The New York Times reported this morning that the pandemic reversed 20 years of progress in reading and math among elementary school students in the United States. Commentators emphasized the dire effect this would have on life prospects for these children and, by implication, the American economy at an especially challenging moment in its history.
These are easy to imagine. The structure of the labor market increasingly demands greater computational and literacy skills; upward financial and social mobility hinges on successful navigation of this market. And administrative states, such as the U.S., require these skills in the labor force for effective governance, let alone national defense. So, the impact of the pandemic on education and therefore on the nation’s future will be profound.
This awful news should help Americans better understand the effects of violent conflict and economic sanctions on countries around the world. Their populations have been battered by the equivalent of terrible pandemics every year. When we observe political instability, a shattered middle class, high poverty rates, and poor economic performance in say, Iraq, it is easy to blame these conditions on intrinsic social defects.
While cultural factors might play a role, they are difficult to define and nearly impossible to measure. Other, secular factors, especially the destruction of educational systems and psychological and nutritional effects on children who grow up to participate and shape their countries’ lives can be observed and quantified.
As we in the United States cope with the longer-term effects of a single pandemic on American children, we should think about the consequences for war torn and sanctioned societies of educational deprivation for, among other things, political stability. The costs of conflict and message sending via damage to the minds and bodies of children can be extremely high.
Steven Simon is a Distinguished Fellow and visiting lecturer at Dartmouth College and Senior Research Fellow at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft. Previously, he was the Robert E. Wilhelm Fellow in International Affairs at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He served as the National Security Council senior director for counterterrorism in the Clinton White House and for the Middle East and North Africa in the Obama White House. He is the author of "Grand Delusion: The Rise and Fall of American Ambition in the Middle East" (2023).
Children who fled the escalating violence in the southern part of Iraq share a small house with relatives in Turaq. 04/07/2011. Erbil, Iraq. UN Photo/Bikem/Flickr
Top image credit: Houthi supporters shout slogans and hold up weapons during a protest against the US and Israel, in Sana a, Yemen, 15 August 2025. IMAGO/ Sanaa Yemen via REUTERS
Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz threatened to "cut the hands" of Israel's enemies, but his specific target — Yemen's Houthi movement (Ansarullah) — has not only survived months of IDF and U.S. military pressure, but has also grown stronger with each confrontation.
The latest Israeli strike on Heyzaz power plant near Sanaa, Yemen’s capital, exemplifies this strategic failure: a symbolic attack on civilian infrastructure that inflicts severe hardship on Yemen's civilian population while doing nothing to degrade Houthi military capabilities.
The cycle of violence remains unmistakable. Since October 2023, Houthi forces have carried out near-daily attacks against Israeli-linked shipping in the Red Sea, as well as targets in Israel proper, such as air and sea ports, launching more than 70 missiles and 22 drones at Israel since March 2025 alone.
These attacks, which the Houthis consistently frame as protests against Israel's military campaign in Gaza, have been painful: since November 2023, the Houthis have targeted more than 100 merchant ships in the Red Sea, pushing insurance rates to skyrocket and forcing costly detours for commercial shipping. The strikes forced the key Israeli Red Sea port of Eilat to reduce operations by 90%, pushing it to the brink of bankruptcy. These actions prompted relentless Israeli retaliation against Yemeni targets.
While the U.S. initially joined Israeli strikes, it quickly recognized the strategic quagmire — the Houthis adapted their tactics faster than Western forces could effectively respond, creating a prohibitively expensive war of attrition. The $1 billion U.S. bombing campaign proved so ineffective that the Trump administration pursued an Oman-brokered ceasefire in May, though notably this agreement only protected U.S. assets while leaving Israel vulnerable to continued attacks.
Recent reporting highlights the resilience of Houthi forces. Since the pause in U.S. strikes, they have reportedly rebuilt radar systems, communication networks, and reconnaissance capabilities. They also conducted naval exercises at Al Hudaydah port, deployed modern weapons to Red Sea coastal areas, and relocated munitions to mountainous western regions.
Israel's campaign has now escalated beyond targeting Houthi military targets to include critical civilian infrastructure. Heyzaz power plant is one of the key facilities in supplying the Yemeni capital Sanaa. Despite that, Tel Aviv tried to justify the attack by claiming that it was used by the Houthis, mirroring its rationale for bombing the Al Hudaydah port in June, a vital lifeline for Yemen’s fuel, medicines, and food imports.
The Israeli strategy of attacking civilian facilities reflects fundamental miscalculations. These strikes, while certainly disruptive, are unlikely to significantly impact the Houthis' determination to continue military operations in support of the Palestinians. In terms of targeting energy infrastructure specifically, already during the war with the Saudi-led coalition (2015-2023), the Houthi-controlled territories had transitioned to relying primarily on decentralized power sources. Small-scale solar installations, backyard generators, and diesel-powered units became the backbone of electricity supply. As a result, Israeli strikes against centralized power plants yield minimal strategic effect.
The immediate Houthi response — a ballistic missile launch at Israel that Tel Aviv claimed was intercepted — demonstrated their undiminished capacity. Furthermore, these attacks on civilian facilities only strengthen Ansarullah's resolve and narrative of resisting Israeli aggression, boosting their regional legitimacy while Israel's international isolation grows.
Houthi leader Abdul Malik al-Houthi has increasingly styled himself as a pivotal leader of the regional "Axis of Resistance," echoing the rhetorical and strategic playbook of the Lebanese Hezbollah’s leader Hassan Nasrallah, assassinated during an Israeli attack on Beirut. In a recent speech, he framed the conflict in stark terms that went beyond Yemen, lambasting Arab governments for their "shameful weakness" in submitting to U.S. and Israeli pressure while contrasting their inaction with the Houthis’ defiance.
Al-Houthi’s messaging is deliberate and effective. By condemning Lebanon’s acceptance of U.S. demands for Hezbollah to be disarmed as a "betrayal of sovereignty," mocking Egypt’s gas deals with Israel as a "sad paradox" next to Norway’s sovereign wealth fund’s boycott of Israel, and accusing Arab leaders of silence over the Netanyahu government’s expansionist “Greater Israel” rhetoric, he positions the Houthis as the only force willing to confront Israel militarily and rhetorically.
While conventional wisdom often dismisses the Houthis as an Iranian proxy, their fiery rhetoric also challenges Tehran. Iran's rulers face growing criticism for failing to deter Israeli attacks — both against regional allies like Hezbollah and on its own soil during the 12-day June war — by seeking de-escalation over a full-force retaliation.
This narrative resonates across the region, where popular frustration with both Israel’s war in Gaza and the perceived complicity of U.S.-aligned governments runs high. Each Israeli strike on Yemen — particularly against civilian sites — reinforces the Houthis’ claim to leadership of the resistance camp, eroding Israel’s standing while consolidating Ansarullah’s influence far beyond Yemen’s borders.
Meanwhile, Israel's stubborn reliance on military solutions continues to ignore the fundamental political reality: the Houthis' campaign will persist as long as Israel's assault on Gaza continues. A durable ceasefire in Gaza remains the singular solution that would eliminate the Houthis' primary justification for their attacks. This underscores the core problem — military action cannot resolve what is, at its heart, a political conflict. Equally counterproductive is the ongoing blockade of Yemen, which serves only to inflict suffering on civilians while failing to weaken Houthi recruitment or reduce anti-Western sentiment.
History offers clear lessons. From Hezbollah to Hamas to Houthis, asymmetric opponents don't surrender under bombardment — they evolve. Israel's current path promises only deeper isolation, drained resources, and prolonged conflict. True strength lies not in empty threats but in breaking cycles of violence. The question remains whether Israeli leaders will learn this lesson before their long-term strategic position deteriorates further.
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Top image credit: President Donald Trump meets with Russian president Vladimir Putin in the Billy Mitchell Room at Joint Base Elmendorf Richardson in Anchorage, Alaska, Friday, August 15, 2025. (Official White House Photo by Daniel Torok)
The Trump-Putin Alaska summit was about far more than Ukraine. Since long before the meeting in Anchorage, the Arctic has been recognized as a setting for U.S.-Russia cooperation.
Now, with the historic presidential summit in the unexpected location of Alaska, the Arctic has been confirmed as one of the key areas for the normalization of the bilateral relationship.
During the joint news conference with President Trump, President Putin said “cooperation in the Arctic and the resumption of region-to-region contacts, including between the Russian Far East and the West Coast of the USA, also appear relevant.” President Trump did not specifically mention the Arctic in his remarks, but his administration’s initiative to host the meeting in Alaska was symbolic and indicative of a new age in U.S.-Russia Arctic cooperation.
Icebreakers and energy
Just before the meeting, U.S. officials had internal discussions on using Russian nuclear-powered icebreaker vessels to support the development of gas projects in Alaska as a potential deal to be made with President Putin. Although the details of what was discussed in Alaska are (as of writing this piece) limited, the icebreaker proposal makes sense. Russia is the only country with nuclear-powered icebreakers which help Russian companies conduct year-round shipping along the Northern Sea Route in the Arctic. In total, Russia has 41 nuclear and diesel-electric icebreakers and has a sophisticated network of Arctic port infrastructure.
By contrast, the U.S. operates only three polar icebreakers: USCGC Healy, USCGC Polar Star, and USCGC Storis. Expanding the U.S. icebreaker fleet is evidently important to President Trump; the administration has sought to acquire icebreakers from Finland and has allocated $25 billion for Polar and Arctic Security Cutters (icebreakers) for the U.S. Coast Guard.
Russian policymakers have also called for joint economic ventures, especially energy extraction and natural resource projects. A week before flying to Alaska, Putin’s foreign policy adviser Yuri Ushakov said, “It is in Alaska and in the Arctic that the economic interests of our countries converge and prospects for implementing large-scale mutually beneficial projects arise.” At the February 2025 bilateral meeting in Saudi Arabia, the Arctic was specifically discussed as a setting for joint projects. The Arctic, specifically where the two countries meet in the Bering Strait, presents the U.S. and Russia with a region of mutual interests.
Sanctions on Russia have led Moscow to increase its cooperation with China in Arctic energy and shipping projects. U.S. officials see Arctic cooperation as a potential means to “drive a wedge” between Moscow and Beijing. For Moscow, a new partnership with Washington could be an opportunity to offset its economic and technological dependence on China.
Climate cooperation
However, there are many more aspects to Arctic cooperation that could benefit the two countries, the region, and humankind as a whole: climate research and deconfliction. The Arctic is warming four times faster than the rest of the world, leading to dramatic transformations in the region: melting sea ice, thawing permafrost, eroding coastlines, and collapsing ecosystems. These impacts are detrimental to Arctic residents and Indigenous Peoples.
The U.S. and Russia have a nearly century-long history of Arctic science cooperation to jointly understand such processes and inform climate adaptation and mitigation. This crucial research has largely been paralyzed since 2022, when the Western Arctic states condemned Russia’s military actions in Ukraine and paused the work of the Arctic Council. The Biden White House also announced a termination of scientific cooperation with Russia.
While a return to climate-centric cooperation may be unlikely with the current Trump administration’s positions on climate change, environmental initiatives with a more specific focus may be achievable. Putin’s envoy Kirill Dmitriev said earlier this year that “the key issue for our discussion with Western powers, including the U.S., is climate… because we believe the Arctic is changing.”
The logic of the potential icebreakers deal (the U.S. gaining access to Russian expertise) can be applied to the study of permafrost: Russian researchers have centuries of experience in studying and adapting to permafrost thaw. The deterioration of permafrost undermines any potential economic ventures and threatens the structural integrity of infrastructure. American and Russian researchers should revamp their collaboration in this critical area.
Arctic peacekeeping
Ensuring the Arctic remains a region of peace and security is another important channel of cooperation for the U.S. and Russia. The frequency and intensity of military activity in the Arctic has increased. The participants in military exercises have increased, including China and non-Arctic NATO states. There are risks of a renewed arms race and the deployment of more powerful weapons systems, including hypersonic missiles, in the Arctic. Arctic security is important to the Trump administration as evidenced by President Trump’s rhetoric on acquiring Greenland and the 14 mentions of the Arctic in the 2025 Annual Threat Assessment.
The shortest distance for missiles and planes between the U.S. and Russia is via the Arctic. With Finland and Sweden now under the nuclear umbrella of the U.S. and NATO, all but one of the Arctic states (Russia) is a NATO Ally. The upcoming 2026 expiration of the New START agreement has important implications for Arctic security due to Russia’s concentration of its sea-based nuclear weapons in the region.
Previously, the Arctic was the setting for confidence-building measures, information sharing, and programs to reduce the risks of miscalculation, such as the Arctic Military Environmental Cooperation. Gorbachev’s Murmansk Initiative included calls for Arctic denuclearization, disarmament and establishing an “Arctic zone of peace.” Today, we are at dangerously low levels of trust — preventing such joint efforts.
To prevent a security dilemma and address these critical issues of Arctic security, it is important for the U.S.-Russia Arctic cooperation agenda to include trust-building, transparency, confidence-building measures, military-to-military and expert-to-expert dialogue, and additional measures to reduce the risk of escalation in the region. New military security architecture is needed in the Arctic. Restarting frameworks such as the Arctic Coast Guard Forum and Arctic Chiefs of Defense meetings may be first steps towards improving mutual understanding in the region.
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Top image credit: U.S. President Donald Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy meet at the White House, amid negotiations to end the Russian war in Ukraine, in Washington, D.C., U.S., August 18, 2025. Ukrainian Presidential Press Service/Handout via REUTERS
President Trump's meetings on Monday with his European and Ukrainian counterparts generated what appeared to be a consensus on a host of key war termination issues, the biggest among them being a format for viable security guarantees to Ukraine.
Trump suggested that Russian President Vladimir Putin has acquiesced to “Article 5-like” guarantees for Kyiv, a development that drew praise from Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and the European leaders in attendance.
This proposal is not new. Indeed, it harkens back to the 2022 Istanbul peace talks, which stipulated that Ukraine was to receive guarantees similar to NATO’s collective defense provision from a coalition of guarantor states. That coalition was to include Russia itself and, at a later stage in those negotiations, Moscow introduced a clause requiring unanimous consent from all signatory states before the collective defense provision could be triggered.
Ukrainian negotiators rejected that revision on the grounds that it amounted to Moscow’s veto over the West’s ability to defend Ukraine in the event of a future Russian re-invasion. Yet there are other potential issues with Article 5-like guarantees that, though quite not as glaring, can nonetheless derail the White House’s ongoing peace initiative if not addressed directly.
Though Moscow has clearly accepted the principle that Kyiv should come out of this war with a viable defensive deterrent against future aggression, the devil is in the details on precisely what form this deterrent can take.
Over the past three years, Moscow has consistently rejected any scheme for security guarantees that would greenlight the permanent deployment of NATO or Western troops on Ukrainian soil. The Kremlin has demonstrated a degree of flexibility in other areas, including on freezing the lines in the southeast and not attempting to block Ukraine’s path to EU membership. There is, however, no indication that it has budged on what has been its bright red lines surrounding Western contingents in Ukraine. The Kremlin reiterated its stance during the Monday meeting, which also included a phone call between President Trump and Putin.
“We reaffirm our repeatedly stated position on our categorical rejection of any scenarios that envisage the appearance in Ukraine of a military contingent with the participation of NATO countries,” read a statement by Russia’s Foreign Ministry.
Yet even on this point, there are nuances that will have to be sifted through by U.S. and Russian negotiators. Russia stridently rejects the preemptive deployment of Western troops in Ukraine after a peace deal is reached, but that is a different proposition from a situation where a European contingent is inserted in response to a future Russian reinvasion.
In either case, it will have to be determined what function these European troops (as President Trump has categorically ruled out U.S. boots on the ground) will play. Will they join the Ukrainian military in engaging Russian forces along the line of contact, or would their role be confined to logistics, support, and manning rear lines? These points should be elucidated by European leaders not just to provide Kyiv with clarity on what the West is and is not willing to do, but for the sake of European publics that deserve to know if their governments are committing themselves to go to war against Russia over Ukraine if hostilities resume.
On the issue of preemptive deployments, it remains to be seen if the Kremlin is willing to demonstrate any flexibility in agreeing to small European contingents whose role is strictly limited to training and maintenance work. In that rather unlikely scenario, the Kremlin would push for strict verification mechanisms and ironclad assurances that such a force neither gradually grows in size nor takes on more direct military functions.
In practice, “Article 5-like” guarantees to Ukraine can look a lot like what the West is already doing for Ukraine, but with additional functions that may or may not include the imposition of no-fly-zones and aerial support. If Moscow gets enough of what it wants in terms of the other components of a settlement — particularly on sanctions relief, not just a prohibition against Ukraine’s NATO membership but documented guarantees against the alliance’s eastward expansion, and a satisfactory resolution of territorial issues — then it may find that it has reasons to settle for some version of a Taiwan-style strategic ambiguity model that leaves the door open on European deployments in response to a future invasion but does not commit any Western country to fight for Ukraine.
It is clear that Russia has red lines on these questions, and it is of paramount importance at this advanced stage in negotiations to identify exactly where they lie. Unlike in Istanbul 2022, Ukraine now has a group of guarantors willing to provide meaningful security assurances. Yet the window for a peace deal is not infinite, and there may not be another opportunity to settle this war in the short to medium term if these talks fall flat.
The security concerns at play are far too important both for Moscow and Ukraine not to be spelled out and explicitly agreed, lest they become a diplomatic poison pill that threatens to undo the substantial progress made in Alaska and in the White House over the past week.
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