Biden's Middle East trip: Following in Trump's footsteps
WATCH: Biden looks poised to betray his campaign promise to sideline Saudi Arabia. Does this really serve America's interests?
Responsible Statecraft
Responsible Statecraft is a publication of analysis, opinion, and news that seeks to promote a positive vision of U.S. foreign policy based on humility, diplomatic engagement, and military restraint. RS also critiques the ideas — and the ideologies and interests behind them — that have mired the United States in counterproductive and endless wars and made the world less secure.
Top image credit: Lucas Parker and FotoField via shutterstock.com
No, even a 'small attack' on Iran will lead to war
February 20, 2026
The Wall Street Journal reports that President Donald Trump is considering a small attack to force Iran to agree to his nuclear deal, and if Tehran refuses, escalate the attacks until Iran either agrees or the regime falls.
Here’s why this won’t work.
First of all, the “deal” Trump has put forward entails Tehran completely giving up its nuclear program in return for no new sanctions, but no actual sanctions relief. This is, of course, a non-starter for Iran.
There are hardly any more sanctions the U.S. could impose on Iran. And the current level of sanctions is suffocating the economy. Accepting this deal would not enable Iran to escape its economic dead end, but would only prolong the economic decay while depriving it of the nuclear leverage it believes it needs to free itself from existing sanctions.
Second, according to my sources, Trump recently also floated the idea of a smaller attack, with the Iranians responding symbolically by striking an empty U.S. base. But Tehran refused and made clear that any attack would be responded to forcefully. Trump may hope that with a much larger strike force in the region, Tehran will reconsider its response.
But it is difficult to see why Tehran would, since caving to this military threat likely will only invite further coercive demands, beginning with conventional military options such as its missile capabilities. That is Iran’s last remaining deterrent against Israel. Without it, Israel would be more inclined to attack and cement its subjugation of Iran, or alternatively move to collapse the theocratic regime altogether, Tehran fears.
Thus, capitulating to Trump’s “deal” would not end the confrontation, but only make Tehran more vulnerable to further attacks by Israel or the U.S.
Third, since the U.S. strategy, according to the WSJ, is to escalate until Tehran caves, and since capitulation is a non-option for Iran, the Iranians are incentivized to strike back right away at the U.S. The only exit Tehran sees is to fight back, inflict as much pain as possible on the U.S., and hope that this causes Trump to back off or accept a more equitable deal.
In this calculation, Iran would not need to win the war (militarily, it can’t); it would only have to get close to destroying Trump’s presidency before it loses the war by: 1) closing the Strait of Hormuz and strike oil installations in the region in the hope of driving oil prices to record levels and by that inflation in the U.S.; and 2) strike at U.S. bases, ships, or other regional assets and make Trump choose between compromise or a forever war in the region, rather than the quick glorious victory he is looking for.
This is an extremely risky option for Iran, but one that Tehran sees as less risky than the capitulation “deal” Trump is seeking to force on Iran.
None of this, of course, serves U.S. interest, has been authorized by Congress, enjoys the support of the American people or the support of regional allies (save Israel), is compatible with international law, or answers the crucial question: How does this end?
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TOP IMAGE CREDIT: An aerial view of Diego Garcia, the Chagossian Island home to one of the U.S. military's 750 worldwide bases. The UK handed sovereignty of the islands back to Mauritius, with the stipulation that the U.S. must be allowed to continue its base's operation on Diego Garcia for the next 99 years. (Kev1ar82 / Shutterstock.com).
As Iran strikes loom, US and UK fight over Indian Ocean base
February 19, 2026
As the U.S. surges troops to the Middle East, a battle is brewing over a strategically significant American base in the middle of the Indian Ocean.
President Donald Trump announced Wednesday that he would oppose any effort to return the Chagos Islands to Mauritius, arguing that a U.S. base on the island of Diego Garcia may be necessary to “eradicate a potential attack by a highly unstable and dangerous [Iranian] Regime.” The comment came just a day after the State Department reiterated its support for the U.K.’s decision to give up sovereignty over the islands while maintaining a 99-year lease for the base.
The sudden shift emerged from a dispute over whether the U.K. would join the U.S. in a military campaign against Iran, according to The Times. British officials, fearful that a campaign of strikes would violate international law, are reportedly refusing to grant permission for American forces to use the base on Diego Garcia as well as a second major air base in England, both of which are jointly operated by Washington and London.
The battle risks derailing a years-long effort by the U.K. to return the Chagos Islands to Mauritius, a former British colony that won a series of international court cases affirming its territorial claims over the archipelago. British leaders say the only way to ensure the continued operation of the military base there is to respect these rulings, and Mauritius has expressed support for this approach. But the U.K. can only move forward on the deal with U.S. approval, according to senior British officials who spoke with The Times.
The joint base on Diego Garcia holds an outsized role in U.S. military strategy in the Middle East. The island, which British authorities depopulated in the 1960s and 70s, lies at the heart of the Indian Ocean. American forces have long used the base there as a port for naval vessels and a key refueling station for long-range bombers, which the U.S. would need in order to launch a major air campaign against Iran.
Trump has repeatedly gone back and forth on whether to back the deal with Mauritius, calling it an “act of great stupidity” in January before changing course and embracing it as the “best deal [Britain] could make” earlier this month. These reversals lend credence to the idea that Trump is using the issue in an attempt to strong-arm the British government into assisting American airstrikes in Iran.
But support among European allies for attacks on Iran remains limited. The European Union warned Thursday that escalation would have “heavy repercussions” in the Middle East, adding that it is “crucial that all the parties abide by international law” and “show restraint.”
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Top photo credit: Secretary of State Marco Rubio. Daniel Hernandez-Salazar/Shutterstock
Is Rubio backing off Cuba regime change for his own political good?
February 19, 2026
As the Trump administration's de facto oil blockade of Cuba brings life on the island to a grinding halt, several factors may be causing Secretary of State Marco Rubio to think twice about pursuing immediate regime change in Havana.
Rubio's potential future presidential aspirations and the humanitarian implications of full-fledged government collapse must be weighing heavily here. Meanwhile, reports that the administration is issuing U.S. licenses for oil shipments to the island's private sector, and that unconfirmed informal “discussions” are now taking place with power-brokers in Havana, seem to indicate that Rubio might be playing a longer game that leaves the current government in place while seeking greater leverage over the economic direction the country takes.
All this suggests that Rubio may end up pursuing a Venezuela-style accommodation with the Cuban government given his own political ambitions and the existing realities and constraints he faces as the chief executor of U.S. foreign policy under President Trump.
Of course this would frustrate or at least delay one of his main objectives for the past 20 years: the overthrow of the Cuban regime.
William LeoGrande, a Cuba expert at American University and a non-resident fellow at the Quincy Institute, said last month that Rubio, whether he likes it or not, may be compelled to go along with Trump’s plans for Cuba — which is to hammer out a deal. As has occurred in Venezuela, sources say Trump prefers not to seek wholesale regime change given memories of the disastrous de-Baathification campaign after the 2003 invasion of Iraq.
If Rubio were to run for president, his need to win his first-ever national — not just Florida — election, could make his potential role in the outright collapse of Cuba a liability, not an asset.
This could be why Rubio responded cautiously at a recent Senate hearing when asked about Cuba policy: "I think we would like to see the regime there change. That doesn’t mean that we’re going to make a change, but we would love to see a change," he said.
While hardliners in South Florida are increasing the pressure on both Washington and Havana by urging the Treasury Department to prohibit all flights and remittances to the island, the Justice Department to indict Raul Castro over a 30-year-old incident, and the Commerce Department to revoke almost all licenses for U.S. firms doing business on the island, Rubio has not endorsed those appeals.
In fact, last weekend Rubio told Bloomberg that Cuban government economic reforms — “not just political freedom” — could offer a path toward lifting the U.S. oil siege and improving bilateral relations. RS previously reported that such a deal, whereby the Cuban government pursues economic reforms while remaining largely in power, as has occurred in Venezuela, is an arrangement Havana officials have expressed openness to, and it would likely prove less chaotic than immediate regime implosion, a popular overthrow of the government, or U.S. military action.
This approach would be “the most sensible, prudent, and humane path,” said former Joe García, a former Florida congressman who has tried to mediate between the two governments in the past.
Rubio’s Bloomberg interview came after The Economist reported last week that if the administration's oil siege on the island continues, Rubio could become the public face of an induced humanitarian crisis that could lead to another wave of "boat people" ending up on Florida's shores during a crucial election year.
The Economist cited several sources indicating that Washington, as a result, is considering supplying small quantities of cooking gas and diesel fuel to sustain the island's water infrastructure. When contacted by RS, the report’s author clarified that it seems the administration would allow some Caribbean countries, like Jamaica or Curaçao, to sell Cuba propane or diesel without facing 30% U.S. tariffs, as threatened in Trump’s January 29 executive order.
As mentioned above, to avoid outright collapse and island-wide destabilization — which CIA officials, an anonymous U.S. official and Rubio himself have warned against — some private companies on the island have been granted U.S. licenses to import fuel for their own operations, numerous sources tell RS. Cuba’s Foreign Trade Minister reportedly authorized such imports earlier this month after the Trump administration cut off shipments from Cuba’s two biggest suppliers, Venezuela and Mexico.
More recently, Axios reported that Rubio has held conversations with Raúl Guillermo Rodríguez Castro, the grandson, bodyguard, and caretaker of former Cuban president and Army General Raúl Castro. Also known as “El Cangrejo” (The Crab), Raúl Guillermo, according to Axios, is considered by “Trump advisers” to be “the most important figure on the island to cultivate” as the administration looks for the “next Delcy [Rodríguez] in Cuba.”
One source described Rubio’s conversations with El Cangrejo — which, like secret talks under the Obama administration, have reportedly bypassed official bilateral channels — as "surprisingly" friendly, saying he represents more pragmatic, business-minded Cubans who see value in rapprochement with the U.S.
On X, the report’s author clarified that El Cangrejo, who is a lieutenant colonel in Cuba’s military, may be Rubio’s current interlocutor but is not necessarily the island’s “next Delcy Rodríguez,” presumably because the embargo cannot be lifted while a Castro is in power, per Title II of the 1996 Helms-Burton Act.
Not everyone sees the situation the same way. Drop Site News charges that Rubio is intentionally misleading Trump about the nature of current contacts with Cuban leadership. The New York Times and the Miami Herald cite U.S and Cuban sources, claiming that substantive negotiations are not currently taking place between the two governments.
Rubio may not be having talks with the government but all signs point to him talking with people close to it, including Havana’s military and business elite. As author Peter Kornbluh has said, “dialogue, even under duress, is preferable to overt U.S. aggression and offers a potential off ramp for both sides."
While Rubio undoubtedly wants to get rid of the current regime, existing conditions, his own political ambitions, and pressure to deliver a deal to the president may make a Venezuela-style accommodation more likely for now than induced regime collapse and its potentially explosive consequences for which Rubio would likely be held responsible.
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