President Trump paused most foreign aid programs in January but is now asking Congress to approve $1 billion worth of bombs and demolition equipment to Israel.
The administration has been adding exceptions to its foreign aid pause since announcing it, but it seems Israel’s aid was never in jeopardy, according to diplomatic cables.
The American taxpayer will pay for the $1 billion sale of the weapons as part of the $3.8. billion military aid package sent to Israel each year. In total, from Oct. 2023 to Oct. 2024, Israel received a record-breaking $17.9 billion worth of weapons, and President Biden announced plans to send an $8 billion arms package to the nation in January, but it has not yet been fully approved by Congress.
This new arms package comes as President Trump is set to meet with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on Tuesday. Trump also lifted the pause on the sale of 2,000-pound bombs to Israel in late January.
The weapons and equipment included in the most recent sale include 1,000-pound “general purpose” bombs and Caterpillar D9 armored bulldozers, which have historically been used to raze houses and other buildings in the West Bank as collective punishment, including as part of an ongoing operation in Jenin.
Trump’s decision to continue large-scale arms sales to Israel is shadowed by a fragile cease-fire in Gaza, and by reports that raised the death count in Gaza to at least 62,000.
Aaron is a reporter for Responsible Statecraft and a contributor to the Mises Institute. He received both his undergraduate and masters degrees in international relations from Liberty University.
Top Photo: A Palestinian man looks at an Israeli military vehicle during an Israeli raid in Tubas in the Israeli-occupied West Bank October 31, 2023. REUTERS/Raneen Sawafta
A Palestinian man looks at an Israeli military vehicle during an Israeli raid in Tubas in the Israeli-occupied West Bank October 31, 2023. REUTERS/Raneen Sawafta
Top image credit: Secretary Marco Rubio participates in a podcast with Megyn Kelly at the Department of State in Washington, D.C., January 30, 2025. (Official State Department photo by Freddie Everett)
I almost fell off my chair listening to Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s recent interview with former Fox News host Megyn Kelly where he declared unipolarity an anomaly and treated a return to multipolarity essentially as a correction by the gravitational forces of geopolitics.
This is what he said:
“So it’s not normal for the world to simply have a unipolar power. That was not — that was an anomaly. It was a product of the end of the Cold War, but eventually you were going to reach back to a point where you had a multipolar world, multi-great powers in different parts of the planet. We face that now with China and to some extent Russia, and then you have rogue states like Iran and North Korea you have to deal with.”
Rubio’s comments should be getting more attention.
Setting aside whether he truly believes this or is simply adjusting to President Trump's worldview, it is still very significant for the secretary of state to not only declare unipolarity over (Hillary Clinton said the world was multipolar already in 2010, but saying it and meaning it are two different things), but to also treat the return to multipolarity as a return to normalcy.
It’s not clear how far Rubio has thought this through, and he makes no mention of ending primacy as a grand strategy. However, he speaks of centering U.S. interests in U.S. foreign policy and that the U.S. cannot be responsible for resolving every problem in the world.
But if one sees unipolarity as a historical accident and an anomaly, then it would be difficult to justify a grand strategy of primacy or liberal hegemony that, at its essence, seeks to either restore or prolong that anomaly.
Of course, the gap between what is thought, what is said, and what is done by the Trump administration may be quite sizable.
Either way, Rubio's interview here deserves more attention. Not only because it is refreshing but also because a serious grandstrategic conversation — free from dishonest accusations of isolationism or China-hugging — is long overdue.
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Top image credit: Russian officers from the wagner group are seen around Central African president Faustin-Archange Touadera as they are part of the presidential security system during the referendum campaign to change the constitution and remove term limits, in Bangui, Central African Republic July 17, 2023. REUTERS/Leger Kokpakpa
After a whirlwind two-year expansion into the Sahel, 2024 saw a number of setbacks for Russian military operations.
The Russian private military company (PMC) Wagner Group’s routing in Tinzaouaten laid bare issues of command and control after a half-handover of operations from Yevgeny Prigozhin’s PMC to the Ministry of Defense (MoD). The fall of Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad in December then called into question the future of Russia’s eastern Mediterranean port in Tartus and its critical airbase at Khmeimim, all against a backdrop of a grinding third year of war in Ukraine.
These developments have led some analysts to believe Russia’s influence and ability to project power in the Sahel is waning, or that the Kremlin no longer considers the Sahel and other friendly states in Africa a priority. And indeed, there are members of Russia’s military, political, and expert communities pushing to scale back Moscow’s presence on the continent, or to use Africa as a bargaining chip in any potential negotiations between Russian President Vladimir Putin and U.S. President Donald Trump.
Based on conversations with Russian officers, experts, and members of the PMC community, a retreat from the Sahel, and Africa more generally, still appears unlikely. Rumor and speculation on future strategies are rife, but it is becoming clear that, after several years of expansion, Russian operations in Africa are recalibrating to better match capacity.
Claiming a leadership position within the Global South remains an important priority to the Kremlin, of which Africa constitutes an important, albeit discordant political bloc. The Sahel and Africa more broadly also offer a platform for strengthening Russia’s cooperation with China and Turkey.
And yet, there is still no official Russian state strategy vis-à-vis Africa, no document drawn up, agreed upon, approved, and accepted for implementation. Instead, Russian activity in Africa has tended to occur in an unsystematic fashion, through structures like Yevgeny Prigozhin’s Wagner Group. These structures had freedom to make proactive decisions on the ground in accordance with emerging opportunities.
The success of Wagner’s assault detachments in a counteroffensive against armed groups in the Central African Republic (CAR) in 2021 turbocharged Prigozhin’s security export in Africa, and his PMC began marketing itself as a military solution to complex conflicts. In CAR, Prigozhin’s operation was largely a private initiative. Once Wagner spread through Mali in early 2022, however, the lack of an interdisciplinary analytical center, capable of realistically assessing the Sahel’s compounding crises, quickly became clear.
From the beginning of the Malian campaign, the Russian expert community and a number of military officers criticized both the direct participation of Russian armed contingents in an asymmetric conflict and, in general, solving the conflict exclusively by force.
The constant participation of Wagner units in the most difficult and bloody areas of the campaign, sometimes operating practically independently of the Malian military (FAMa), led to a degradation of FAMa’s combat capability. Without a unified policy of interaction between Russian military planners, Russian military intelligence, Wagner’s commanders, Malian commanders, and Malian ministers, operations lacked a clear chain of command. In this environment, Prigozhin’s structures exerted a degree of independence—still far less than what Wagner commanders enjoyed in CAR—but they still found themselves drawn into the economics of the conflict and tied to the Malian establishment.
Following the death of Yevgeny Prigozhin in August 20023, employees of his structures within Russia were redistributed among security forces or pushed out to Belarus. The handover of African units, however, was more complicated. It was not possible to disband Wagner units or replace them with other structures, since the preparation of cohesive, well-coordinated units takes time.
A half-handover, however, still took place, from PMC Wagner to the MoD-subordinated Africa Corps. In Mali, combat units of PMC Wagner stayed directly involved in hostilities, while a group of military advisers from Africa Corps, together with the Malian General Staff, were involved in planning operations. There were still issues of command and control, supplies, and logistics; Wagner’s assault detachments were technically subordinate to FAMa. The General Staff worked with Russian officers to plan operations, while Wagner commanders tended to receive discrete tasks.
Moreover, Russia’s war in Ukraine drained Africa of experienced Wagner fighters and specialists. The belief that Africa was an “easier” deployment than to Ukraine, issues of nepotism in getting those deployments, and rewards for loyalty over skill further degraded the quality of forces in Mali. Wagner’s routing at Tinzaouaten, an ambush that saw as many as 100 Wagner fighters killed, was the culmination of these trends.
The ambush has given leverage to military officers and experts arguing for Russia to scale back direct participation in Malian military operations. Russians passing through Mali are well aware that Moscow lacks the capacity and desire to tackle the Sahel’s massive developmental, economic, and humanitarian crises. This group is lobbying to shift focus to training local army and law enforcement forces in the region.
Of course, the demand for direct participation is not unanimous among Sahelian states. The military leadership of Niger has not expressed a desire for assault detachments, and the head of the military government of Burkina Faso, Captain Traoré, has repeatedly spoken against foreign military units operating in the country. In Mali, where assault detachments are in demand, the recent delivery of military equipment, including tanks and armored vehicles likely evacuated from Russian military bases in Syria, may serve to reassure Bamako of Moscow’s continued support.
Africa Corps personnel are supposed to be largely comprised of instructors, with combat units intended as an operational reserve to ensure the security of administrative centers and critical infrastructure. The announcement of a 5,000-strong special joint military force of Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso to combat terrorism may fit into this new paradigm, and it is possible Russian instructors will focus on training this force in particular.
Russian investment is planned for soft-power initiatives beyond military training. Government and private initiatives are expected to start non-profits and public associations that capitalize on anti-Western sentiment and distrust of Western interventions in the Sahel. Despite agreement on the importance of traditional values and the failures of liberalism, meaningful cooperation with the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump in Africa remains unlikely. The allure of a Global South aligned against a collective West remains more potent for now.
Indeed, competition between PMCs may be more likely. Trump’s foreign policy is looking to scale back military and humanitarian operations in the Middle East and Africa to focus on North and South America, creating new market opportunities for America’s own private security industry in Africa.
Prigozhin was able to undercut his Western competition through his own deep pockets and access to Russian military equipment and subsidies, which allowed him to tolerate serious risk in hope of long-term returns. Whether American PMCs can lobby for similar deals remains to be seen. If they do and they stick to training, not offensive operations, African leaders will be well-placed to take advantage of a more competitive market.
Russian and Ukrainian leaders appear to be goading one another as to who is and who isn’t ready to negotiate an end to the war in Ukraine.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov charged late last week that Ukraine is not ready for serious negotiations. “Despite the increasingly loud talk about the need for peace talks,” he said, “there are objectively no practical actions indicating that Kyiv and the West are really ready for them.”
The Russian foreign minister added, “There is a (Ukrainian) legal ban on negotiations, and the issue of the legitimacy of the Ukrainian authorities is not being resolved,” said Lavrov — referring to the fact that Zelenskyy did not hold an election in May of 2024 and has been in power under martial law.
Meanwhile, Russian President Putin expressed concern that Zelenskyy is not legally qualified to sign a long-term peace agreement. “In terms of signing documents, everything has to be done in a way that legal experts confirm the legitimacy of those who are authorized by the Ukrainian state to sign these agreements," he said.
For his part, Zelenskyy shot back. “Today, Putin once again confirmed that he is afraid of negotiations, afraid of strong leaders, and does everything possible to prolong the war,” he posted on X.
Despite this rhetoric, support for a negotiated peace is high amongst Ukraine’s public, as many are war-weary. Additionally, some experts are optimistic. “There is much discussion on how to separate Russian and Ukrainian political posturing from their actual negotiating positions, but those distinctions will naturally emerge over the course of peace talks,” says the Quincy Institute’s Mark Episkopos. “The main task at hand is to incentivize both sides to negotiate in good faith.”
President Trump and Secretary of State Marco Rubio announced a pause on most U.S. foreign aid last week, and now Ukrainians are beginning to feel the effects. The Guardianreports that most U.S. Aid programs in Ukraine have abruptly stopped.
The United States has provided Ukraine with $37 billion in humanitarian and development aid since the start of Russia’s invasion in 2022, mainly through the Agency for International Development (USAID).
“They’re going to feel the effect of this next week,” saidHope for Ukraine founder Yuriy Boyechko. Many organizations are unsure what to do in the long term but will temporarily use local and redirected funds to fill some funding holes.
Ukrainian President Zelenskyy indicated that the United States would continue providing military aid, but it is unclear how long the pause on other forms of assistance will last.
Reutersreports that Ukrainian officials uncovered “mass fraud” totaling around $40 million in its weapons procurement system. A contract for mortar shells had been reached with Lviv Arsenal, but the shells never arrived, and the money was moved to foreign accounts. “According to the investigation, former and current high-ranking officials of the Ministry of Defence and heads of affiliated companies are involved in the embezzlement,” said Ukrainian security officials.
At least 20 American mercenaries are MIA in Russia, hitting a 6-month spike, according to CNN. Additionally, the remains of at least 5 Americans are currently stuck in Europe as their extradition is being negotiated with European governments. It is unknown how many Americans have died in Ukraine so far.
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