Western leader blurts out what was once taboo on Ukraine

This week, Politico scooped the news: German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, before meeting NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte in Berlin, informally voiced opposition to Ukraine’s prospects for an alliance membership, suggesting instead a “Finlandization” option — a neutral status like Finland maintained between NATO and the Soviet Union during the Cold War and for the subsequent three decades between NATO and Russia.

According to the report, his suggestion was mulled amid talk in Berlin of setting up a “contact group” together with China, India, and Brazil in search of a negotiated end to the war in Ukraine. This idea was not raised during the meeting with Rutte as it does not yet represent a consolidated position of the German government — an unwieldy coalition of Scholz’s war-weary Social Democrats, ardently pro-Ukraine Greens, and fiscal hawks in the liberal Free Democrats party (FDP).

The fact, however, that the Finlandization option is even discussed now shows how far the debate in Europe has shifted from the “whatever it takes for Ukraine’s victory” mantra to a more sober assessment of the realities on the ground: even The Economist, a staunch supporter of Ukraine’s cause from the outset, now accepts that it’s not a victory but mere survival as an independent state that is at stake for Ukraine.

For Ukraine, “Finlandization” would mean giving up its NATO membership aspirations — something that Moscow claimed was such an intolerable threat to its national security that felt compelled to invade Ukraine to prevent it. The concept first acquired negative connotations during the debates on the Baltic states’ prospective NATO membership in 1990s — it was perceived then by supporters, both in the U.S. and the Baltics, as artificially creating zones of influence in Europe. By being left outside of NATO, the Baltics feared they would be relegated to Russia’s zone of influence, if not worse.

The Baltics, of course, joined NATO during the George W. Bush administration, and there is no point now in relitigating the debates that led up to the decision. It, however, was always odd to use “Finlandization” as a bogeyman considering that Finland managed to build a resilient democracy and a top-performing, innovative economy while remaining neutral.

But these days, even Finland seems to repudiate that remarkably successful legacy; its ambassador to Berlin dismissed the notion because “it is not in our interest to restore any artificial spheres of interest” and “we are obliged to respect the freedom of choice of Ukraine, as well as its territorial integrity.”

Finland, as well as Sweden, joined NATO after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, even though the ground for such a step had already been prepared for decades by hawkish Atlanticists in both countries, including Alexander Stubb, the current president of Finland, and Carl Bildt, a former prime minister and foreign minister of Sweden.

There are, however, still examples of successful neutral countries in Europe, like Austria, where even now none of the mainstream political parties are pushing for NATO membership. That underscores the limited utility of using a NATO/Russia dichotomy as the exclusive lens for discussions on security and stability in eastern Europe.

The fact that Berlin seems to be willing to look beyond that artificial dichotomy and warm to the idea of Ukraine’s permanent neutrality reflects the shifting popular mood in Germany. Chancellor Scholz has for some months voiced ideas that were until recently considered taboo, such as direct talks with Russia at a next peace summit on Ukraine. The rise in a string of local elections of the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) and the left-populist Sahra Wagenknecht party (BSW) at the expense of the ruling coalition’s parties is explained in part by their opposition to a further war in Ukraine. In June 2024, the AfD and BSW boycotted a Bundestag address by Volodymyr Zelenskyy, Ukraine’s president, for his “uncompromising views,” even though Wagenknecht condemned Putin’s invasion.

Of the two parties, the BSW in particular is poised to reap the political benefits from its anti-war stance. As a far-right party, AfD is subjected to a “cordon sanitaire,” or firewall, meaning that no other party has agreed to form a coalition with it, either at a local or national level. That gives BSW additional leverage to negotiate coalition deals. It already used it in Thuringia, a state in Germany’s east, forcing the two potential partners, the state’s center-right Christian-Democrats (CDU) and center-left Social Democrats (SPD) to issue a call for Germany to lead efforts for a diplomatic settlement of the war.

The BSW, which at 9% currently, far outperforms in the national polls the liberal FDP (which would not clear the 5% threshold if elections were held today) and runs neck and neck with the declining Greens (around 10%) emerges as a viable alternative for coalition-building with both the CDU and SPD -- the new legislative elections in Germany are currently scheduled for autumn 2025 but could take place much earlier if the current federal coalition collapses, as seems increasingly likely. – On November 6, the Chancellor Scholz sacked Finance Minister Christian Lindner (FDP) over the latter’s calls for early elections due to disagreements over the budget. That sets the stage for a confidence vote on the government to be held on January 15, and then snap elections in March. In any early elections, both BSW and AfD are likely to perform well given the recent state election results, and BSW will almost certainly leverage its pro-peace stance in any potential negotiations.

The problem is that even if “Finlandization” of Ukraine becomes the official line of a hypothetical new German government, it may simply be too late to use it as an incentive for Russia to end the war. It was a realistic option in the still-born peace agreement negotiated in Istanbul in April 2022 but that collapsed over Russia’s overbearing demands and the West’s promises to escalate support for Ukraine on the battlefield.

Sensing that the tide has turned in his favor, Russian President Vladimir Putin may be tempted to press for greater advantage before he acquiesces to serious negotiations. Russian hardliners, such as the former president and current deputy chairman of the Security Council, Dmitry Medvedev, are pushing further west and talking about the destruction of Ukrainian statehood as a war aim. Tragically, “Finlandization,” even if Ukraine and its Western backers like Germany, would agree to it, may no longer be enough to end the war.