Tehran’s grip on Lebanon is loosening, and this shift was on full display during Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi’s latest visit to Beirut.
While publicly emphasizing “state-to-state” relations and “non-interference” in meetings with President Joseph Aoun, Prime Minister Nawaf Salam, Foreign Minister Youssef Rajji, and Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, Araghchi’s outreach reflected Iran’s efforts to adapt as its influence wanes and Hezbollah’s power diminishes after its punishing war with Israel last fall.
The nuances of Iran's pivot were evident in Araghchi’s itinerary. His public statements avoided direct mentions of Hezbollah, a marked departure from previous speeches that celebrated its centrality to the "Axis of Resistance." He also expressed Tehran’s readiness for its companies to participate in Lebanon’s reconstruction, and, significantly, acquiesced to Beirut’s insistence that all reconstruction aid flow through state channels, hinting at Iran's adaptation to Lebanon's burgeoning state assertiveness.
Araghchi also found time for a less publicized, but highly symbolic meeting with Hezbollah's new secretary-general Naim Qassem, and laid a wreath at the grave of his predecessor, Hassan Nasrallah. Here, the rhetoric reverted to confrontation, with Araghchi proclaiming, "I am certain that the ultimate victory belongs to the people of Lebanon and the resistance, and that the Zionist regime’s defeat is an inevitable matter."
This dual approach — projecting moderation to Lebanese leadership and the international community while reaffirming unwavering ideological commitment to its key Lebanese ally — suggests a significant recalibration rather than an outright abandonment.
The catalyst for this shift is undeniably the brutal and still ongoing war between Hezbollah and Israel, which erupted following Hamas's October 7, 2023, attack on Israel and which quickly expanded into a wider conflict with Hamas-aligned groups in the region. Hezbollah has since suffered devastating losses, including the elimination of much of its weapons arsenal and the deaths of Nasrallah and his deputy, Hashem Safieddine, in Israeli airstrikes.
A particularly profound blow came with the exploding pager attacks in September 2024, which crippled Hezbollah’s communications and provided a chilling demonstration of Israel's spycraft.
Beyond military attrition, Hezbollah’s traditional logistical lifeline, the overland corridor through Syria, which Iran used to funnel weapons and cash to the group via Iraq, was severed with the collapse of the Assad regime in December 2024. In a significant shift, the new Syrian government has engaged in border demarcation and security cooperation with Lebanon, explicitly aimed at closing illegal crossings and tightening monitoring of smuggling. This Lebanese-Syrian rapprochement, notably backed by Saudi mediation, has facilitated unprecedented strategic convergence between Beirut and Damascus against Hezbollah.
Consequently, Iran's once-reliable blueprint for projecting power through covert overland arms shipments to Hezbollah is no longer viable in the same form. Compounding this, Lebanon’s new government has tightened control over Beirut’s Rafic Hariri International Airport, historically another key channel for illicit transfers to the group. Since February, Iranian flights have been indefinitely suspended, following explicit Israeli threats to target flights originating from Iran due to suspicions of them carrying cash or arms to Hezbollah.
To make matters worse, Hezbollah’s resources are severely strained, with reports of cash flow problems and delays in compensating war-affected communities in southern Lebanon and its Beirut stronghold, Dahiyeh. The group’s popularity, though still strong based on recent municipal election results, has long depended on its ability to quickly provide compensation and services, which helped pacify discontent over the hardships caused by war while reinforcing its image as both a defender of Lebanon’s sovereignty and a steadfast supporter of the Palestinian cause.
However, persistent delays in delivering aid to its constituents could raise questions about its long-term ability to maintain loyalty.
With the diminished capacity of both patron and proxy, Iran has seemingly recognized its own limits and those of Hezbollah in financing reconstruction on the scale seen after the 2006 war with Israel, when Iranian funds were channeled directly through the group, bypassing the Lebanese state.
Moreover, the emergence of a new Lebanese political leadership, backed by a unified international and regional front, further complicates Iran’s position. President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam have explicitly committed to reasserting state sovereignty and establishing a "monopoly on arms." Salam, directly eyeing Iran’s influence, declared in an interview with Sky News Arabia that "the era of exporting the Iranian revolution is over.”
Critically, the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) have engaged in unprecedented, albeit indirect, cooperation with Israel, facilitated by the U.S, aimed at helping the Lebanese army locate and dismantle Hezbollah’s weapons stockpiles in southern Lebanon.
Additionally, donor countries are actively prioritizing military aid and capacity building for the LAF, making the assertion of state control the key prerequisite before disbursing large-scale reconstruction funding.
The U.S. and Gulf countries are united in demanding the dismantling of Hezbollah’s defense infrastructure, with Israel warning on June 6 that it will continue to bomb Lebanon until Hezbollah is disarmed. The intensity and unanimity of this resistance leave Iran facing formidable, if not insurmountable, obstacles to maintaining its influence in Lebanon.
Iran’s ongoing nuclear talks with the Trump administration add another layer of complexity.
Its economy faces a combustible mix of runaway inflation and declining purchasing power. Petroleum export revenues are lower than planned, with aggressive U.S. sanctions tearing through the once-discreet trading channels and shadow fleets Iran used to circumvent sanctions and ferry crude to global markets.
This situation has pushed Iran towards diplomacy as a means of alleviating its economic woes. In addition, the massive losses suffered by Hezbollah after October 7 have made Iran’s military and financial support for Hezbollah increasingly burdensome, and the traditional proxy playbook is no longer politically defensible to a domestic audience contending with intense economic pressures.
Compounding this predicament, Israel remains at Iran's throat, actively preparing for airstrikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities should diplomacy between the U.S. and Iran on a new nuclear agreement fail.
Hezbollah’s own situation closely mirrors Iran’s, simultaneously displaying defiance with one arm while extending the other towards political engagement. Hezbollah Secretary-General Naim Qassem’s defiant stance, stating, "let Israel withdraw, end its aggression, and release the captives. After that, we’ll talk," highlights that disarmament is non-negotiable without a definitive end to Israeli aggression. This position also strategically exploits a catch-22, with Israel's own withdrawal from southern Lebanon contingent on Hezbollah's disarmament.
While the group’s spiritual leadership postures aggressively, its political arm engages pragmatically within the Lebanese political system, notably by holding ministerial positions in the very cabinet that is attempting to curb its influence. Its tactical flexibility in parliament was evident in President Aoun's election: after initially casting blank ballots in protest, Hezbollah and its staunch ally, the Amal party, ultimately voted for Aoun — recognizing that continued obstruction would only prolong the crisis and risk alienating their base, which is in urgent need of reconstruction aid.
Hezbollah’s domestic weakness is closely tied to the mounting challenges of its main patron, Iran, which is being forced to rethink its approach as traditional supply channels are now severely limited or entirely disrupted. In addition to the loss of the land corridor through Syria, bank transfers are stifled by aggressive U.S. sanctions and potential measures from the Lebanese government and central bank which could target Hezbollah's financial access.
With international reconstruction aid now explicitly tied to weakening Hezbollah’s influence, there is limited space for the paramilitary-political group to restore its previous financial and operational standing.
Iran’s relationship with its “Axis of Resistance” crown jewel is thus undergoing a profound transformation, with Tehran now overtly conceding that even steadfast revolutionary ideals must yield to the harsh realities of economic survival and diminished power.
