Biden's Middle East trip: Following in Trump's footsteps
WATCH: Biden looks poised to betray his campaign promise to sideline Saudi Arabia. Does this really serve America's interests?
Responsible Statecraft
Responsible Statecraft is a publication of analysis, opinion, and news that seeks to promote a positive vision of U.S. foreign policy based on humility, diplomatic engagement, and military restraint. RS also critiques the ideas — and the ideologies and interests behind them — that have mired the United States in counterproductive and endless wars and made the world less secure.
Top image credit: U.S. President Donald Trump talks to Chief Justice of the Supreme Court John Roberts on the day of his speech to a joint session of Congress, in the House Chamber of the U.S. Capitol in Washington, D.C., March 4, 2025. (REUTERS/Kevin Lamarque)
Why SCOTUS won’t deter Trump’s desire to weaponize trade
February 20, 2026
In a 6-3 decision, the Supreme Court today ruled against the White House on a key economic initiative of the Trump administration, concluding that the International Economic Emergency Powers Act (IEEPA) does not give the president the right to impose tariffs.
The ruling was not really a surprise; the tone of the questioning by several justices in early November was overwhelmingly skeptical of the administration’s argument, as prediction markets rightly concluded. Given the likelihood of this result, it should also come as no surprise that the Trump administration has already been plotting ways to work around the decision.
Tariffs have been the administration’s signature economic policy, and Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent referred to them as such when he defended their use on the eve of the Supreme Court hearings. At the time, he also noted that the administration has other legislative rationales to impose them should the court rule against the White House. And indeed, the administration just announced a global tariff of 10% under a section of the 1974 Trade Act designed to counter balance of payments difficulties.
These tools (known by their section numbers to trade law aficionados) include Section 301, which targets “unfair trade practices,” and Section 232, which invokes considerations of “national security.” Both those tools have been used by this and previous administrations, with Section 301 being the rationale for a multiyear battle between the U.S. and the European Union about their respective (alleged) subsidies to Boeing and Airbus.
The U.S. has also invoked the national security rationale in the past, hitting imports of oil from Iran and Libya in the 1970s and 1980s. But the use of Section 232 fell out of favor until Trump used it to justify broad tariffs on steel imports in his first term. Thus far, in his second term, he has used Section 232 to impose tariffs on products ranging from autos to bathroom vanities, with a number of investigations still continuing. Among other things, the protectionist approach to bathroom vanities might suggest a somewhat expansive vision of national security.
Tariffs under Sections 232 and 301 both require a period of investigation by the Commerce Department or U.S. Trade Representative before they can be put into effect. This makes them different from the IEEPA authority invoked by President Trump when he imposed tariffs for varied and sundry reasons on countries in the Global South, as in the case of the tariffs levied against Mexico for fentanyl, Brazil for "persecuting a former President" of that country, and India for importing Russian oil.
IEEPA authority was also the rationale behind the “reciprocal tariffs” of Liberation Day, an extraordinarily sweeping attempt to remake the global trading system and force countries seeking access to America’s markets to invest in production sites in the U.S. One big question is whether the SCOTUS ruling leaves the administration with other tools to achieve such an end. Among untried trade tools until now, Section 122 allows tariffs to remedy persistent trade imbalances, but such tariffs expire after 150 days unless Congress votes to extend them. This may prove to be an issue as six Republican representatives recently jumped ship in a vote that aimed to revoke the administration’s tariffs on Canada with a 219-211 majority. However, the measure may not pass the Senate, let alone survive a veto.
There is, however, one other clause: Section 338 of the 1930 Smoot-Hawley Act, which allows tariffs of up to 50% against any country that “discriminates” against the U.S. And indeed, in its calculation of the original Liberation Day tariffs, the administration already used a simple failure to achieve a perfect bilateral balance of trade as evidence of non-tariff barriers. As noted here by Clark Packard, a trade expert at the Cato Institute, Section 338 might come the closest to replicating President Trump’s use of IEEPA as a broad-spectrum trade tool.
It might thus be too soon to sound the all-clear on U.S. trade policy when it concerns an administration determined to use market access to the U.S. as both a swiss army knife and a sledgehammer.
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Top image credit: Lucas Parker and FotoField via shutterstock.com
No, even a 'small attack' on Iran will lead to war
February 20, 2026
The Wall Street Journal reports that President Donald Trump is considering a small attack to force Iran to agree to his nuclear deal, and if Tehran refuses, escalate the attacks until Iran either agrees or the regime falls.
Here’s why this won’t work.
First of all, the “deal” Trump has put forward entails Tehran completely giving up its nuclear program in return for no new sanctions, but no actual sanctions relief. This is, of course, a non-starter for Iran.
There are hardly any more sanctions the U.S. could impose on Iran. And the current level of sanctions is suffocating the economy. Accepting this deal would not enable Iran to escape its economic dead end, but would only prolong the economic decay while depriving it of the nuclear leverage it believes it needs to free itself from existing sanctions.
Second, according to my sources, Trump recently also floated the idea of a smaller attack, with the Iranians responding symbolically by striking an empty U.S. base. But Tehran refused and made clear that any attack would be responded to forcefully. Trump may hope that with a much larger strike force in the region, Tehran will reconsider its response.
But it is difficult to see why Tehran would, since caving to this military threat likely will only invite further coercive demands, beginning with conventional military options such as its missile capabilities. That is Iran’s last remaining deterrent against Israel. Without it, Israel would be more inclined to attack and cement its subjugation of Iran, or alternatively move to collapse the theocratic regime altogether, Tehran fears.
Thus, capitulating to Trump’s “deal” would not end the confrontation, but only make Tehran more vulnerable to further attacks by Israel or the U.S.
Third, since the U.S. strategy, according to the WSJ, is to escalate until Tehran caves, and since capitulation is a non-option for Iran, the Iranians are incentivized to strike back right away at the U.S. The only exit Tehran sees is to fight back, inflict as much pain as possible on the U.S., and hope that this causes Trump to back off or accept a more equitable deal.
In this calculation, Iran would not need to win the war (militarily, it can’t); it would only have to get close to destroying Trump’s presidency before it loses the war by: 1) closing the Strait of Hormuz and strike oil installations in the region in the hope of driving oil prices to record levels and by that inflation in the U.S.; and 2) strike at U.S. bases, ships, or other regional assets and make Trump choose between compromise or a forever war in the region, rather than the quick glorious victory he is looking for.
This is an extremely risky option for Iran, but one that Tehran sees as less risky than the capitulation “deal” Trump is seeking to force on Iran.
None of this, of course, serves U.S. interest, has been authorized by Congress, enjoys the support of the American people or the support of regional allies (save Israel), is compatible with international law, or answers the crucial question: How does this end?
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TOP IMAGE CREDIT: An aerial view of Diego Garcia, the Chagossian Island home to one of the U.S. military's 750 worldwide bases. The UK handed sovereignty of the islands back to Mauritius, with the stipulation that the U.S. must be allowed to continue its base's operation on Diego Garcia for the next 99 years. (Kev1ar82 / Shutterstock.com).
As Iran strikes loom, US and UK fight over Indian Ocean base
February 19, 2026
As the U.S. surges troops to the Middle East, a battle is brewing over a strategically significant American base in the middle of the Indian Ocean.
President Donald Trump announced Wednesday that he would oppose any effort to return the Chagos Islands to Mauritius, arguing that a U.S. base on the island of Diego Garcia may be necessary to “eradicate a potential attack by a highly unstable and dangerous [Iranian] Regime.” The comment came just a day after the State Department reiterated its support for the U.K.’s decision to give up sovereignty over the islands while maintaining a 99-year lease for the base.
The sudden shift emerged from a dispute over whether the U.K. would join the U.S. in a military campaign against Iran, according to The Times. British officials, fearful that a campaign of strikes would violate international law, are reportedly refusing to grant permission for American forces to use the base on Diego Garcia as well as a second major air base in England, both of which are jointly operated by Washington and London.
The battle risks derailing a years-long effort by the U.K. to return the Chagos Islands to Mauritius, a former British colony that won a series of international court cases affirming its territorial claims over the archipelago. British leaders say the only way to ensure the continued operation of the military base there is to respect these rulings, and Mauritius has expressed support for this approach. But the U.K. can only move forward on the deal with U.S. approval, according to senior British officials who spoke with The Times.
The joint base on Diego Garcia holds an outsized role in U.S. military strategy in the Middle East. The island, which British authorities depopulated in the 1960s and 70s, lies at the heart of the Indian Ocean. American forces have long used the base there as a port for naval vessels and a key refueling station for long-range bombers, which the U.S. would need in order to launch a major air campaign against Iran.
Trump has repeatedly gone back and forth on whether to back the deal with Mauritius, calling it an “act of great stupidity” in January before changing course and embracing it as the “best deal [Britain] could make” earlier this month. These reversals lend credence to the idea that Trump is using the issue in an attempt to strong-arm the British government into assisting American airstrikes in Iran.
But support among European allies for attacks on Iran remains limited. The European Union warned Thursday that escalation would have “heavy repercussions” in the Middle East, adding that it is “crucial that all the parties abide by international law” and “show restraint.”
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