
Biden's Middle East trip: Following in Trump's footsteps
WATCH: Biden looks poised to betray his campaign promise to sideline Saudi Arabia. Does this really serve America's interests?

Responsible Statecraft
Responsible Statecraft is a publication of analysis, opinion, and news that seeks to promote a positive vision of U.S. foreign policy based on humility, diplomatic engagement, and military restraint. RS also critiques the ideas — and the ideologies and interests behind them — that have mired the United States in counterproductive and endless wars and made the world less secure.
Top photo credit: U.S. Army Soldiers, from the 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team depart for Afghanistan from Italy on Feb. 25, 2005. (U.S. Air Force Photo by Staff Sgt. Bethann Caporaletti)
Could the US win a war with a near-peer adversary today?
February 12, 2026
“One should never assert a power that he cannot exert,” said British statesman and wordsmith Winston Churchill. My hometown football coach expressed a similar thought: “The man with an alligator mouth and a hummingbird ass” would get more than his share of whippings.
The U.S. military today has a hummingbird’s ass. Despite decades of sky-high military spending, our force is incapable of defeating a peer or near-peer adversary in today’s complex, dangerous world. If we continue on our alligator-mouth-sized trajectory, the consequences will be catastrophic.
The gap is apparent in three critical requirements to win a war: manpower, material, and money. We cannot generate sufficient forces or replace material losses at scale, and we are $38 trillion in debt, with $1 trillion annual budget deficits projected ad infinitum.
Manpower
Until 1973, the U.S. military met its personnel needs through a mix of volunteers and conscription in both war and peacetime. The move to an All Volunteer Force (AVF) resulted from the most unpopular and unfair draft in American history – the Vietnam War. The AVF was a political solution, not a strategic one.
Over the last five decades, the AVF has seen success and failure tied to economic conditions and perceived risk. It benefited greatly from the fall of the Soviet Union, allowing active forces to shrink from 2.3 million to 1.3 million, and women’s participation, which rose from a 2% legal cap in the early 1970s 24 to 17.7% across the active duty and reserves as of 2023 according to the Department of Defense.
The AVF was decisively tested in 2003. It failed. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan demanded more manpower than the AVF could provide, despite lowered enlistment standards — no longer requiring a high school diploma or GED, lowering aptitude test requirements, waivers for mental health and criminal record — and unprecedented enlistment bonuses that disproportionately attracted working class and middle class Americans.
Rather than exercising its constitutional authority to compel service, the government relied on repeated deployments of active and reserve forces. The result: tens of thousands of service members and families broken by suicide, PTSD, traumatic brain injury, amputations, substance abuse, and more than 7,000 combat deaths.
This abuse of the force makes it unlikely that wartime manpower needs could be met through volunteers. Young Americans’ propensity to serve fell from 15% percent to 9%t; the portion eligible dropped from 30%to 2%; and the U.S. birth rate has dropped to a new low of 1.6 babies per woman. Fewer citizens, from a smaller pool, are willing or able to serve.
The top reasons Americans give for not enlisting: fear of death, fear of serious injury, and leaving home. Americans struggling to afford daily life are not studying maps of distant places for future wars, or dreaming of battlefield glory.
The alternative is reinstating the draft, but the likelihood of success is low, raising a dangerous question: What if we had a war and no one showed up?
Material
In the 1990s, the U.S. government consolidated its military-industrial base, believing a smaller number of suppliers could be more efficient and responsive. By decade’s end, 107 firms became 5: Boeing, Lockheed Martin, RTX, General Dynamics, and Northrop Grumman.
These five survivors are enormously profitable, wielding unprecedented power with Congress and the Pentagon and fulfilling the warning by President Eisenhower of a dangerous Military-Industrial complex.
This consolidation made us vulnerable. As the 2025 National Security Strategy acknowledges, America lacks the industrial capacity to produce modern systems and munitions at scale and must rapidly adapt to low-cost, high-volume warfare.
Ukraine is a devastating example of our material shortcomings. The U.S. has transferred more than 3 million 155mm artillery rounds – 1250% of current annual production. Rebuilding that inventory will take two years.
Replacing sophisticated weapons systems is more difficult. Restoring stocks of the Javelin antitank missile would take five and a half to eight years to replenish; the HIMARS guided rocket, two to three years, and the Stinger anti-aircraft missile, six to 18 years.
The Navy now operates only four shipyards, ensuring sunk warships will take years to replace. The Air Force faces similar challenges. Further complicating this problem for both branches is their lack of access to the rare-earth materials required for sophisticated weapons systems. Manpower remains a parallel crisis. The Navy is short 14,000 enlisted sailors; the Air Force 1,800 pilots, including 1,100 combat pilots.
Forming a capable factory workforce is another hurdle. In a 2025 survey, 80% of Americans said the country would be better off if more people worked in factories, yet 73% said they personally would not be better off doing so.
No amount of optimism can overcome these facts.
Money
Wars throughout history have always been expensive, often crippling or destroying great nations.
Today, the U.S. is $38 trillion in debt, with trillion-dollar annual budget shortfalls projected for the future. Interest payments alone approach $1 trillion annually.
The Pentagon is a major contributor to this debt, officially consuming nearly $1 trillion annually while failing eight consecutive financial audits. Other budget areas contributing to the real cost of “defense” — the Department of Veterans Affairs, the nuclear budget, and the Department of Homeland Security — drive costs to $1.5 trillion per year. Our defense budget eclipses the next eight nations combined.
There’s little to show for it. Since World War II, the U.S. has won one war, tied another, and lost three: a win in the 1990-91 Gulf War, a tie in Korea, and losses in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Our National Security Strategy is based on insanity – doing things the same way but expecting different results.
Seeking Truth
“War is hell,” said General Sherman during the Civil War. For many Americans, war remains abstract since it’s not come home since then. For those in Gaza, Kyiv, or Tehran, war is hell.
Wishful thinking won’t stop new technologies from bringing war to our shores. Truth and security can be sought via the following method.
Any time Congress considers committing U.S. forces to armed conflict, it must answer the following questions, drawn from the Powell doctrine, in an open forum so that Americans know what’s being done in their name.
1. Is a vital national security interest threatened?
2. Do we have a clear, obtainable objective?
3. Have the risks and costs been fully and frankly analyzed?
4. Have all other non-violent policy means been fully exhausted?
5. Is there a plausible exit strategy to avoid endless entanglements?
6. Have the consequences of our actions been fully considered?
7. Is the action supported by the American people?
8. Do we have genuine, broad international support?
I would add two more:
9. How many U.S. troops will die, and from what socio-economic quintile(s) will they come?
10. Will Congress impose an up-front war tax to pay for the conflict without adding to the national debt?
Had we followed this guide, would we have invaded Iraq or stayed in Afghanistan? Would we have taken “ownership” of Venezuela, or considered military action against Greenland, Canada, or Iran? Likely not.
Should America continue to bully weaker nations, more powerful nations could intervene, risking a war that could end this 250‑year democratic experiment, or worse for civilization, trigger nuclear armageddon.
Winston Churchill said, giving credit to Shakespeare, “Cry havoc...and let slip the dogs of war.” Or, as my football coach would say, “When shit hits the fan, no one’s in control.”
It’s time to face facts: we’re sleepwalking into fights we cannot win.
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Top photo credit: May 21, 2023, Hiroshima, Hiroshima, Japan: (From R to L) Comoros' President Azali Assoumani, World Trade Organization (WTO) Director-General Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, Australia's Prime Minister Anthony Albanese and India's Prime Minister Narendra Modi at the G7 summit in Hiroshima, Japan. (Credit Image: © POOL via ZUMA Press Wire)
Middle Powers are setting the table so they won't be 'on the menu'
February 12, 2026
The global order was already fragmenting before Donald Trump returned to the White House. But the upended “rules” of global economic and foreign policies have now reached a point of no return.
What has changed is not direction, but speed. Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney’s remarks in Davos last month — “Middle powers must act together, because if we’re not at the table, we’re on the menu” — captured the consequences of not acting quickly. And Carney is not alone in those fears.
Leaders around the world are increasingly moving from rhetorical warnings about the systemic risks of superpower dynamics to actively experimenting with new ways of navigating what Carney called “a rupture in the world order.”
One such strategy is “workarounding,” a deliberate use of flexible, issue-specific cooperation among middle powers to create strategic space outside rigid U.S.-China alignments. This approach has gained traction over the past decade as great power competition intensified. It is now expanding as Washington’s policies inject further uncertainty into the global system.

This shift in practice offers several advantages for middle powers. Small, adaptive constellations, often cross-regional, can bypass growing volatility at the global level by excluding superpowers from cooperation. They preserve room for maneuver by diversifying partnerships. And they create space to shape outcomes on issues that matter for middle powers.
Unsurprisingly, examples of workarounding abound.
Forecasting a “messy” decade of transition, Singapore’s Prime Minister Lawrence Wong warned in October 2025 that U.S. policies were undermining global trade and common interests. Rather than relying on existing institutions, he called for building new trade connections and closer cooperation with like-minded partners. Countering unilateral tariffs, Wong argued, could not be done alone.
These ideas were quickly translated into action. Middle powers Singapore and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) joined together with 12 small states to roll out an adaptive, non-traditional project promoting open trade. Dubbed the Future of Investment and Trade Partnership (FITP), it includes Brunei, Chile, Costa Rica, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Morocco, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Rwanda, Switzerland, and Uruguay. Its purpose is not to replace existing institutions, but to amplify the collective influence of its members through pragmatic coordination.
FITP-like arrangements and other agile platforms enable members to collaborate across selected trade and investment issues. Other workarounding tactics include strengthening supply chains, removing non-tariff trade barriers, facilitating investment and establishing rules around emerging technologies. These tactics are flexible, non-binding, and deliberately modular, making them attractive to middle powers adapting to an increasingly volatile environment.
One notable result of this experimentation is that middle powers are shifting from regional to cross-regional constellations, ranging from the Indo-Pacific to the Middle East, to Europe and beyond. This trend extends beyond trade. For example, the Digital Economy Partnership Agreement (DEPA) includes issues of technological interoperability and AI governance alongside digital trade rules.
Established in 2020 by Singapore, Chile, and New Zealand, DEPA’s appeal as a flexible alternative to traditional trade regimes is evident in the rapid expansion of its membership. South Korea joined in 2024, and Canada, Costa Rica, Peru, the UAE, El Salvador, and Ukraine have also formally applied.
Beyond preserving strategic space, workarounding enables middle powers to exert influence. In Latin America, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Bolivia are exploring coordination in lithium production to avoid being squeezed by dominant buyers such as the United States and China. Described as a potential “OPEC for lithium,” such cooperation symbolizes middle power efforts to translate resource endowments into collective leverage amid the global energy transition and technological competition.
Similar dynamics may soon emerge in Africa as competition over critical minerals intensifies.
Clearly, workarounding is becoming a core element of pragmatic statecraft among small states and middle powers. But this is true for larger middle powers as well. After facing a series of setbacks in 2025, including a sharp tariff hike imposed by the United States, India intensified efforts to diversify its trade relationships.
Expanding negotiations beyond traditional partners, New Delhi renewed its engagement with the Eurasian Economic Union, is pushing for a speedy deal with the Southern African Customs Union, and concluded a long-delayed trade agreement with the European Union in February 2026. This immediately accelerated the India-US trade deal that had been in a limbo for months. New agreements on trade, semiconductors, critical minerals and defense signed during German Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s recent state visit to India reinforce the capacity for workarounding to move the needle on some of the most turbulent geopolitical issues.
Taken together, these developments point to an evolving landscape of middle power statecraft that blends competition and cooperation. A Goldman Sachs report highlights the growing influence of geopolitical “swing states,” suggesting their ability to navigate superpower competition could help stabilize an increasingly fragmented order.
Another concept gaining traction is the “Fourth Pole.” This argument suggests that, alongside the United States, the European Union and China, there is room for a fourth pole comprising India, the Gulf States and other players across Asia, Africa, Southeast Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean. Linked by networks rather than formal alliances, these states could act as force multipliers, facilitating innovation, norm-setting, and strategic autonomy for themselves in a changing world.
In this sense, workarounding practices are living laboratories for new forms of statecraft, industrial policies and economic and science diplomacy. They expand the geographical reach of cooperation, connect public and private actors across regions, and embody the speed at which states are adapting to shifting political and security realities
Canadian Prime Minister Carney’s Davos statement, “We are in the midst of a rupture, not a transition,” demonstrates middle powers’ mindset has already shifted. For Washington, the implication is clear: it remains a central power, but no longer sets the agenda alone. How it engages with these middle power networks will shape whether workarounding complements U.S. strategy or bypasses it.
If ignored, workarounding may evolve in ways that gradually dilute American influence in the very systems it once anchored. Despite Trump’s bluster and hemispheric pretensions, cooperation between and among middle powers is a growing force to be reckoned with.
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U.S. Vice President JD Vance gets out of a car before boarding Air Force Two upon departure for Azerbaijan, at Zvartnots International Airport in Yerevan, Armenia, February 10, 2026. REUTERS/Kevin Lamarque/Pool
VP Vance’s timely TRIPP to the South Caucasus
February 11, 2026
Vice President JD Vance’s regional tour to Armenia and Azerbaijan this week — the highest level visit by an American official to the South Caucasus since Vice President Joe Biden went to Georgia in 2009 — demonstrates that Washington is not ignoring Yerevan and Baku and is taking an active role in their normalization process.
Vance’s stop in Armenia included an announcement that Yerevan has procured $11 million in U.S. defense systems — a first — in particular Shield AI’s V-BAT, an ISR unmanned aircraft system. It was also announced that the second stage of a groundbreaking AI supercomputer project led by Firebird, a U.S.-based AI cloud and infrastructure company, would commence after having secured American licensing for the sale and delivery of an additional 41,000 NVIDIA GB300 graphics processing units.
In addition, the Vice President and Armenia’s Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan signed a joint statement on the completion of negotiations on a 123 Agreement, which establishes a legally binding framework for peaceful nuclear cooperation between the U.S. and partner countries. The U.S. has emerged as a leading contender to replace Armenia’s aging Soviet-era nuclear power plant with small modular reactors, and this agreement helps pave the way to a decision in Washington’s favor. According to Vance, potential deals may include “up to $5 billion” in an initial agreement “plus an additional $4 billion in long-term support through fuel and maintenance contracts.”
While in Azerbaijan, Vance and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev signed a Strategic Partnership Charter between the U.S. and Azerbaijan that covers regional connectivity, economic investment, and security and defense issues. In his public remarks, the Vice President noted that the U.S. is planning to “ship some new boats to Azerbaijan” to help with the protection of territorial waters.
Vance’s visit comes some six months after President Donald Trump hosted Pashinyan and Aliyev at the White House for a historic summit last August. The results of that gathering included American MOUs (Memorandum of Understanding) with each visiting delegation and the Armenian and Azerbaijani foreign ministers initialing the already agreed text of their peace and normalization agreement.
In Washington last month, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan released a joint statement on the TRIPP (Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity) Implementation Framework, which begins to lay out the technical and regulatory components of the trade corridor which would connect Azerbaijan to Turkey through southern Armenia.
The Framework outlines a 49-year initial term for the joint development company, which will construct the transit, trade, energy and communications infrastructure for the new corridor. The U.S. will retain a 74% controlling stake and Armenia will hold the remaining 26%. A recent visit to Armenia by AECOM, an American engineering consulting firm, focused on beginning a feasibility study of the TRIPP project “to support Armenia’s long-term economic growth, connectivity, and regional integration,” according to the U.S. Embassy in Yerevan.
Since its announcement last August, the project has reinvigorated Washington’s engagements with and interests in the region. Those conversations continued during Vance’s visit to the region this week.
From Washington’s perspective, TRIPP fits into a broader strategic vision of an interconnected South Caucasus that can act as an American sponsored strategic artery linking Central Asia to Turkey and Europe—which is likely to prove an important corridor for critical trade and energy flows across Eurasia while avoiding Russian and Iranian territory.
The agreements have already brought some dividends to the region. Since last August’s meeting delivered Trump’s personal imprint onto the peace process, the likelihood of renewed war, or even violent flare ups, between Armenia and Azerbaijan has declined. Both Yerevan and Baku recognize that their countries are likely to reap significant economic and political benefit from the TRIPP project—not to mention that upsetting Washington would prove strategically unwise.
Recent shipments from Azerbaijan to Armenia via Georgia, while mostly symbolic, represents a modest breakthrough that may lead to greater dividends down the road if direct and reciprocal access to each other’s infrastructure networks is allowed. The re-opening of Armenia’s border with Turkey, closed since 1993, would also represent an important step in the direction of expanding regional interconnectedness.
For over 30 years the South Caucasus has largely been a region in name only, lacking the type of integration that could drive prosperity and help mitigate insecurity. Reincorporating Georgia, once the standard bearer of American engagement in the South Caucasus, into the budding regional economic architecture will be crucial to its long-term success. The recent Georgian delegation visit to Washington offers an encouraging signal that Tbilisi and Washington may reestablish pragmatic working relations. Last year’s trilateral meeting in Georgia’s capital Tbilisi between Deputy Foreign Ministers from Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia was a positive development—and one that ought to be continued at the level of Foreign Ministers.
On the whole, while favorable conditions had been set before returning to office in January 2025, the Trump Administration ultimately succeeded where previous administrations had failed. Transforming those earlier successes into a long-term and stable U.S. policy in the South Caucasus will be equally as important. No less crucial will be ensuring that America’s involvement in this sensitive region does not lead to further destabilization.
There will undoubtedly be numerous external pitfalls along the way that must be delicately managed, most notably Russian and Iranian interests in the South Caucasus and concerns with the TRIPP project in particular.
In contrast to some fears that Washington is preparing to “grant” Russia a sphere of influence across the former Soviet Union, the U.S. appears instead to be demonstrating that it will respect the security red lines of the other great powers without abandoning America’s economic and political interests. Indeed, as one Russian columnist wrote “There is disappointment, annoyance, and a feeling of helplessness [in Moscow]. Because it is precisely in this region…that Russia’s position has noticeably sunk in recent years.”
For the U.S., this is indeed a fine line to walk, and its success will depend on prudent statesmanship that has been largely unfamiliar to the post-Cold War generation of America’s political elites. Vance’s trip to Armenia and Azerbaijan sends a strong signal that the U.S. attaches a newfound importance to the South Caucasus and the wider region, one that may endure for years to come.keep readingShow less
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