BRICS, at the conclusion of its summit in Johannesburg, South Africa, announced an expansion with the addition of six new member states — Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and UAE. This is a big deal. It is the first expansion of the grouping since 2010, when South Africa joined, and the biggest step since the 2015 founding of its New Development Bank.
The expansion will bring in deep-pocketed and energy-rich Gulf states, will enhance Africa and Latin America's representation, and showcase the great diversity of the member states’ domestic political systems. It also embeds regional rivals Saudi Arabia and Iran into what is starting to look like a broader multilateral institution, which could help cement the two's growing thaw.
It was likely that the summit would result in certain concrete criteria being defined for admitting new members. But announcing the actual admission of specific new members was a surprise.
The expansion— and the still-long waiting list of close to 20 states — is a demand signal for alternative structures for solving common challenges and furthering interests of Global South states, which are not being satisfied in the current global order.
Almost all Global South states in BRICS — old and new — are certainly not anti-American (many of them are close U.S. partners and two have American troops stationed on their soil), but they want to evolve alternative geoeconomic structures that can fill the deep gaps and deficiencies in the current US-led order.
The key for BRICS now is to translate expanded membership into enhanced efficacy of its institutions. Typically as a club expands, delivery challenges grow. There is no question that BRICS still has much hard work to do to create a robust organization on the ground. But this is a grouping on the move.
White House National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan, by pointing to the diversity of interests of its members in a recent press conference, seemed to dismiss BRICS' significance. If so, that is a mistake. As the Quincy Institute’s Trita Parsi has noted, the admission of Iran, for example, is a sign that the U.S. is no longer able to act as a gatekeeper controlling the entry of states it doesn’t like into major global groupings — yet another sign that the era of unipolarity is coming, or has already come, to an end.
Washington should respond to the message from Johannesburg by repairing its currently deficient, sometimes counterproductive, policy approach to the Global South. By doing so, it will recover its own eroding credibility and influence and help in the faster resolution of major global challenges facing the planet.
Sarang Shidore is Director of the Global South Program at the Quincy Institute, and member of the adjunct faculty at George Washington University. He has published in Foreign Affairs and The New York times, among others. Sarang was previously a senior research scholar at the University of Texas at Austin and senior global analyst at the geopolitical risk firm Stratfor Inc.
Russia's Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov attends a meeting with South Africa's Foreign Minister Naledi Pandor on the sidelines of the BRICS summit in Johannesburg, South Africa, August 23, 2023. Russian Foreign Ministry/Handout via REUTERS
Iran's President Masoud Pezeshkian visits Iran's nuclear achievements exhibition in Tehran, Iran April 9, 2025. Iran's Presidency/WANA (West Asia News Agency)/Handout via REUTERS
On August 28, the E3 (Britain, France and Germany) set the clock ticking, triggering the snapback mechanism and warning Iran that it must show meaningful progress on nuclear diplomacy within 30 days or face the return of pre-2015 U.N. sanctions.
Coming after Israel and the United States attacked Iran, hitting nuclear facilities and infrastructure and assassinating senior Revolutionary Guard (IRGC) officers and nuclear scientists, the EU’s decision has raised the stakes immeasurably.
It also comes as President Trump declared Iran should not engage in uranium enrichment. But the issue is not simply one of centrifuges and international inspection protocols to monitor Iran’s compliance. It is whether the Islamic Republic can reconcile its ideological posture with the need to survive.
The debate inside Tehran is now sharper than at any point since the collapse of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2018 when U.S. President Trump unilaterally withdrew from the deal, which limited Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for easing sanctions. At one end stands President Masoud Pezeshkian urging pragmatic engagement. At the other, the hardline bloc associated with Keyhan newspaper in demanding escalation. Above them, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei sets the limits, allowing neither surrender nor uncontrolled confrontation.
Pezeshkian is keenly aware that confrontation with the United States will not serve Iran. He is also aware that he would be signing the end of his political career if he capitulated to U.S. pressure to abandon Tehran’s nuclear program. This is a tough balancing act. After U.S. and Israeli strikes on Iran in June, Pezeshkian’s government suspended cooperation with the IAEA by banning international inspections at nuclear facilities. This was a defiant act, meant to show Iran would not be bullied. Yet Pezeshkian’s tone in other moments has been pointedly different, revealing a realistic assessment of his options. “If we rebuild the nuclear facilities, they are going to attack them again,” he said last month before asking the obvious question directed at hardliners who reject diplomacy: “What can we do if we do not enter negotiations?”
Pezeshkian’s reformist base has gone even further. In a controversial statement, the Reform Front urged Tehran to suspend uranium enrichment voluntarily to prevent snapback and the economic collapse that would likely follow. Iranian outlets carried the call, which was immediately condemned as treachery by hardliners
In a rare public statement, former President Hasan Rouhani, expressed hope that Iran could still convince European signatories to JCPOA to remove snapback from the U.N. Security Council agenda, although he did not say how. Rouhani made it clear that snapback will be very costly for Iran, and pleaded with JCPOA critics to stop censoring the deal.
Keyhan, the hardliners’ mouthpiece, has been adamant that Iran must not retreat, but instead rely on threats that force others to step back. They have called for Iran’s exit from the Non-Proliferation Treaty and even threatening shipping in the Strait of Hormuz. Such moves, of course, would escalate the crisis deliberately and increase incentives for building a nuclear bomb. For this faction, which includes the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, compromise is a slippery slope. Better to endure sanctions, and possibly another round of confrontation with Israel and the United States, than surrender sovereignty.
Khamenei hovers uneasily over the two camps, which might explain his often contradictory statements. He has described the nuclear issue with the U.S. as “unsolvable” and dismissed direct dialogue as superficial. Yet, in the same week he defended Pezeshkian from criticism, urging Iranians to support “those who serve the nation, especially the president, who is hardworking and persistent.” The balance is revealing, he will not permit surrender and sees the pragmatists as useful in breaking out of this quandary.
Outside powers complicate the equation. Russia and Chinaopposed the E3 decision but they cannot block snapback; instead, they may simply refuse to enforce sanctions, dulling the economic impact on Iran. Tehran may be encouraged by that. But this would offer only partial relief; while significant, they can’t substitute for access to global markets.
Russian officials have openly called the E3 move “illegitimate,” with Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov warning it will inflict additional damage to confidence in international mechanisms. For its part, China’s foreign ministry described the decision as “irresponsible” and signaled that Beijing would not cooperate with enforcement. Official Iranian outlets, such as Tasnim and Fars, have amplified these statements, presenting Moscow and Beijing as bulwarks against Western pressure. Yet Iranian economists caution that Russian and Chinese non-compliance cannot compensate for the loss of European markets or access to global banking. The IMF projects Iran’s economy to grow only 0.6% in 2025, the lowest in the Middle East except for war-ravaged Syria and Lebanon.
Israel, meanwhile, has wasted no time. It is lobbying Washington to act again, urging the U.S. not to relent on its “maximum pressure” on Tehran. Defense Minister Israel Katz warned bluntly that Israel would strike if threatened. With the 30-day deadline looming, delay in Tehran’s response to the E3 to restore trust will be read in Tel Aviv as a green light for renewed bombing. The lesson of June, that Iran’s nuclear program can be struck and set back overnight, likely informs Israeli calculations.
All hope seems to rest on Pezeshkian’s ability to navigate this maze and somehow secure the approval of the Supreme Leader to find a compromise. His mission would be to match national pride with pragmatism: preserve the right to enrich, but cap levels and accept inspections that reassure Europe and lower the risk of further strikes. Khamenei has done this before, dressing compromise in revolutionary terms as “heroic flexibility.” He may do so again to prevent the greater danger of collapse. It may be that Rouhani’s comments were aimed for the ear of the Supreme Leader so that he reins in the hardliners.
Ordinary Iranians, meanwhile, are showing signs of war weariness. Sporadic local protests over basic needs have become commonplace. Surveys published last month by the Iranian Students Polling Agency suggest that over 70 percent of Iranians prioritize economic stability over nuclear advancement, further evidence that the public mood is shifting. This underlines Pezeshkian’s dilemma: his push for negotiations is not only a diplomatic calculation, but also a response to the mounting fatigue of a society unwilling to carry the costs of perpetual confrontation.
Without a compromise within the coming weeks, the consequences could be devastating. The return of sanctions will likely crush what remains of Iran’s economic resilience. The IRGC may be willing to fight on, but ordinary Iranians have demonstrated they do not wish to be sacrificed at the altar of ideology. Without a quick response to stop the clock, Israel will view Tehran’s inaction as a license to strike again. The regime will face what it has feared most: a challenge not to its centrifuges, but to its very survival.
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Top photo credit: Vladimir Putin and Volodymyr Zelensky (Shutterstock/miss.cabul)
Scoffing over Russia-Ukraine ceasefire wont last. Here's why.
In the early hours of Sunday morning, Russia launched its largest air attack on Ukraine to date, including over 800 drones and 13 ballistic missiles. Cities across the country came under fire, and a government building in Kyiv was damaged.
Officials in Europe and theUnited States were quick to condemn the attacks as evidence that Vladimir Putin is not serious about ending Russia’s nearly four-year conflict with Ukraine. They are right. Putin is not yet ready to stop fighting. And why would he be? After all, his army has the upper hand on the battlefield while Ukraine struggles with manpower shortages and materiel deficiencies.
Putin may, however, be ready to start bargaining over what the end to the war might look like, and signaled as much at last week’s Shanghai Cooperation Organization meeting in China. “It seems to me that if common sense prevails, it will be possible to agree on an acceptable solution to end this conflict,” he told reporters in Beijing.
Let’s hope that U.S. President Donald Trump is paying attention. Though his face-to-face with Putin in Alaska failed to achieve the desired results, Trump can still jumpstart flagging efforts to end the war in Ukraine. But to do so, he will need to ignore voices calling for more sanctions or military pressure to be put on Russia.
Instead, he should double down on diplomacy by initiating serious working level discussions between Washington, Moscow, and Kyiv that can begin to hash out the terms of a settlement. This move may be unpopular, but real negotiations have to start sometime, and waiting won’t make peace easier to reach.
Each year since it began, Putin has spoken about the war in Ukraine at the annual summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, a multilateral group that includes China, Russia, and India among other states. His remarks have typically emphasized three main themes. First, he has countered the narrative that Russia is the aggressor in Ukraine, blaming the United States and Europe for meddling in Ukraine’s elections and pushing NATO’s boundaries closer to Russia’s borders.
Second, he has criticized the sanctions imposed on Russia by the West. Finally, he has thanked fellow SCO members for their support and efforts to work toward peace.
This year seemed different. Though his prepared remarks reiterated well-worn criticisms of NATO expansion and appreciation for Russia’s partners, in sideline conversations and answers to press questions he went further, expressing optimism about the war’s trajectory, observing that there might be a “light at the end of the tunnel,” and discussing Russia’s conditions for peace — those that are non-negotiable and those where some compromise might be reached.
There are clear limits to what Putin will agree to. Yet the positions Putin has outlined recently — in China, Alaska, and in-between — are not quite as maximalist as they were a year ago. There appears to be some bargaining space on key issues that could pave a pathway to peace if the Trump administration plays its cards right.
For example, while in China, Putin made clear once again that Ukraine’s membership in NATO is a redline for Russia, but also confirmed that Moscow does not object to Ukraine’s entrance into the EU (of course, only other EU member states can offer Kyiv membership in the economic and political union).
Putin also seemed open to discussing some kind of security guarantee for Ukraine, though it was unclear what this would entail. Putin may still be focused on the model proposed in Istanbul in which a group of countries including Russia, would guarantee Ukraine’s security. This is a non-starter for Kyiv, just as Putin is likely to veto Europe’s “reassurance force” plan.
But it’s possible that in the context of serious negotiations Putin might be open to other security arrangements for Ukraine, for example some types of Western military assistance during peacetime, Ukraine’s long-term defense industrial cooperation with Europe, or promises of additional U.S. military aid and intelligence sharing in case Russia attacks Ukraine again. Elsewhere, Moscow has signaled some flexibility on Russia’s “demilitarization” demand suggesting it would not object to a defensively armed Ukrainian military force.
Putin appears somewhat less willing to give ground on territory. Still, he noted in China that Russia would be willing to work with the United States (or even Ukraine) to oversee the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant. He continues to seek full control of Donetsk but appears satisfied freezing the lines of contact in Zaporizhzhia and Kherson.
Europe and Ukraine may not like Putin’s opening bid, but ignoring what flexibility has emerged in Russia’s terms in recent months risks missing a real chance for peace. Putin’s seeming escalation in the skies over Ukraine and his willingness to begin serious negotiations are not mutually exclusive. In fact, if he is serious about talking, eeking out whatever military gains he can now would be a rational way to increase bargaining leverage.
In any case, delaying diplomacy and continuing to struggle on the battlefield until Putin puts down his weapons is likely to make things worse, not better, for Ukraine. The most favorable settlement available to Ukraine was the one it might have negotiated in April 2022 or November 2022. With its military currently on the ropes, the next best option is the one negotiated today. If Putin is indeed open to talking, even if just at the working level and if fighting continues at the same time, it is in Ukraine’s best interest to get on board.
Ultimately, it is Kyiv and Moscow who must reach an agreement but in addition to eschewing new sanctions and other futile tactics to force Putin into a ceasefire, the Trump administration can help push things along in three ways.
First, Washington can serve as convener, bringing teams from Moscow and Kyiv together and facilitating private dialogue between the two sides. In this role, Trump will have to avoid the temptation to insert himself directly while the necessarily slow process plays out. After all, Kyiv and Moscow have shown that given time and space they can reach a mutually agreeable endpoint. They almost succeeded in Istanbul in 2022 and can do so again.
Second, the United States can help bridge the demands made by each side, offering Ukraine carrots to make concessions easier and Russia incentives to reduce the demands on Ukraine. For example, promising Ukraine time-limited military assistance after a settlement or building strategic stockpiles of air defense and other munitions that Kyiv would receive in the event of renewed war would be sustainable ways to reassure Ukraine of its future security without compromising U.S. interests.
In the case of Russia, the Trump administration might offer to open discussions about the U.S. role in Europe’s long-term security architecture in return for more flexibility from Moscow on Ukraine’s own military capabilities. The Trump administration has already signaled an interest in pulling back from its role in Europe, so reductions in U.S. commitments on NATO’s eastern flank could be a win-win — achieving an administration priority while addressing Putin’s “root causes.” The promise of sanctions relief or other types of bilateral cooperation might also convince Russia to lessen what it requests from Ukraine.
Finally, the Trump administration can regulate European involvement in negotiations, acting as a buffer against what has been the continent’s unhelpful interference. So far, European leaders have encouraged Zelensky to stick to unreasonable goals, set unrealistic expectations, and criticized what progress has occurred. The latest “reassurance force” charade is more of the same, an exercise in fantasy that extends the war rather than ending it.
The United States continues to have significant leverage over Europe, and the Trump administration should not be afraid to use it to keep Brussels from scuttling future diplomacy. Trump should communicate to his European counterparts that meddling in ongoing talks is unwelcome and will come with consequences for the transatlantic relationship. At the same time, he can engage with Europe at a later point on how they can support Ukraine after an agreement is reached.
With his military forces advancing on the battlefield, Putin is unlikely to stop fighting in the immediate term. Still, he seems ready to at least think about the end of the war and to talk about the terms of a settlement. If Trump is serious about achieving peace, he shouldn’t let this window of opportunity pass.
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Top photo credit: Republic of Singapore Air Force pilots step to their F-15SG Eagle aircraft before a training mission during Cope Tiger 13 at Korat Royal Thai Air Force Base, Thailand, March 12, 2013. ((U.S. Air Force photo/2nd Lt. Jake Bailey)
In an event barely noticed outside of the region, the U.S. military abruptly cancelled a planned bed down — the military term for housing planes — of 12 Republic of Singapore Air Force (RSAF) F-15s at Andersen Air Force Base (AAFB) in Guam.
No other explanations about the “mutually agreed” decision, announced in August, have been forthcoming. In the context of the U.S. campaign for regional allies to boost burden sharing, commit to conflict with China, and increase defense budgets, this decision to cancel a desired agreement with a close ally raises unanswered questions.
Without further explanation we can assume, given the broader context, that the cancellation reflects an increasing unilateralism by the U.S. which anticipates full compliance from its partners.
The case for the bed down of RSAF fighters at a US Air Force base
The proposed basing of RSAF fighters at AAFB had been agreed to in 2019. The interest of Singapore in basing fighters (with attendant magazine areas) was clear:
“Overseas training detachments are integral to meeting the RSAF's training requirements. The access to vast airspace overseas allows the RSAF to overcome local airspace constraints, and conduct high-end, realistic training to hone its operational competence.”
Having fighters and ordnance staged in Guam would have provided Singapore’s Defence Forces unusually unfettered freedom for both flight and live fire activities in the Marianas Island Testing and Training (MITT) area. As late as December 2023, the U.S. Air Force was bullish on the project, noting the project:
“is needed to enhance DAF (Department of the Air Force) capability to support U.S. and partner nation forces within the Indo-Pacific region and strengthen the U.S.’s ability to respond regionally and worldwide, through…increased support of fighter aircraft, in alignment with evolving DAF and DoD strategies and initiatives for the region. Increasing and improving airfield and munitions infrastructure would address capability gaps and allow for greater efficiencies and agility in the way ground operations are conducted.”
The prospect for this type of activity was heralded in the halls of the U.S. Congress. In addition to the RSAF, the Senate Armed Services Committee Fiscal Year 2025 National Defense Authorization Act expressed the view that “DOD should consider whether there are additional opportunities to host the military forces of other foreign partner countries on a permanent or rotational basis at Andersen.”
As the formal scoping process for developing the infrastructure for the project began it was noted that the project was in “alignment with (the US Department of Defense’s) initiatives for deterrence and stabilization in the Indo-Pacific region.” This process began in April 2021 and did raise concerns (particularly the impacts on native and engaged flora and fauna) as well as the socioeconomic impact of relying on off-base housing to host the accompanied Singapore Defence Forces personnel.
The Singapore Ministry of Defense, in a response to media queries on August 12, released a brief statement saying it was a “mutual” agreement to cancel the project. “The RSAF will continue with periodic short-term training and exercises in Guam, such as an upcoming fighter training detachment in Oct-Nov 25,” the statement read.
Cancelling a close ally
Today, it remains unclear what happened in discussions between the U.S. and Singaporean governments from late spring to early summer 2025. It is unlikely, however, that this was an outcome desired by Singapore.
As noted in the ROD, the decision was “based on matters discussed in the Final Environmental Impact Statement, input from the public and regulatory agencies, and other relevant factors.” A notice that was published in Guam newspapers on August 8, 2025, contained a similar but slightly different construction:
The decision was based on operational analysis, results of site surveys, and environmental, economic, and technical factors discussed in the ROD; environmental impacts as analyzed in the Final EIS; input from the public and government agencies; and military judgment factors.
But given that the Final EIS published on April 26 did not present environmental obstacles, it is difficult to reconcile how those issues played a significant role in the final decision. Moreover, in Guam, the U.S. military has regularly cleared pristine environmental areas with endangered flora and fauna to make way for military projects. If the U.S. Department of Defense wanted the project to proceed, even if environmental issues had been identified as “significant,” accommodations through “mitigation” would have been made.
Importantly, many of the proposed projects of the bed down are slated to proceed without the RSAF. Specifically, construction for approximately 20 acres of new airfield aprons adjacent to the existing runway, new fuel lines that tie into the existing fuel transfer system, a utilities vault and new utilities lines, security fencing, roadways, parking, walkways, and stormwater management infrastructure are moving ahead.
We believe, however, that “other relevant factors” and “military judgment factors” weighed on the U.S. decision to cancel the RSAF bed down. Moreover, the cancellation may be an important bellwether for how other “relevant” and “military judgment decisions” of the U.S. government are executed across the region. In an environment of sharpening U.S. competition with China, and a U.S. expectation that allies do more, spend more, and commit more to U.S. objectives in relation to China, what happens in Guam merits attention.
The U.S. holds all the cards in access to its bases in Guam. Whatever U.S. requirements led to the discontinuation of discussions about the RSAF bed down, it is a safe assumption that the U.S. was leveraging the privileges of a host. Whether the U.S. requested Singapore to “pay up” for the planned improvements or sought the commitment of RSAF fighters on station at AAFB in the event of a conflict with China, Singapore blinked.
That a deal between allies fell through is itself significant, but the implications of what happened in Guam are likely much broader.
Sovereignty and security
Early in the process, the US Air Force rejected alternative RSAF bed down locations in Diego Garcia (BIOT) and Iwo To (Japan) because these foreign locations could “impede U.S. military activity.” The bed down of the RSAF assets “on U.S. soil” was a determining factor in identifying AAFB, since it was deemed essential that the U.S. maintain full operational control of strategic military assets on U.S. lands to achieve the necessary national objectives in the Indo-Pacific.
Setting aside for a moment the question of American sovereignty in Guam (where the U.S. government has actively obstructed and denied the local self-determination/decolonization of a Territory as outlined by the United Nations), the conditions which the U.S. might put on Singapore for access to its bases are its indisputable prerogative.
In general, the trend is bending toward a U.S. preference for the region, writ large, for both (1) unilateral decision-making and (2) the pre-commitment of others to its future actions.
If Singapore backed out because it did not want a deployment in Guam to signal participation in a U.S.-led containment strategy, which could draw Chinese retaliation, emerging U.S. calls for operational control of basing assets across the region would have provided important context.
The imposition of its U.S. national security objectives and accompanying assignment of local risk defines Guam’s relationship with the U.S. military. It is not a pretty picture if Guam is your homeland. Corrosive and underdeveloped socio-economic circumstances frustrate the development of both sustainable modernity and indigenous government. On the “security” front, there is no better example of the military-first view than the expectation that Guam will be a first-strike community in the event of a conflict with China.
On one hand, the U.S. Department of Defense is developing a multi-billion-dollar “missile defense” network that is likely (at best) only to frustrate a determined attack by an adversary. On the other hand, there are no plans for community shelters or food resiliency in the event of the anticipated conflict. From the military perspective, Guam is all utility and risk with no provision for community security.
As the U.S. military and policymakers look to turn back the clock on spheres of influence to times of client states, advancing a decision structure that has been in place in Guam since 1898 seems ascendant. This approach would benefit operationalization of the military’s self-defined “initiatives for deterrence and stabilization in the Indo-Pacific region.”
How this approach might advance the security of sovereign nations in the region will be a matter for them to determine. As other states enter discussions on these issues with the U.S., they might benefit from understanding what happens in Guam.
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