What does Putin really want?

This article is part of our special series recognizing the four-year anniversary of the Ukraine War

The Russian invasion of Ukraine is entering its fifth year. We know from history that warring states are capable of enduring far longer than anyone imagined possible, despite unrecoverable losses in men and materiel, national treasure and morale, or international prestige.

And as battles over piles of rubble grind on, the war’s causes, so front of mind at the outset, may recede from public consciousness. Arguments over causes and origins seem less important than the need to prevail or survive, to pull something worthwhile from ruin.

After four years of nearly ceaseless combat, Russia has not conquered all of the Donbas. Minuscule territorial gains have come at such a cost that losses now exceed recruitment. Neither side has achieved a military breakthrough, and neither appears on the brink of military or political collapse.

Moreover, important questions that emerged in the early months of this endless war of attrition remain difficult to answer. Thus, the two sides aren’t mired only at the front lines in eastern Ukraine. There’s been little substantial movement around the obstacles to a durable peace.

I asked several experts to comment on how Russia’s autocrat defines victory — what are Putin’s aims? Also, whether Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy should drop his opposition to ceding national territory, what Ukraine might receive in return for such a concession, and the consequences for the “rules-based order.”

Nicolai Petro, political scientist at the University of Rhode Island and Senior Washington Fellow at the Institute for Peace and Diplomacy

Putin’s peace terms have been consistent since the outbreak of the war. They are: 1) a neutral and non-nuclear Ukraine that is not part of any military alliance; 2) a demilitarized Ukraine; 3) a denazified Ukraine. Russian control over Crimea, Donetsk, Lugansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia is non-negotiable for Russia, though this need not be formally recognized by Ukraine, so long as it withdraws its troops from these regions.

Each side — Ukraine, Russia, America, and Europe — will try to spin the final agreement to their own domestic political advantage. For Russia, complete victory would be achieving all three objectives. Anything short of that will be spun as a partial (but still worthwhile) victory by Russia, and as a defeat of Russia by the West.

In any negotiation worthy of the name, acceptable terms are decided by the interlocutors. The involvement of third parties only complicates direct negotiations. Also, since territorial exchanges after wars are commonplace, I see no consequences for international law or any “rules-based order.” Any territorial changes are simply made part of the new order.

Sergey Radchenko, historian at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and author of “To Run The World.”

There are two issues here that lead to dramatically different interpretations of what Putin is after. One is that Putin is basically interested in the Donbas, and if the Ukrainians abandon the territory, then the war will end in some sort of a ceasefire. But there’s another interpretation. That is, Putin wants not just the territory but political control of Ukraine itself. In this sense, until he actually reaches that point, he will not end the war.

Or you might think about this from Putin’s perspective. He has a fixation with territory because he sees control over Ukraine as part of Russia’s self-image as a great empire. He’s trying to restore Russian greatness. This is where there is no agreement as to what Putin’s goals are.

Ukrainians have put too much faith in a promise of Western security guarantees. The West has not been willing to put boots on the ground to fight the Russians. And to imagine it’ll be willing to do that in the future is folly. I don’t see the United States guaranteeing anything at all, although Trump has been talking about NATO Article 5-style guarantees. I find it hard to believe it would be credible.

So, what can actually guarantee Ukraine’s security? The answer is Ukraine’s own military. In the Istanbul talks back in 2022, the sticking point was what kind of army would Ukraine be allowed to have post-conflict. The Russians have been trying to restrict it because they know that is the real guarantee of Ukraine’s security.

Dr. Sumantra Maitra, Senior Fellow, Center for Renewing America

Vladimir Putin miscalculated Ukrainian resolve when he started the conflict, but now that he is in, he wants two things. One, to keep Ukraine out of NATO. That aim is a permanent aim of Russian grand strategy, to have a buffer between NATO and Russia. For that cause, he is willing to continue the conflict, as he enjoys superiority in numbers, and he knows that NATO won't directly join the war against Russia. His second aim is to have a grand bargain with the U.S. and have a disunited European continent. He is willing not to escalate the conflict to devastating proportions, because he wants to keep a negotiation option open.

The Russian way of war didn't quite serve the aims of Putin, as the Russian army is not capable of good combined arms ops against Ukraine, and the Russian economy is clashing against the overwhelming might of European countries and the US. That being said, he can continue his little random gains as he has superior numbers, and Ukrainians suffer from desertions and low manpower. If this continues, we might end up in a World War One scenario of rapid Ukrainian lines collapsing.

Ukraine should at least consider the current boundaries as the international line of demarcation. Both sides should decide on a day of cessation of fighting, and then pull troops back five miles essentially creating a demarcation zone similar to the Korean War. Then negotiations can continue. The American side should threaten to walk away if that doesn't happen.

The rules-based order was never orderly, nor rules based, and we are now back in a world of imperialism, spheres, conquests, and great powers. That is a result of structural realities, such as multipolarity, relative power gap between powers, tech advancement and offense dominated battlespace, and surplus elites having no jobs, fueling populism.

Nikolas Gvosdev, Senior fellow for national security at the Foreign Policy Research Institute

Ever since the 2004 Orange Revolution, Putin has been consistent in what he "wants" from Ukraine: a government in Kyiv that is receptive to Russian interests. These include a Ukraine that does not deploy NATO infrastructure or personnel on its territory, does not compromise Russia's power projection capabilities into the Black Sea and the larger Mediterranean area, that does not obstruct Russia's ability to reach larger global markets, and most importantly, a Ukraine that does not put up barriers to separate itself from a larger Russian world space.

What has changed over the years are the tactics, from support for Viktor Yanukovych and backing political forces inside Ukraine, to seizing Crimea and attempting to impose a constitutional settlement on Ukraine, to resorting to large-scale armed conflict. Since 2022, Russian methods have changed, from attempting an effective coup d'etat, to trying to hive off southeastern Ukraine, to now engaging in a war of attrition in the hopes that Ukraine will accept a settlement in order to preserve the rest of the country. But he will define victory as meeting these overall conditions. Many rounds of negotiations have made it clear that Ukraine is not ready to acquiesce to this entire program.

The inconsistent enforcement of the "rules" has already exposed the hollowness of the concept. What I often hear from "Global South" interlocutors is that much of the rest of the world is already used to a divergence between de jure claims and de facto realities. One thing I've seen in the negotiating process is an effort to find a fig leaf to paper over the gap. At one point, there was a proposal for Ukraine to "sell" Crimea to Russia; now we have ideas about demilitarized, special-economic zones as a way to reconcile irreconcilable Russian and Ukrainian claims. In this regard, how India and Pakistan continue to manage the Kashmir challenge may provide useful guidance.