Biden's Middle East trip: Following in Trump's footsteps
WATCH: Biden looks poised to betray his campaign promise to sideline Saudi Arabia. Does this really serve America's interests?
Responsible Statecraft
Responsible Statecraft is a publication of analysis, opinion, and news that seeks to promote a positive vision of U.S. foreign policy based on humility, diplomatic engagement, and military restraint. RS also critiques the ideas — and the ideologies and interests behind them — that have mired the United States in counterproductive and endless wars and made the world less secure.
Top photo credit: Senator Ted Cruz (R-Texas) (Shutterstock/lev radin)
Ted Cruz's anti-Tucker pose for 2028 is truly a Jurassic Park dud
January 28, 2026
Ted Cruz is reportedly planning on running for president. But which version?
The Tea Party Republican senator who once called the Iraq war a mistake, tried to appeal to non-interventionist Ron Paul libertarians, questioned Barack Obama’s authority to strike Syria, warned against U.S. military adventurism, who was also once the favored alternative to Donald Trump in the 2016 GOP presidential primary only to eventually capitulate to MAGA even after Trump insulted his wife?
No. This Cruz will be neocon. But without calling it that, or even appearing to rebrand to Trump voters, while also, in actuality, rebranding.
Axios reported Sunday that it had obtained recordings of Cruz speaking privately with donors in which he takes particular aim at Vice President JD Vance and popular conservative personality Tucker Carlson.
“Cruz's rebukes, during two meetings last year, are some of the harshest criticisms of Trump and Vance by a fellow Republican since they took office a year ago,” Axios reported. “The recordings — nearly 10 minutes in total — provide an unvarnished look at how Cruz is positioning himself as a traditional free trade, pro-interventionist Republican ahead of a possible 2028 primary campaign against the less hawkish Vance.”
The report continued, “During his talks, Cruz cast Vance as a pawn of conservative podcaster Tucker Carlson. Cruz has accused Carlson of promoting antisemitism and an anti-Israel foreign policy in their well-publicized spats.”
In an interview with Carlson in June, the host embarrassed Cruz by asking the senator which part of the Bible supported his Christain Zionist beliefs. Cruz had nothing. He has repeatedly accused Carlson of being an anti-Semite ever since.
“Cruz repeatedly brings up Vance in the recordings, tying him to Carlson and accusing him of advancing the podcaster's anti-interventionist foreign policy,” Axios observed. Cruz says on a recording, "Tucker created JD. JD is Tucker's protégé, and they are one and the same.”
The recordings reported on Sunday taking aim at Vance and Carlson are but the latest speculations that Cruz is hawk-eyeing 2028. Axios reported in November that by tussling with Tucker, Cruz was “staking out turf as a traditional, pro-interventionist Republican.” In other words, a political dinosaur.
“By poking at Carlson's isolationist foreign policy views, accusing him of antisemitism and more, Cruz is putting himself on a collision course with Vice President Vance, a Carlson ally widely seen as the 2028 GOP frontrunner,” Axios noted.
If there is a contested GOP primary for the 2028 Republican nomination, the vice president will have more trouble convincing the Jurassic Park warriors in Washington, which have never completely warmed up to him. And they may be pre-Trumpism relics, but they still have plenty of money, influence, and institutional power to burn.
Cruz is shrewd enough to understand this and is clearly presenting himself as the Old Guard’s candidate.This might sound like a gamble as the Republican base twice elected Trump. Who does he think is up for still up for grabs?
Donors, for starters. And Marco Rubio supporters, should he not run. Any wealthy Republican still frustrated that their party was snatched away by Trumpism. Hawkish Senator Lindsey Graham doesn’t necessarily have a tangible MAGA base either, but he latches his neoconservative agenda to it out of convenience. Wouldn’t it be nice to be openly interventionist and not have to try to square it with “America First’ again? There’s money slushing around to talk about free trade and ideological interventions, like regime change in Iran. Where there’s war or the promise of it, there’s always money.
In November, The American Conservative’s Scott Greer analyzed Cruz’s strategy. “Cruz is in a difficult situation,” Greer wrote. “He needs to distinguish himself from JD Vance, Trump’s assumed heir who will run on the administration’s legacy. But Cruz can’t attack Trump or his movement. Instead, he’s set on Tucker Carlson as a proxy target to deride Trumpism.”
This would allow Cruz to advertise as MAGA in public and something closer to Bush-Cheney in private.
“With Tucker as his preferred nemesis, Cruz can claim he’s MAGA while he demands the GOP return to the old guard conservatism Trump buried in 2016,” Greer speculates. “The senator will simply brand Carlson’s America Firstism as un-MAGA and his own conservatism as true MAGA.”
It will be a ruse, but can it be one that works?
Publicly, the senator supports the Trump administration's ousting of Nicolas Maduro in Venezuela, was pleased the administration designated Nigeria a “Country of Particular Concern” over the killing of Christians, is more than ready for a U.S.-led regime change in Iran, and of course can’t say enough that he “stands” with Israel. Privately he blames Vance for leading an isolationist strain inside the White House.
Polls have shown that over the course of the current bloodshed in Gaza, younger Republicans have soured on Israel to a significant degree, showing a real age gap on the issue in the party. Popular non-interventionist pundits like Carlson have given voice to this trend.
Cruz noted this in a video released Monday, "There is a tangible, dangerous antisemitic contingent on the right. That is gaining traction, gaining popularity, being listened to by young people, and gaining attention."
Of course, Cruz is vowing to head off this danger.
He is making these moves in a period where many of Donald Trump’s original restraint-oriented supporters have been disappointed by how much he’s been willing to intervene abroad, with the president often appearing to want to make regime change great again instead.
That kind of environment could be more fertile ground for a Cruzian MAGA in 2028, yet polls also show that Americans-at-large believe the president’s foreign policy has gone too far. How much traction would a more hawkish Republican candidate get? A dinosaur at that?
Expect Ted Cruz to keep going after J.D. Vance, who will keep being renamed Tucker Carlson by the senator for the foreseeable future, in public and in private.
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Top image credit: Busan, South Korea – October 30, 2025: Chinese President Xi Jinping meets US President Donald Trump. carlos110 via shutterstock.com
Why China is playing it cool amid Trump's chaos
January 27, 2026
Entering 2026, as President Donald Trump draws global attention to Venezuela, Iran, and Greenland, Beijing has been oddly included in debates over these issues.
Commentators have argued that they could create potential friction between the United States and China over regional influence in Latin America, the Middle East, and the Arctic. However, Beijing so far has largely adopted the “wait and see” approach and has instead been busy with rallying efforts to ensure a good start to its 15th Five-Year Plan and continuing anti-corruption campaign, especially in the military. Over the last weekend, two more members of China’s Central Military Commission were put under investigation, including the senior-most general Zhang Youxia.
While China tends to act assertively in what it regards as core sovereignty and security issues, including Taiwan and the South China Sea, it has reasons to be more reserved on issues beyond Asia.
On the one hand, China’s reservation could be attributed to the simple fact that it has few benefits to gain from intervening, despite having signed strategic partnerships with countries like Venezuela and Iran. In the case of Venezuela, while some argue that China is the creditor and has economic interests, namely oil, in Venezuela, the China-Venezuela economic ties had already chilled before the U.S. capture of Nicolas Maduro. The partnership itself does not guarantee that China will take active actions to help Venezuela amid the crisis.
Moreover, given the one-year truce reached during the Trump-Xi Busan Summit last year, it is unlikely that China would take substantive actions to confront the United States on issues falling outside its bilateral agenda.
Rather than being entangled in contentious issues beyond Asia, China is more likely to prioritize addressing domestic economic challenges over anything else. Indeed, China seems to be a beneficiary of the strained relations between the United States and its traditional allies. Alongside a series of policies and measures to boost domestic consumption and strengthen self-reliance, Beijing hosted several foreign leaders and signed cooperation documents and memorandums with countries including South Korea and Canada. China and the EU also reached a breakthrough on EVs amid the Greenland crisis.
There are also self-imposed limitations on what China could do. Since the early years of the People’s Republic, Chinese foreign policies have adhered to the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. If the principle of “mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity” undergirds China’s claims over Taiwan and other disputed territories, then the principle of “mutual non-interference in internal affairs” enables China’s practical approach toward different types of regimes, but with great restraint.
While Trump could initiate a military operation in Caracas, urge the Iranians to keep protesting, and vow to purchase Greenland, under claims of national security and interests, China could not initiate similar strategies or tactics under the principle of non-interference. Rather, China would tailor its approach accordingly once unrest in countries like Venezuela and Iran has been resolved, prioritizing post-crisis engagement over direct involvement.
This approach explains China’s restraint in recent geopolitical tensions. China has condemned the U.S. for capturing Maduro and his wife, taken a cautious approach toward Iran, defended its activities in the Arctic, and stressed the advocacy of the U.N. Charter and international law, but nothing beyond low-cost rhetoric.
The principle of non-interference inevitably constrains the toolkits China could use under these circumstances. Critics might point to China’s increased use of economic coercion and propaganda infiltration, as seen in the continuously intensified Sino-Japanese relations. After Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi remarked that a Chinese attack on Taiwan could pose “an existential threat” to Japan last November, China launched a series of campaigns against Japan, including the ban on dual-use goods, travel warning, and the use of public opinion, psychological, and legal warfare.
However, these measures are mostly wielded in direct bilateral relations and issues that China regards as red lines, such as Taiwan. By contrast, China has been more cautious in wielding similar coercive tactics against unrest in third countries beyond its core interests, where such actions would more clearly violate its non-interference principle.
And, besides its economic strength and so-called grey zone tactics, China does not possess military parity with the United States, ruling out the option of military operations to police the world.
China neither wants to, nor can, take a greater responsibility for issues beyond its interests. However, if disruptions to the international order continue, China may face a major test of its restraint, and be tempted to expand its global influence through coercion and force amid heightened great power rivalry.
The latest series of Qiushi, the official theoretical journal of the Chinese Communist Party, published an analysis of the U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS), stating that the strategic adjustment in the NSS signals “the beginning of a long-term, protracted war of attrition.” China has to maintain strategic composure and resolve, it said.
Beijing is aware of the test it is facing. Rather than learning the lesson of “might makes right” from the United States, China is more likely to remain strategically restrained by claiming adherence to the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and by adhering to the U.N. Charter and international law. The caveat, however, is that if the United States shifts its focus to Asia by becoming actively involved in ongoing Sino-Japanese tensions or Cross-Strait issues, China’s strategic calculus could change markedly.
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Top photo credit: Parts of the Mirador de las Americas monument, commemorating 150 years of Chinese presence in Panama since the first migration for railway construction, is seen near the Panama Canal, in Arraijan, on the outskirts of Panama City, Panama, January 24, 2025. REUTERS/Enea Lebrun/File Photo
Panama court could trip Trump's wire over China linked ports
January 27, 2026
During his inaugural address, President Donald Trump made very clear his thoughts on the Panama Canal: “We have been treated very badly from this foolish gift that should have never been made, and Panama’s promise to us has been broken.”
Chief among his concerns was that China was in effect operating the waterway. “We didn’t give it to China. We gave it to Panama, and we’re taking it back,” Trump said. And almost exactly one year later, a court decision may make Trump’s dream a reality.
The Supreme Court of Panama is currently finishing up deliberations that will determine whether CK Hutchison, a private Hong Kong company, will be allowed to continue running two ports on opposite ends of the Panama Canal — a decision imbued with significant geopolitical tensions.
Mounting tensions
These tensions have been brewing for decades. While the U.S. originally built and operated the canal in the early 20th century, Panama gained full control in 1999 and around the same time, Chinese companies, through Hong Kong-based subsidiaries, began operating port facilities out of the canal.
While there is no evidence that the Chinese government operates the canal, as Trump claims, Chinese companies, both private and state owned, have a significant presence in Panama. China is the second-largest user of the Panama Canal, and China’s national security law mean that the Chinese government can exercise oversight and influence over mainland and Hong Kong-based companies, like CK Hutchison.
This to no small extent has caused security concerns in Washington, according to David Gantz, fellow in Trade and International Economics for Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy.
“It is not irrational to argue that a major Chinese presence at Cristóbal and Balboa could raise national security concerns,” Gantz told Responsible Statecraft. “The Panama Canal is vitally important to the United States. An interruption would be extremely disruptive to the U.S. economy.” CK Hutchison originally began operating the two ports in 1997 and has come to be seen as a company under “strong influence of the Chinese government and the Chinese Communist Party,” Gantz added.
The canal is an important fixture of both the American and global economies, with at least 5% of global trade flowing through the waterway annually. Concerns about any interruptions to this vital aspect of the economy, coupled with security concerns raised in some U.S. policy sectors about a Chinese presence in the canal, have contributed to Trump’s hard stance on its status and threats to seize it by force, according to Karthik Sankaran, senior research fellow in geoeconomics at the Quincy Institute.
“That concern intensified once it became clear that a company perceived as affiliated with China was controlling the ports on both sides of the canal and the locks themselves,” Sankaran told Responsible Statecraft. “It ended up superimposing contemporary fears about China onto longstanding anger over the canal’s status.”
A legal battle begins
The Hong Kong-based company resurfaced in the national conversation after Trump’s fierce avowal to “take back” the canal from Chinese influence during his Inaugural Address. Later that same day, Panamanian comptroller general Anel Flores announced an audit of Panama Ports Company, the owner of the two ports, in which CK Hutchison holds a stake of 90%.
In March of 2025, a potential solution came in the form of an announcement made by BlackRock, an American firm that happens to be the biggest asset manager in the world. The financial institution announced that it would be working with the Mediterranean Shipping Company (MSC) to acquire Panama Ports Company and 41 other ports within CK Hutchison’s global portfolio.
This move would have assuaged national fears and security concerns over Chinese influence in the canal. However, as expected, the Chinese government did not back down easily, threatening to block the agreement unless Cosco, a Chinese state-owned shipping company, was included as a veto-holding member of the takeover consortium.
“One of the key questions is whether China actually wants to retain control of the canal, or whether an entity linked to it does, or whether Beijing is simply looking for a better quid pro quo from the United States,” Sankaran said. “My suspicion is that it’s less about holding onto the canal for nefarious strategic reasons and more about leverage.”
Later, a prolonged legal dispute emerged as Flores called Panama Ports’ contract “unfair” and “abusive,” claiming that the company had not paid enough royalties to the government and that its 25-year extension, finalized in 2023, had not taken place with the necessary authorizations.
Along with private lawyers, Flores filed lawsuits against CK Hutchison, seeking to nullify the recently signed contract and declare it unconstitutional.
“Hutchison’s relationship with Panamanian society over the past decades has been very tense and difficult,” Felipe Chapman, Panama’s finance minister, said in an interview with the Wall Street Journal.
However, experts note that these legal challenges come at the height of geopolitical tensions between the U.S. and China regarding the canal; tensions that are expected to bleed into the long-awaited Panama Supreme Court decision. Panama is “between a rock and a hard place,” said Benjamin Gedan, director of the Stimson Center Latin America Program.
“On one side, its most important international geostrategic partner, the United States, is threatening to invade, to seize by force, the most important economic engine in the country,” Gedan told RS. “On the other hand, China is an important investor in Panama, and the Panamanian private sector certainly values Chinese commercial engagement in Panama. Panama… does not want to provoke Donald Trump, nor does it want to lose access to Chinese financing and trade.”
There is no doubt that the Panama Supreme Court is facing serious pressure. If it rules to allow CK Hutchison to continue operating out of the ports, it risks upsetting Trump — who, with a recent invasion of Venezuela and threats to Canada, Greenland, and Cuba, has proven he is willing to wield a big stick.
“When Trump got involved, that woke up Panama to the fact that the primary relationship in the international system has to be with the United States…I think that kind of shook Panama to the fact that we don't want to be isolated from the United States,” Andrew Thomas, author of “The Canal of Panama and Globalization: Growth and Challenges in the 21st Century,” told Responsible Statecraft.
Aside from political pressures, Panama has serious economic vulnerabilities that contribute to the “substantial leverage” that the U.S. has over Panama, according to Sankaran. “It is a dollarized economy, which makes it extremely vulnerable to U.S. financial pressure. Cutting off access to dollars, even indirectly, would be devastating,” Sankaran said.
Future influence in Latin America
Regardless of any influential factors, the lawsuit will either strip CK Hutchison of its license, with expected legal and political retaliations to follow, or the company will be allowed to continue running the ports, albeit with some potential fines or remedy measures.
However the case is decided, Gatz is certain of the eventual outcome: “one way or another, I don’t think CK Hutchison will remain there long term,” he said. Even if the Supreme Court upholds Hutchison’s position, he suspects that American pressure will force the company to negotiate an exit with the Panamanian government.
While a ruling against CK Hutchison could indicate that Trump has won the battle, the war for Latin American influence is far from over. Sankaran points out that “China’s economic ties to Latin America are deep and structural,” with the economies being “naturally complementary.”
Additionally, China shows no signs of retreat. Following the U.S. invasion of Venezuela, China announced that they are forming a Latin America task force to look at how to protect their interests in the region.
Regardless, the court decision, which is expected to be announced soon, is likely to play a major role in the geopolitical significance of the Panama Canal in the years to come.
“I think the issue will come down to what, if anything, will satisfy Donald Trump,” Gedan said. “Will he insist on the United States retaking the Panama Canal, or will he claim victory if his pressure pushed a Chinese company out of the former Panama Canal Zone? That will be the big question in the next phase of this drama.”
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