Update 9/18, 7 a.m. EST: In a press conference Wednesday, Lebanese Health Minister Firas Abiad updated the casualties, saying close to 2,800 injured and 12 dead in yesterday's exploding pager attack. An 11-year-old boy, in addition to an 8-year-old girl, are among the dead.
It's not clear at this juncture whether theexploding Hezbollah pager attack in Lebanon that has so far killed nine people — including an 8-year-old girl — and injured nearly 3,000 — including Iran’s ambassador, who was using Hezbollah’s phone network— was a between-meal snack or an amuse bouche preceding a lavish entrée.
Reports indicate this was a coordinated attack and a significant breach of the militants’ communications system. Presumably the Israelis, if they intend to strike, will want to do so while Hezbollah’s command and control is disrupted.
Israeli defense minister Yoav Gallant has been eager to commence some sort of large-scale operation in the north; this is why he has been a proponent of a Gaza ceasefire. Apparently, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has made the return of Israeli civilians to their homes in the north a war aim. He has said this publicly but more importantly directly to the senior U.S. official monitoring the situation. (For the record, Washington has noted that a war in the north would preclude the return of internally displaced Israelis to northern towns.)
Apart from Israel’s exploitation of Hezbollah communications to enable the detonation of thousands of pagers, there have not been any obvious precursors to a large-scale Israeli ground attack. It is possible, of course, that the IDF is content to stage an incursion with a smaller force than would seem prudent, along the lines of the one currently deployed to the northern front (1 active and 1 reserve division). But the operational risk could be considerable. So for the moment, it’s wait and see.
Steven Simon is a Distinguished Fellow and visiting lecturer at Dartmouth College and Senior Research Fellow at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft. Previously, he was the Robert E. Wilhelm Fellow in International Affairs at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He served as the National Security Council senior director for counterterrorism in the Clinton White House and for the Middle East and North Africa in the Obama White House. He is the author of "Grand Delusion: The Rise and Fall of American Ambition in the Middle East" (2023).
A person is carried on a stretcher outside American University of Beirut Medical Center (AUBMC) as people, including Hezbollah fighters and medics, were wounded and killed when the pagers they use to communicate exploded across Lebanon, according to a security source, in Beirut, Lebanon September 17, 2024. REUTERS/Mohamed Azakir TPX
Top image credit: France's Prime Minister Francois Bayrou arrives to hear France's President Emmanuel Macron deliver a speech to army leaders at l'Hotel de Brienne in Paris on July 13, 2025, on the eve of the annual Bastille Day Parade in the French capital. LUDOVIC MARIN/Pool via REUTERS
If you wanted to create a classic recipe for political crisis, you could well choose a mixture of a stagnant economy, a huge and growing public debt, a perceived need radically to increase military spending, an immigration crisis, a deeply unpopular president, a government without a majority in parliament, and growing radical parties on the right and left.
In other words, France today. And France’s crisis is only one part of the growing crisis of Western Europe as a whole, with serious implications for the future of transatlantic relations.
The latest shock in France has come with the announcement by Prime Minister Francois Bayrou that he will call a parliamentary vote of confidence on September 8 over his plan for €43.8 billion ($51.1 billion) in budget cuts to address France’s budget deficit 5.8 percent of GDP — almost double the three percent that is supposed to be the limit for members of the Eurozone, and the highest in Europe after Greece and Italy, leading to a debt to GDP ratio of 113 percent. French GDP growth last year was only 1.2 percent and the economy is projected to grow by a mere 0.6 percent this year.
Bayrou’s plan includes the freezing of welfare payments, reductions in pensioners’ benefits, the abolition of two national holidays, deep cuts to state jobs, and unspecified tax increases for the wealthy. The only area of state spending that will increase is the military — and it is President Macron’s pledge (in line with the promise of Europe’s NATO members to President Trump) radically to increase military spending that has brought France’s fiscal crisis to a head.
This would involve the French military budget rising from around two percent now to 3.5 percent (plus another 1.5 percent in “defense-related” infrastructure spending). In July, Macron promised that the French military budget would reach €64 billion in 2027, three years earlier than previously planned and twice the figure in 2017. He also promised that this would not involve any increase in debt. Bayrou’s thankless task is to try to reconcile these two promises.
Bayrou is prime minister today because his predecessor, Michel Barnier, was ousted nine months ago in a vote of no confidence after he passed the 2025 budget by emergency decree having failed to gain a parliamentary majority for budget cuts. This was the first time a government had been ousted by a no confidence vote since 1962.
Bayrou stands a very good chance of being the second premier in a year to fall this way. On the face of it, his challenge looks insuperable. The loose coalition of centrist parties that supports the government was beaten in the snap elections called by Macron in the summer of 2024, and despite an election deal with the left in the second round to keep National Rally (which won a plurality of votes) down to third place in the number of seats, have only 210 seats in the National Assembly, compared to 142 for the radical rightists National Rally and its allies, and 180 for the left-wing New Popular Front.
Both of these groupings have declared that they will vote to oust the government if it persists with its budget plan. The socialists are strongly opposed to austerity measures, and are allied with trades unions that have announced a nationwide strike on September 10 to block the budget.
As for Marine le Pen, leader of the National Rally, her friendliness towards the government is hardly likely to have been increased by what many see as a politically-motivated legal case launched against her by the government, which (unless overturned on appeal) will lead to her being banned from standing in the next presidential elections.
If Bayrou’s government falls, there are likely to be fresh parliamentary elections; and the premier’s best chance may be that neither of the opposition blocs are afraid that the French public would blame them for a new political crisis, and that if the government is prepared to abandon some of its budget cuts (or covertly abandon the case against Le Pen), one or other could abstain in the no-confidence vote, leading to a government victory.
This is far from certain however. Radical socialist leader Jean-Luc Melenchon has already said that Macron himself should resign if the government loses new elections.
The implications of this crisis extend far beyond the borders of France. Bayrou has warned that if it does not reduce its debt, France will risk the fate of Greece after the 2008 financial crisis, when it suffered years of recession and very harsh and bitterly unpopular austerity measures imposed by the European Union (at the instigation of Germany) as a condition of its bailouts.
It seems inconceivable however that Brussels would be able to impose such austerity measures on France, the second largest economy in the EU. Presiding over deepening economic decline would be the politically easier choice. Moreover Germany, the largest economy, is facing severe budgetary problems of its own. Disputes over the budget brought down the last German coalition government.
The present coalition of Christian Democrats and Social Democrats have agreed (despite deep unhappiness among fiscal conservatives in the CDU) to increase borrowing from €33 billion in 2024 to €81 billion this year and €126 billion in 2029 in order to pay for a doubling of Germany’s military spending and huge (and badly needed) investment in infrastructure. Economists are warning however that this will not be sustainable without cuts in social welfare. As elsewhere in Europe, Germany’s problems in this regard are being worsened by its aging population, which both reduces the tax base and creates a huge lobby against cuts to pensions and healthcare.
The German elections in February saw a surge in support for the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) which opinion polls now show as close to overtaking the Christian Democrats as the most popular party. If this rise is sustained up to the next German national elections due in 2029, then one of two things will happen: either the other parties will maintain their “firewall” against allowing AfD into government, which will require a permanent, unstable and deeply divided coalition of perhaps all the other parties against them, or the firewall will collapse, leading to a German government far to the right of anything seen since 1945.
In Britain too, the Labour government of Keir Starmer is deeply unpopular. It has suffered two humiliating revolts by its own MPs against its attempts to cut social welfare so as to increase military spending and is facing the defection of many of its voters to a new left-wing party. Debt to GDP stands at 103 percent and rising.
As in France and Germany, the right-wing populist Reform Party of Nigel Farage is surging in the polls, and has a real chance of forming the next British government.
Some of these radical parties of the right and left (like AfD and the socialists in France) are openly opposed to European military support for Ukraine and increases in military spending. Others fell in line behind NATO under the shock of the Russian invasion, but are strongly opposed to a European reassurance force for Ukraine. All believe (though with very different emphases) that their countries’ problems are overwhelmingly internal ones, that will not be solved by higher military spending.
The lessons for the Trump administration are the following: first, be very skeptical of European promises to significantly increase military spending. Even if present governments are sincere, it may well be simply beyond their power.Second, however, be careful of pushing them too hard. The political and economic stability of Europe is an old and vital US interest — far more vital than the exact borders of Ukraine.
Finally, be even more careful about encouraging and guaranteeing a European “reassurance force” for Ukraine. Lacking both adequate resources and adequate political support, the European planners of this force are in no position to guarantee it themselves.
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Top photo credit: President of Russia Vladimir Putin, during the World Cup Champion Trophy Award Ceremony in 2018 (shutterstock/A.RICARDO)
After a furious week of diplomacy in Alaska and Washington D.C., U.S. President Donald Trump signaled on Friday that he would be pausing his intensive push to end war in Ukraine. His frustration was obvious. “I’m not happy about anything about that war. Nothing. Not happy at all,” he told reporters in the Oval Office.
To be sure, Trump’s high-profile engagements fell short of his own promises. But almost two weeks after Trump met Russian President Vladimir Putin in Alaska and European leaders in Washington, it is clear that there were real winners and losers from Trump’s back-to-back summits, and while neither meeting resolved the conflict, they offered important insights into where things may be headed in the months ahead.
Putin clearly fared best of all. He got a face-to-face meeting with his American counterpart on U.S. soil, avoided the economic penalties that Trump had threatened, and continued his war without making notable concessions. Putin had long wanted a bilateral with Trump, not only for the legitimacy such a meeting would give Russia’s great power aspirations, but also because keeping Trump engaged in negotiations is essential to Putin’s war aims. Only with U.S. involvement can Putin hope to address the “root causes” of the war in Ukraine, including NATO’s eastward expansion.
The substance of the meeting offered Putin additional wins. He convinced Trump to give up on the European demand for an unconditional ceasefire, and to accept in principle Russia’s territorial demands, though Trump acknowledged only Ukraine could agree to Putin’s terms.
Putin did not achieve all his goals, however. He arrived ready to bargain, but did not walk away with any of the U.S.-Russia deals that he seemed to hope for, on natural resources, arctic cooperation, or arms control, though these issues may have been discussed. Still, back in Moscow, Putin must have felt pleased, especially as he watched Europe’s sprint to Washington days later.
Trump didn’t leave empty handed either, though he did not get what he really wanted — an end to the war. For starters, Trump clearly welcomed the opportunity to play peacemaker, and relished the pageantry of his made-for-television Alaska summit, complete with a red carpet and stealth bomber flyover. Last Monday’s meeting at the White House gave Trump’s ego an additional boost, as Europe’s politicians fell over themselves praising his leadership.
But Trump’s biggest gains from Alaska had little to do with his efforts to end the war in Ukraine. First and most important was Putin’s validation of Trump’s longtime grievances against the Biden administration, including his claim that the war in Ukraine never would have started under a Trump presidency. Second, having backed himself into a corner with his 10-day ultimatum, the summit gave Trump an escape route and a way to defer economic punishments that he knew would not affect Putin’s calculus and did not want to impose in the first place.
That his subsequent meeting with Europe yielded fewer tangible outcomes could also be framed as a win. Europeans arrived determined to extract clear statements from the United States on security guarantees for Ukraine. Trump denied this aim by offering only the most vague and limited of U.S. commitments and muddying the waters further in subsequent interviews.
n doing so, he threw the ball back in Europe’s court, making clear that they would be providing the bulk of any security guarantee to Ukraine, no matter how they wanted to spin it.
Still, Trump’s position is not enviable. If his summit diplomacy revealed one thing it is how little leverage he actually has to end the war. He has few sticks he can wield to force Putin to the bargaining table, a fact he himself admitted weeks ago, and seems unwilling to coerce Zelensky into concessions, perhaps fearing the domestic political costs of being seen as the leader who “lost” Ukraine.
Even with these setbacks, however, Trump came out far better than Europe. After their meeting in Washington, European leaders were upbeat. They had prevented Trump from strong-arming Zelensky and saw Trump’s apparent openness to U.S. involvement in security guarantees as a victory, even if that commitment was flimsy at best.
Their reality, however, was less rosy than their post-meeting soundbites. They were unable to change Trump’s mind on the wisdom of land swaps and unable to win him back to their view that an immediate ceasefire was necessary. They failed to get “iron-clad” U.S. support for Ukraine or even specific U.S. contributions to a European reassurance force, though some proposals have now been offered.
Worse, in a repeat of the March 2025 “coalition of the willing” drama, it is still unclear whether Europe can find the manpower or willpower to resource a long-term force based inside Ukraine that they themselves have proposed. In any case, the Europeans are fooling themselves if they think Trump, who has been unwilling to impose economic penalties on Moscow, would really put U.S. forces at risk in Ukraine if it came down to it.
Most damaging for Europe were the optics. Racing across the Atlantic to meet with Trump, European leaders looked desperate and panicked. They insisted that they deserved a seat at the table, after being left out of Alaska, but their performance in Washington suggested instead just how little they have to offer. After all, they have few weapons to provide Ukraine, limited economic leverage on Moscow, and no plan for ending the war.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, Ukraine came out worst of all. True, it did not have to make major concessions and was not forced into surrender. But the writing seemed to be on the wall. Over the course of four days, Trump made clear that Ukraine would not be in NATO and would have to give up territory. He pressed Zelensky on when he would hold elections and at points returned to blaming Ukraine for starting the war. He offered nothing concrete in the way of military aid or security commitments that would help end the war or keep Ukraine secure over the longer term.
Kyiv’s real problem is that time is not on its side. Its battlefield position is eroding rapidly, largely due to lack of sufficient personnel, while Russia is gaining ground in the Donbas and elsewhere. The longer the war endures, the worse Kyiv’s position becomes. Eventually, Ukraine’s front lines will collapse, and at that point the terms of any settlement will look considerably worse than what’s on offer today.
The high-stakes summits and the scramble afterwards to come up with security guarantees for Ukraine ultimately made things worse for Kyiv. Russia has already indicated that it will reject any settlement that includes provisions for NATO member states to position forces inside Ukraine, especially if U.S. military assets are involved—but this is just the solution that Europeans are offering. Putin is likely to keep fighting if this is the deal on the table, rather than settle, extending the war. For Ukraine, this is the worst possible outcome.
Zelensky left Washington last week with no good options, the two summits having underscored just how dire his position is. The only security guarantees the West might offer are strong enough to keep Putin in the war today but too weak to protect Ukraine or to sell to his domestic population as compensation for concessions elsewhere.
Meanwhile, his most vocal backers, the Europeans, have revealed themselves to be largely incapable of influencing the trajectory of the war. They will continue to advocate for Kyiv, but are likely to be bystanders in meaningful developments to end the conflict.
For his part, Trump really does seem to want peace, but he cares at least as much about how the war and its end affects his political legacy as he does about the details of the conflict or the settlement reached. This is not a good starting place for what will eventually be a challenging negotiation with Russia to end the war. An agreement that leaves the door open to recurring war could easily result if Trump rushes to reach a deal for his own sake.
Giving Russia and Ukraine his famous “two weeks” notice last Friday, Trump found himself in the same position he was a month ago. He issues deadlines, the war continues, and there’s not much he can do about it.
Russia can’t fight forever, but for now, the timeline for peace remains firmly in Putin’s hands.
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Top image credit: U.S. Marines with Force Reconnaissance Platoon, Maritime Raid Force, 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit, prepare to clear a room during a limited scale raid exercise at Sam Hill Airfield, Queensland, Australia, June 21, 2025. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Cpl. Alora Finigan)
There is a dangerous pattern on display by the Trump administration. The president and Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth seem to hold the threat and use of military force as their go-to method of solving America’s problems and asserting state power.
The president’s reported authorization for the Pentagon to use U.S. military warfighting capacity to combat drug cartels — a domain that should remain within the realm of law enforcement — represents a significant escalation. This presents a concerning evolution and has serious implications for civil liberties — especially given the administration’s parallel moves with the deployment of troops to the southern border, the use of federal forces to quell protests in California, and the recent deployment of armed National Guard to the streets of our nation’s capital.
Last week, the Pentagon sent three guided-missile destroyers to interdict drug cartel operations off the coast of South America, giving the U.S. Navy unprecedented counternarcotics authority and foreshadowing a potential military stand-off against Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro, who is wanted by the United States on charges of narco-terrorism. This development is echoed by President Trump reportedly seeking authorization to deploy U.S. military forces on the ground against drug cartels in Mexico.
These efforts are not new. Trump and the GOP have increasingly called for U.S. military interdiction against Mexican drug cartels under the banner of counterterrorism. During his first administration, Trump seriously considered launching strikes at drug labs in Mexico in an effort that was successfully shut down by then-Secretary of Defense Mark Esper.
But there are no such guardrails in the new Trump administration, and the rhetoric has progressively crept toward the use of U.S. special operations, specifically. During an interview on Fox News in November, incoming Border Czar Tom Homan announced that, “[President Trump] will use the full might of the United States special operations to take [the cartels] out.”
If that is indeed the direction the administration wants to go, it appears to be taking action to set plans into motion, starting with an executive order on day one that designated cartels as foreign terrorist organizations — thus opening a Pandora’s box of potential legal authority to use military force. On signing the order, President Trump acknowledged, “People have been wanting to do this for years.” And when asked if he would be ordering U.S. special forces into Mexico to “take out” the cartels, Trump replied enigmatically, “Could happen … stranger things have happened.”
The executive order upholds that drug cartels “operate both within and outside the United States … [and] present an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States.” It declares a national emergency under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act. The specificity of both “within and outside” the U.S. combined with the declaration of a national emergency is perhaps the first step toward the broader use of executive power to deploy military forces in counternarcotics operations not only within Mexico, but potentially the United States too.
To be sure, the Trump administration is already testing the limits of Posse Comitatus — the law that prevents presidents from using the military as a domestic police force — by invoking questionable authorities to use National Guard and active duty troops during the counter-ICE protests in California and, most recently, to declare a “crime emergency” in Washington, D.C. federalizing the police force and deploying troops to patrol the district’s streets. Reports this week suggest the administration is preparing to do the same in Chicago.
The naval operations in South America are likely just the beginning. If the U.S. military were to engage in Mexico, the most likely forces to execute an operation would be a task force under the U.S. Army’s 7th Special Forces Group, whose area of responsibility includes Central and South America, or a specialized task force under the Joint Special Operations Command.
Historically, along with past administrations, Trump has been inclined toward the use of special operations forces as his default problem-solver. Hegseth has amplified the same proclivity, noting at an industry forum in May that the presidentially-directed use of special operations forces has increased exponentially in the past three years and will only continue, pledging a significant increase in funding for the U.S. Special Operations Command.
Under both Authorizations for the Use of Military Force (2001, 2002) to counter global terrorism, recent presidents, including Trump, have enjoyed an incredible level of authority to unilaterally deploy U.S. military forces for crises or other contingencies without congressional approval. Because of their relatively low troop footprints and the ability to accomplish targeted and short-duration missions (creating a convenient perception of limited military involvement) special operations forces are often preferred.
However, the prospect of using military force in counterdrug operations under the banner of counterterrorism is not only legally debated, it is doctrinally unsound. The Department of Defense defines terrorism as “the unlawful use of violence, or threat of violence, often motivated by religious, political, or other ideological beliefs, to instill fear and coerce governments or societies in pursuit of goals that are usually political.” This is paralleled by the FBI’s definition of terrorism. However, there is no evidence that America’s illicit drug problem is driven by anything other than the pursuit of profit on part of disparate criminal organizations and individuals — fueled by the desire and demand for illicit drugs on part of the millions of Americans consuming them. Therefore, America’s drug problem, as concerning as it is, does not meet the United States’ own definition of terrorism.
While there are malign actions on part of the cartels that parallel activities committed by terrorist organizations — such as the use of violence and intimidation against the civilian populace, government officials, and military and law enforcement — the overriding motivation of drug cartels is not inherently political, or religious, or ideological in nature. Rather, it is largely financial. As with many other categories of criminal activity, illicit drug activity must remain within the domain of law enforcement, and any undermining of government authority by drug cartels is done mainly in the interest of securing profit.
This is a very important delineation when contemplating the use of American warfighters. During the “war on terror,” U.S. forces conducted counterdrug operations across the Middle East. I was directly involved in counternarcotics activities against ISIS-K as a part of the Special Operations Task Force - Afghanistan. However, ISIS was carrying out these operations to directly fund terrorist activities toward the deliberate, ideologically- and politically-driven aim of overthrowing state governments.
Equally important, the Mexican government has made it clear that the deployment of U.S. military forces within Mexico is neither desired nor welcomed and would be considered a violation of Mexico’s sovereignty. Mexico already collaborates with U.S. federal law enforcement in its fight against the drug cartels.
Rather than deploying special operations forces to conduct the kind of activities that would likely lead Mexico into full-scale counterinsurgency conflict — with U.S. forces directly entangled — we should instead nourish long-standing law enforcement partnerships. This would be the most legally appropriate and strategically sound course of action both diplomatically and in interest of regional security.
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