Israel’s parliament, the Knesset, approved a piece of legislation on Thursday that gives the government permission to deport family members of those who Israel labels as “terrorists.” This law affects Israelis, as well as Palestinian citizens.
The law was sponsored by Hanoch Milwidsky, a member of the right-wing Likud party. If the legislation goes unchallenged by the courts, it would allow the interior minister to deport parents, siblings, or spouses of anyone labeled as a terrorist, if that person has “expressed support or identification” or failed to report information concerning an act of terror, or terror organization. Al Jazeera’s Nour Odeh points out that one potential issue with this policy is that “all Palestinian factions are labeled as terrorist organizations by Israel.” Additionally, expressing sympathy for the humanitarian situation in Gaza has previously been labeled as being sympathetic to terror.
Annelle Sheline, research fellow at the Quincy Institute, agrees, saying “the proposed legislation is horrifying, both for expanding Israel's existing policy of holding individuals accountable for the actions of members of their family, and for the extremely broad definition of so-called 'terrorism' that they intend to apply.”
Israeli national security minister Itamar Ben-Gvir expressed support for the new law on X: “today we passed a law deporting families of terrorists. It seems to me that the left has come under pressure, let's continue!”
The expulsions would range from 7-20 years depending on the legal status of the defendant. The law may be challenged in court, however, with a senior researcher at the Israel Democracy Institute, Eran Shamir-Borer, saying that the Supreme Court will likely strike down the law. “The bottom line is this is completely nonconstitutional and a clear conflict to Israel’s core values,” he said.
Israel does recognize a basic protection of freedom of speech and expression, but it is notably limited. Expression is restricted when it is likely to cause public harm. Speech that could insight racism, terrorism, Holocaust denialism, or insult to public servants is also restricted.
During the same session, the Knesset approved a temporary measure that allows for minors under the age of 14 to be imprisoned following a murder conviction that is connected to a terrorist act or organization.
Aaron is a reporter for Responsible Statecraft and a contributor to the Mises Institute. He received both his undergraduate and masters degrees in international relations from Liberty University.
Top image credit: Itamar Ben-Gvir, Minister of National Security of Israel, shouts at the opening of the 25th Knesset session marking the anniversary of the “Iron Swords” war on Monday, in Jerusalem, October 28, 2024. DEBBIE HILL/Pool via REUTERS
Top Photo: U.S. House Speaker Mike Johnson (R-LA) and Senate Foreign Relations Chair, Senator Ben Cardin (D-MD), listen as Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu addresses a joint meeting of Congress at the U.S. Capitol in Washington, U.S., July 24, 2024. REUTERS/Craig Hudson
The upcoming House of Representatives Rules Committee Package is sure to include a section requiring the consideration of a bill that would sanction the International Criminal Court (ICC), therefore shielding Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu from arrest.
The ICC issued arrest warrants for Netanyahu, as well as former Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant and Hamas leader Ibrahim Al-Masri in November 2024 for their actions in Gaza, alleging war crimes and crimes against humanity. ICC judges said that the Gaza blockade "created conditions of life calculated to bring about the destruction of part of the civilian population in Gaza, which resulted in the death of civilians, including children, due to malnutrition and dehydration.”
A House Resolution introduced by over a dozen House Republicans, titled the”‘Illegitimate Court Counteraction Act” is meant “to impose sanctions with respect to the International Criminal Court engaged in any effort to investigate, arrest, detain, or prosecute any protected person of the United States and its allies.”
The bill found that “The United States and Israel are not parties to the Rome Statute or members of the International Criminal Court (ICC), and therefore the ICC has no legitimacy or jurisdiction over the United States or Israel.” Because of the lack of jurisdiction, the co-sponsors assert, “The ICC’s actions against Israel, including the preliminary examination and investigation of Israel and issuance of arrest warrants against Israeli officials, are illegitimate and baseless and create a damaging precedent that threatens the United States, Israel, and all United States partners who have not consented to the ICC’s jurisdiction.”
The bill further states that “if the International Criminal Court is engaging in any attempt to investigate, arrest, detain, or prosecute any protected person,” the President shall then impose sanctions. These sanctions can be placed on any “foreign person” who directly aided or engaged in efforts to assist the ICC in investigating, arresting, detaining, or prosecuting a protected person. This could include financial or material assistance.
Despite calling the arrest warrant for Netanyahu “outrageous,” President Biden had previously opposed sanctioning the ICC for seeking arrest warrants against Benjamin Netanyahu. However, President Trump notably approved sanctions in September 2020 on members of the ICC who were “involved in the ICC’s efforts to investigate US personnel.”
The ICC has no actual enforcement authorities, leaving detention and arrest to the 125 members countries that are party to the Rome convention. But it is fully voluntary. It appears, according to the text, that the bill is authorizing Congress to impose sanctions on any foreign actor (who could be from a partner or allied country) and their families if they helped to detain Netanayhu on behalf of a member state. What this would look like in practice is unclear. Ireland and the Netherlands (a NATO alliance member) have both indicated that the Israeli prime minister would be arrested if he set foot on their soil.
The decision to include H.R. 23 in the Rules package is not without its opponents. Congressman Thomas Massie (R-Ky) dissented on X: “The United States is a sovereign country, so I don’t assign any credibility to decisions of the International Criminal Court. But how did a bill to protect Netanyahu make it into the House rules package to be voted on immediately after the Speaker vote? Where are our priorities?!” His office declined to comment further when RS inquired.
It is important to note that the package cannot be voted on until House leadership appoints the committee, which may come with additional challenges, as previous speaker Kevin McCarthy was forced to appoint three Freedom Caucus members to the last Rules Committee, and these three members regularly joined Democrats to vote down legislation submitted by Republican leadership.
Reports indicate that the appointments will likely happen by this Friday.
Robin Brooks, a Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institute, took to X recently to declare that "there needs to be a ban on any academic papers that interpret Russia’s resilient GDP as a sign that sanctions aren’t working." I found it remarkable that he should acknowledge the unexpected resilience of Russia’s economy yet try to disbar analysis which might suggest, therefore, that sanctions had failed.
Brooks produces some interesting analysis, and at the heart of his statement lies an important argument that others have taken up recently: that Western powers didn’t impose tough enough sanctions on Russia at the start of the Ukraine crisis, but could still impose such a catastrophic economic cost on Russia that Putin will, for the first time, be forced to back down.
Let’s take a look at what a maximum pressure policy in 2014 might have involved.
Putting a complete block on the import of Russian oil and gas has always been the go-to sanctions target for Western pundits. Russian goods exports in 2014 amounted to almost $500 billion. With over two thirds of those exports oil and gas, and the EU accounting for most trade, a total ban would have blown a $200 billion hole in Russian exporters. It would also have opened a gaping hole in state finances as roughly one half of Russian state revenue comes from taxes levied on oil and gas. This would undoubtedly have limited Russia’s ability to continue massive investment in its military which had been ongoing since 2011.
However, this would have also had catastrophic consequences for energy security in many parts of Europe, including in countries that received 100% of their gas from Russia such as Finland, the Baltic States, and Bulgaria. Germany at that time received 40% of its gas from Russia. That would have caused energy shortages, huge energy inflation and cost of living challenges, with the EU still locked in a cycle of low growth, low productivity, and negative interest rates following the global financial crisis.
Of course, European countries may simply have accelerated their move away from Russian energy, but this process wouldn’t have happened overnight. President Obama only lifted the 40-year U.S. ban on oil and gas exports in December 2015, which ushered in a rapid rise in U.S. liquefied natural gas exports to Europe in particular.
The gradual shift to higher cost U.S. LNG has had massive political and economic consequences in Germany which is suffering from deindustrialization. Its governing coalition just collapsed due to a rise in far right and far left populist populism amid the economic fallout. A much more extreme version of the political earthquakes we are witnessing today in Europe would simply have happened sooner had the West imposed a full blockade on Russian energy in 2014.
Another idea from that time was to cut Russia off from SWIFT — or the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications. According to the Financial times, cutting Russia off from SWIFT would render Russia unable to transact export business in foreign currencies at all. This would have devastated Russia’s export dependent economy. It would have bankrupted state-owned companies like Rosneft, Gazprom and Rostec, as Western financial sector sanctions had already induced serious liquidity problems, in particular at oil giant Rosneft. Without export earnings, its biggest state firms going under, Russia would have been unable to build up its reserves to underwrite the huge cost of a war which it launched in 2022.
However, cutting Russia off from SWIFT is also what Bloomberg described as the economic version of Mutually Assured Destruction, at least for Europe. European importers would have struggled to pay for Russian imports (see my comments above on the impact of losing access to Russian energy). They also would have been unable to receive payments for exports to Russia, therefore cutting them off from a huge market.
EU companies exported $100 billion worth of goods to Russia in 2014. EU political leaders were never going to sign up for this.
In 2014-2015 Russia had refrained from a full-scale invasion of Ukraine because it wanted to try to retain reasonably good relations with France and Germany — and the Minsk Agreement seemed to offer the chance of this. Even hawkish UK foreign policy makers in Whitehall described a move on SWIFT as the “nuclear option”; so devastating that it might tip Putin towards heeding his most hawkish advisors and invading Ukraine (or worse) — at a time when Ukraine was vastly less able to resist than it was in 2022.
Freezing Russia’s international reserve assets in 2014 might theoretically have been more damaging then than it was in 2022. Russia in late 2014 was reeling from the November oil price collapse. The Central Bank vainly hosed $100 billion in reserves at the foreign exchange markets in the run up to the Black Tuesday rouble meltdown of December 16, 2014. Had Russian assets already been frozen, Russia’s central bank may have been unable to prevent an even more devastating currency collapse.
But I remain skeptical that this would have made a significant difference to Russian policy in Ukraine. Even after Black Tuesday, Russia retained available reserves of $400 billion. Had the West frozen assets in their jurisdictions of around $200 billion, Russia could still have covered eight months of imports. What Russian policy makers learned from Black Tuesday was that a weak ruble was a strength, in increasing the ruble value of oil and gas exports which were traded in U.S. dollars.
Quite unrelated to Western sanctions, Russia embraced a weak ruble as an article of economic policy, a point few pro-sanctions/pro-war advocates in the West seem to appreciate. That allowed Russia, as I’ve said many times before, to rebuild its reserves ahead of the war in 2022. Seizing Russian assets in 2014 may simply have accelerated that process and emboldened Russia to war sooner.
I was at the front line of imposing sanctions on Russia for 10 years, yet I have never believed that a tougher line on sanctions in 2014 would either have prevented war in Ukraine or been politically and economically deliverable in Europe.
I recognize the frustration that commentators feel about the ineffectiveness of sanctions. It’s always important to remember that any foreign policy needs a clear goal and measures of success. The purpose and justification for sanctions against Russia has or should have been to limit, halt and/or reverse aggression against Ukraine. Damaging Russia’s economy, even though that hasn’t happened in a way analysts like Brooks would have hoped, is not the yardstick against which we should be measuring sanctions.
Putin has said he would like sanctions relief as part of a possible future peace deal, but sanctions have at no point over the past eleven years looked likely to constrain his decision making.
Suggesting new ways to inflict economic pain on Russia is therefore missing the point. We should be asking how we can end the war, rather than suggesting the same old ideas that will undoubtedly prolong it.
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Top photo credit: X screengrab from the account of Kurdish journalist Mustafa Al-Ali, Jan. 2, 2025.
The Pentagon addressed questions regarding reports this week about the U.S. military moving construction materials into Kobani, a city in northeastern Syria close to Turkey's border, ostensibly to help its long time partners, the Kurdish-led Syrian Defense Forces, stave off attacks by the Turks.
"We're continuing to work and focus on our mission, which you know why we're in Syria, to ensure the enduring defeat of ISIS. But when it comes to US forces in Kobani, there's no plan or intent right now to set up any base. I'm not sure where those reports are coming from," said Pentagon spokesperson Sabrina Singh.
Unfortunately the follow-ups in the briefing room were weak and didn't ask the next logical question more plainly: if not a "base" is there an outpost or smaller fortification being constructed for the mobilization of U.S. troops and personnel? If video and on-the-ground reports are to be believed, something is going on there.
A half dozen years after abandoning Kobani, U.S. forces are reportedly building a base in this northern Syrian city on the Turkish border that has been riven by strife between Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and Turkish-backed forces. This all comes as a new Syrian government is trying to establish control over the country after ousting Bashar al-Assad.
Several videos and images have emerged on social media claiming to show U.S. troops and equipment heading toward Kobani, reportedly to build a new international coalition base.
US forces brought in a convoy of 50 trucks carrying cement blocks to SDF-controlled areas in north-eastern Syria.
SOHR activists have reported seeing the convoy on Al-Hasakah-Al-Raqqah highway, while it was heading to Ain Al-Arab area (Kobani) in the eastern countryside of Aleppo. The convoy was accompanied by a military vehicle of SDF.
According to SOHR sources, this comes as a part of US forces’ efforts to boost their bases and establish a new military base in Ain Al-Arab in light of the growing security and military tension in that region.
Yesterday, SOHR sources reported that “International Coalition” forces brought a convoy of logistic reinforcements including premade chambers, surveillance cameras, cement blocks, fuel tanks and digging machineries towards Ain Al-Arab (Kobani).
According to reliable SOHR sources, the digging and drilling will start tomorrow and more military reinforcements such as soldiers, weapons, armoured vehicles, radars and anti-aircraft weapons will be brought.
Altman reports that "the claimed U.S. build-up in Kobani comes as fighting continues between the SDF and Turkish-backed forces in northern Syria" since the fall of Bashar al-Assad's government in early December. "Video emerged on social media claiming the SDF downed a Turkish Bayraktar TB-2 drone over the Qarqozak Bridge, south of Kobani. It is claimed to be the third such shootdown in a month."
"Turkish-backed forces have reportedly escalated attacks on the Tishreen Dam as well as the Qara Quzak Bridge, both key to logistics in the area. Kurdish journalist Rohat Baran emphasized that these sites are not just vital for the local population but also hold broader regional importance in terms of trade, energy, and military operations," Altman wrote.
Meanwhile the U.S. and its coalition partners, which include French forces, have been actively fighting ISIS in central and eastern Syria, he said. There are now 2,000 U.S. military in the country, a number that suddenly increased with no real explanation beyond the 900 that were assumed there just a month ago.
When asked again about whether there are U.S. forces in Kobani, Singh said, according to the transcript, "On your first question on Kobani, I'm not aware of US forces. Again, I've seen those reports and, as Liz had asked me earlier about US forces establishing some type of base or presence in Kobani, I'm not tracking that that is accurate or that we have plans to do so in any way."
So no "presence" in Kobani? Sources who talked with RS mentioned that if the reports of the material rolling into Kobani are accurate, it may mean something other than a "base" is being built by the U.S. military there. The wall segments, for instance, could be erected to house a company or platoon, or bigger. The key is to watch for more videos or reporting about the volume of material being transported to indicate the size and scope of the construction. Singh may be right about there not being "a base" planned, but the U.S. military has a range of installations under different names across the globe housing thousands of troops and military assets. They aren't all called "bases."
RS reached out to the Pentagon press office on Thursday and asked if the military "is sending reinforcements and is building a new facility in Kobani" and if so, were the troop numbers beyond the 2,000 being reported in the country today. We were told they were currently looking into the reports.
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