After Israel's strike in Qatar, is Turkey next?

Israel’s recent strike on Qatar, a major non-NATO ally of the United States, has given rise to the question of whether Turkey, a NATO ally of the United States, may be Israel’s next target. While several parallels between Qatar and Turkey suggest that an Israeli assault on Turkey is not entirely impossible, a number of factors, chiefly Israel’s own intimate reliance on Turkey, are likely to act as a strong deterrent against a future Israeli strike on Turkey.

Israel’s September 9 strike against Hamas leaders in Qatar’s capital, Doha, marked yet another escalation in Israel’s nearly two-year military campaign that has now extended its operations to Iran, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, Iraq, Tunisia, and Qatar — all while perpetuating the ongoing humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza and aggressive settlement expansion on the West Bank.

Though the Qatar strike follows an escalatory trajectory pursued by Israel over the past two years, it is nonetheless a break with precedent in that it targeted an actor previously seen — for a variety of good reasons — as off-limits.

First, unlike its openly adversarial relationship with Iran, Israel’s relations with Qatar cannot be characterized as acrimonious. Quite the contrary, Doha has maintained limited but consistent relations with Jerusalem, periodically opening channels for unofficial dialogue and trade while stopping short of full diplomatic ties. It has even positioned itself as a key mediator between Israel and Hamas, a role that has proven increasingly vital over the last two years.

Second, Qatar has a modern military, hosts a sprawling U.S. base with 11,000 troops, and boasts state-of-the-art U.S. air defenses. Third, Qatar is a major non-NATO ally of the U.S.

Yet none of these factors appear to have deterred Israel from running roughshod on Qatari sovereignty, prompting observers, including voices within Israel, to ask whether Turkey is going to be Israel’s next target.

The question is not far-fetched, as there are a number of striking parallels between Turkey and Qatar that render both appealing candidates for Israel’s next strike. For instance, both countries enjoy cordial ties with Hamas and have in the past hosted — and continue to host — the organization’s leaders.

Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his ministers have repeatedly met publicly with Hamas leaders, with Erdoğan describing the organization as a “liberation group.” Furthermore, ever since the collapse of Bashar al-Assad in Syria and the rise of a regime close to both Turkey and Qatar in Damascus, Israeli planners have been increasingly seeing Turkey and Qatar as “strategic threats.”

Already, a commission established by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to examine Israel’s evolving security environment has recommended that Israel allocate resources with a view to potential conflict scenarios involving Turkey, particularly in the Eastern Mediterranean and over Turkey’s influence in Syria and Gaza.

But assuming that an Israeli appetite to strike Turkey does exist, do the impulses pushing Israel toward such a strike outweigh the restraints that would keep it in check?

A most common argument invoked to dispel the possibility of an Israeli strike on Turkey is the latter’s NATO membership. Proponents of this argument stress that any attack on Turkey would automatically trigger Article 5 of the Atlantic Treaty, obligating the entire alliance to come to Ankara’s defense.

However, even if Article 5 is successfully invoked in the event of a direct Israeli attack on Turkey, members are not obliged to respond with force. The treaty text allows each state to take “such action as it deems necessary,” which can range from military measures to purely political gestures, which allows NATO members to limit their response to purely diplomatic support rather than commit themselves to a significant military response.

Indeed, as Ankara’s own complicated past dealings with NATO have revealed, the alliance’s collective defense clause does not automatically preclude the possibility of Turkey being left in the lurch by its NATO allies in the event of an Israeli strike. In 2012, after Syria shot down a Turkish military aircraft, Ankara considered invoking Article 5 but ultimately settled for Article 4 consultations instead, while NATO deployed Patriot missiles to Turkey but avoided broader military escalation. NATO membership, Ankara was bitterly reminded, does not guarantee an automatic invocation of Article 5 in case of an armed conflict.

Indeed, a vivid illustration of the limits, or risks, of such military partnerships is to be found in Qatar’s own predicament with Israel. It will be lost on neither Ankara nor Jerusalem that Qatar’s deep military ties with the United States — a major non-NATO ally of the U.S. and generous host to a vast American military base — not only offered it little protection but was instrumental in making the strike on September 9 possible. Furthermore, when the strike did finally occur, Washington’s support for Doha was limited to a U.N. Security Council statement condemning Israel’s operation. Qatar will be forgiven for viewing with some bitterness their alliance with Washington as a Faustian bargain.

Much more than its NATO membership, it is Turkey’s own military strength, its deep economic leverage over Israel, and finally its new role as the chief patron of the new Syrian regime that more likely deter Israeli leaders from embarking on exceedingly reckless military adventures against Turkey.

Turkey’s military capabilities overwhelmingly surpass Qatar’s, not only in scale but also in technological sophistication. In the event of an Israeli strike, Turkey will likely be able to restore a lasting measure of military deterrence using its conventional military hardware such as indigenous drones and American-made war planes. That said, should hostilities escalate into a sustained confrontation, the shadow of Israel’s nuclear arsenal would impose a significant psychological cap on the intensity and pace of Turkey’s escalation.

Furthermore, in the event of a flare-up with Israel, Turkish leaders could potentially challenge Israel through their foothold in Syria. They could in theory supply advanced weapons to the Syrian regime or other armed groups to complicate Israel’s security calculus. And, though it may seem unlikely under present conditions, should tensions with Israel increase and a rare constellation of factors align, Ankara might even be tempted to instruct the new government in Damascus to turn a blind eye to Iranian — or non-Iranian — arms transfers to Hezbollah through Syria, effectively undoing much of what Israel has sought to achieve in its campaign to weaken its Lebanese foe.

Ironically, one of Turkey’s most effective deterrents against an Israeli attack is a non-military option: cutting or disrupting Israel’s fuel supply. Israel relies heavily on crude oil shipped from Azerbaijan through Turkey’s Ceyhan port, making Ankara a critical lifeline for Israel’s energy security. As Israeli leaders know full well, in the event of an Israeli strike on Turkish territory, Ankara can cause a serious energy crunch that could impair Israel’s economy and military operations. This represents an immediate and powerful lever of retaliation that, unlike military escalation, would not require Turkey to fire even a single shot.

Today, Turkey no doubt possesses real and significant cards it can use should hostilities erupt with Israel. Cognizant of this, even the most reckless Israeli cabinet will think long and hard before taking any hostile military action against Turkey. Yet deterrents notwithstanding, Israeli leaders — particularly under Netanyahu in the past two years — have shown themselves fully capable of rash and ill-considered moves, such as the war with Iran or the recent strike on Qatar, neither of which advanced Israel’s long-term strategic interests.