USAID administrator Samantha Power said on Wednesday that the humanitarian situation in Gaza is “worse now than ever before” and acknowledged that “Israeli military operations & closed crossings” were the primary impediments to the delivery of American aid.
The post on X followed comments by Power that although Israeli operations in Rafah were “limited,” the “catastrophic consequences” of Israeli military actions in southern Gazan city were nonetheless taking place.
It is the latest and among the most direct examples of the Biden administration admitting that Israel is violating both international and U.S. law without saying so directly. As a result their policy remains largely unchanged.
Section 620I of the Foreign Assistance Act mandates that, “no assistance shall be furnished … to any country when it is made known to the President that the government of such country prohibits or otherwise restricts, directly or indirectly, the transport or delivery of US humanitarian assistance.”
Lawmakers who have been critical of Biden’s “blank check” approach have identified the blocking of humanitarian assistance as the most obvious example of Israeli violations of U.S. law, and therefore as the reason why Washington should cut off arms sales to Tel Aviv.
But the administration has been unmoved. The NSM-20 report, a result of this pressure from Congress, ultimately concluded that the State Department “does not currently assess that the Israeli government is prohibiting or otherwise restricting the transport or delivery of U.S. humanitarian assistance within the meaning of section 620I,” and that consequently no change in policy was required.
Administration officials told RS shortly before the release of that report that experts and staffers would possibly be willing to resign if the report asserted that Israel was complying with the law, since the blocking of aid has been so blatant. That became a reality this week when Stacy Gilbert, an adviser in the State Department’s bureau of population, refugees and migration, publicized her recent resignation. She called the NSM-20 report “patently false” and said that the department “could have AI write the report because it is not informed by reality or context or the informed opinions of subject matter experts.”
The administration’s own actions are also an acknowledgement of how difficult it has been for the U.S. to distribute aid in Gaza. The $320 million humanitarian pier, which was intended to be the Biden administration’s attempt to overcome the difficulties to distribute aid, has been a failure. Less than two weeks after it became operational — in which it delivered fewer than 60 aid trucks of aid, very few, if any, of which were distributed in Gaza — the pier was towed away and forced to suspend operations due to inclement weather .
There is evidence that U.S. pressure can push Israel to make some changes. After the Israeli strike that killed seven World Central Kitchen staffers led Biden to threaten a change in U.S. policy, there was a small uptick in the aid corridors opened and trucks allowed in. But even at the time, Power warned that famine was likely underway in parts of Gaza, and the entire population was at risk of facing famine. And now she says that partners on the ground indicate that the situation is even worse than it was before the WCK staffers were killed, and no change in U.S. policy appears to be forthcoming.
Blaise Malley is a freelance writer and a former Responsible Statecraft reporter. He is currently a MA candidate at New York University. His writing has appeared in The New Republic, The American Prospect, The American Conservative, and elsewhere.
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File:Samantha Power Speaking in Geneva.jpg - Wikimedia Commons
In a September 20 Truth Social post, President Trump threatened the Taliban, declaring, “If Afghanistan doesn’t give Bagram Airbase back… BAD THINGS ARE GOING TO HAPPEN!!” He now wants the military base he once negotiated away as part of the U.S. withdrawal agreement his first administration signed in 2019.
Not unexpectedly, the Taliban quickly refused, noting “under the Doha Agreement, the United States pledged that ‘it will not use or threaten force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Afghanistan, nor interfere in its internal affairs.’” And with China now deeply entrenched in post-war Afghanistan, it’s likely Beijing will ensure that the threat remains little more than another off-the-cuff comment that should not be taken literally nor seriously.
Since early 2025, Trump has mentioned Bagram, not as a military objective but as a strategic chess piece in his broader confrontation with China. He has described the base as being “an hour away from where [China] makes its nuclear weapons,” framing it as a critical outpost the U.S. should never have given up. In Trump’s view, reclaiming Bagram would reestablish American dominance in a region he believes is drifting into Beijing’s orbit. It’s also a powerful political narrative: take back what Biden lost, restore strength and project American resolve in an era of perceived decline.
But while Trump talks about taking Bagram back, China has already moved in. After the U.S. withdrawal in 2021, Beijing wasted little time expanding its influence, becoming the first country to accredit a Taliban ambassador in 2023.
In August 2025, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi visited Kabul for high-level talks, during which Beijing signaled interest in Afghanistan’s vast mineral reserves, including lithium, copper and uranium, and in expanding trade and infrastructure links under its Belt and Road Initiative. For China, Afghanistan is now a critical strategic partner. A renewed U.S. military presence would threaten those interests, and Beijing is unlikely to stand by quietly if Washington tries to force its way back in.
Some analysts believe Trump’s demand may be less about actually retaking Bagram and more about creating leverage. It could be a bargaining chip, a maximalist opening meant to extract something smaller, such as the return of some of the $7 billion in U.S. weapons left behind during the withdrawal. He might seek assurances regarding the protection of minority rights or commitments to restrict terrorist safe havens in exchange for concessions, even though concerns of ISIS-K and other terror groups have proven illusory.
According to Helena Malikyar, Afghanistan's former ambassador to Italy, “The U.S. has military bases in many other countries, but that doesn’t necessarily imply a colonizer-colonized relationship — consider Japan, Germany, Qatar, or Bahrain.” She adds: “That said, I doubt the U.S. has any urgent need for Bagram, given that Pakistan has granted access to its airbases since 1959. In fact, the airbases in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Punjab are even closer to China than Bagram is.”
Rhetorically, Trump’s ploy also plays well, allowing him to cast Biden’s exit from Afghanistan as a historic blunder that he alone is prepared to fix. But whether it’s a bluff or a real objective, the rhetoric raises the stakes, and regional powers like China, Russia and even the Taliban are watching closely.
But as Zalmai Nishat, Research Fellow at Sussex Asia Centre, points out, “the Taliban is far from monolithic. While certain factions may see benefit in cooperating with the U.S., others, particularly those tied closely to Hibatullah [Akhundzada], would fiercely resist. Any move to reclaim Bagram would expose these divisions, and the Taliban’s response would depend on which faction prevails.”
This internal fragmentation is only one layer of a far more complex equation. Trump’s push for Bagram would not just challenge the Taliban but also confront a regional order that no longer centers on Washington. Realities on the ground have shifted dramatically since the days of U.S. occupation. China is intent on solidifying its role in Afghanistan’s reconstruction and won’t tolerate a U.S. return that threatens its access to valuable minerals or its broader security interests.
Iran would certainly see U.S. facilities as potential targets and Russia, the first country to formally recognize the Taliban government, has a broad footprint in Afghanistan today. It provides oil and wheat at discounted prices, cooperates with its security services on counterterrorism programs and promotes its 11-nation Moscow Format to address Afghan issues. Neither Beijing nor Moscow is likely to support a renewed American military presence that could destabilize the fragile balance they seek to maintain.
Critically, the American people are likely to reject a military redeployment to a country where two decades of fighting achieved little and the threat of Afghanistan turning into a sanctuary and safe haven for terrorism has not borne out.
Even if the Taliban were to agree to a negotiated solution, it would be difficult for President Trump to sell the deal. It took two decades after the fall of Saigon for the United States to reestablish diplomatic relationships with Vietnam, and it’s reasonable to believe that popular and congressional support would be equally opposed. Like most of President Trump’s verbal and Truth Social pronouncements, the Bagram proposal can be taken literally or seriously, but not both.
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Top photo credit: Leader of ANO party Andrej Babis speaks during a press conference after the preliminary results of the parliamentary election, at the party's election headquarters in Prague, Czech Republic, October 4, 2025. REUTERS/Radovan Stoklasa
Nationalist populist Andrej Babiš scored a decisive win in the Czech Republic’s parliamentary elections held over the weekend. With the vote count almost finalized, the ANO (“Yes”) party of former Prime Minister Andrej Babiš had 35% of the vote with incumbent Prime Minister Petr Fiala’s centrist Spolu (“Together”) coalition in second place with around 23%.
ANO’s victory margin exceeds the forecasts of pre-election polling, which anticipated a gap of about ten percentage points.
This election replicated the pattern seen in recent contests in Austria, Poland, and Romania where right populists emulating the success of Trump have harnessed economic and social grievances, a sovereigntist challenge to the EU, migration flows, and Ukraine fatigue to gain support and sometimes win power. These developments across Europe have been called Trump’s European revolution.
ANO’s strong finish indicates that the alarm raised by the center right PM Fiala, President Petr Pavel, and the sympathetic European press, about the pernicious role of Russian disinformation failed to move the needle back toward the incumbent mainstream. A self-described “Trumpist,” Babiš campaigned on a “Strong Czechia” (Silne Cesko) slogan, displayed on red baseball caps.
Babiš does not favor leaving the EU or NATO, but he opposes arming Ukraine and the NATO pledge to raise defense spending to 5% of GDP. The issue of migration is not as salient on the populist right in Czechia as it is in France, Germany or Hungary. However, the country has offered refuge to many Ukrainians, an expense resented by some voters, in view of the tight fiscal policy of the Fiala government.
Along with Hungarian PM Viktor Orbán, Babiš founded the right-populist Patriots of Europe faction in the European Parliament after the European elections of last year. Two other Czech parties broadly in support of Babiš, the Freedom and Direct Democracy (SPD) party and the Motorists for Themselves, finished with 7.9% and 6.8% respectively. Both parties are Eurosceptic and belong to Patriots for Europe. The SPD has called for referendums testing support for remaining in the EU and NATO.
Babiš has promised to boost social spending and is ready to defy EU limitations on fiscal deficits. He also opposes EU migration policies and EU-imposed climate related guidelines.
Security issues in the campaign
President Petr Pavel, a former NATO general, is a fervent supporter of the European consensus on Ukraine and of NATO’s rearmament drive. His signature contribution has been to spearhead an EU initiative to procure artillery shells globally for Ukraine. Babiš has indicated he might drop or modify Czech participation in this scheme.
Pavel seems prepared to appoint Babiš but has indicated he would oppose any role for SPD in a governing coalition because they are open to withdrawal from the EU and NATO. In a speech on October 1, Pavel urged voters to reject Russian attempts to draw Central Europe back under Russian influence.
This decisive win for ANO makes the Babiš appointment likely, but Pavel has pledged to scrutinize conflicts of interest stemming from Babiš’ considerable business activities. Hard evidence of Russian meddling through TikTok and other social media could also hold up the formation of a new government.
Critics depicted Babiš as at best complacent about Russia’s potential threat to European NATO members after drone incursions in Poland and Romania and the alleged violation of Estonian airspace by Russian military aircraft.
Polls indicate that a solid majority of Czech citizens favor a negotiated settlement of the war in Ukraine, even if this involves ceding territory. It seems highly improbable that these evolving attitudes are explained exclusively by Russian influence operations. Two politically active former Czech presidents, Václav Klaus (2003-2013) and Miloš Zeman (2013-2023), are fervent Eurosceptics and not enthusiastic supporters of Ukraine.
A centrist coalition consisting of Spolu, STAN (mayors and independents), and Pirates would amount to only 42% of the vote. Babiš has stated his preference to govern alone with a minority of seats, seeking only ad hoc support from other parties. Whether this will be feasible depends on the conditions Pavel will require in return for designating Babiš to form a government. His two potential coalition partners — SPD and Motorists — are more anti-EU and anti-Ukraine than he is. Pavel has indicated he considers EU and NATO membership to be a core raison d’etat for the Czech Republic.
Implications: Cohabitation or deadlock
The cohabitation of presidents and prime ministers from opposing parties will test institutions in Czechia as it is already doing in Poland. Presidents in both countries have some power to shape foreign and security policy. Poland’s president Karol Nawrocki is a nationalist-populist in uneasy cohabitation with the pro-EU and pro-Ukraine liberal PM Donald Tusk. The situation emerging in Czechia will have the two roles reversed.
Poland, Hungary, Czechia and Slovakia will now have some or all power held by nationalist-populists. This may lead to a revival of the four countries’ cooperation in their Visegrad group to press the common sovereigntist outlook of Poland’s Nawrocki, Hungary’s Orbán, Slovakia’s Fico, and Czechia’s Babiš. This could create problems for Brussels and Ukraine.
Babiš will have to conciliate Pavel in order to gain and keep the role of Prime Minister. Although he admires and likes Orbán, he seems likely to follow the more cautious approach followed by Italy’s Georgia Meloni in relation to the EU, rather than joining Orbán’s high-risk challenge to the EU and open opposition to Ukraine’s European aspirations.
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Top photo credit: Safra A. Catz, CEO of Oracle, prepares to place a memorial candle on the day Republican presidential nominee and former U.S. President Donald Trump participates in an event commemorating the one-year anniversary of the October 7 Hamas attacks on Israel, at his golf resort in Doral, Florida, U.S., October 7, 2024. REUTERS/Marco Bello
TikTok’s impending sale to a group of U.S. investors led by Oracle was supposed to alleviate concerns about foreign influence over the popular social media platform. But a series of statements in Israeli media outlets by company executives including Executive Vice Board Chair and former CEO Safra Catz, reveal the company's commitment to Israel is “unequivocal" and is not shy about squelching criticism of Israel internally.
These statements raise questions about how Oracle might exercise its impending ownership role at TikTok, a platform popular with young adults who are often critical of U.S. support for Israel’s war in Gaza and Israel’s killing of Palestinian civilians, which a U.N. commission recently characterized as a “genocide.”
In 2021, Catz visited Israel as her first trip outside the U.S. after the COVID-19 pandemic. Calcalist, an Israeli publication, reported on remarks by the Oracle CEO:
When asked about the protests against Israel organized by employees at Google and Apple, Catz said that "when you connect with Oracle you understand that we are committed to the U.S. and Israel. We are not flexible regarding our mission, and our commitment to Israel is second to none. This is a free world and I love my employees, and if they don't agree with our mission to support the State of Israel then maybe we aren't the right company for them. Larry (Ellison, co-founder of Oracle) and I are publicly committed to Israel and devote personal time to the country and no one should be surprised by that."
In a 2024 interview with Calcalist, Catz emphasized that one of her first actions after the October 7th 2023 Hamas attack was to send the message to Oracle’s clients around the world - including, presumably, in many countries where Oracle holds government contracts - that the technology company prioritizes Israel. She said:
"So what we did was first sort of hug our employees, hug my Oracle employees by doing everything we could think of and put on our website ‘We stand with Israel’, not only on our Israeli website or even on our American website, but on our websites around the world in the local language. And as you know, we operate in a lot of countries. And it was very important for us to make sure we made a powerful message about how important Israel is and what the difference is between good and evil.”
Head of Oracle Israel Eran Feigenbaum reinforced the messages delivered by Catz in a 2023 interview with the Israeli publication Ynet. Feigenbaum said:
"I couldn't fathom a global company offering more support to Israel than Oracle. It's an incredible opportunity to lead the Israeli branch with the backing of a global powerhouse. Oracle's leadership, including the fact that Larry himself has an Israeli origin, has consistently demonstrated unequivocal support for Israel. So much so, that employees not aligning with support for Israel may find Oracle isn't the right fit."
The message from higher ups at Oracle that anything less than total prioritization of Israeli interests is unwelcome behavior appears to be reinforced through the company’s human resources department. An anonymous Substack, Oracle For Palestine, written by a group of Oracle employees, claims that that “our leadership’s unquestioning public support for Israel” has led to a failure of the company to address the one-sided political positions taken by top management and the discrimination faced by employees who don’t share the political views of management.
“In response to legitimate concerns, many of us have been referred to internal mental health resources rather than having those concerns addressed appropriately,” said the group in a post last year.
Catz’s comments as well as the anecdote about Oracle staff being referred to mental health resources were all celebrated in a Times of Israel blog post by Oracle employee Ivan Bassov.
“Oracle has been refreshingly clear and consistent under the leadership of our CEO, Safra Catz,” wrote Bassov. “She has repeatedly articulated both her personal commitment and Oracle’s commitment to Israel.”
Bassov appeared to corroborate the anonymous Substack’s claims and endorsed Oracle’s treatment of his “anti-Israel” colleagues, writing, “Well, if sending these ‘activists’ to therapy instead of resetting the company’s moral compass counts as ‘repression,’ then maybe the company’s judgment was sounder than they think.”
Earlier this week, Responsible Statecraft reported on a leaked email from the hacked email account of former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak. “We have all been horrified by the growth of the BDS movement in college campuses and have concluded that we have to fight this battle before the kids even get to college,” said an email appearing to originate from Catz to Barak in 2015. “We believe that we have to embed the love and respect for Israel in the American culture.”
Sources familiar with the matter “could not confirm the authenticity of the email” and Oracle declined to comment about Catz’s statements. However, review of Catz’s public statements, as well as those from another executive at Oracle, reveal similar biases in favor of Israel and even clearer expressions of Oracle’s prioritization of Israel over any other countries or corporate interests.The track record of Oracle executives demanding commitment to Israel from staff around the world raises a number of questions:
How does Oracle address situations in which U.S. interests, or the interests of any other country in which the company operates, are in conflict with Israel's interests?
Will these statements of unequivocal support for Israel translate into restrictions on speech critical of Israel on TikTok under Oracle’s ownership?
An Oracle spokesperson did not respond to these questions.
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