Biden's Middle East trip: Following in Trump's footsteps
WATCH: Biden looks poised to betray his campaign promise to sideline Saudi Arabia. Does this really serve America's interests?
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Responsible Statecraft is a publication of analysis, opinion, and news that seeks to promote a positive vision of U.S. foreign policy based on humility, diplomatic engagement, and military restraint. RS also critiques the ideas — and the ideologies and interests behind them — that have mired the United States in counterproductive and endless wars and made the world less secure.
Top image credit: People walking on Red square in Moscow in winter. (Oleg Elkov/Shutterstock)
Why Russians haven't risen up to stop the Ukraine war
December 25, 2025
After its emergence from the Soviet collapse, the new Russia grappled with the complex issue of developing a national identity that could embrace the radical contradictions of Russia’s past and foster integration with the West while maintaining Russian distinctiveness.
The Ukraine War has significantly changed public attitudes toward this question, and led to a consolidation of most of the Russian population behind a set of national ideas. This has contributed to the resilience that Russia has shown in the war, and helped to frustrate Western hopes that economic pressure and heavy casualties would undermine support for the war and for President Vladimir Putin. To judge by the evidence to date, there is very little hope of these Western goals being achieved in the future.
The first post-Soviet president, Boris Yeltsin, sought a radical break with communism and based his rule on the negation of his country’s — and his own — past, leaving Russia with a profound sense of negative identity. Vladimir Putin, upon assuming office, presented a more positive vision centered on integration with the West (albeit on Russian terms and predicated on retaining Russian independence), but it foundered in the face of irreconcilable differences between Russia and the West.
The state has since struggled to articulate a coherent conception of identity that would define Russia’s distinctiveness. Only World War II emerged as a potential unifier, with the majority of Russians expressing their pride in Russia’s role in it, and it acquired an almost religious reverence within the leadership’s narrative.
Apart from pride in the “Great Patriotic War” (as World War II is known in Russia), the overall public response to identity construction was for a long time lukewarm. When the war in Ukraine started, without any warning to the Russian public, it was initially met with disbelief, confusion, and bewilderment. Most were concerned with their chances to navigate the troubled waters rather than providing support for their country.
No longer. Nearly four years of war has profoundly transformed Russia. Fostered by state propaganda, many ordinary Russians have developed a sense of pride that Russia has survived in the face of Western hostility. This feeling has been fed by Western expressions of contempt toward the Russian people and Russian culture — insults that are assiduously quoted by the state-controlled Russian media. The Russian public struggles to see how the situation can be viewed from the other side and acknowledge that Western concerns may have grounds behind them; for example, the Kremlin’s attempts at meddling in the 2016 U.S. presidential elections better explain the negative attitudes toward Russia in Washington, rather than pre-existing cultural prejudices.
For some time now, patriotism has appeared to be ascendant: recruitment progresses steadily, men are willing to serve (admittedly in return for extremely high wages), and the “Help the Army” movement by women and pensioners shows no sign of abating. Speaking against the tide is considered socially unacceptable as well as dangerous.
Even though it was Russia that invaded Ukraine and that continues to attack the formerly ‘brotherly nation’, many in Russia view the war as defensive in nature and inevitable. A perception of external threat united much of the nation, and anti-Westernism became pervasive. Many Russians have become convinced that the West means Russia no good and, given an opportunity, would seek to inflict harm, unless it is strong enough to protect itself.
The state, which has a responsibility to protect, should be supported — paradoxically even when, as exemplified by the Kursk incursion, it has failed to do so. Accounts of civilians who were trapped for seven months under Ukrainian occupation brought the realities of war home to many Russians, while attacks on the Russian territory, which resulted, according to the official figures, in 621 civilian deaths, instilled a sense of insecurity in European Russia. Trump’s arrival marked a departure from hostility towards the U.S., but the prevailing attitude toward his peace initiatives is skepticism.
This new sense of national identity is not only rooted in the war. It also stems from economic dynamism. The Russian economy, the most heavily sanctioned globally, experienced sustained growth for three consecutive years. Despite inflation, there is a widespread mood of optimism about the future. The war has stimulated innovation. State and private manufacturers drive technological advancement, similar to what occurred during World War II when Katyusha rockets and T-34 tanks were created. While not all inventions may be groundbreaking, they are numerous and heavily publicized.
The Russian development model constitutes another key identity pillar. Large state obligations, public investment, affordable utilities, and low taxes are the customary norms that Russian citizens anticipate and that form the components of the social contract between them and the state. They believe that their counterparts in the West are disadvantaged in this regard.
The nation is also experiencing something of a cultural renaissance. While the public was initially shocked by the cancellation of Russian culture in the West in 2022, perceiving it as collective punishment, this has become the new normal. Consequently, attention has shifted toward domestic resources and the Russian public. Numerous new theaters, plays, music concerts, art galleries, and cultural venues have opened in major cities, catering to the growing demand for these offerings. Already, during the COVID-19 pandemic, Russians discovered their own country through travel, leading to a surge in domestic tourism, including previously inaccessible regions such as Dagestan and Chechnya.
At the start of the war, around 170 cultural figures fled Russia in protest, including Alla Pugacheva, the 76-year-old Russian diva, and Chulpan Khamatova, an actress, who starred in the internationally acclaimed “Good Bye, Lenin!” and the Russian TV series “Zuleikha Opens Her Eyes.” Out of all emigrés, perhaps these two had the widest acclaim as iconic faces of Russian popular culture. Pugacheva, moving between Israel, Cyprus, and Latvia, still commands interest among older-generation Russians due to her extravagant personality, but, as a performer, she lost prominence. Ironically, her ex-husband, Philipp Kirkorov, who stayed in Russia, became the country’s no.1 entertainer. Khamatova performs at a theater in Riga, Latvia, with the sole notable cinema role in which she is featured being a film about immigration. So far, the only cultural figure who has managed to achieve a successful career in the West is director Kirill Serebrennikov, while others have audiences chiefly among the Russian emigre circles.
Initially, the exodus of well-known figures disturbed educated Russians, but it also created space for others to move in, such as “Shaman” (Yaroslav Dronov), a prince of patriotic pop, or Yura Borisov, a leading character in the Oscar-winning “Anora” movie, who attracts offers from major international directors. Gradually, the plight of Russian figures abroad, facing alien cultural terrain and with no mass audiences or stable funding, started to generate derision back home. The thinking is that, if the Russians who left believed that their anti-war position would be rewarded by new careers in the West, they were mistaken.
Emphasis on Russian culture has become more pronounced, and not only because of the war. Russia, having rejected ‘woke’ ideology when it emerged onto the global stage, has presented itself as the ‘true,’ or traditional, 20th-century Europe. This appeals even to many liberal Russians, who aspired to join the Western civilization of the past, but not what it has become today. Even among Russians who strongly opposed the war, there is a feeling of satisfaction that Russia no longer has to defer to the West culturally.
Russia today is therefore a different country from the one that entered the war, with a greater sense of social cohesion and confidence in its own viability as a nation. In the long run, this may lead to profound changes in Russia’s identity. In the short term at least, it will sustain public willingness to continue the war.
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Top image credit: Pope Leo XIV prays in front of Nacimiento Gaudium, a nativity scene donated by Costa Rica, in which the Madonna is represented pregnant, at the Paul VI Hall in the Vatican. (Maria Grazia Picciarella / SOPA Images via Reuters)
Pope Leo's crack team of diplomats face war in Venezuela
December 24, 2025
Earlier this month, Venezuelan Cardinal Baltazar Porras was supposed to fly to Madrid to accept his appointment as the spiritual protector of the Order of St. Lazarus, an ancient Catholic organization. But his trip ended before it really began.
When Porras arrived at the airport in Caracas, Venezuelan authorities moved quickly to detain him and take away his travel documents. The cardinal sat through two hours of questioning before being forced to sign a form acknowledging that he was now banned from leaving Venezuela because he attempted to fly on a Vatican passport. Once the interrogation ended, officials simply dropped off the elderly religious leader at the baggage claim.
The incident came amid a snowballing crisis between the Venezuelan government and the Catholic Church. Years of economic mismanagement and foreign sanctions have left the regime of President Nicolas Maduro on the verge of collapse, and Maduro has responded with a tightening crackdown on any and all forms of dissent. Local Catholic leaders have become increasingly outspoken about these abuses, and many of the faithful are now prepared to do anything to put a stop to them — even if that means accepting a U.S. military intervention.
The situation has created a profound early challenge for Pope Leo XIV. The soft-spoken clergyman, known to few outside the Vatican prior to his election in May, is grappling with what it means to be the first ever American pope just as his home nation edges closer to open war with a majority Catholic country. So far, he has attempted to maintain a delicate balancing act, urging all parties to prioritize dialogue while avoiding any sharp critiques of the Trump administration or the Maduro regime. But this careful approach has done little to slow either Maduro’s crackdown on the church or the U.S. march toward conflict.
As the drumbeat of war grows louder, Leo may well face a consequential choice. Will he loudly condemn escalation, possibly endangering the church in Venezuela as well as his relationship with the U.S. government? Or will he maintain a relatively quiet posture — one that would better allow him to support mediation behind the scenes?
Whatever he decides could reverberate across the region, according to Massimo Faggioli, a prominent Catholic columnist and professor at Trinity College Dublin. “What happens in Venezuela could send a message to other countries where the Catholic church in Latin America is more and more under pressure by local strongmen,” Faggioli said, citing Nicaragua in particular. “If Venezuela turns [out] a certain way, that could send a different kind of message to the whole continent.”
An American pope, whether he likes it or not
It’s been a long time since the Holy See was the dominant force in Western politics. But even in the modern world, it pays to have the pope in your corner.
The Vatican may not have military or trade interests, but it retains a surprising degree of influence in international institutions, thanks in no small part to its crack corps of diplomat-priests, who receive extensive training in mediation and other useful diplomatic tactics. This skillset has helped the Holy See play a key role in deescalating conflicts, including the Cuban Missile Crisis and a civil war in South Sudan.
It doesn’t hurt that the pope retains a remarkable level of soft power, exemplified most clearly by the way in which global media still hangs on the pontiff’s every word. As Faggioli put it, “if you want to talk to the world, talking to the Vatican is a very good step.”
Leo has only begun to come to terms with the extraordinary role he now holds as a religious leader-cum-head of state. In many ways, he has followed the path of Pope Francis, urging the international community to fight the scourges of global poverty and war while offering to mediate conflicts like the war in Ukraine. Like Francis, who was Argentinian, Leo developed many of his views while serving as a clergyman in Latin America. But the similarities only go so far.
While Francis would often speak off the cuff about global affairs, Leo has leaned instead on carefully worded speeches crafted with the help of his diplomatic corps. While Francis excoriated NATO for “barking at the gates of Russia” prior to the war in Ukraine, Leo has focused his criticism on the Trump administration’s attempts to “break apart” the alliance between Europe and the U.S.
“My impression is that his view of the world is quite typical of a Catholic born in post-World War II America,” Faggioli said. Leo has a “pre-Trumpian” view of the West, he argued. “Not a neocon but very distant from Trumpism [and] also very distant from Francis' anti-Yankee and anti-North American, anti-NATO view.”
Pope Leo has tried to stay out of his home country’s politics. But differences of opinion with the Trump administration have complicated this approach. Just prior to his own election, Leo appeared to criticize JD Vance for his comments on Trump’s immigration policies in which the Vice President referenced a Catholic tenet of obligation derived from the writings of St. Augustine: “that you love your family and then you love your neighbor, and then you love your community, and then you love your fellow citizens, and then after that, prioritize the rest of the world.”
Leo responded by re-posting an article from a Catholic publication with the headline: “JD Vance is wrong: Jesus doesn’t ask us to rank our love for others.”
“He's a little bit more modest in his approach to things [than Francis was], unless it comes to something that's very close to the core of the gospel,” said Rev. David Hollenbach, a senior fellow at Georgetown University.
Despite these differences, Pope Leo could be a powerful partner for the United States, assuming that President Donald Trump is willing to work with him. The new pontiff has placed a particular emphasis on working through his professional diplomatic corps, which could provide invaluable support for Trump’s efforts to stop foreign wars (and avoid new ones, like in Venezuela).
“Now we see Pope Leo really putting some of the best people he has available in place,” said Mary Ellen O’Connell, an international law professor at Notre Dame University.
“There are so many conflicts that are in need of new talent for diplomatic solutions,” O’Connell told RS. “He can bring in people who can move [Ukraine talks] forward.”
A problem from hell
Like many Catholic problems, the crisis between Maduro and the church has played out through a debate over the saints. At an October event marking the canonization of two Venezuelan saints, Cardinal Porras lamented the state of affairs in Venezuela, citing in particular the “growth of poverty, militarization as a form of government to incite violence, corruption and lack of autonomy of public powers, and the disrespect of the people’s will.”
A few days later, back in Rome, Vatican Secretary of State Cardinal Pietro Parolin made unusually pointed remarks to a gathering that included a delegation of Venezuelan government officials in the front row. “Listen to the words of the Lord, who calls you to open unjust prisons, to break the chains of oppression, to set the oppressed free,” Parolin said. Tensions came to a head a few days later when the church suddenly cancelled a 50,000 person mass in Caracas meant to celebrate the new saints, out of fears that Maduro would turn the event into an impromptu rally for his embattled regime, according to The Pillar, a Catholic news site.
Parolin’s role highlights the careful balancing act that Pope Leo is hoping to maintain as the crisis in Venezuela deepens. Unlike Francis, Leo has collaborated closely with Parolin, who has extensive experience as a Vatican diplomat, including a stint as the Holy See’s ambassador in Venezuela. “The pope supports Parolin when Parolin says something because of course he knew that he was going to say that,” Faggioli said. “That gives more stability and more credibility. Being predictable in Vatican diplomacy is a great asset.”
As Venezuelan authorities have increased their pressure on the local church, Leo has been reluctant to take further actions, at least in public. “In secret, there's a lot going on, but in public that [pressure] limits your options,” Faggioli told RS.
This caution extends to Leo’s approach to Washington. While he has called for deescalation, he has done so infrequently and with little of the gusto that accompanied Pope Francis’ declarations on issues of war and peace. Victor Gaetan, the author of a recent book on Vatican diplomacy, said many see Leo’s comments as “rather modest and not sufficiently forceful” compared to the scale of the threat, and the possible repercussions of an invasion.
Leo has also yet to publicly offer up the Holy See as a mediator between America and Venezuela. But that doesn’t necessarily give an indication of what’s happening behind closed doors. The pope has a close relationship with the clergy in Venezuela, forged during his two decades working as a bishop in Peru. And he has a natural relationship with the U.S. given his American citizenship and popularity in the country. So he could be working to deescalate the situation and avoid war, as the church did in Panama in 1989, when it allowed President Manuel Noriega to briefly take refuge in its embassy in order to avoid further bloodshed.
All of the Vatican watchers who spoke with RS expect that Leo would sharpen his tone if the U.S. mounts a full-scale invasion. In the meantime, the American-Peruvian pontiff will have little choice but to encourage dialogue, both in and out of the public eye. The logic here is simple: The Vatican “believes that as long as you’re talking, you’re not shooting,” said Fr. Thomas Reese, a senior analyst at Religion News Service.
“The Vatican doesn’t have any magic answers for war and peace,” Reese said. “But what it does do is raise the moral issues and just beg people to try another way than war.” In other words, Pope Leo can provide an off-ramp — but only Trump and Maduro can decide whether to take it.
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Top photo credit: Tourists in China (Maysam Yabandeh/Creative Commons)
Taiwan shouldn't become the thorn we use to provoke China
December 24, 2025
Japan’s Prime Minister, Sanae Takaichi, caused an ongoing diplomatic row with China in November when she stated that a Chinese blockade of Taiwan would likely constitute a threat to Japan's survival and require the mobilization of the Japanese Self-Defense Force.
Her statement marked a departure from the position of previous Prime Ministers, who followed a policy of strategic ambiguity on the Taiwan issue, mirroring the longstanding position of the United States.
China responded predictably to the comments, hitting Japan economically, culturally, and militarily by stopping seafood imports, canceling Japanese film screenings and concerts mid-show, and deploying naval and air assets to the waters between Japan and Taiwan. Although the spat is still ongoing, the result is already clear: relations between the two countries have soured, and Taiwan is no better off than it was before the crisis, even if its citizens and supporters abroad feel temporarily vindicated by the PM’s rhetoric.
This incident bears a strong resemblance to August 2022, when then-speaker Nancy Pelosi and five other Democrats visited Taiwan, becoming the highest-ranking member of Congress to visit the island since Newt Gingrich in 1997. China condemned the visit, with Xi Jinping warning President Biden he was playing with fire. China also carried out live fire artillery exercises in response, and there were an unprecedented number of Chinese air force intrusions across the unofficial median line separating the two sides.
Some concluded the visit created a “new normal” in cross-strait relations in which such gray zone warfare is the rule rather than the exception.
Defenders of Pelosi’s visit and Takaichi’s statements adhere to a misguided belief that strong statements and actions in support of Taiwan deter aggression. Their beliefs ultimately rest on the view that, if it could, China would attack Taiwan tomorrow, and it is only their lack of relative military power and fear of U.S. intervention that prevents them from doing so. They cite China’s increasing naval and amphibious capabilities, increased military activity in the Taiwan Strait, and U.S. intelligence assessments that point to 2027 as a potential timeline as evidence of this impending action.
While it is undeniable that China’s capabilities have improved, it is wrong to attribute increased military activity to unilateral aggression and conclude the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has a firm timeline for action. Although it is true that, according to the Center for Strategic and International Studies’ Maritime Transparency initiative, Chinese ADIZ violations increased from 69 in September 2020 to 325 by June 2024, the month-by-month data reveal an ebb and flow. Intrusions peaked at 446 in August of 2022 following the Pelosi visit. They also shrunk to near-2020 levels in late 2023 during the lead-up to Taiwan’s January 2024 presidential election.
After the more independence-leaning Democratic Progressive Party won the election, intrusions ramped up almost immediately. This pattern suggests that aggressive actions in the Strait are reactive, not proactive.
The oft-cited 2027 target for invasion was dubbed the “Davidson Window” after Admiral Phil Davidson, who warned in congressional testimony that China was planning to invade Taiwan by that year. Since that hearing, Davidson’s comments have been clarified by numerous officials, including then-CIA Director William Burns, who downplayed the threat, saying the 2027 date is a readiness goal, not a deadline to act.
Meanwhile, at a high-level 2024 San Francisco meeting, one U.S. official reported that Xi himself grew exasperated at the frequent mentioning of 2027 as the target date for invasion, saying he had no knowledge of such plans.
It seems more likely that China does not want to use force to take Taiwan, but could feel compelled to do so in specific circumstances. China’s own statements on the topic of Taiwan have been remarkably consistent across the decades. China has issued three white papers on Taiwan since 1993. In each of them, they echo the same basic position: China prefers peaceful reunification but reserves the right to use force in response to perceived Taiwanese separatism or foreign interference.
Accordingly, U.S. actions and statements intended to deter China have the opposite effect, backing the Chinese government into a corner until it feels obligated to stop what it views as foreign interference.
Unfortunately, recent actions by the United States reinforce rather than dissuade the notion of likely American involvement. As Jake Werner, Director of the Quincy Institute’s East Asia Program, points out, the 2025 National Security Strategy (NSS) released in December seems to deepen, rather than walk back, U.S. commitments. Specifically, the NSS holds that Taiwan is a strategic location, implying a willingness to defend it, and that the solution to preventing conflict is a massive military buildup combined with pressuring allies to facilitate the expansion of U.S. posture in East Asia.
Actions such as these would add teeth to the provocative comments of policymakers and could be interpreted by Beijing as crossing a red line regarding foreign interference.
What should the United States do, then? For the last four decades, the U.S. has successfully had its cake and eaten it too, normalizing relations with China and preserving a free Taiwan by adhering to strategic ambiguity and avoiding firm commitments. Although not as exciting or emotionally rewarding as confronting the bully that is the CCP, it has been remarkably effective in preserving peace in the region for over 40 years, and departures from it seem to make the situation worse, not better.
The United States should continue this time-tested path, making clear to China that any attempt to unilaterally change the situation will result in severe economic consequences at the very least. Toward Taiwan, the U.S. should make clear that it is not its benefactor, will not support it in its independence efforts, and that it needs to start taking its own defense more seriously. The United States should make future arms sales contingent upon Taiwan's implementation of necessary military reforms and an increase in its defense spending.
After this, the United States could resume sales, focusing on cheap, expendable platforms that enhance asymmetric capabilities and avoiding large, expensive legacy platforms.
Having spent significant time in Taiwan, including the frontline island of Kinmen, I deeply desire to see Taiwan remain a free, independent country in practice, if not in name. I admittedly see the appeal of and feel vindicated by statements of support. And yet, there is a difference between feeling safe and being safe. Categorical statements of support for Taiwan from world leaders in recent years have made Taiwan less, not more secure.
If we continue down this path, we will bring about the very outcome we seek to avoid. For all its recent criticism, strategic ambiguity has kept peace in the region for 40 years, and reflects a smart, pragmatic foreign policy that places mutual benefit and peaceful coexistence over ideological grandstanding and Cold War mindsets. If we want to preserve the delicate peace in the region, we must return to this and resist the temptation of empty platitudes, political stunts, and commitments that we cannot back up.keep readingShow less
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