Just a few weeks ago, Sudanese political and military factions appeared poised to sign a final agreement on April 11 to pave the way for a transitional civilian government. But this week's outbreak of fighting between the army led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) led by al-Burhan’s deputy, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, better known as Hemedti, has dashed those hopes.
The power struggle between the two factions, which are backed by different regional and international players, has been simmering since 2021. It was not a matter of if, but rather when they would come to blows. The intensity and breadth of the violence, which continued Monday, suggests that Africa’s third largest country is rapidly descending into chaos.
Originally formed from the notorious Janjaweed militias in western Sudan that were deployed by former President Omar al-Bashir's government to quash a rebellion in the Darfur region in the early 2000s, the RSF, under Hemedti’s leadership, has grown in strength and influence over the past decade, and he is leveraging its power to gain political benefits both domestically and regionally.
Three key issues underlie the army-RSF conflict, beginning with the dispute over the RSF’s integration into the Sudanese army. While the army seeks to limit the RSF's power and influence, the RSF wants to maintain its autonomy and expand its reach.
In particular, the army has pressed for a two-year integration period and a review of RSF officers and their ranks, while the RSF wants to extend the integration period to at least 10 years and maintain the current ranks of its officers. The army has also demanded that the RSF halt new recruitment.
In addition, the army wants the combined force during the integration period to be led by a body composed of four army officers and two RSF members, while the latter has demanded that the interim leadership report to a civilian president. But some popular civilian forces oppose any integration of the RSF, fearing that it could jeopardize the fragile gains of the 2019 revolution and perpetuate the culture of impunity that characterized al-Bashir’s 26-year reign.
The second major issue relates to the extent and management of the transitional period, as well as the relationship between military and civilian forces in Sudan. While al-Burhan and Hemedti are both opposed to a strong civilian and democratic government, they are at odds regarding the management of the transition, its pace, and which forces should be included in the transitional government.
The framework agreement signed last December between the army generals and the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC), a broad coalition of armed groups, political parties, and civil society organizations that led the protest movement against al-Bashir, aimed to transfer power to a two-year transitional government to be formed by July of the following year. Al-Burhan has insisted fthat the agreement is not binding on the army because some political forces rejected it. He wants his civilian allies to be included in the agreement in order to retain his influence after the transfer of power to a civilian government.
On the other hand, Hemedti, who is allied with a key faction of the FFC, views the framework agreement as an integrated package that must be implemented without any modification. He aims to eliminate al-Burhan's control over the Transitional Sovereign Council, which has run the country since the removal of al-Bashir before the RSF’s integration into the army.
The third major issue underlying the current conflict relates to the intervention in Sudan of various regional forces, each with their own political agenda and interests. Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Israel have all been involved in sabotaging the transition to civilian rule, each for their own purposes. While all these parties oppose a strong democratic, civilian-led government in Khartoum that is unlikely to be aligned to their respective regional agendas, they have contributed to the ongoing crisis by adopting different approaches and supporting different players within Sudan.
Egypt, for example, hindered the establishment of a robust civilian government and chose to side with al-Burhan in the conflict. (It is notable that the RSF captured a group of Egyptian soldiers during clashes with the Sudanese army at Merowe airbase, northeast of Khartoum.) The same considerations led Cairo to support al-Burhan’s coup against the civilian government of Abdalla Hamdok in October 2021. Despite its insistence that it wants to help stabilize its southern neighbor, Egypt has also worked to sow discord and division between and among civilians and the military, which has contributed to the country’s ongoing instability.
The UAE and Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, have built strong connections with both the Sudanese army and the RSF, particularly after the 2019 revolution that ousted al-Bashir. With their vast financial resources and fear of the spread of democratic aspirations across the region as happened in 2011, both countries supported the Sudanese military in preventing the establishment of civilian rule in Sudan. But the two countries have backed different factions over the past couple of years. While the UAE has supported Hemedti financially and diplomatically, Saudi Arabia has backed al-Burhan.
Finally, while al-Burhan and Hemedti have expressed their support for normalizing ties with Israel under the 2018 Abraham Accords, Hemedti has been more vocal in his advocacy and has reportedly met with Mossad officials on multiple occasions in recent years.
Meanwhile, the ongoing crisis in Sudan highlights the diminishing role of the United States in the region. Despite Sudan's strategic importance and the Biden administration’s rhetoric about supporting democracy abroad, Washington has focused its attention much more on Khartoum’s full implementation of the Abraham Accords with Israel than on promoting a true democratic transition in the country.
The lack of U.S. commitment has enabled the regional players to pursue their own interests in Sudan, even if they conflict with the democratic aspirations of the Sudanese people or U.S. interests. This has similarly enabled Russia to extend its influence in Sudan and build strong relations with Hemedti and the RSF, which has worked with Russia’s Wagner Group in the Central African Republic and Libya.
Moreover, the failure of the international quartet, which includes the U.S., Britain, the Emirates, and Saudi Arabia, to resolve the differences between al-Burhan and Hemedti over the past weeks further highlights Washington’s weakness in the crisis. The fact that Washington is relying on regional players, such as the UAE and Saudi Arabia, to end the current conflict speaks volumes about its limited options.
The United States should take a more active role in both supporting a democratic transition in Sudan and pressing regional players to stop their efforts to prevent it. Failure to do so could lead to the spread of the conflict not only within Sudan but beyond its borders as well.
