M23 & Rwanda are trying to redraw the map and it's all about to blow

M23 and Rwanda

The M23 rebellion first emerged in 2012, but was defeated in 2013 — largely through international pressure on Rwanda. In theory, M23 is fighting to protect the Rwandophone community in eastern Congo, most especially its Tutsi community. But its agenda is more ambitious and closely linked with Kigali’s interests in the region. The more recent creation of the Alliance du Fleuve Congo (AFC) — also fits within this strategy; it’s the political wing of M23, which has a broader political agenda of regime change in Kinshasa.

M23 reemerged in November 2021 for a number of reasons, including the failure of the the Congolese government to abide by promises it made to the militia’s veterans, such as their integration into the national army. But the main reason was due to Rwanda’s fears that its interests in the region were under threat.

Kigali has a number of interests in eastern DRC. It considers the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) rebel group, which consists of the remnants of the mainly Hutu perpetrators of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, an existential security threat, notwithstanding their diminishing numbers. It also has economic interests: gold is Rwanda’s most important export, and it’s a well-known secret that most of that gold is mined in eastern DRC.

Moreover, with neighboring countries Uganda and Burundi expanding military operations against their own DRC-based insurgencies into territory that it considers within its own zone of influence, Rwanda felt it necessary to reactivate its armed proxy, the M23, to protect its interests there. Rwanda’s elites have long doubted Kinshasa’s ability govern eastern DRC and urged the creation of a buffer zone, which they sometimes refer to as a “Kurdistan.” M23 fits the bill in in this overall picture: trained and supplied by Kigali, the militia is also backed by Rwanda’s own forces on the ground. The U.N. estimated that between 4,000 and 7,000 Rwandan troops were inside the DRC late last year, a number that has surely increased since the takeover of Goma and Bukavu.

The M23’s offensive has exacted a heavy humanitarian price: Over the past 14 months, three million people, including hundreds of thousands who were pushed out of refugee camps, have been displaced; and thousands have been killed. A public health nightmare is also unfolding. Moreover, the risks of a bigger regional conflict have risen sharply.

Burundi

Burundians are increasingly worried about possible war with Rwanda. Tensions between Kigali and Gitega have increased rapidly, with each side accusing the other of supporting rebel forces against their governments. The border between the two countries has closed, and the U.N. has reported that Rwanda’s army has issued direct orders to target Burundian soldiers in the region. In recent weeks, the war of words has escalated: last week, Burundian President Évariste Ndayishimiye urged his citizens to prepare for war and denounced Rwanda as an “enemy of Burundi.”

Rwanda, the more powerful of the two countries, would not oppose regime change in Burundi. But how far it wants to go in redrawing the region’s geopolitical map is not yet clear.

Uganda

Like Rwanda, Uganda has a mix of political, security and economic interests in eastern DRC. Gold, for example, is also Uganda’s most important export, and most of it comes from the DRC. Kampala has a long and complicated “frenemy” relationship with Kigali: the two countries have at times collaborated in eastern DRC; at other times, they have competed for influence there.

In the current conflict, Kampala has played an ambiguous role. On the one hand, the U.N. has reported over the past 18 months that Uganda has provided some support to M23; including permitting it to recruit in Ugandan-controlled territory and even incorporating Ugandan security personnel in its ranks. On the other hand, and parallel to M23’s rapid territorial expansion over the last weeks, the Ugandan army has also expanded its presence in eastern DRC. Like Kigali, Kamapala is carving out territory in the region.

Kinshasa losing control

It is clear to all that President Felix Tshisekedi is losing control over the region. His army’s morale seems particularly low: videos of fleeing soldiers have further reduced his credibility. The withdrawal in mid-February of Burundian forces, which had been the DRC’s most important military ally, marked the collapse of Tshekedi’s military strategy.

With M23 increasingly moving its forces southward, Katanga — the center of most of DRC’s industrial mining — is increasingly coming into focus. Here the conflict takes on additional layers of complexities. In an “enemy of my enemy is my friend” logic, many Katangans are not necessarily opposed to M23/AFC; nor do they endorse or support it or Rwanda’s ambitions. But they share a resentment against the Tshisekedi government in Kinshasa: the last two presidents and the DRC’s main opposition leader all hail from Katanga and have felt excluded from power. A recent op-ed by former President Joseph Kabila lends credence to Tshisekedi’s accusations that Kabila is behind the M23/AFC coalition.

Thus, in addition to the risk of regional escalation, ethnic and political tensions within DRC are on the rise. The Congolese “radio trottoir” is filled with rumors of various groups mobilizing for possible violence. In the capital, threats against Swahili speakers, who generally hail from the east, have circulated, spreading and contributing to a vicious circle by lending credence to M23 and Rwanda’s claims that Rwandaphones are at risk.

The current situation looks strikingly similar to the early days of the Second Congolese war, which lasted five years beginning in 1998. In that conflict, neighboring countries sought to effectively partition Congo into zones of influence. The war cost millions of lives.

The importance of US pressure

When M23 first emerged in 2012, international pressure on Rwanda was decisive in ending the conflict in 2013. Donors suspended $240 million in international aid, with the U.S. played a key role, including phone calls by President Barack Obama to his Rwandan counterpart, Paul Kagame.

Isolated, Tshisekedi is desperately trying to revive international pressure on Rwanda to end its support for M23 — but with only very limited success so far.

That effort has included an appeal for military assistance to the administration of President Donald Trump in exchange for exclusive access to DRC’s vast mineral wealth by proposing “minerals for security deals.” In addition to gold, the country holds enormous stores of cobalt and produces other strategic minerals, including lithium, tantalum, and uranium. (Similar offers have reportedly been made to the United Arab Emirates and Russia.)

Acting through one lobbyist, Kinshasa has also offered Washington access to its military bases “to protect strategic resources,” as well as a major stake in a billion-dollar deep-water port project. According to a letter from Africa-USA Business Council, the Tshisekedi government is “signaling a clear desire to shift away from China’s dominant influence and strengthen economic ties with the West.”

According to our interviews, the proposal, which has been conveyed by different actors with conflicting messages, is perceived within the U.S. administration as vague, uncoordinated, and difficult to implement. If anything, the offers have underlined the fragility and desperation of the Congolese leadership.

Under former President Biden, Washington was the most outspoken of the Western powers in denouncing Rwanda’s backing for M23. Although sanctions were taken against two individuals (of the Rwandan Defense Forces, and M23), and military cooperation was further restricted, no U.S. development aid was suspended.

The more recent announcement by the Trump administration of U.S. sanctions against two Rwandan individuals — notably James Kaberebe, who, as minister of state for regional integration, is central to Rwanda’s support to M23 — marks a step in the right direction. But persuading Kigali to end its support for M23 will likely require significantly more pressure.