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Time to rip up the president's blank check for war

Time to rip up the president's blank check for war

The 2002 military authorization — up for a vote today — is largely symbolic. The 2001 AUMF is what's being used to justify all post-9/11 interventions.

Analysis | Military Industrial Complex
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In a Senate Foreign Relations Committee meeting recently, we debated repealing the 2002 Authorization for the Iraq War. The Iraq War ended long ago. You’d think it would be unanimously agreed to end a war that’s already over.    

But, if we stop with just repealing the Iraq War authorization, I fear nothing will change.

We need to take the additional step of also repealing the Authorization for the war in Afghanistan. The 2001 authorization to bring the 9/11 terrorists to justice was warranted, but like the Iraq War, the Afghan War has long ago ended — yet its authorization remains on the books.

Deciding when and where to go to war is Congress’s job. The president has authority to execute the war, but not to initiate it. James Madison wrote that the executive branch was the most prone to go to war and, therefore, the Constitution vested that power in the legislature.

There is wisdom in Madison’s words. Presidents of both parties abused the 9/11 authorization to take us to war in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Somalia, Libya, and Niger, among others.

Repealing the Iraq War authorization is a step in the right direction. But realize that the Biden administration will not oppose its repeal because the United States does not independently rely on it for ongoing military activities. In other words, they don’t need it. Repeal the 2002 Iraq War authorization only, and nothing changes. The decision of where and when to go to war will still be dependent solely upon the whims of the executive.

All recent presidents erroneously claim limitless war powers under Article II of the Constitution and use the 9/11 2001 authorization to justify wars in at least 19 countries.

But the 9/11 AUMF authorizes force only against those who “planned, authorized, committed or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons.”

It authorizes force against those entities narrowly defined by their relationship to the 9/11 attacks. Authorization was not given for a global war on terror or against radical Islamists.

Over the years, the definition of what groups are covered by this AUMF grew. Over time, the 9/11 2001 AUMF was said, without congressional authorization, to cover “associated forces,” meaning the president could claim the authority to go to war against any group no matter how tenuous the relationship to its involvement in 9/11.

No one in Congress in 2001 believed they were voting for a decades’ long war fought in at least 19 countries.

Our job is not just to put a congressional imprimatur on war. The important job of Congress is to determine where and when we send our sons and daughters to fight.

Recently, I asked my fellow committee members: would anyone here vote to authorize the status quo? Would you vote to authorize military operations nearly two dozen countries? Don’t you think Congress should have a debate over the question where and when we go to war?

Some argue repealing the 2001 9/11 AUMF would put us at risk.

Then let’s have that debate. The amendment I offered makes no mention of whether we should continue these operations. My amendment sunsets the 2001 9/11 AUMF after six months. We can use that time to debate exactly where and how to authorize force.

War is sometimes necessary, but going to war should not be the decision of one person. Ending congressional authorization for the Iraq War and the Afghanistan War returns the war power to the American people and their representatives.


A U.S. Soldier, in the Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility, Jan. 17, 2021. The Soldiers are in Syria to support the Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR) mission. (U.S. Army photo by Spc. Jensen Guillory)|A U.S. Soldier, in the Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility, Jan. 17, 2021. The Soldiers are in Syria to support the Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR) mission. (U.S. Army photo by Spc. Jensen Guillory)
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Analysis | Military Industrial Complex
Dan Caine
Top photo credit: Secretary of War Pete Hegseth and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff U.S. Air Force Gen. Dan Caine conduct a press briefing on Operation Epic Fury at the Pentagon, Washington, D.C., March 4, 2026. (DoW photo by U.S. Navy Petty Officer 1st Class Alexander Kubitza)

Did Caine just announce the Morgenthau option for Iran?

QiOSK

Gen. Dan Caine’s formulation of American war aims in Iran is remarkable not because it is bellicose, but because it is strategically incoherent.

In a press conference Tuesday morning, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not describe a limited campaign to suppress missile fire, blunt Iran’s naval threat, or even impose a severe but bounded setback on Tehran’s coercive instruments. He described a campaign against Iran’s “military and industrial base” designed to prevent the regime from attacking Americans, U.S. interests, and regional partners “for years to come.” In an earlier briefing he put the objective similarly: to prevent Iran from projecting power outside its borders. Rather than the language of a discrete coercive operation, this describes a war against a state’s capacity to regenerate power.

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Mbs-mbz-scaled
UAE President Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed al-Nahyan receives Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman at the Presidential Airport in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates November 27, 2019. WAM/Handout via REUTERS

Is the US goading Arab states to join war against Iran?

QiOSK

On Sunday, U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Mike Waltz told ABC News that Arab Gulf states may soon step up their involvement in the U.S.-Israeli war on Iran. “I expect that you'll see additional diplomatic and possibly military action from them in the coming days and weeks,” Waltz said.

Then, on Monday morning, Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.) slammed Saudi Arabia for staying out of the war even as “Americans are dying and the U.S. is spending billions” of dollars to conduct regime change in Iran. “If you are not willing to use your military now, when are you willing to use it?” Graham asked. “Hopefully this changes soon. If not, consequences will follow.”

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Why Tehran may have time on its side
Top image credit: Iranian army military personnel stand at attention under a banner featuring an image of an Iranian-made unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) during a military parade commemorating the anniversary of Army Day outside the Shrine of Iran's late leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in the south of Tehran, Iran, on April 18, 2025. (Photo by Morteza Nikoubazl/NurPhoto)

Why Tehran may have time on its side

QiOSK

A provocative calculus by Anusar Farrouqui (“policytensor”) has been circulating on X and in more exhaustive form on the author’s Substack. It purports to demonstrate a sobering reality: in a high-intensity U.S.-Iran conflict, the United States may be unable to suppress Iranian drone production quickly enough to prevent a strategically consequential period of regional devastation.

The argument is framed through a quantitative lens, carrying the seductive appeal of mathematical precision. It arranges variables—such as U.S. sortie rates and degradation efficiency against Iranian repair cycles and rebuild speeds—to suggest a "sustainable firing rate." The implication is that Iran could maintain a persistent strike capability long enough to exhaust American political patience, forcing Washington toward a premature declaration of success or an unfavorable ceasefire.

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