For twenty years, the United States and its close allies have focused on Afghanistan and Pakistan largely due to the threat of terrorism. But the climate change show of force unleashed on Pakistan this August should raise alarms in capitals the world over. Its destructive power dwarfs the conventional threats that preoccupy world leaders.
Immediate aid is a welcome first step. This week, the United States announced that it is providing $30,000,000 USD to Pakistan for flood relief — still less than the $70 million pledged in 2010, but not insignificant. But this must be accompanied by serious structural reforms in the West and coordination with frontline countries most immediately impacted by climate change. If not, Washington is merely paying interest on a fast accruing climate time bomb. The effects of climate change on North America and Europe are noteworthy but not yet severe enough to wake us from our collective slumber on this issue. The horrors faced by the people of Pakistan should be our wake-up call.
Ideally, we should assist the people of Pakistan out of a sense of collective global responsibility for a climate change crisis that is largely driven by the world’s most industrialized nations. But if altruism and humanitarian incentives are not enough, then we should take action for our own security.
Pakistan’s 2010 floods occurred in the backdrop of the U.S. surge in Afghanistan. This is important for two reasons: A large U.S. troop presence next door made the logistics of helping out easier, and Washington had an incentive to improve ties with Pakistan. But there are still many reasons for Washington to be concerned about the stability of Pakistan and other countries disproportionately impacted by climate change. The current floods in Pakistan have directly affected over 33 million people and that number is climbing. Tent cities have popped up along the sides of highways and entire communities have been erased from the map. This will have troubling long-term effects that extend for years to come. Crops were destroyed, which will assuredly increase food insecurity. Mass migration to urban centers will place increased stress on infrastructure already teetering on the edge. Extremists and non-state actors may capitalize on resentment felt by the displaced. As the worst effects of climate change become irreversible, these events will spread across the world.
The hard choices of what to do about climate change will always occur in the backdrop of seemingly high priority threats and goals. This is what makes climate change so dangerous. It requires collective and sustained global action — something that has historically been difficult to achieve. It is time that we accept that climate change presents an existential threat to life as we know it and is already here.
Adam Weinstein is Deputy Director of the Middle East program at the Quincy Institute, whose current research focuses on security and rule of law in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq.
A flood victim wades through flood water, following rains and floods during the monsoon season in Bajara village, Sehwan, Pakistan, August 31, 2022. REUTERS/Yasir Rajput
Top photo credit: President Eisenhower and Egyptian President Nasser on sidelines of UN General Assembly in Waldorf Astoria presidential suite, New York in 1960. (public domain)
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu wants to accelerate his war against Iran with direct, offensive assistance from Washington — at a moment when there is less support for it than ever among the American people.
Netanyahu must expect that Washington will be compelled to accommodate and, if necessary, implement Israel’s expansive war aims – notably the complete destruction of Iran’s nuclear program, its ballistic missile capabilities, and even regime change itself. U.S. assistance is widely considered to be critical to Israel’s success in this regard.
It might well be the case that Israel’s decision to go to war on Friday June 13 was contingent on an American-Israeli understanding that each side is, for the time being at least, reticent to acknowledge publicly. Indeed, since June 1967 and including the current campaign in Gaza, Israel has never gone to war without assuring itself of American support. And in this current conflict, Washington has already acknowledged downing Iranian missiles headed for Israel.
Yet Israelis would be right to be concerned about the limits of Trump’s commitment to their war aims.
Amos Gilad, a key architect of the bilateral relationship and a central figure in Israel’s security-obsessed deep state, is publicly expressing his concern that Trump was indeed telling the truth when he announced early on that, "The U.S. had nothing to do with the attack on Iran.”
“If we're alone,” Gilad noted in an interview with Israel Channel 12, “the Iranians will continue the confrontation, and Khamenei may decide to accelerate toward nuclear [capabilities]. There is the Fordow site, which is deeply buried underground and requires American assistance,” he explained.
Gilad voiced concern over Iran's capacity to retaliate, stating, “We may reach a situation where they continue to attack us. They understand, based on what our ambassador in New York, who is supposed to represent Israel, is saying, that the United States is not with us.”
Gilad warned that Iran may indeed accelerate its nuclear program. “Eventually, Iran will say, Israel attacked us, so we have no choice but to develop nuclear weapons. Our reward will be our defeat.
“The Iranians will fight, and it may take a long time. From their perspective, we have harmed their national honor,” he said.
Gilad also dismissed characterizations of Trump as unpredictable. “That’s not true — he has a method. He’s very happy for others to do the work. He will fight until the last Israeli,” he warned. “He might join, but he said it himself: only if American soldiers are attacked. And they haven’t been.”
Gilad noted concerns that Netanyahu has miscalculated his ability to steer American policy according to his intentions.
“What is the political leadership doing? We started the war, and now we’re asking Trump to intervene? Why would he? Is Trump obligated to us?”
Gilad concluded that Israel may indeed win the battle but lose the war. “The Iranians intend to continue launching rockets, and they may retain this ability. Countries like China and Russia might also stand by their side,” he said.
A quick stroll down memory lane highlights the unanticipated consequences of an Israeli decision to roll the dice in the expectation that Washington can be compelled, against its considered interest, to come to Israel’s aid in its campaign against Tehran, and indeed to become a party to Israel’s determination to destroy by force of arms Iran’s nuclear infrastructure and conventional missile capabilities.
The potential costs of Israel’s strategic isolation during wartime bring to mind Israel’s disastrous decision to join France and Britain in the “Tripartite Agression” against Egypt under President Gamal Abdel Nasser in October 1956.
To compel Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza and the Sinai Peninsula, President Dwight D. Eisenhower employed a brutally effective mix of diplomatic pressure, threats of economic sanctions, and international political maneuvering to force an Israel’s retreat from Sinai and the Gaza Strip.
When Britain and France vetoed a UN Security Council resolution calling for a ceasefire, Eisenhower took the issue to the UN General Assembly, where a resolution demanding withdrawal passed overwhelmingly.
Eisenhower threatened to cut off U.S. financial aid to Israel and suggested the possibility of suspending tax-deductible donations to Israel from American citizens.
He emphasized the importance of international law and non-aggression principles, framing his pressure on the three co-conspirators as a defense of the UN Charter.
“If the United Nations once admits that international disputes can be settled by using force, then we will have destroyed the very foundation of the [UN] Organization … I would, I feel, be untrue to the standards of the high office … if I lent the influence of the United States to the proposition that a nation which invades another should be permitted to exact conditions for withdrawal.”
Bowing to U.S. pressure, Israel withdrew from Gaza and Egyptian Sinai in March 1957.
In exchange, Israel received U.S. assurances of freedom of navigation in the Straits of Tiran and won the deployment of a United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) in Sinai as a tripwire to conflict.
After Suez, policies adopted by Washington – foremost among them the forced Israeli retreat from Egypt — established the foundation for the U.S. to consolidate its role as successor to the legacy of French and British imperialism in the region. This was a foundation which, up until Trump, every administration has reaffirmed.
If Eisenhower’s diktat to Israel was the springboard for an era of U.S. ascendency in the region, Netanyahu’s decision to initiate a war without Washington’s collaboration may well signal another historic Israeli failure to correctly gauge Washington’s interests on the threshold of a new era.
However, chances are not inconsiderable that the Trump administration will decide to collaborate in an expanding Israeli military campaign to consolidate its strategic superiority throughout the region.
But at Suez, Israel paid the price for obstructing expansion of American power in the region. Today almost a century later, it may suffer the consequences of obstructing an American desire to retreat.
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TAIWAN STRAIT (August 23, 2019) – US Naval Officers scan the horizon from the bridge while standing watch, part of Commander, Amphibious Squadron 11, operating in the Indo-Pacific region to enhance interoperability with partners and serve as a ready-response force for any type of contingency. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Markus Castaneda)
After more than a decade of calling for military action against Iran, they finally got their wish — sort of. The United States did not immediately join Israel’s campaign, but President Donald Trump acquiesced to Israel’s decision to use military force and has not meaningfully restrained Israel’s actions. For those hoping Trump would bring radical change to U.S. foreign policy, his failure to halt Israel’s preventative war is a disappointment and a betrayal of past promises.
Advocates of restraint should not give up hope, however, and observers abroad should not rush to prejudge the trajectory of U.S. foreign policy based on the events of the past week.
Trump can still avoid tarnishing his legacy by staying out of yet another long, costly adventure in the Middle East. This is best accomplished by eschewing any U.S. involvement in Israel’s war. But even if the United States is unable to immediately extricate itself from the conflict, there are compelling reasons to believe that the foreign policy consensus in Washington will ultimately shift in favor of those skeptical of U.S. military power and opposed to foreign interventions.
Moreover, as the U.S. military commitment to Europe has come under increasing scrutiny, similar questions about the U.S.-Israel relationship have been muted. While Republican members of Congress pushed back on the Biden administration’s requests for additional Ukraine aid in 2024, there was little resistance to the related request for additional military assistance for Israel to support its wars against Hezbollah and Hamas.
In part, the resilience of Israel’s position in U.S. foreign policy reflects the powerful influence of U.S.-based Israel supporters who have for decades effectively used political donations and media pressure to shape U.S. strategy and commitments in the Middle East. While U.S. European and Asian allies also have influential advocates in Washington, none can rival Israel’s strength of support. No other tail will wag the dog this effectively.
Second, the recent push for greater restraint in U.S. foreign policy will continue to gain momentum due to an ongoing generational shift in attitudes about the limits of American military power and U.S. foreign policy priorities.
The voices pushing hardest for the United States to join Israel’s military campaign come from the “old guard,” including Reagan Republicans and Baby Boomers nearing retirement, including, for example Mark Levin of Fox News, long-time members of Congress like Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.), and architects of the catastrophic U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, such as Ari Fleischer, Elliott Abrams, and John Bolton. Cold War crusaders and “end-of-history” triumphalists may retain some sway over Trump’s foreign policy today, but their careers are coming to an end.
Already, the advocates of endless war are being displaced by a younger generation that has had to pay its price. Anti-interventionist figures shaped by the failures of the War on Terror and the Iraq war occupy key positions in the current administration and increasingly staff mid-level positions in government. After watching the United States waste money, lives, and military power in the Middle East, this rising generation is eager to pursue a foreign policy more directly defined by the national interest.
Members of this cohort have already been pushing for changes to U.S. commitments abroad, especially in Europe, where the United States has signaled its intention to reduce its military involvement, and on Ukraine, where the Pentagon has indicated that it will cut military assistance to Kyiv in the coming months to focus on other priorities.
Finally, there are real structural limits to the ability of the United States to continue its pursuit of global preeminence, regardless of what happens in the Middle East in coming weeks. The most important of these is constrained resources. Washington simply does not have the monetary or military means to indefinitely sustain a strategy of American primacy.
Already the Pentagon is concerned about the depth of its munition stockpiles and the sufficiency of its air defense assets after years of supporting Ukraine and well over a year of battling the Houthis in Yemen and the Red Sea. At the same time, the military balance in Asia has shifted more in China’s favor in recent years, raising questions about Washington’s continued ability to credibly meet its commitments to allies and partners in that region.
Some argue that the solution for the eroding U.S. military advantage is higher defense spending. Roger Wicker (R-Miss), chair of the Senate Armed Services Committee, and former Senate Majority leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky), for instance, have called for defense spending of at least 5% of GDP. The Commission on the National Defense Strategy also called for large increases in the Pentagon budget to sustain U.S. military dominance. This group, however, helpfully admitted that to do so in today’s budget environment would require both tax increases and entitlement reform. With no political appetite for either, the level of spending needed for continued U.S. primacy seems unattainable.
Out of necessity, then, U.S. foreign policy goals will have to become more limited over time. Future presidents, if not Trump himself, will have to make hard choices about how to expend U.S. military power. This decision point may come sooner rather than later if Trump gives into pressure to join Israel’s war on Iran. The military expenditures required for such a war would greatly reduce what the United States has available to support security goals and commitments in Europe and Asia—certainly in the near term and perhaps for decades.
This could demand significant shifts in U.S. strategy in both theaters and lead to a forced, rather than managed, U.S. military retrenchment.
Movement toward a more restrained U.S. foreign policy is not inevitable, but it remains likely despite Trump’s acquiescence to Israel’s military campaign. For those in the United States who are pushing for this type of transformation, the priority over the next days and weeks should be to focus public attention on the hard tradeoffs that the United States faces when it comes to military resources and security commitments and to remind Trump and his advisors of the limits of American military power to solve problems in the Middle East—Iran’s nuclear program included.
Advocates of restraint should also hold Trump to account for the promises he has made repeatedly during his decade on the political stage, including his commitments to avoid starting new “forever wars,” to put America’s domestic interests first, and to be a peacemaker.
For those abroad uncertain about the direction of U.S. foreign policy or confused by recent inconsistencies, the best approach is patience. Neoconservatism has grown old. Although it has refused to learn new tricks, it’s no longer the only game in town.
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Top photo credit: Iraqi Shi'ite Muslims hold a cutout of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu as they attend a protest against Israeli strikes on Iran, in Baghdad, Iraq, June 16, 2025. REUTERS/Ahmed Saad
As Israeli jets and Iranian rockets streak across the Middle Eastern skies, Iraq finds itself caught squarely in the crossfire.
With regional titans clashing above its head, Iraq’s fragile and hard-won stability, painstakingly rebuilt over decades of conflict, now hangs precariously in the balance. Washington’s own tacit acknowledgement of Iraq’s vulnerable position was laid bare by its decision to partially evacuate embassy personnel in Iraq and allow military dependents to leave the region.
This withdrawal, prompted by intelligence indicating Israeli preparations for long-range strikes, highlighted that Iraq’s airspace would be an unwitting corridor for Israeli and Iranian operations.
Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ al-Sudani is now caught in a complicated bind, attempting to uphold Iraq’s security partnership with the United States while simultaneously facing intense domestic pressure from powerful, Iran-aligned Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) factions. These groups, emboldened by the Israel-Iran clash, have intensified their calls for American troop withdrawal and threaten renewed attacks against U.S. personnel, viewing them as legitimate targets and enablers of Israeli aggression.
The PMF, a powerful array of predominantly Shiite militias formalized in 2016 and nominally reporting to the prime minister as commander-in-chief of the armed forces after their pivotal role in fighting ISIS, have since presented a difficult challenge to Iraqi state sovereignty. For years, these groups, especially the hardline elements among them known as the “muqawama” or resistance factions, have demonstrated a capacity to act in opposition to Baghdad’s formal policy.
This was seen recently in their threats to arrest Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa ahead of the Arab League summit in Baghdad last month, citing an outstanding Iraqi arrest warrant for his past terrorist activities on Iraqi soil. This directly undermined the Iraqi prime minister’s attempts at rapprochement with Damascus. Moreover, one of the PMF’s hardline factions, Kata'ib Hezbollah, has been implicated in the abduction of Elizabeth Tsurkov, an Israeli-Russian academic whose release remains under negotiation, despite concerted efforts by Iraqi Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein and Prime Minister al-Sudani.
The deep-seated hostility of these PMF factions toward American forces was significantly intensified by the 2020 U.S. killing of Iranian General Qasem Soleimani and PMF commander Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis — a strike the U.S. justified as necessary to prevent imminent attacks that Soleimani was allegedly planning against American diplomats and military personnel in Iraq and the region. This animosity escalated further following the outbreak of violence between Israel and Hamas in October 2023.
As a result, Iraq — a country uniquely navigating alliances with both the U.S. and Iran, hosting some 2,500 American troops while also having Iran-backed militias integrated into its security forces — has since witnessed a sharp escalation in both rhetoric and repeated attacks against U.S. assets and personnel. This belligerence has only amplified following Israel’s recent strikes on Iran.
“If America dares to intervene in the war, we will directly target its interests and military bases spread across the region without hesitation,” warned Abu Hussein al-Hamidawi, secretary-general of Kata’ib Hezbollah. Other PMF leaders have echoed this stance, with Akram Al-Kaabi, head of Harakat Hezbollah Al-Nujaba, asserting that the assault on Iran was “in cooperation with the American occupier” and demanding the U.S. “must be removed from Iraq.”
The Iraqi government’s ability to restrain these groups, given their power and influence within the political system, remains limited and may prove increasingly difficult in the face of a prolonged war between Israel and Iran.
This internal challenge is compounded by Iraq’s vulnerability to airspace violations. Despite recent multi-billion dollar investments aimed at modernizing its air defense systems, including plans to acquire advanced capabilities from South Korea and France and bolster early warning systems, these improvements remain incomplete.
Iraq’s current air defenses are therefore not robust enough to intercept high-speed or long-range threats, such as Israeli jets or Iranian ballistic missiles traversing its skies. Indeed, this vulnerability has manifested already, U.S. air defense systems near the American Consulate in Erbil reportedly shot down a suspected Iranian drone on June 15.
The Iraqi government’s only recourse is through diplomatic channels. Prime Minister al-Sudani himself conveyed Iraq’s “categorical rejection of the use of its territory or airspace to carry out or facilitate any acts of aggression against neighboring countries” to Steven Fagin, the U.S. Chargé d’Affaires in Iraq, and Major General Kevin Leahy, commander of the International Coalition to Combat ISIS, according to a press release from his office.
Baghdad has also formally filed a complaint to the United Nations Security Council and directly urged the U.S. to prevent Israeli overflights. However, Iraq’s leverage remains minimal.
The 2008 Strategic Framework Agreement — designed to solidify long-term diplomatic, economic, and security relations between the U.S. and Iraq — explicitly precludes the use of Iraqi territory for "attacks against other countries." But in practice, U.S. strategic interests, especially amid the current conflict, evidently override Baghdad’s theoretical control. This places the U.S. in a dilemma: not preventing Israeli overflights for attacks on Iran implicitly undermines Iraq's airspace sovereignty and risks further escalation with Tehran, yet forcefully attempting to stop them could directly entangle Washington in the conflict.
Iran, keenly aware of Iraq’s impotence, has intensified its diplomatic pressure on Baghdad. Iran’s Deputy Foreign Minister Kazem Gharibabadi openly declared that Iraq “is unable to preserve and control the sovereignty of its territory in the face of aggression,” demanding Baghdad “bear its responsibility in preventing the use of its airspace for aggression against neighboring countries.” Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian reiterated this stance, urging Iraq to prevent its airspace from being “misused” against Iran.
Beyond the awkwardness of being an involuntary conduit for Israeli strikes, Iraq also needs stability in Iran for its energy needs. With roughly one-third of Iraq's electricity generated by Iranian natural gas, any sustained disruption to these supplies — already threatened by damage to Iran's energy infrastructure from recent strikes — risks triggering widespread blackouts and social unrest, further weakening Baghdad's position.
Adding to Iraq's woes, President Donald Trump’s confusing signals are of no help.
While praising Israel’s strikes as “excellent” and warning Iran of “more to come,” evidently hoping to extract concessions from nuclear talks that now appear on the verge of collapse, he simultaneously claimed advanced knowledge of Israeli plans, leaving the precise nature of U.S. support deliberately ambiguous. Simultaneously, Secretary of State Marco Rubio insisted on U.S. non-involvement, instead emphasizing that the priority was protecting American forces, distancing Washington from direct responsibility.
However, the U.S.'s role in helping intercept Iranian rockets during Iranian counter-attacks, and the U.S. decision to reduce its diplomatic footprint in Iraq just prior to Israel launching its attacks, have been widely interpreted, particularly by Iran and its allies in Iraq, as clear indicators of Washington's complicity.
The greatest risk is that if al-Sudani fails to restrain PMF factions and U.S. troops face sustained attacks, their focus would inevitably shift from fighting ISIS to self-defense or withdrawal. This would severely diminish their ability to support Iraqi and Kurdish forces on counterterrorism, creating a dangerous vacuum for ISIS to regroup and expand.
Internally fragile and geographically exposed, Iraq risks becoming both a battleground and casualty in the Israel-Iran conflict. A prolonged showdown poses an existential threat to its security and imperils its nascent recovery.
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