
Biden's Middle East trip: Following in Trump's footsteps
WATCH: Biden looks poised to betray his campaign promise to sideline Saudi Arabia. Does this really serve America's interests?

Responsible Statecraft
Responsible Statecraft is a publication of analysis, opinion, and news that seeks to promote a positive vision of U.S. foreign policy based on humility, diplomatic engagement, and military restraint. RS also critiques the ideas — and the ideologies and interests behind them — that have mired the United States in counterproductive and endless wars and made the world less secure.
Top image credit: U.S. President Donald Trump talks to Chief Justice of the Supreme Court John Roberts on the day of his speech to a joint session of Congress, in the House Chamber of the U.S. Capitol in Washington, D.C., March 4, 2025. (REUTERS/Kevin Lamarque)
Why SCOTUS won’t deter Trump’s desire to weaponize trade
February 20, 2026
In a 6-3 decision, the Supreme Court today ruled against the White House on a key economic initiative of the Trump administration, concluding that the International Economic Emergency Powers Act (IEEPA) does not give the president the right to impose tariffs.
The ruling was not really a surprise; the tone of the questioning by several justices in early November was overwhelmingly skeptical of the administration’s argument, as prediction markets rightly concluded. Given the likelihood of this result, it should also come as no surprise that the Trump administration has already been plotting ways to work around the decision.
Tariffs have been the administration’s signature economic policy, and Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent referred to them as such when he defended their use on the eve of the Supreme Court hearings. At the time, he also noted that the administration has other legislative rationales to impose them should the court rule against the White House. And indeed, the administration just announced a global tariff of 10% under a section of the 1974 Trade Act designed to counter balance of payments difficulties.
These tools (known by their section numbers to trade law aficionados) include Section 301, which targets “unfair trade practices,” and Section 232, which invokes considerations of “national security.” Both those tools have been used by this and previous administrations, with Section 301 being the rationale for a multiyear battle between the U.S. and the European Union about their respective (alleged) subsidies to Boeing and Airbus.
The U.S. has also invoked the national security rationale in the past, hitting imports of oil from Iran and Libya in the 1970s and 1980s. But the use of Section 232 fell out of favor until Trump used it to justify broad tariffs on steel imports in his first term. Thus far, in his second term, he has used Section 232 to impose tariffs on products ranging from autos to bathroom vanities, with a number of investigations still continuing. Among other things, the protectionist approach to bathroom vanities might suggest a somewhat expansive vision of national security.
Tariffs under Sections 232 and 301 both require a period of investigation by the Commerce Department or U.S. Trade Representative before they can be put into effect. This makes them different from the IEEPA authority invoked by President Trump when he imposed tariffs for varied and sundry reasons on countries in the Global South, as in the case of the tariffs levied against Mexico for fentanyl, Brazil for "persecuting a former President" of that country, and India for importing Russian oil.
IEEPA authority was also the rationale behind the “reciprocal tariffs” of Liberation Day, an extraordinarily sweeping attempt to remake the global trading system and force countries seeking access to America’s markets to invest in production sites in the U.S. One big question is whether the SCOTUS ruling leaves the administration with other tools to achieve such an end. Among untried trade tools until now, Section 122 allows tariffs to remedy persistent trade imbalances, but such tariffs expire after 150 days unless Congress votes to extend them. This may prove to be an issue as six Republican representatives recently jumped ship in a vote that aimed to revoke the administration’s tariffs on Canada with a 219-211 majority. However, the measure may not pass the Senate, let alone survive a veto.
There is, however, one other clause: Section 338 of the 1930 Smoot-Hawley Act, which allows tariffs of up to 50% against any country that “discriminates” against the U.S. And indeed, in its calculation of the original Liberation Day tariffs, the administration already used a simple failure to achieve a perfect bilateral balance of trade as evidence of non-tariff barriers. As noted here by Clark Packard, a trade expert at the Cato Institute, Section 338 might come the closest to replicating President Trump’s use of IEEPA as a broad-spectrum trade tool.
It might thus be too soon to sound the all-clear on U.S. trade policy when it concerns an administration determined to use market access to the U.S. as both a swiss army knife and a sledgehammer.
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Top image credit: Lucas Parker and FotoField via shutterstock.com
No, even a 'small attack' on Iran will lead to war
February 20, 2026
The Wall Street Journal reports that President Donald Trump is considering a small attack to force Iran to agree to his nuclear deal, and if Tehran refuses, escalate the attacks until Iran either agrees or the regime falls.
Here’s why this won’t work.
First of all, the “deal” Trump has put forward entails Tehran completely giving up its nuclear program in return for no new sanctions, but no actual sanctions relief. This is, of course, a non-starter for Iran.
There are hardly any more sanctions the U.S. could impose on Iran. And the current level of sanctions is suffocating the economy. Accepting this deal would not enable Iran to escape its economic dead end, but would only prolong the economic decay while depriving it of the nuclear leverage it believes it needs to free itself from existing sanctions.
Second, according to my sources, Trump recently also floated the idea of a smaller attack, with the Iranians responding symbolically by striking an empty U.S. base. But Tehran refused and made clear that any attack would be responded to forcefully. Trump may hope that with a much larger strike force in the region, Tehran will reconsider its response.
But it is difficult to see why Tehran would, since caving to this military threat likely will only invite further coercive demands, beginning with conventional military options such as its missile capabilities. That is Iran’s last remaining deterrent against Israel. Without it, Israel would be more inclined to attack and cement its subjugation of Iran, or alternatively move to collapse the theocratic regime altogether, Tehran fears.
Thus, capitulating to Trump’s “deal” would not end the confrontation, but only make Tehran more vulnerable to further attacks by Israel or the U.S.
Third, since the U.S. strategy, according to the WSJ, is to escalate until Tehran caves, and since capitulation is a non-option for Iran, the Iranians are incentivized to strike back right away at the U.S. The only exit Tehran sees is to fight back, inflict as much pain as possible on the U.S., and hope that this causes Trump to back off or accept a more equitable deal.
In this calculation, Iran would not need to win the war (militarily, it can’t); it would only have to get close to destroying Trump’s presidency before it loses the war by: 1) closing the Strait of Hormuz and strike oil installations in the region in the hope of driving oil prices to record levels and by that inflation in the U.S.; and 2) strike at U.S. bases, ships, or other regional assets and make Trump choose between compromise or a forever war in the region, rather than the quick glorious victory he is looking for.
This is an extremely risky option for Iran, but one that Tehran sees as less risky than the capitulation “deal” Trump is seeking to force on Iran.
None of this, of course, serves U.S. interest, has been authorized by Congress, enjoys the support of the American people or the support of regional allies (save Israel), is compatible with international law, or answers the crucial question: How does this end?
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US Air Force (USAF) KC-135R Stratotanker, 92nd Air Refueling Wing (ARW), Fairchild AFB, Washington (US Air Force photo)
Military tankers for Iran attack deploying near Iraq War levels
February 19, 2026
Military experts say the U.S. asset mobilization in the Middle East theater is now resembling a real staging for war, with the prevailing chatter more about "when" than "if" an attack will happen.
One of the data points catching the eye of these experts is the number of air tankers — military aircraft used to refuel combat fighters in midair — that are in or headed to the region. Open source intelligence analysts say there are at least 108 such tankers either in CENTCOM theater as of Friday (31) or in strategic locations outside that command or staging in Europe. Most are KC-135 Stratotankers, made by Boeing. (Editor's note: This information has been updated).
"Pulling the hammer back. Strikes could occur any time now," said one retired flag officer when RS asked him about the tankers.

"This is a snap shot of the dynamic movement. What it tells you is we're getting ready for something here," said the retired flag officer. "There's a lot of movement. They are coming from all over the place. It's worldwide. That's always an indicator."
According to the military, there were about 149 KC-135 refuelers operating in the first phase of the March 2003 Iraq War.
"The size of these deployments ...indicates the force is preparing for more sustained operations," said Dan Grazier, retired Marine officer and senior fellow at the Stimson Center. "The strike last year against Iran's nuclear sites involved a lot of moving parts but only lasted about a day. Nearly 100 aerial refuelers in addition to carrier strike groups and fleets of fighters being moved into the region suggests there are plans for a longer operation this time around."
Experts also note that refueling capacity supports a ratio of one tanker per 6 to 10 fighters, depending on the type of combat aircraft/tanker. Estimates range from 250 or more U.S. aircraft now in the region when you include both the USS Lincoln and Ford strike groups (the Ford is on its way). Right now there are way more tankers moving than needed. Experts say that speaks to two things: that Washington is planning for sustained operations, and/or it plans on using fighters well out of range of Iran's strike capabilities.
"The departure of huge numbers of tankers to the Middle East, without concomitant massive fighter deployments, indicates that the USAF intends to base its strike aircraft out of the easy range of Iranian short-range missiles on the other side of the Middle East or even farther afield in Cyprus, Diego Garcia, etc.," wrote "Armchair Warlord" on X.
Reports Thursday outlined Trump's options (beyond not attacking, which is what the majority of Americans want), including taking out top Iranian leadership (regime change), or attacks limited to nuclear enrichment and ballistic missile facilities, which could entail sustained operations.
"Preparations of this kind mere months after the spectacular strikes against Iran's nuclear facilities suggest last year's actions against the regime weren't as successful as touted at the time," noted Grazier, referring to "Operation Midnight Hammer," which Trump declared had destroyed Iran's nuclear enrichment sites.
The retired flag officer said the number of tankers staged across far-flung air bases means we will be taking advantage of all capacity "at all ranges." That includes two tankers at our base at Diego Garcia from which two B-2 Stealth Bombers flew to attack during Operation Midnight Hammer. According to my colleague Connor Echols today, President Trump announced Wednesday that he now wants to stop the UK from turning over the Chagos Islands (home to Diego Garcia) to Mauritius, because the base may be necessary to “eradicate a potential attack by a highly unstable and dangerous [Iranian] Regime.”
Trita Parsi, executive vice president of the Quincy Institute, says it looks like Trump may have made his decision.
"It's important to understand that Trump has not engaged in any real diplomacy. Rather, the U.S. delegation has largely showed up at the meetings with demands for Iranian capitulation rather than real engagement. The meetings largely serve to check in to see if Iran is ready to submit to Trump or be bombed," he said. "This is not diplomacy. A deal can be reached, but Trump does not appear to be seriously pursuing it."
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