As it weighs the nomination of Tulsi Gabbard for the position of Director of National Intelligence, the United States Senate faces a fundamental choice: Should it reject those like Gabbard who challenge conventional wisdom, or should it recognize that sensibly questioning orthodox views is essential to avoid the kinds of intelligence and foreign policy failures we have experienced in such places as Iraq, Libya, Afghanistan, and Ukraine?
The New York Times’ recent attack on Gabbard’s religious beliefs suggests that the foreign policy establishment is much more concerned about protecting its power than about the dangers of majoritarian intolerance that prompted the Bill of Rights. But disrespect for minority views and constitutional freedoms is exactly what most plagues our Intelligence Community (IC).
In fact, a form of groupthink has driven establishment approaches to national security for many years. It is rooted in three implicit assumptions.
Consensus Judgments are Correct Judgments. “The National Security Council’s consensus view tends to be the best, most informed judgment across… the U.S. government,” proclaimed NSC staffer Alexander Vindman while testifying in President Trump’s first impeachment trial over Ukraine in 2019.
He referred explicitly to this interagency consensus almost three dozen times in the course of his testimony, condemning Trump’s departures from it. This belief, that consensus views are most likely to be correct views, underpins the IC’s approach to analysis.
Using what the IC calls “coordination” to weed out basic errors is a sound approach to fact-checking, but it is not the best way to anticipate future discontinuities or overcome confirmation bias.
In fact, history is riddled with examples of consensus analytic judgments that proved false. Iraq had destroyed its stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) well before Operation Iraqi Freedom. The so-called “Washington Consensus” on political and economic reform in 1990s-era Russiaproved disastrous. Bringing China into the World Trade Organization did not produce a liberalizing middle class. Deposing Muammar Qaddafi failed to bring democracy and stability to Libya. Given this record, should Gabbard’s controversial warning that Assad’s removal might pave the way to radical Islamic rule in Syria be considered a disqualification?
The point is not that minority judgments are usually correct. It is that in many of these past examples, those who rightly questioned majority views did so at their personal and professional peril. If the IC is to improve its analytic record, it needs to promote rather than penalize diverse thinking and employ rigorous methodology to explain instances where objective analysts might reasonably offer alternatives to mainstream opinion.
Americans Can Trust the IC to Respect Civil Liberties. In 2013, Edward Snowden, employed at the time as a contractor by the National Security Agency, leaked reams of documents exposing highly classified intelligence programs that trampled on the privacy rights of American citizens. Some were horrified by the excesses revealed by the leaks. Many were outraged that Snowden had violated the law and put our nation’s security at risk. Both sides raised valid concerns.
Snowden was undoubtedly wrong to make himself the arbiter of whether classified information should be published, and his decision to defect to Russia only fueled questions about his motives and patriotism. But at the same time, the material he published highlighted the dangers of relying on the IC to police its own compliance with constitutional law and bureaucratic regulations.
His leaks also exposed the ways that new information technologies have eroded the wall that once separated foreign intelligence collection from America’s domestic affairs. This erosion has led to increasing IC involvement in electoral politics—rendering public judgments about what U.S. presidential candidates our adversaries prefer, for example—and to a growing role as arbiter of what constitutes “disinformation” in our public discourse. This has distorted important debates over such issues as Russiagate, the Hunter Biden laptop, and the origins and treatment of COVID-19.
Safeguarding democracy requires striking a reasonable balance on the spectrum between absolute security and absolute freedom. Left to its own devices, the IC will naturally prioritize security, because that is its primary responsibility.
That means that new intelligence collection technology must be carefully constrained within law and overseen by elected representatives of the people in both Congress and the executive branch. It also means that we need IC leaders who, like Gabbard, are sensitive to the dangers of IC overreach in its collection programs and public activities.
Empathizing With Rivals is Wrong. In the messy political scrum over acquiring and exercising power over foreign policy, Americans have too often confused analytic empathy with sympathy for the views and agendas of foreign adversaries. Hence the potency of Hillary Clinton’s accusation that Gabbard is a Russian “favorite” and the buzz from her skeptics that she harbors a disqualifying fondness for autocrats.
In fact, one of the most fundamental duties of any analyst of foreign affairs is to be able to walk in the shoes of adversaries and view U.S. actions from their perspective. That is not because their views are typically accurate and justified. Rather, it is because an inability to understand their perceptions and misperceptions greatly increases the likelihood of intelligence and policy failures.
Former Secretary of State Dean Acheson cited Washington’s misunderstanding of Japan’s perceptions as a central reason for the surprise over its attack on Pearl Harbor. Similarly, the WMD Commission highlighted a failure to grasp Saddam Hussein’s threat perceptions as a factor that led analysts to doubt he had destroyed Iraq’s stockpiles of WMD.
Securing a place for analytic empathy in the Intelligence Community is no easy task. In considering Gabbard, senators should ask themselves what combination of insight and political courage would have been required to dent the consensus views of the Iraq War and the intelligence used to justify it. They have a real-life example in the late Brent Scowcroft, whose warnings about the dangers of invading led to his expulsion from President Bush’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.
A string of intelligence and foreign policy failures over the past several decades has undermined the trust of American people in the wisdom of Washington’s foreign policy establishment. In turn, its intrusive involvement in electoral politics has undermined the trust of Donald Trump and helped to elect him to a second term.
It is time to rebuild that trust. An establishment that zealously punishes dissenters and strictly polices public discourse is an establishment that is increasingly out of touch with the American people. And it is an establishment that is setting itself up for even more failures.
George Beebe spent more than two decades in government as an intelligence analyst, diplomat, and policy advisor, including as director of the CIA's Russia analysis and as a staff advisor on Russia matters to Vice President Cheney. He is the author of "The Russia Trap: How Our Shadow War with Russia Could Spiral into Nuclear Catastrophe" (2019).
Top photo credit: Tulsi Gabbard in Congress, July 2018 (LindamozukuCreative Commons)
Top photo credit: President Donald Trump walks out with Steve Witkoff after taking part in bilateral meetings at the United Nations Headquarters in New York City, Tuesday, September 23, 2025. (Official White House Photo by Daniel Torok)
In Deir al-Balah, a mother told me her son now counts the seconds between blasts. Policy, to her, isn’t a debate; it’s whether trucks arrive and the night is quiet. Donald Trump’s 20-point plan promises ceasefire, hostages home, Israeli withdrawal, and reconstruction. It sounds complete. It isn’t.
Without enforceable mechanics, maps, timelines, phased verification, and real local ownership; it risks being a short-lived show, not a durable peace.
On paper, the plan strings together familiar parts: a ceasefire tied to hostage releases, withdrawal linked to disarmament, and a multinational stabilization effort to guard rebuilding. Used well, those tools can buy civilians time to breathe: a tranche-based exchange that releases hostages as pauses begin and expands aid corridors with each verified step; and a properly mandated, regionally backed stabilization presence that keeps fighters away from families, protects convoys, and secures reconstruction sites so hospitals, schools, and water systems can function. Modest instruments, not magic, but correctly sequenced, they save lives.
The design breaks down where hard agreements usually do. First, it effectively treats disarmament as surrender, demanding that an armed actor relinquish leverage before credible political guarantees and security protections exist. Durable settlements don’t start with a leap of faith over a void.
Second, the withdrawal language is vague. If a “pullback” arrives bundled with continuing perimeter control, airspace, crossings, or security carve-outs, residents will experience it as occupation under a new brand. Independent analysis notes the text lacks concrete timelines and operational granularity past the opening phase.
Third, enforcement leans on statements rather than machinery. Without mapped guarantor responsibilities, triggerable penalties, and pre-positioned logistics, promises turn into press releases. Reporting on the Palestinian Authority’s potential role underscores how preconditions and sequencing could stall implementation.
There’s a deeper political absence, too. This deal does not deliver what Palestinians actually hope for: self-determination and a say in their future. After high-profile recognitions of Palestinian statehood, offering a Gaza-only fix that sidelines political rights makes those gestures look symbolic rather than substantive. Having Israeli institutions effectively able to veto consequential steps feels like Oslo all over again: process without power-balancing.
That is how interim arrangements harden into permanent limbo — deference to political will instead of instruments, asymmetric leverage left intact, and verification without consequences. Analyses of the current proposal also point to how leaders can convert hesitation into de facto veto power.
If Trump is serious about peace, Jerusalem and the West Bank must be inside the plan, not promised to some later round. Facts on the ground are moving the other way. The UN Security Council has said settlements lack legal validity and violate international law. The UN humanitarian office has documented widespread settler violence and access restrictions that corrode daily life and any negotiated horizon.
I don’t say this as a spectator. For three decades, and, crucially, from 1994 to 2012, I worked across Israel and the Palestinian territories, running dialogues, designing confidence measures, and trying to push fragile agreements into daily reality. I arrived at Oslo believing its interim architecture could be saved. Hard experience taught me why it often wasn’t: interimism without enforcement calcifies; asymmetry invites spoilers; and externally driven programs that sideline local voices manufacture the very grievances violence feeds on. Those are not laments; they’re operating instructions.
So what would a plan that acts like peace look like? Start with measured, verifiable sequencing. Convert the hostage-for-ceasefire idea into a tranche ladder with objective indicators.
Tranche 0: a 72-hour humanitarian pause and release of the most vulnerable hostages, independently verified.
Tranche 1: further releases and sustained relief corridors.
Tranche 2: armor out of GPS-mapped grid squares; municipal functions transferred to neutral civil administrators.
Tranche 3: localized arms-reduction pilots paired with trained community policing.
Tranche 4: broader demobilization tied to political benchmarks. Publish indicators per tranche, names returned, coordinates vacated, tonnage of aid delivered, verified hand-ins, police trained, on a public dashboard so guarantors act on facts, not spin.
Next, replace applause with commitments on paper. Regional states and major donors should sign a concise guarantor treaty with annexes that spell out who does what when breaches occur: logistics deployed within 48 hours, escrowed funds released or frozen, proportionate sanctions, or a rapid-response element under hybrid command.
Add an escalation ladder, a dispute-resolution clause, and a small guarantor secretariat that tracks readiness daily. Tie money to verification outcomes so incentives are immediate and reversible. Established policy work already frames these sequencing and governance choices—use it to draft the legal plumbing.
Then give monitoring real teeth. Stand up a Verification & Rapid Response Authority (VRRA) with three pillars: a Technical Verification Unit (remote sensing, forensics, chain-of-custody); a Civilian Observers Network (local monitors and NGO liaisons); and a Rapid Response Wing (pre-positioned transport, medevac, engineering). When the VRRA issues an evidence packet—geolocated imagery, metadata, documented hand-ins—it should automatically trigger the agreed guarantor response. Monitoring that cannot cause action is theater; people in Gaza do not have time for theater.
Demobilization must not be coerced by a vacuum. It should be gradual, conditional, and reversible — and paired with a transitional political compact that guarantees participation, association, and a mapped route to representation. Pilot DDR alongside livelihoods, public hiring, micro-grants, reconstruction jobs—and community-led policing reforms so neighborhoods feel safer, not abandoned. Field reporting shows that sequencing PA governance and security responsibilities will make or break feasibility; treat that as a design constraint, not a footnote.
Reconstruction must rebuild institutions, not patronage. Create a Donor Compact & Reconstruction Authority (DCRA) with pooled escrow and a multistakeholder board, Gaza municipalities, West Bank civil society, donors, independent auditors, and a VRRA liaison. Use digitized public procurement, local-first contracting, community sign-off on major projects, and payments contingent on VRRA-verified delivery. Coverage of an Arab-backed multibillion-dollar plan illustrates how donor politics can fragment; a compact like DCRA keeps money honest and visible to the people it is meant to serve.
Finally, coherence or collapse: a Gaza-only fix will not hold. Pair Gaza tranches with West Bank protections, temporary settlement constraints tied to compliance, increased international monitoring at checkpoints, and targeted support for communities under strain, because what happens in one arena cascades into the other.
If negotiators want something immediate and practical to insist on, here it is: redraft the plan into a tranche protocol with mapped withdrawals and a public verification dashboard; sign the guarantor treaty and pre-position logistics and escrow, with an explicit escalation ladder; and stand up the VRRA and DCRA with legal charters, independent boards, and automatic triggers so verification leads to action, not statements.
Gaza’s families don’t need grandeur; they need a night without terror, a clinic with light, a school bell that rings. Recognitions of Palestine should mean voice and agency, not just new communiqués. A plan that looks like peace but acts like control will fail them. Put Jerusalem and the West Bank inside the deal. Build the scaffold, measured tranches, mapped withdrawals, independent verification, accountable reconstruction, and you buy time for politics, dignity for civilians, and a future Palestinians can recognize as their own.
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Top image credit: screen grab via https://www.youtube.com/@RealTime
On Friday, Van Jones joked about kids dying in Gaza.
“If you open your phone, and all you see is dead Gaza baby, dead Gaza baby, dead Gaza baby, Diddy,” Jones said on Bill Maher’s ‘Real Time’ HBO program.
“That’s basically your whole feed,” Jones said.
The audience laughed and applauded.
The CNN host came off as dismissive of these deaths, calling it a “disinformation campaign” on behalf of Iran and Qatar.
The backlash on social media was fierce, where users made clear that the bloodshed in Gaza was very real and not mere “disinformation.”
Progressive pundit Briahna Joy Reid wrote, “Turning ‘dead Gaza baby’ into a punchline is such an evil choice that I'm struggling to even engage with the outrageous lie that we only care about Gazan deaths because of an Iranian social media campaign.”
The Yaqeen Institute’s Omar Suleiman shot back, “Truly disgraceful and vile (Van Jones). I’m sorry dead Gaza babies bother you so much. Maybe tell the people paying you to put lipstick on a genocide to stop killing them.”
The Quincy Institute’s Trita Parsi said Jones’ comments were a blueprint for how pro-Israel elites try to censor “what is actually happening in Gaza: A genocide of children conducted by Israel and defended by plenty of folks in the US, many of them on Israel's payroll.”
NBC News’s Hola Gorani reacted in a post, “I've watched hundreds of hours of Gaza videos in the last 2 years, including content filmed by our brave teams inside the strip, and can confirm that the ‘dead Gaza baby’ images are quite real, not the product of a ‘disinformation campaign’ and that there is nothing funny about them.”
Media critic Sana Saeed might have summed it up best, “The reason Van Jones can get up, use ‘dead Gaza babies’ so crassly, toss in a joke about Diddy mid-sentence, and have an audience erupt in laughter - without hesitation for either context or content - is because of the depth and breadth of dehumanization that’s been permitted toward Palestinians…There is no America in which ‘dead Jewish babies’ could ever be invoked in such a vulgar way on such a platform.”
On Sunday, Jones apologized. Twice. Jones also turned off X replies to his apology.
This did not stop people from replying.
Democratic Senator Chris Van Hollen perhaps best summarized how many received Jones apology, “I’m glad Van Jones apologized for his sick joking about dead kids in Gaza.”
“But the problem goes deeper: he spread Netanyahu propaganda that the mass killings of civilians in Gaza—including 20K+ kids—is Iranian fake news,” the senator added.
“It’s not the students and young people who are fooled. It’s Van Jones,” Van Hollen said.
The senator is right. A recent poll showed a whopping 41 percent of Americans now call the actions of Israel’s government in Gaza a “genocide.” Another poll showed that in December 2023, 69 percent of Americans believed U.S. support for Israel was in their country’s national interest. Last month, that support for Israel had dropped to 47 percent.
The mass killing of Palestinians, including children, is not something millions of Americans and the world are merely imagining due to foreign propaganda campaigns of Van Jones’ imagination. The deaths are real, the internet exists, and people are seeing this carnage in real time thanks to modern technology.
And as humanity demands, they are horrified by it.
It’s that simple. No one is making this up. If I included every negative reaction to Jones in the last 48 hours this column could become a novel.
Jones' comments on Friday night came almost literally at the same moment President Donald Trump hailed on X that “Israel has temporarily stopped the bombing in order to give the Hostage release and Peace Deal a chance to be completed.”
Whether Israel actually implemented a ceasefire or Trump’s plan is viable are separate questions. But that even the president acknowledges the ongoing Israeli war on Gaza is key.
This is no fantasy, Van Jones. It’s certainly no joke.
What’s important, and perhaps the lesson to be learned by this controversy, is that pro-Israel elites simply denying the most massive slaughters of human beings in the Middle East this century is no longer viable.
Americans have eyes. Hearts, too.
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Top image credit: Frederic Legrand - COMEO, Joey Sussman, miss.cabul via shutterstock.com
In a September 20 Truth Social post, President Trump threatened the Taliban, declaring, “If Afghanistan doesn’t give Bagram Airbase back… BAD THINGS ARE GOING TO HAPPEN!!” He now wants the military base he once negotiated away as part of the U.S. withdrawal agreement his first administration signed in 2019.
Not unexpectedly, the Taliban quickly refused, noting “under the Doha Agreement, the United States pledged that ‘it will not use or threaten force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Afghanistan, nor interfere in its internal affairs.’” And with China now deeply entrenched in post-war Afghanistan, it’s likely Beijing will ensure that the threat remains little more than another off-the-cuff comment that should not be taken literally nor seriously.
Since early 2025, Trump has mentioned Bagram, not as a military objective but as a strategic chess piece in his broader confrontation with China. He has described the base as being “an hour away from where [China] makes its nuclear weapons,” framing it as a critical outpost the U.S. should never have given up. In Trump’s view, reclaiming Bagram would reestablish American dominance in a region he believes is drifting into Beijing’s orbit. It’s also a powerful political narrative: take back what Biden lost, restore strength and project American resolve in an era of perceived decline.
But while Trump talks about taking Bagram back, China has already moved in. After the U.S. withdrawal in 2021, Beijing wasted little time expanding its influence, becoming the first country to accredit a Taliban ambassador in 2023.
In August 2025, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi visited Kabul for high-level talks, during which Beijing signaled interest in Afghanistan’s vast mineral reserves, including lithium, copper and uranium, and in expanding trade and infrastructure links under its Belt and Road Initiative. For China, Afghanistan is now a critical strategic partner. A renewed U.S. military presence would threaten those interests, and Beijing is unlikely to stand by quietly if Washington tries to force its way back in.
Some analysts believe Trump’s demand may be less about actually retaking Bagram and more about creating leverage. It could be a bargaining chip, a maximalist opening meant to extract something smaller, such as the return of some of the $7 billion in U.S. weapons left behind during the withdrawal. He might seek assurances regarding the protection of minority rights or commitments to restrict terrorist safe havens in exchange for concessions, even though concerns of ISIS-K and other terror groups have proven illusory.
According to Helena Malikyar, Afghanistan's former ambassador to Italy, “The U.S. has military bases in many other countries, but that doesn’t necessarily imply a colonizer-colonized relationship — consider Japan, Germany, Qatar, or Bahrain.” She adds: “That said, I doubt the U.S. has any urgent need for Bagram, given that Pakistan has granted access to its airbases since 1959. In fact, the airbases in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Punjab are even closer to China than Bagram is.”
Rhetorically, Trump’s ploy also plays well, allowing him to cast Biden’s exit from Afghanistan as a historic blunder that he alone is prepared to fix. But whether it’s a bluff or a real objective, the rhetoric raises the stakes, and regional powers like China, Russia and even the Taliban are watching closely.
But as Zalmai Nishat, Research Fellow at Sussex Asia Centre, points out, “the Taliban is far from monolithic. While certain factions may see benefit in cooperating with the U.S., others, particularly those tied closely to Hibatullah [Akhundzada], would fiercely resist. Any move to reclaim Bagram would expose these divisions, and the Taliban’s response would depend on which faction prevails.”
This internal fragmentation is only one layer of a far more complex equation. Trump’s push for Bagram would not just challenge the Taliban but also confront a regional order that no longer centers on Washington. Realities on the ground have shifted dramatically since the days of U.S. occupation. China is intent on solidifying its role in Afghanistan’s reconstruction and won’t tolerate a U.S. return that threatens its access to valuable minerals or its broader security interests.
Iran would certainly see U.S. facilities as potential targets and Russia, the first country to formally recognize the Taliban government, has a broad footprint in Afghanistan today. It provides oil and wheat at discounted prices, cooperates with its security services on counterterrorism programs and promotes its 11-nation Moscow Format to address Afghan issues. Neither Beijing nor Moscow is likely to support a renewed American military presence that could destabilize the fragile balance they seek to maintain.
Critically, the American people are likely to reject a military redeployment to a country where two decades of fighting achieved little and the threat of Afghanistan turning into a sanctuary and safe haven for terrorism has not borne out.
Even if the Taliban were to agree to a negotiated solution, it would be difficult for President Trump to sell the deal. It took two decades after the fall of Saigon for the United States to reestablish diplomatic relationships with Vietnam, and it’s reasonable to believe that popular and congressional support would be equally opposed. Like most of President Trump’s verbal and Truth Social pronouncements, the Bagram proposal can be taken literally or seriously, but not both.
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