In a dangerous echo of past miscalculations, the E3 — France, Germany, and the United Kingdom — are once again escalating tensions with Iran, this time by threatening to trigger the reinstatement of U.N. Security Council sanctions (the so-called “snapback”) if U.S.-Iran nuclear talks collapse.
The E3 sees such a step as deploying leverage to force concessions from Iran on its nuclear program. However, it risks derailing diplomacy entirely and plunging the Middle East into deeper crisis.
Leading this charge is France, reprising its role as the E3’s most hawkish voice, reminiscent of its hard line in the JCPOA negotiations in 2015. At a closed-door U.N. Security Council meeting on proliferation at the end of April, French Foreign Minister Jean Noël Barrot exemplified this combative turn, saying that if the U.S. – Iran talks do not bear fruit, France and its European partners “will not hesitate for a second to reimpose all the sanctions that were lifted 10 years ago.”
Weeks later, after Iranian dissident director Jafar Panahi received a Cannes Film Festival award, Barrot hailed the accolade as a symbol of “resistance to the Iranian regime’s oppression.” While there is nothing wrong with praising the victory of an Iranian director, the politicized framing and the timing — amid delicate nuclear talks — was diplomatically inept, needlessly antagonizing Tehran.
Such rhetoric aligns with France’s and other European countries’ broader patterns of conflating Iran’s domestic policies with its nuclear obligations, an approach that only hardens Tehran’s stance. Little surprise, then, that Barrot’s remarks were received poorly in Tehran, with the French envoy summoned to the ministry of foreign affairs, and Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi lashing out at France’s perceived hypocrisy on human rights.
But France is not alone. Britain’s influential and outspoken ambassador to the U.S., Peter Mandelson, appeared to side with those in Washington who demand an end to any domestic uranium enrichment in Iran — the thickest of Iran’s red lines and the main bone of contention in the ongoing talks with the U.S. These suggestions were met with an immediate reaction from Tehran, with Araghchi warning about an end to any negotiations with E3 if “zero enrichment” was indeed to become the official European position.
In a remarkable about-face, the E3, which in early 2000s spearheaded the process that eventually led to the JCPOA, are now increasingly aligning with the Washington hawks, who, like Secretary of State Marco Rubio, opposed the JCPOA from the outset. In fact, there seems to be two competing tracks in motion right now: one is the Trump-Witkoff track that appears to be a genuine effort to strike a deal with Tehran, to the extent of President Trump openly admitting that he warned Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu against any steps that might derail a deal. And the other track is led by Rubio and the E3 privileging coercion over diplomacy. Since the U.S. can no longer invoke the snapback as it’s not a part of the JCPOA, Rubio is encouraging the E3 to do just that.
In that context, Barrot’s assertion that “there is no military solution to Iran’s nuclear program, but the path of diplomacy is narrow,” sounds disingenuous. It aligns with the views expressed by the former Biden top Middle East official Brett McGurk who pushed for “deadlines” for diplomatic negotiations, backed up by perennial “credible military threat.”
Yet history shows that pressure only causes Tehran to dig in, not fold. Objectively, there is also no reason for that: yes, Iran’s enrichment levels reached 60% which is far beyond the 3.67% permissible under JCPOA. But Tehran also consistently signaled that it is open to negotiate “everything” provided that its domestic enrichment rights are respected. That leaves ample space to negotiate the technical details, such as the caps on the enrichment, sunset provisions, the fate of the stockpiles of the enriched uranium, and verification.
During the Tehran Dialogue Forum, which I attended last week, many ideas in that regard were floating around. One informal — not coming from an official source — suggested a temporary suspension of enrichment as a confidence-building measure, with the stockpiles exported to Russia once the enrichment is renewed. The idea of a regional enrichment consortium — provided Iran’s enrichment rights are safeguarded — is gaining ground
Iranian officials also privately hinted at the possibility of pausing some of their advanced centrifuges. And while Tehran opposes perpetual restrictions on certain aspects of its nuclear program in principle, negotiating a renewal of sunset provisions for another 5 or 10 years should not be impossible. It would allow Trump to claim a superior deal over the one negotiated by Obama. As far as verification is concerned, Iran has signaled, in an important shift, that it is open to admitting American inspectors to its nuclear sites within the IAEA inspections.
These dynamics show that there is a space for diplomacy. The hawks’ and E3 insistence on artificial deadlines is unjustified — complex issues between two longtime adversaries cannot be resolved in a few meetings in Muscat and Rome. Building trust requires time. But what seems to matter to the E3 the most is not the resolution of the nuclear stand-off but using its leverage as an end in itself. “Use it or lose it” seems to be the new mantra in Paris, London and Berlin.
What explains that course is the E3’s apparent desire to punish Iran for issues unrelated to the nuclear file, such as its military ties with Russia or domestic human rights abuses.
These concerns are valid. Europe sees Russia’s war in Ukraine as an existential threat. Seen through this lens, Europeans hold a dim view of Iran. Amplifying the negative perceptions are issues related to alleged activities of Iranian intelligence services on the European soil and arrests of European citizens in Iran on apparently spurious grounds, which the EU sees as hostage-taking.
However grave and legitimate these grievances, merging them with nuclear diplomacy is a recipe for failure. The JCPOA was never intended to address all problems with Iran; it was a narrowly crafted nonproliferation agreement. Holding the nuclear deal hostage to extraneous demands guarantees its collapse — and with it, any hope of containing Iran’s nuclear program or its other policies the E3/EU finds objectionable, such as military ties with Russia.
Tehran has warned of “severe consequences” if the E3 invokes the snapback. Top among these could be withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, a scenario that would eliminate international oversight of Iran’s program. The current moderate government would be weakened — and it already faces criticisms from hardliners for supposedly being too quick to frontload Iran’s concessions, such as a readiness to temporarily go back to the JCPOA-levels of enrichment. In a déjà vu following the demise of the JCPOA at the tail end of the pragmatic Rouhani presidency (2017-2021), hardliners could reassert themselves again, ironically exacerbating every policy the E3 dislikes — accelerated enrichment, deepened ties with Russia, and tightening the screws domestically.
This is why the E3’s threat of snapback is not just irrational — it is self-defeating. Europe, already grappling with the Ukraine war, can ill afford another avoidable crisis. If the E3 can’t help with the U.S.–Iran talks, it should, at least, refrain from actively undermining them.
