Here is why US troops may be in Iraq indefinitely

When Arab leaders arrived in Iraq last week for the Arab League Summit, they were greeted by a city determined to impress.

Driving into the city from Baghdad International Airport, they passed the statue marking the spot where, on January 3, 2020, a U.S. drone strike killed Maj. Gen. Qassem Soleimani, commander of Iran’s Quds Force, and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, commander of Iraq’s Kata’ib Hezbollah militia. The strike, carried out on Iraqi soil without the consent of the government, amplified demands for the withdrawal of U.S. and coalition forces.

These demands still reverberate in Iraq’s corridors of power — and its streets.

While negotiations were delayed for years, Coalition Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve, the 30-nation force formed in 2014 to conduct military operations against ISIS in Iraq and Syria, finally agreed to terminate its mission and disband its headquarters in September 2025. Importantly, this does not fully end all foreign military presence in Iraq, as a provision in the agreement allows for continued military operations in Syria from an undetermined location until September 2026, as well as another provision that calls for “bilateral security partnerships in a manner that supports Iraqi forces and maintains pressure on ISIS.”

On these two provisions — continued operations against ISIS in Syria from an undetermined location (likely Northern Iraq/Kurdistan) and in-country bilateral security partnerships — there are significant disagreements within Iraq. Some Shia political and religious factions continue to push for a full and immediate withdrawal as do Iranian-backed paramilitary forces. Others argue that the international military support is critical, particularly considering the lingering threat posed by ISIS and regional instability such as developments in Syria.

One former senior official offers a frank assessment of the current landscape.

“Some [Shia] camps want the Coalition Forces to stay for the foreseeable future,” he says. “The pro-Iran militias of the ruling group parrot whatever Iran says. At present, they are lying low awaiting the Iranian position after the talks [with the U.S.]. Meanwhile, they are scared to bits of possible Israeli assassinations of their leadership. The prime minister speaks from both sides of his mouth. The Sunnis and Kurds want them to stay, not so much because of Daesh/ISIS resurgence, but as a counterweight to Iran’s presence.”

Yet for others, the very presence of foreign troops is seen not as a stabilizing force, but as a source of insecurity and foreign interference.

“The presence of any foreign military troops has never been a source of stability. Even if there are still existential challenges threatening Iraq’s stability, facing them would require national unity, regional and international cooperation and solidarity and not breaching international laws and states’ sovereignty,” says Dhiaa Al-Asadi, a former state minister and ex-parliamentarian who once led the Al Ahrar (Sadrist) Bloc. “For these and other reasons most Shia forces insist that the U.S. troops should withdraw as soon as possible.”

Among Iraq’s Sunni population, the sentiment is largely ambivalent, often ranging from indifference to cautious pragmatism. Many Iraqis, across sectarian and political lines, express a desire for a more strategic, negotiated arrangement, rather than a hasty exit. These complex, often contradictory views show how an uncertain future weighs heavily on a nation still struggling to reach consensus.

Al-Asadi remains skeptical of any prolonged negotiations as long as foreign troops remain on Iraqi soil.

“Unless all foreign troops completely and unconditionally withdraw from Iraq, any negotiations would be impacted by their presence,” he says. “All pretexts and excuses used to justify their existence would lack solid ground. The point of departure should solely be ‘the Iraqi national interest’ seen from a pure and genuine Iraqi perspective — not one colored by partisanship, sectarianism or ethnicity.”

Fundamentally, the arguments surrounding the ending of the foreign troop presence come down to two issues: will the troops leave, and should the troops leave?

As is so often the case, the answers are conditional and ambiguous. It is a certainty that the troops of all countries will leave if instructed by the Government of Iraq. They deployed to Iraq in 2014 as the Iraqi military was reeling from the ISIS invasion, and this return was facilitated by the flimsiest of documents — an invitation letter from Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari inviting foreign countries to support Iraq in its fight against ISIS. The invitation letter did not invoke treaty obligations, nor did it elaborate a formal Status of Forces Agreement as was negotiated in 2009 and expired in 2011. Instead, it was an emergency measure crucial to reverse a rapidly deteriorating military situation.

Eleven years later, few would argue that ISIS is an existential threat to Iraq. It was declared defeated in 2017 and the few remaining “rogue elements” and “sleeper cells” in Iraq are primarily handled by an Iraqi Security Forces rearmed and rebuilt by the Coalition. Detractors note that its purpose was to Advise, Assist and Enable partnered forces until the Iraqi Security Forces could independently defeat ISIS in Iraq and to provide longer term security cooperation, but this was completed years ago. For many, the Coalition is no longer necessary, and the time has come to withdraw the invitation letter and end the presence of foreign forces.

Yet should all foreign forces leave? There is still an argument for longer term security cooperation. That implies foreign support, and likely support “on the ground.” The withdrawal agreement provides for a Higher Military Commission to routinely discuss these issues and provides a back door for retaining or deploying forces in the future.

For Al-Asadi, this is not needed. He argues that a strong national army could defend the country without relying on external support if the government provides the funds for training, modern equipment, intelligence support and technological upgrades.

“Building the capacity and infrastructure of the Iraqi army is far better and easier than relying on foreign forces,” says Al-Asadi. A “do-it-yourself” approach, alongside the bitter lessons learned from five years of brutal warfare against ISIS, he believes, is the correct decision.

The former senior official disagrees, noting, “A responsible Iraq position would be to keep the presence of Coalition forces but at the technical and intelligence side working with the counterterrorism forces of Iraq rather than combat troops in secured bases,” he explains.

“I think the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) are able to handle a mid-level insurgency on two fronts, but not an invading terrorist army as in 2014. At its peak, ISIS had about 100,000 fighters on the Iraqi Syrian front,” he added. “The ISF cannot handle that.”

In many ways, both positions are correct. The threat from ISIS is diminished and there are few existential threats that require massive security forces armed and trained to first world standards. Even in its current state, the respected Global Firepower Power Index ranks Iraq as the sixth most powerful military in the Middle East, stronger than the United Arab Emirates, Jordan, Qatar and other modern defense forces in the region.

Yet, the current Iraqi Security Forces have significant gaps in capability because of longstanding reliance on external support (in particular, effective air defense systems, sufficient fighter and transport aircraft and a near-absence of helicopters). Additionally, the ISF relies on intelligence mostly “fed” to them by allies. As both Al-Asadi and the former official note, the Iraqi Army still needs to mature, although they disagree if this should be done internally or externally.

In the wake of the Arab Summit, the development of the Iraqi Security Forces and the continued presence of foreign troops will return to the center of a national debate on sovereignty, security, and Iraq’s evolving role in a region gripped by shifting alliances and unresolved conflicts.

Instability is the order of the day, with a Gaza crisis that lures in Iraqi militias unaccountable to sovereign control, Israeli and U.S. airspace violations, airstrikes against terrorist targets, and looming aftershocks should U.S.-Iran nuclear talks break down. For these reasons, Iraq needs a competent security establishment to provide external and internal defense. But the question remains: who should safeguard Iraq’s future — an alliance or itself?