Biden's Middle East trip: Following in Trump's footsteps
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Responsible Statecraft
Responsible Statecraft is a publication of analysis, opinion, and news that seeks to promote a positive vision of U.S. foreign policy based on humility, diplomatic engagement, and military restraint. RS also critiques the ideas — and the ideologies and interests behind them — that have mired the United States in counterproductive and endless wars and made the world less secure.
Top Image Credit: Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu attends the U.S. Independence Day reception, known as the annual "Fourth of July" celebration, hosted by Newsmax, in Jerusalem August 13, 2025. REUTERS/Ronen Zvulun/Pool (ReutersConnect)
Netanyahu’s ‘total victory’ rhetoric takes an extreme turn
August 20, 2025
As Israel’s war on Gaza escalates with IDF troops now moving to take over Gaza City, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has been deploying more extreme language than usual to describe his plans for “total” victory over Hamas. He has eschewed ceasefire talks, and is instead leaning into his expansive vision for a “Greater Israel,” which not only includes an Israeli takeover of Gaza but of neighboring territories too.
His public remarks and media appearances over the last week have caused some to observe that the prime minister may be taking his approach, which is already heavily influenced by the hardline right wing in his cabinet, to an even more maximalist level.
For example, Netanyahu completely dismissed the idea of a political solution for Gaza at a Newsmax conference hosted in Jerusalem last week.
“In the search for an alternative to victory, this idea emerged — what they call a ‘political solution,’ which is nothing more than another term for defeat and surrender. That will not happen,” Netanyahu said in Hebrew.
During the same remarks, Netanyahu appeared to be throwing his own military under the bus, suggesting IDF chiefs who had been calling for the Gaza campaign to end have lost their commitment to “victory.” “I will not give up on victory. The people of Israel will not give up on victory,” Netanyahu proclaimed, alleging that “victory” was now the last word in the army’s lexicon.
Appearing on Israeli media channel i24 last week, Netanyahu also said that Israel was looking for other countries to take in Palestinians, just as Trump had proposed to do back in Spring. “I think that the right thing to do, even according to the laws of war as I know them, is to allow the population to leave, and then you go in with all your might against the enemy who remains there,” Netanyahu said.
During the i24 interview, Netanyahu also endorsed the Greater Israel vision, which calls for Israel to expand to include other Middle Eastern countries. Arab nations widely condemned his comments, alleging that Netanyahu’s support for that idea threatens their security, and risks peace prospects in general.
And at the Newsmax conference, moreover, he also said there was “no starvation” in Gaza. “Hamas needs ozempic,” Netanyahu mused, referring to the popular weight loss drug.
RS spoke with experts about what Netanyahu’s more recent rhetoric means for his political trajectory, and for the future of Israel’s war on the Gaza Strip. Broadly, observers suggest his amped up language points to a grim reality in which Netanyahu’s government has stripped away any pretense of a political solution and is closer than ever to carrying out a maximalist endgame of absolute control over the Gaza strip, with no regard for the Palestinians who live there.
Unpacking Netanyahu's rhetoric
Israeli political analyst Ori Goldberg said Netanyahu, as a political leader, operates on a complex duality: his long-term reign as prime minister gives him a veneer of political stability, but also gives him leeway to make hard, even risky, choices for the sake of Israel’s future.
In this respect, Netanyahu’s recent rhetoric, which Goldberg describes as “more extreme” than usual, showcases his willingness to commit to these high-stakes choices — even if they are irreversible, or otherwise risk Israel's security or international standing.
Netanyahu “is going for broke, he's committed. He doesn't have any other options,” Goldberg observed. “He is playing ‘chicken’ with the international community. He has made his choice and will be happy to let both Israel and Palestine go down in flames.”
Israel is reportedly in talks to send Gazans to South Sudan, and Israel is sending aid to the impoverished country as a likely sweetener. Whether the transfer of Gazans materializes does not matter, said Goldberg.
“It's about making noise,” he charged. “It goes to show that Israel still has some international clout,” and that it has partners it can make political deals with, “even if [it has] to bribe them into it.”
Carol Daniel-Kasbari, Quincy Institute non-resident fellow and senior associate director of the Conflict Resolution Program at the Carter Center, told RS that Netanyahu’s rhetoric “point[s] to an endgame of open-ended Israeli security dominance, shrinking space for a two-state outcome, and a coalition calculus that rewards ideological consistency over diplomatic compromise.”
Daniel-Kasbari said Netanyahu “governs with partners to his right whose agendas prioritize settlement expansion and permanent Israeli control.” Considering this political reality, "rejecting a negotiated track for Gaza and hinting at Gazan ‘emigration’ are not rhetorical flourishes; they’re policy signals,” she said, also highlighting Netanyahu’s historical opposition to a sovereign Palestinian state west of the Jordan river.
Daniel Levy, President of the U.S./Middle East Project, said the Israeli prime minister has always supported this “Greater Israel” vision and cautioned not to over-interpret his comments.
As per the i24 interview, however, Netanyahu now seems to be endorsing an “expansive definition which has been more regularly referenced by [Israeli Finance Minister Bezalel] Smotrich,” Levy pointed out. Smotrich has repeatedly advocated for a Greater Israel that would include parts of Palestine, Syria, and Jordan.
Nevertheless, Levy said Netanyahu has always “been very clear, including presenting bills to the Israeli parliament, that he opposes a Palestinian state, seeks to expand Israel's borders, and he has acted on these intentions, including the intention to annex Palestinian territories.”
“This is indeed a decades-long project," he said.
Will Israel annex Gaza?
Israel is now positioning itself to force Palestinians out of Gaza City, where the IDF, pursuing a plan the Israeli security cabinet approved earlier this month, aims to displace about one million people. To that end, many Israelis are critical of such plans because of their perceived capacity to harm the remaining hostages, further weaken the IDF, and worsen the humanitarian crisis on the ground.
“Will Israel take this next step and carry out crimes against humanity after they have been officially approved by the Israeli government?” Goldberg asked, noting the obvious U.S. complicity — where Washington has unconditionally transferred bombs, guns, ammo, and other supplies necessary for an Israeli military incursion and occupation. “Without being armed by the United States, nothing will happen.”
For its part, Washington has frequently deferred to Jerusalem regarding its possible plans for the Gaza Strip and West Bank. Early this month, Trump said it was “pretty much up to Israel,” to decide whether it would pursue occupying the territory.
Netanyahu said earlier this month that Israel would proceed with this takeover, deeming it “the best way to end the war and the best way to end it speedily."
“If Israel decides to do this, the images will be horrible,” said Goldberg, who doubts that a complete takeover is possible, given the practical and logistical hurdles Israel would need to clear to achieve that goal.
“But then again…Netanyahu is so committed to this course, he has no other option. The Israeli military is desperate for a win,” he added.
“All of this may happen. And if it does, then, there really is no going back.”
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Top image credit: Houthi supporters shout slogans and hold up weapons during a protest against the US and Israel, in Sana a, Yemen, 15 August 2025. IMAGO/ Sanaa Yemen via REUTERS
Why Israel won't beat the Houthis
August 19, 2025
Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz threatened to "cut the hands" of Israel's enemies, but his specific target — Yemen's Houthi movement (Ansarullah) — has not only survived months of IDF and U.S. military pressure, but has also grown stronger with each confrontation.
The latest Israeli strike on Heyzaz power plant near Sanaa, Yemen’s capital, exemplifies this strategic failure: a symbolic attack on civilian infrastructure that inflicts severe hardship on Yemen's civilian population while doing nothing to degrade Houthi military capabilities.
The cycle of violence remains unmistakable. Since October 2023, Houthi forces have carried out near-daily attacks against Israeli-linked shipping in the Red Sea, as well as targets in Israel proper, such as air and sea ports, launching more than 70 missiles and 22 drones at Israel since March 2025 alone.
These attacks, which the Houthis consistently frame as protests against Israel's military campaign in Gaza, have been painful: since November 2023, the Houthis have targeted more than 100 merchant ships in the Red Sea, pushing insurance rates to skyrocket and forcing costly detours for commercial shipping. The strikes forced the key Israeli Red Sea port of Eilat to reduce operations by 90%, pushing it to the brink of bankruptcy. These actions prompted relentless Israeli retaliation against Yemeni targets.
While the U.S. initially joined Israeli strikes, it quickly recognized the strategic quagmire — the Houthis adapted their tactics faster than Western forces could effectively respond, creating a prohibitively expensive war of attrition. The $1 billion U.S. bombing campaign proved so ineffective that the Trump administration pursued an Oman-brokered ceasefire in May, though notably this agreement only protected U.S. assets while leaving Israel vulnerable to continued attacks.
Recent reporting highlights the resilience of Houthi forces. Since the pause in U.S. strikes, they have reportedly rebuilt radar systems, communication networks, and reconnaissance capabilities. They also conducted naval exercises at Al Hudaydah port, deployed modern weapons to Red Sea coastal areas, and relocated munitions to mountainous western regions.
Israel's campaign has now escalated beyond targeting Houthi military targets to include critical civilian infrastructure. Heyzaz power plant is one of the key facilities in supplying the Yemeni capital Sanaa. Despite that, Tel Aviv tried to justify the attack by claiming that it was used by the Houthis, mirroring its rationale for bombing the Al Hudaydah port in June, a vital lifeline for Yemen’s fuel, medicines, and food imports.
The Israeli strategy of attacking civilian facilities reflects fundamental miscalculations. These strikes, while certainly disruptive, are unlikely to significantly impact the Houthis' determination to continue military operations in support of the Palestinians. In terms of targeting energy infrastructure specifically, already during the war with the Saudi-led coalition (2015-2023), the Houthi-controlled territories had transitioned to relying primarily on decentralized power sources. Small-scale solar installations, backyard generators, and diesel-powered units became the backbone of electricity supply. As a result, Israeli strikes against centralized power plants yield minimal strategic effect.
The immediate Houthi response — a ballistic missile launch at Israel that Tel Aviv claimed was intercepted — demonstrated their undiminished capacity. Furthermore, these attacks on civilian facilities only strengthen Ansarullah's resolve and narrative of resisting Israeli aggression, boosting their regional legitimacy while Israel's international isolation grows.
Houthi leader Abdul Malik al-Houthi has increasingly styled himself as a pivotal leader of the regional "Axis of Resistance," echoing the rhetorical and strategic playbook of the Lebanese Hezbollah’s leader Hassan Nasrallah, assassinated during an Israeli attack on Beirut. In a recent speech, he framed the conflict in stark terms that went beyond Yemen, lambasting Arab governments for their "shameful weakness" in submitting to U.S. and Israeli pressure while contrasting their inaction with the Houthis’ defiance.
Al-Houthi’s messaging is deliberate and effective. By condemning Lebanon’s acceptance of U.S. demands for Hezbollah to be disarmed as a "betrayal of sovereignty," mocking Egypt’s gas deals with Israel as a "sad paradox" next to Norway’s sovereign wealth fund’s boycott of Israel, and accusing Arab leaders of silence over the Netanyahu government’s expansionist “Greater Israel” rhetoric, he positions the Houthis as the only force willing to confront Israel militarily and rhetorically.
While conventional wisdom often dismisses the Houthis as an Iranian proxy, their fiery rhetoric also challenges Tehran. Iran's rulers face growing criticism for failing to deter Israeli attacks — both against regional allies like Hezbollah and on its own soil during the 12-day June war — by seeking de-escalation over a full-force retaliation.
This narrative resonates across the region, where popular frustration with both Israel’s war in Gaza and the perceived complicity of U.S.-aligned governments runs high. Each Israeli strike on Yemen — particularly against civilian sites — reinforces the Houthis’ claim to leadership of the resistance camp, eroding Israel’s standing while consolidating Ansarullah’s influence far beyond Yemen’s borders.
Meanwhile, Israel's stubborn reliance on military solutions continues to ignore the fundamental political reality: the Houthis' campaign will persist as long as Israel's assault on Gaza continues. A durable ceasefire in Gaza remains the singular solution that would eliminate the Houthis' primary justification for their attacks. This underscores the core problem — military action cannot resolve what is, at its heart, a political conflict. Equally counterproductive is the ongoing blockade of Yemen, which serves only to inflict suffering on civilians while failing to weaken Houthi recruitment or reduce anti-Western sentiment.
History offers clear lessons. From Hezbollah to Hamas to Houthis, asymmetric opponents don't surrender under bombardment — they evolve. Israel's current path promises only deeper isolation, drained resources, and prolonged conflict. True strength lies not in empty threats but in breaking cycles of violence. The question remains whether Israeli leaders will learn this lesson before their long-term strategic position deteriorates further.
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Top image credit: President Donald Trump meets with Russian president Vladimir Putin in the Billy Mitchell Room at Joint Base Elmendorf Richardson in Anchorage, Alaska, Friday, August 15, 2025. (Official White House Photo by Daniel Torok)
Did the Alaska Summit usher in a new ice age?
August 19, 2025
The Trump-Putin Alaska summit was about far more than Ukraine. Since long before the meeting in Anchorage, the Arctic has been recognized as a setting for U.S.-Russia cooperation.
Now, with the historic presidential summit in the unexpected location of Alaska, the Arctic has been confirmed as one of the key areas for the normalization of the bilateral relationship.
During the joint news conference with President Trump, President Putin said “cooperation in the Arctic and the resumption of region-to-region contacts, including between the Russian Far East and the West Coast of the USA, also appear relevant.” President Trump did not specifically mention the Arctic in his remarks, but his administration’s initiative to host the meeting in Alaska was symbolic and indicative of a new age in U.S.-Russia Arctic cooperation.
Icebreakers and energy
Just before the meeting, U.S. officials had internal discussions on using Russian nuclear-powered icebreaker vessels to support the development of gas projects in Alaska as a potential deal to be made with President Putin. Although the details of what was discussed in Alaska are (as of writing this piece) limited, the icebreaker proposal makes sense. Russia is the only country with nuclear-powered icebreakers which help Russian companies conduct year-round shipping along the Northern Sea Route in the Arctic. In total, Russia has 41 nuclear and diesel-electric icebreakers and has a sophisticated network of Arctic port infrastructure.
By contrast, the U.S. operates only three polar icebreakers: USCGC Healy, USCGC Polar Star, and USCGC Storis. Expanding the U.S. icebreaker fleet is evidently important to President Trump; the administration has sought to acquire icebreakers from Finland and has allocated $25 billion for Polar and Arctic Security Cutters (icebreakers) for the U.S. Coast Guard.
Russian policymakers have also called for joint economic ventures, especially energy extraction and natural resource projects. A week before flying to Alaska, Putin’s foreign policy adviser Yuri Ushakov said, “It is in Alaska and in the Arctic that the economic interests of our countries converge and prospects for implementing large-scale mutually beneficial projects arise.” At the February 2025 bilateral meeting in Saudi Arabia, the Arctic was specifically discussed as a setting for joint projects. The Arctic, specifically where the two countries meet in the Bering Strait, presents the U.S. and Russia with a region of mutual interests.
Sanctions on Russia have led Moscow to increase its cooperation with China in Arctic energy and shipping projects. U.S. officials see Arctic cooperation as a potential means to “drive a wedge” between Moscow and Beijing. For Moscow, a new partnership with Washington could be an opportunity to offset its economic and technological dependence on China.
Climate cooperation
However, there are many more aspects to Arctic cooperation that could benefit the two countries, the region, and humankind as a whole: climate research and deconfliction. The Arctic is warming four times faster than the rest of the world, leading to dramatic transformations in the region: melting sea ice, thawing permafrost, eroding coastlines, and collapsing ecosystems. These impacts are detrimental to Arctic residents and Indigenous Peoples.
The U.S. and Russia have a nearly century-long history of Arctic science cooperation to jointly understand such processes and inform climate adaptation and mitigation. This crucial research has largely been paralyzed since 2022, when the Western Arctic states condemned Russia’s military actions in Ukraine and paused the work of the Arctic Council. The Biden White House also announced a termination of scientific cooperation with Russia.
While a return to climate-centric cooperation may be unlikely with the current Trump administration’s positions on climate change, environmental initiatives with a more specific focus may be achievable. Putin’s envoy Kirill Dmitriev said earlier this year that “the key issue for our discussion with Western powers, including the U.S., is climate… because we believe the Arctic is changing.”
The logic of the potential icebreakers deal (the U.S. gaining access to Russian expertise) can be applied to the study of permafrost: Russian researchers have centuries of experience in studying and adapting to permafrost thaw. The deterioration of permafrost undermines any potential economic ventures and threatens the structural integrity of infrastructure. American and Russian researchers should revamp their collaboration in this critical area.
Arctic peacekeeping
Ensuring the Arctic remains a region of peace and security is another important channel of cooperation for the U.S. and Russia. The frequency and intensity of military activity in the Arctic has increased. The participants in military exercises have increased, including China and non-Arctic NATO states. There are risks of a renewed arms race and the deployment of more powerful weapons systems, including hypersonic missiles, in the Arctic. Arctic security is important to the Trump administration as evidenced by President Trump’s rhetoric on acquiring Greenland and the 14 mentions of the Arctic in the 2025 Annual Threat Assessment.
The shortest distance for missiles and planes between the U.S. and Russia is via the Arctic. With Finland and Sweden now under the nuclear umbrella of the U.S. and NATO, all but one of the Arctic states (Russia) is a NATO Ally. The upcoming 2026 expiration of the New START agreement has important implications for Arctic security due to Russia’s concentration of its sea-based nuclear weapons in the region.
Previously, the Arctic was the setting for confidence-building measures, information sharing, and programs to reduce the risks of miscalculation, such as the Arctic Military Environmental Cooperation. Gorbachev’s Murmansk Initiative included calls for Arctic denuclearization, disarmament and establishing an “Arctic zone of peace.” Today, we are at dangerously low levels of trust — preventing such joint efforts.
To prevent a security dilemma and address these critical issues of Arctic security, it is important for the U.S.-Russia Arctic cooperation agenda to include trust-building, transparency, confidence-building measures, military-to-military and expert-to-expert dialogue, and additional measures to reduce the risk of escalation in the region. New military security architecture is needed in the Arctic. Restarting frameworks such as the Arctic Coast Guard Forum and Arctic Chiefs of Defense meetings may be first steps towards improving mutual understanding in the region.
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