to steel and aluminum and automobile tariffs.
Yet, their exemption from this round suggests at least some recognition of the extent to which automotive supply chains are integrated in North America, even if he seems inclined towards disintegrating them over the medium-term.
In his actions on automotive tariffs announced on March 26, Trump exempted auto parts for now, but also imposed tariffs on all non-U.S. content embedded in imports within USMCA. This is formally at odds with the agreement, where such content should be exempt if 40-45% of the automobile is made by workers making 16 dollars an hour.
The goal appears to be to force a return of large portions (if not all) of automotive supply chains back to the U.S. It remains to be seen how these aims will be viewed in Canada and Mexico given that the USMCA faces a review to be completed by July 1, 2026.
Even so, the slightly different treatment of USMCA partners may suggest a desire to finesse the choice between aiming for reshoring entirely within the U.S. or permitting some “nearshoring” where American manufacturers have been deeply engaged for long. On this, as on many other issues, uncertainty seems to be the dominant outcome of yesterday’s announcement.
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