Update 9/18, 7 a.m. EST: In a press conference Wednesday, Lebanese Health Minister Firas Abiad updated the casualties, saying close to 2,800 injured and 12 dead in yesterday's exploding pager attack. An 11-year-old boy, in addition to an 8-year-old girl, are among the dead.
It's not clear at this juncture whether theexploding Hezbollah pager attack in Lebanon that has so far killed nine people — including an 8-year-old girl — and injured nearly 3,000 — including Iran’s ambassador, who was using Hezbollah’s phone network— was a between-meal snack or an amuse bouche preceding a lavish entrée.
Reports indicate this was a coordinated attack and a significant breach of the militants’ communications system. Presumably the Israelis, if they intend to strike, will want to do so while Hezbollah’s command and control is disrupted.
Israeli defense minister Yoav Gallant has been eager to commence some sort of large-scale operation in the north; this is why he has been a proponent of a Gaza ceasefire. Apparently, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has made the return of Israeli civilians to their homes in the north a war aim. He has said this publicly but more importantly directly to the senior U.S. official monitoring the situation. (For the record, Washington has noted that a war in the north would preclude the return of internally displaced Israelis to northern towns.)
Apart from Israel’s exploitation of Hezbollah communications to enable the detonation of thousands of pagers, there have not been any obvious precursors to a large-scale Israeli ground attack. It is possible, of course, that the IDF is content to stage an incursion with a smaller force than would seem prudent, along the lines of the one currently deployed to the northern front (1 active and 1 reserve division). But the operational risk could be considerable. So for the moment, it’s wait and see.
Steven Simon is a Distinguished Fellow and visiting lecturer at Dartmouth College and Senior Research Fellow at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft. Previously, he was the Robert E. Wilhelm Fellow in International Affairs at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He served as the National Security Council senior director for counterterrorism in the Clinton White House and for the Middle East and North Africa in the Obama White House. He is the author of "Grand Delusion: The Rise and Fall of American Ambition in the Middle East" (2023).
A person is carried on a stretcher outside American University of Beirut Medical Center (AUBMC) as people, including Hezbollah fighters and medics, were wounded and killed when the pagers they use to communicate exploded across Lebanon, according to a security source, in Beirut, Lebanon September 17, 2024. REUTERS/Mohamed Azakir TPX
Top photo credit: Bonn, Western Germany. February 04, 2025. Friedrich Merz, chancellor candidate (CDU), speaks to voters at a CDU election campaign tour stop at congress center WCCB. (Shutterstock/Ryan Nash Photography)
The German election set for February 23 has been coasting toward a predictable outcome since the collapse of Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s three-party coalition in December.
Friedrich Merz, the center-right leader of the opposition Christian Democrat CDU-CSU, remains comfortably ahead of his nearest rival, the populist nationalist Alternative for Germany (AfD). In order to become chancellor, Merz will have to form a coalition with either the center-left SPD or the Greens, or possibly both.
This outcome risks producing a new iteration of the unpopular, fractious three-party coalition led by Olaf Scholz.
The major novelty of the race is the unprecedented level of support (about 20%) for AfD. Three mass killings in the last three months — in Magdeburg’s Christmas market, in Aschaffenburg and most recently in Munich — have cast a long shadow over the election campaign. All three perpetrators were of Middle Eastern origin and, in two of the three cases, had applied unsuccessfully for asylum.
These events have boosted the fortunes of the AfD in its second-place position behind the CDU-CSU. The CDU-CSU lead over AfD was 15% as recently as mid-November; it may now be as low as 8 percentage points. The first televised debate of the campaign, held February 9, featured only Merz and Scholz, whose SPD is now polling at about 16%.
As the margin between CDU-CSU and AfD narrowed, Merz sponsored a resolution in the Bundestag calling for tougher measures against irregular migration and prompt deportation of failed asylum seekers. On January 29, this resolution passed with support from the AfD. Merz, in the minds of his many critics, had broken the “firewall” taboo — the pledge of all mainstream parties not to cooperate with the AfD. His move was met by very large protest marches in Berlin and other cities. Merz now insists that CDU-CSU will never violate its pledge not to cooperate with AfD.
Over the course of the campaign, neither Scholz’s Social Democrats (SPD) nor the Greens led by Economy Minister Robert Habeck has gained much momentum, as both bear responsibility for the weak economy. Three smaller parties remain near the 5% threshold for winning seats. They are the antiwar populist left party (BSW) led by Sahra Wagenknecht, Die Linke (the Left) headed by Gregor Gysi, and the business-friendly Free Democrats under Christian Lindner.
Shock therapy for Europe
Last week’s diplomatic blitz by Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth at the Ukraine Defense Contact group, followed by Vice President J.D. Vance’s speech at the Munich Security Conference, brought a shocking new focus on the viability of staying the course on Ukraine and on U.S. commitments to European security, raising the stakes in Germany’s election.
Vance’s critique of Germany’s “firewall” was taken as an attempt to boost support for the AfD. Both Scholz and SPD Defense Minister Pistorius reacted viscerally in Munich, while Foreign Minister Baerbock contended that the U.S. could yet be persuaded to revise its positions on a Ukraine settlement, in particular on territorial concessions to Russia and NATO membership for Ukraine.
Conference organizers had revoked invitations to both AfD and BSW because their delegations had walked out of the speech by Ukraine president Zelensky at last year’s event. Vance pointedly made time to meet with Alice Weidel while in Munich. For good measure, Presidential envoy Keith Kellogg made clear at Munich that Europeans would not participate in the initial phase of U.S. Russia talks on a settlement. The opening of talks by the Americans and Russia in Riyadh on February 17 followed with what, for Europe, was dizzying and disorienting speed.
A German diplomat told Politico that Europe had received repeated wake up calls (about the imperative to increase military capabilities) but had “kept hitting the snooze button.” It is hard to understand how European analysts could have failed to prepare any contingency for the kind of dramatic reorientation of American policy on Ukraine that had been forecast clearly before and during Trump’s election campaign.
Merz has recently come over toward the SPD’s position on relaxing the so-called debt brake that has stood in the way of any substantial rise in defense spending in Germany. This may be a small indication that the wake-up call has at last been heard.
The final televised debate of the campaign on Feb. 16, included all four of the leading candidates — Merz, Scholz, Robert Habeck (Greens) and AfD’s Alice Weidel. Merz restated his support for sending German long-range Taurus missiles to Ukraine, and Scholz continued to oppose this. Neither man noted that this long-rehearsed question will be moot if the U.S. succeeds in its attempt to reach a ceasefire or otherwise make progress toward a negotiated settlement.
Merz told Weidel that her “neutral” position on the Ukraine war would, in his mind, disqualify AfD from ever being in government. Scholz harshly mocked AfD’s proposals for reviving the economy. Nevertheless, this debate, planned long before Vance’s challenge about the firewall, implicitly conferred a degree of respectability to the AfD’s standing in the race.
While clearly angry at Vance’s remarks, Scholz nevertheless has restated Germany’s abiding imperative to avoid any breach between the U.S. and NATO’s European members. Germany — traditionally more reliant on American defensive guarantees than nuclear armed Britain or France — seems likely to reconcile itself to a proposed negotiated settlement so long as the outcome for Ukraine can be depicted as representing a foundation for its national survival and recovery.
Germany will accept burden shifting toward Europe in NATO, in the interest of averting any open breach between the U.S. and Europe. In keeping with the German center-right’s Atlanticist tradition, Merz has been comparatively circumspect about the implications of the abrupt Washington policy shift on Ukraine. The antiwar AfD and the BSW have both welcomed the pursuit of negotiations.
Getting real vs. magical thinking
Although the Paris summit convened on Feb 16 by Macron produced no consensus among Europeans on next steps, the focus given to whether and when to deploy peacekeepers indicates that the US has managed to shift the conversation toward accepting the fait accompli of the U.S. about-turn on Ukraine-Russia.
On balance, despite the intense anxiety around the fate of Ukraine and reaction to the shift in American policy, Germany’s election is unlikely to bring any unsettling surprise.
A perpetual fever dream of the National Security Establishment is to speed up the process of buying new weapons. Few should be surprised by this considering that it can take years, and sometimes decades, to field a new piece of hardware.
Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth is expected to shortly issue new acquisition guidance meant to deliver new tech to the troops “at the speed of relevance,” to steal a common Pentagon refrain. Before the new administration’s reformers begin implementing solutions, they need to understand the true nature of the problem.
The current acquisition process is far from perfect and does need to be streamlined, but the process itself is not the primary reason new weapon programs blow through their budgets and fall years behind schedule.
Acquisition programs struggle mainly because they are poorly conceived. The fundamental mindset within the national security establishment is that more technology is always better, but this causes the majority of delays and cost growth. Service leaders and their allies in the defense industry work to pack as many features as possible into every weapon and then wonder why they can’t get all the components to work together properly.
An emblematic example is the F-35’s Distributed Aperture System notably represented by the program’s $400,000 helmet. Fighter pilots need to be able to see what is happening in the sky around them. History has shown that the pilot who spots the enemy first is typically the one who wins.
The best fighters throughout history like the F-86 and the F-16 were designed to improve the pilot’s visibility by having them sit high in the fuselage with a clear bubble canopy. Pilots of those aircraft could use the greatest ocular device yet discovered… the human eyeball.
Such an organic solution apparently would not suffice for the F-35, so designers had to devise something more befitting of the 21st century. Enter the Distributed Aperture System. It uses a series of cameras mounted in the skin of the jet which projects images into the pilot’s helmet visor. Program boosters called the system “magical” and used it as a major selling point for the F-35.
The Government Accountability Office offered a different assessment. In a 2023 report, their analysts singled out the Distributed Aperture System as a primary degrader of the F-35’s full mission capable rate. A reasonable person would be justified to believe that F-35 pilots at least find the system useful.
As it turns out, that is not the case. When asked about the DAS by a documentary crew, an F-35 pilot said that if he needs to see what is beneath him, he simply rolls the jet on its side and looks with his own eyes because he can see “with much higher clarity.”
The term of art for adding needless complexity to weapon programs is “gold plating.” Defense industry leaders engage in the practice for both financial and political reasons. They get to charge the government for the extra costs to research and develop the technologies.
Additionally, each new gadget becomes a subcontract to be awarded to a supplier. These suppliers are scattered all over the country. The member of Congress representing the district containing one of these suppliers suddenly has a vested political interest in the program’s survival. The same goes for the state’s two senators.
Sticking with the F-35 example, Lockheed Martin now claims suppliers for that program in all 50 states according to a helpful interactive map created by the contractor.
Once all of these components are built, they have to be assembled into a F-35. Bolting everything together can be problematic, but system integration at the software level is the real trouble in the information age. The Pentagon’s top testing official recently reported that software development in the F-35 program has stagnated as developers discover flaws faster than they can create fixes.
Any acquisition reform proposal coming from the new administration that does not address the gold plating tendency will fail to produce the desired results. Simply streamlining the weapon buying process without fundamentally changing design practices will only deliver warfighters more acquisition failures at a slightly faster pace.
Accountable acquisition reform begins with a shift in thinking. Weapons are only tools people use in combat. As anyone who has reached for a screwdriver knows, the best tools are the simplest ones that can perform the intended function. In the event that U.S. warfighters employ weapons in combat – which the United States must proactively prevent at all costs – they must be effective. Any additional features make the tool more expensive and are just as likely to distract from the task.
Simplicity is a key in weapon design. Simple weapons have shorter development cycles and cost less. Secretary Hegseth can save money and deliver capabilities to the troops faster merely by changing the way people think about weapon design.
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Top photo credit: Sen. Tom Cotton (Hudson Institute/Creative Commons); Elbridge Colby (U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sgt. Chad Trujillo)
In an interview conducted three days after the election, Elbridge Colby told Tucker Carlson, “I was out [at]a thing a few months ago and this young guy came up. Strong guy, whatever.”
Colby continued, “And he said, ‘Hey, Mr. Colby, I’m going into the Marines and I just want to say that all the young Republicans love what you’re saying.”
“And I said to him, like, well that’s good because all the old Republicans hate it.”
Colby added, “He was like, ‘yeah, that’s the point.’”
Colby, President Donald Trump’s pick for undersecretary of defense for policy, is an advocate for a more sober approach abroad, one that prioritizes the security and interests of American citizens over the democracy promotion/regime change agenda of the neoconservatives who once defined Republican foreign policy.
As Donald Trump has positioned himself away from this Old Guard, there are still Republicans desperate to keep the GOP half of the War Party intact.
Many wondered if this tension might prevent the confirmation of Pete Hegseth for Secretary of Defense. Ditto for Tulsi Gabbard — who once called Hillary Clinton as “queen of warmongers.” But she was confirmed as Director of National Intelligence last week, with the help of uber-hawks like Sen. Tom Cotton (R-Ark.), whose support was a gamechanger for getting her nomination out of committee.
But now Sen. Cotton and others are reportedly voicing issues with Colby, as if too many “America First” realists in the administration might actually threaten their longstanding grip on U.S. foreign policy.
A conservative lawmaker close to Cotton told Breitbart that the senator “has policy concerns with some of Elbridge Colby’s statements on our policy towards stopping Iran from getting a nuclear weapon.”
“Cotton has and is discussing with the White House,” the report noted.
Punchbowl News reported, “Senate Armed Services Committee Chair Roger Wicker (R-Miss.) recently acknowledged that some Republicans have concerns about Colby. But sources cautioned that this shouldn’t be interpreted as a statement of opposition.”
The magazine Jewish Insider got the anti-Colby ball rolling in the anti-Colby campaign back in November when it suggested Colby's "dovish views" on Iran had sparked opposition to his potential pick for Team Trump. Another more recent piece about his nomination in JI says "his views align him with several other isolationist picks" in the new administration.
Here are Colby's exact words in the National Interest, circa 2012:
The reality, however, is that attacking Iran without provocation is a dangerous course. The arguments for avoiding military strikes are well known: deterrence, while neither easy nor cheap, can work; the costs of likely Iranian retaliation outweigh the likely benefits, perhaps markedly; and the United States (and its allies) have considered preventive attacks against adversary nuclear programs before, thought the better of it and come out tolerably.
But perhaps the most important argument against attacking Iran has received less attention. That is that none of the attack proponents can give a sensible answer to the question General David Petraeus posed at the beginning of the Iraq war: “How does this end?”
Furthermore he is blasted for wanting to reduce the U.S. military footprint in the Middle East.
“...retaining the large legacy U.S. force posture and habits of employment in the region, much of which is oriented toward (putatively) ‘deterring’ Iran and defending the Gulf states, is both unnecessary and dangerous. It is unnecessary because it is beyond what is needed to achieve these strategic goals. The United States can pursue these goals more efficiently by bolstering the military capabilities of its partners in the region. And, if need be, it can always flow forces in to assist such defenses and eject any invading Iranian forces, should the need arise. Because of Iran’s weakness, Washington does not need to worry about the fait accompli in the way it does with respect to China in Asia and Russia in Europe.”
In his own way, Trump has supported many these arguments since he first campaigned for president in 2016 and then wanted to withdraw from Afghanistan and Syria during his first presidency. After greenlighting the assassination of Qasem Soleimani in 2020, the Iranians reacted with a limited retaliatory attack on U.S. troops stationed in Iraq. But Trump refused to take it step further with an all-out war on Tehran, despite the urgings by the same folks who are trying to tank Colby’s nomination today.
Colby’s backers, starting with J.D. Vance, recognize that Colby’s nomination represents the last gasp of the Old Guard.
“Bridge has consistently been correct about the big foreign policy debates of the last 20 years,” Vance wrote on X Sunday. “He was critical of the Iraq War, which made him unemployable in the 2000s era conservative movement.”
This position has gained purchase with conservative pundits like Charlie Kirk, who wrote on X on Sunday: “The effort to undermine President Trump continues in the US Senate @SenTomCotton is working behind the scenes to stop Trump’s pick, Elbridge Colby, from getting confirmed at DOD.”
“Colby is one of the most important pieces to stop the Bush/Cheney cabal at DOD,” Kirk added.
“For years, my father has been trying to restore an American foreign policy that puts Americans first. Since he began his 2015 campaign and even before, he saw that the foreign policy we had pursued for decades had led us to unnecessary and costly wars…”
“Yet for many years my father was essentially alone,” Trump Jr. noted. “In fact, in his first term he was surrounded by many who pretended to agree with him, only to work at cross-purposes behind his back. This is why he has repeatedly said that the biggest lesson for him of his first term was to get the right people to implement his America First foreign policy vision. These are people who actually believe in that foreign policy and have the integrity and strength of character to push it through in the face of the opposition of the failed establishment that has tried to use every tool to frustrate and even jail him.”
“No one fits this category better than Elbridge Colby”
Donald Trump himself has said that during his learning-on-the-job first term, he regrettably chose people who refused to work for him and even worked against him, and seems determined not to repeat that mistake again.
Tom Cotton is the kind of Republican who might like to see the president make that mistake again.
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