Biden's Middle East trip: Following in Trump's footsteps
WATCH: Biden looks poised to betray his campaign promise to sideline Saudi Arabia. Does this really serve America's interests?
Responsible Statecraft
Responsible Statecraft is a publication of analysis, opinion, and news that seeks to promote a positive vision of U.S. foreign policy based on humility, diplomatic engagement, and military restraint. RS also critiques the ideas — and the ideologies and interests behind them — that have mired the United States in counterproductive and endless wars and made the world less secure.
Top image credit: President Donald Trump participates in a coffee ceremony with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman Al Saud at the Royal Court Palace in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, Tuesday, May 13, 2025. (Official White House Photo by Daniel Torok)
Trump courts Saudi at the risk of US, Middle East security
November 17, 2025
As Washington prepares for a visit this week to the White House by Saudi Arabia’s de facto leader, Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman (MBS), reports indicate that it could be the occasion for the announcement of a U.S.-Saudi security pact, along the lines of a recent security commitment announced by President Trump for Saudi Arabia’s one-time regional rival, Qatar.
The Qatar agreement commits the United States to take “all lawful and appropriate measures — including diplomatic, economic, and, if necessary, military — to defend the interests of the United States and of the State of Qatar and to restore peace and stability.”
Although this kind of deal would not be the Senate-confirmed legally binding treaty that MBS had previously wanted, if extended to Saudi Arabia, it would still be a uniquely bad idea. Given MBS’s history of reckless behavior — for example violations of the laws of war and systematic human rights abuses — a pact committing Washington to come to Riyadh’s defense would be bad for U.S. interests, regional security, and the people of Saudi Arabia.
From his leadership of Saudi Arabia’s brutal intervention in Yemen, which left nearly 400,000 people dead through direct and indirect means, to his kidnapping of the prime minister of Lebanon, his years-long blockade of Qatar, and his directing the murder of U.S.-resident and Washington Post columnist Jamal Khashoggi, MBS has been a force for instability and rights abuses, and will not be a reliable partner.
Although Saudi Arabia is not currently engaged in an active conflict outside of its borders, thanks in large part to U.S. pressure, that may be temporary. In fact, providing such a security guarantee risks emboldening MBS to resume his foreign policy recklessness, just as former President Biden’s visit to Saudi Arabia in 2022 emboldened MBS’s resurgent domestic repression.
Following Biden’s visit, MBS’s regime went on an unprecedented campaign of handing down decades-long sentences to Saudis merely for expressing their views, including a woman who was sentenced to 45-years in prison and a subsequent 45-year travel ban.
Saudi security forces have also carried out mass killings of migrants at its southern border. And for the second straight year, the Saudi government has executed more than 300 people and is on pace to break the record number of executions it set last year. These include journalist Turki al-Jasser, two individuals convicted of crimes committed when they were children, nearly half convicted of non-violent drug offenses, and 56% who are foreigners.
In his first term, Donald Trump chose to make his first official visit to Saudi Arabia, where he announced an enormous $110 billion arms sales package. The size of the deal was inflated for publicity purposes, but it served its purpose, allowing Trump to tout his skills as a master deal maker. Similarly, his first trip abroad in his second term was to Saudi Arabia, and the administration claimed to secure $600 billion in investment commitments from the Kingdom, including $142 billion in undisclosed arms sales. Recent reporting indicates that the F-35 combat aircraft may be a part of this deal. So far F-35s have not been sold to any country in the region other than Israel.
Trump protected MBS for his role in Khashoggi’s murder during his first term, including refusing to release a congressionally mandated intelligence report assessing the crown prince’s responsibility, stating that he didn’t want to lose business for “our great defense contractors.” This narrow definition of U.S. interests is precisely the kind of logic that has tied the United States to repressive regimes that entangle Washington in unnecessary wars.
The economic ties between Trump’s family and the Saudi regime raise even more questions about Trump’s potential decision to extend a security pact to Saudi Arabia. The crown prince’s sovereign wealth fund provided $2 billion for Trump son-in-law Jared Kushner’s investment firm at the end of the first term, over the objections of the fund’s board members. And other deals are in the works, including possibly a Trump Tower and a golf course in Saudi Arabia, LIV Golf tournaments at Trump properties, and a partnership for the largest buyout ever of EA Sports for $55 billion.
Instead of tying the United States to the fate of the current Saudi government, President Trump should press MBS to release all political prisoners and make the necessary rights reforms that help Americans, including reuniting American families with their loved ones wrongfully detained in Saudi Arabia, such as Saad Almadi, Abdulrahman al-Sadhan, Salman al-Odah, and Sarah and Omar al-Jabri.
The last thing the United States needs is another commitment that could lead to the U.S. being dragged into yet another war in the Middle East. Doing business with Saudi Arabia is one thing. Committing to defend it is another. It’s time for Congress to speak out against a possible new security pact with Saudi Arabia, and to scrutinize any proposed arms sales to Riyadh.
Uncritically continuing to uplift MBS will only embolden the crown prince’s recklessness and repression and risk perpetuating conflict in the region instead of bringing the peace Trump claims to want. It’s the wrong deal at the wrong time.
keep readingShow less
Top photo credit: Donald Trump (White House photo) and Vladimir Putin (Office of the Russian Federation President)
US-Russia talks
A Trump offer that Putin cannot refuse
November 17, 2025
Along Ukraine’s eastern frontline, the question is not if Russia will gain full control of Pokrovsk, a key location on Ukraine’s “fortress belt,” but when.
The city’s collapse will be a strategic loss for Ukraine and a tactical win for Russia, but it won’t bring an end to the war closer. This is because none of the key stakeholders is ready to stop fighting. Worse, the coming months could be the war’s most dangerous, with desperation creeping into Kyiv’s upper ranks and nuclear saber-rattling from the United States and Russia on the rise.
For the Trump administration, this is bad news. The slim window of opportunity it had for simply walking away from Ukraine, no strings attached, has closed and now bilateral diplomacy with Russia is stalled. Though President Donald Trump insists that this is still “Biden’s war,” almost a year into his term, he will certainly own the consequences of the conflict’s eventual end — good or bad.
Washington will need a new strategy, however, if it hopes to salvage its efforts to achieve peace. The starting point for this new strategy must be an acceptance that there is no amount of pressure that will drive Russian President Vladimir Putin to stop the war before he has minimally achieved his objectives. Instead, President Trump’s best shot at reaching a deal would leverage his strongest card: the fact that Putin needs U.S. involvement to achieve his political objectives and cares so much more about the details of a settlement than the U.S. president.
In many ways, the battle for Pokrovsk has become a microcosm of the war itself and the difficulty of resolving the nearly four-year old conflict. Despite the fighting’s toll, neither side seems prepared to lay down its weapons, but their reasons could not be more different.
Moscow’s unwillingness to back down is a sign of resolve and a reminder that Russia is largely impervious to Western-imposed and battlefield costs. Believing that he has the military advantage, Putin has responded to Trump’s calls for peace with escalation, pressing forward where Ukraine’s defenses appear on the verge of collapse. The losses from this strategy are high but sustainable and acceptable given the stakes of the war’s outcome for Putin and his regime.
On the other hand Kyiv’s stubbornness is a sign of weakness, not strength. Ukraine’s leaders recognize that the country needs a ceasefire, but fear what comes after accepting it.
In the eyes of many Ukrainians, any peace deal achieved with Russia now will be temporary. Rightly or wrongly, they believe that Putin will not be satisfied until Russia controls all of Ukraine. Today’s choice is not, therefore, between peace and more war, but between fighting Russia now and fighting Russia later. Facing this dilemma, Kyiv has chosen a slow battlefield loss over a quick capitulation. This is an understandable but dangerous strategy, however, that places the country’s survival on a knife edge.
Moscow and Kyiv are not the only ones willing to let the war drag on. Across Europe, there is little appetite for a rapid end to the conflict in Ukraine despite performative calls for an unconditional ceasefire. Europe’s entreaties to keep Ukraine in the fight may be cloaked in the language of justice and fairness, but they are driven just as much by pragmatism as they are by values.
First, a longer war buys Europe time for its own military build-up. As long as Russia is fighting in Ukraine, its ability to threaten NATO territory is limited. But after the war ends, many in Europe believe Russia will reconstitute its military and turn its attentions further west. Second, Europe’s leaders know that once weapons in Ukraine fall silent, they will have to figure out how to make good on their post-war promises to fund Ukraine’s reconstruction and institutionalize its ties to Europe.
In Washington, Trump genuinely wants to “stop the killing.” But there is little urgency within his administration to work vigorously toward this end. Having offloaded most of the costs and the responsibility for arming Ukraine on to Europe, the Trump administration has cauterized the war as a political and financial concern and seems largely content to wait. Sometimes “you have to let them fight,” Trump said recently.
This “wait and see” strategy has its downsides. Two nightmare scenarios are possible: Ukraine’s collapse, or escalation that pulls the United States deeper into the war.
It is hard to predict how much longer Ukraine’s military forces can hang on. It could be months or a year, or it could be a matter of weeks. If Ukraine’s defenses do crumble, Washington will have to choose between three bad options: increasing support and therefore costs to the United States, walking away and letting Kyiv fall, or forcing Ukraine into an unfavorable deal.
The chance for precipitous escalation also cannot be written off. Kyiv’s only real theory of victory at this point is to widen the conflict, by dragging in at least parts of Europe and preferably all of NATO into the fighting. As Kyiv grows more desperate and Moscow more brazen, the risks of this entanglement could rise, either due to intentional actions of one of the parties or unintentional miscalculations.
Trump has good reasons to be fed up with failed efforts in Ukraine. But this would be the worst possible time for him to disengage. That said, to jumpstart diplomatic progress a new strategy is needed, one that uses carrots not sticks to change Putin’s calculus.
President Trump’s strongest point of leverage is that he cares much less about the actual terms of an armistice than does his Russian counterpart. For Trump, any outcome that stops the fighting is sufficient. Putin, on the other hand, cares very much about the details and needs U.S. involvement to end the war on favorable terms. Russia can certainly achieve its military goals without U.S. participation, for example by seizing the rest of the Donbas by force. But without U.S. engagement, Putin’s political and economic objectives will remain out of reach, including things like a firm commitment that the NATO alliance will not expand farther eastward and promises of sanctions relief for the Russian economy.
The Trump administration should take advantage of this imbalance, indicating to Moscow that it is willing to negotiate on the bigger political and economic issues of most interest to Putin now, but that this willingness is time limited and waning. Washington should make clear that after some expiration date, it would still help mediate a limited settlement between the two combatants (after the war has run its course), but big political or economic bargains would no longer be on the table and the chance for a comprehensive revision to Europe’s future security architecture would be past.
Confronted with these options, Putin would be forced to tradeoff between his stated goals: the territorial gains of continued war and the political, economic, and status wins that a deal with Washington might bring. He might decide to keep fighting, but he might not. This is at least a proposition worth testing. And if he did persist with this war, he would have to do so with the knowledge that more time on the battlefield might well cost him resolution of his “root causes” and limit the sweetness of any victory.
For the United States, this strategy has a high upside and low risks. It would not commit Washington to specific concessions and would not elevate tensions with Russia. The United States would continue to support Ukraine, but signal to Brussels and Kyiv that it is not interested in expanding or escalating its involvement. Most importantly, by making the final implementation of any bilateral U.S.-Russia political or economic deals conditional on resolution of Ukraine-specific issues, this approach could incentivize real progress toward ending the war.
On both sides of the Atlantic, calls for “more pressure on Moscow” continue. This has been and will continue to be a losing strategy. Trump should dare to try something different.
keep readingShow less
Top image credit: 02.07.2025, Tallinn. Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa'ar met his Estonian counterpart Margus Tsahkna (Eesti 200) in Tallinn. Photo: Martin Pedaja/Postimee via REUTERS CONNECT
Baltics' big bear hug of Israel is a strategic blunder
November 14, 2025
As the European Union struggles to agree on a coherent response to Israel’s war on Gaza, Estonia’s and Latvia’s foreign ministers recently warmly welcomed their Israeli counterpart, Gideon Sa’ar.
This diplomatic embrace, occurring as Israel stands accused before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and International Criminal Court (ICC) of crimes against humanity and plausible acts of genocide, reveals a profound and damaging hypocrisy. It is also a strategic blunder.
Estonian Foreign Minister Margus Tsahkna this week welcomed Sa’ar to open the Israeli Embassy in Tallinn. During the ceremony, Tsahkna and his Latvian counterpart Baiba Braze reaffirmed Israel’s “right to self-defense” and condemned “Iran’s destabilizing role.” This is the second visit by Israel’s foreign minister to the region in the last few months: Sa'ar's first destination after the "12 day war" with Iran was to the Baltic trio of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, where his narrative of the conflict received a sympathetic hearing.
But the contradiction in these Baltic states’ posturing is staggering. Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia have built their entire post-Soviet foreign policy and identity on an uncompromising stance toward Russia. Their historical trauma from the Soviet occupation was only reinforced by the Russian invasion and ongoing war in Ukraine.
Understandably, the Baltic states were at the vanguard of a resolute response to the 2022 Russian invasion — lobbying for international sanctions, shunning diplomacy with Moscow, and even advocating for measures implying a collective responsibility of Russian citizens for the crimes committed by the country’s leadership. For example, EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs Kaja Kallas, the former prime minister of Estonia, pushed for blanket visa restrictions on all Russians. While Baltic state officials cite security concerns as their justification, Russian dissidents criticized the measure as counterproductive and playing right into the hands of the Kremlin.
Yet, when it comes to Israel, these same principles evaporated. A diplomatic red carpet is rolled out for the top diplomat of a state whose military campaign has killed more than 69,000 Palestinians, according to Gaza health authorities, displaced vast numbers of the inhabitants, and brought famine to the beleaguered enclave. The ICJ has ordered Israel to take measures to prevent acts of genocide and allow humanitarian aid. The ICC has indicted Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu for war crimes — alongside Russian President Vladimir Putin.
Israel has also violated U.S. President Trump’s ceasefire by killing hundreds of Palestinians and conducting more 124 bombardments after it supposedly entered into force (as of Nov. 11).
The rulings of the international courts and Israeli violations of the ceasefire should, at the very least, give any nation claiming to champion a “rules-based order” serious pause. Instead, the Baltics offer full normalization and support.
This selective application of international norms does not go unnoticed. It is seen clearly in Madrid, Dublin, Ljubljana, Brussels, and even Paris, where leaders have publicly criticized Israel’s conduct. The governments of Spain and Ireland, in particular, have been vocal in demanding that the EU hold Israel accountable, framing it as a fundamental test of the bloc’s values.
When Baltic diplomats then lecture these same partners on the existential need for unwavering solidarity with Ukraine, their words increasingly ring hollow. How can they demand absolute, value-driven support for one victim of aggression while actively legitimizing a government accused of gross violations in another?
This hypocrisy is not just a moral failure; it is also a profound strategic miscalculation. While it’s true that some EU countries, like Hungary, the Czech Republic and Austria, are even more explicitly pro-Israel, none of them is as vulnerable as the Baltics. As small countries at Russia’s doorstep, Baltic security depends almost entirely on EU-NATO cohesion. With doubts growing about Washington’s long-term commitment to European security, the reliance on European solidarity is more vital than ever.
Alienating key EU member states by dismissing their views on Gaza is therefore strategically myopic. It provides ammunition to those in Western Europe who are growing increasingly frustrated by what they see as unhelpful sanctimony expressed by figures like Kallas and other Baltic leaders. The Baltics should actively avoid creating an impression that they champion a “rules-based order” only when it suits their immediate geopolitical interests — and yet they appear to be doing exactly the opposite.
This strategic error is compounded by a fatal misreading of Israel’s own calculus. The Baltics are courting a country whose interests are vested infinitely more in its relationship with Russia than in them. Indeed, Israel’s primary concern is not to help Ukraine, but to deter Iran. That includes preventing Tehran from rearming and, notably, rebuilding its air defenses after the June war with Israel.
Russia has capabilities it can offer to Iran to bolster its defenses. In fact, its deputy foreign minister, Sergey Ryabkov, said that since Moscow does not recognize the snapback of the U.N. Security Council sanctions against Iran, triggered by the European powers, it is looking forward to expanding its military-technical cooperation with Tehran.
While the true extent of such cooperation remains to be seen, the mere possibility is a source of deep anxiety to Israel. Therefore, Jerusalem has consistently — and remarkably successfully — sought pragmatic, cordial relations with Moscow in order to minimize the latter’s support for Tehran. The dynamic is extensively described in former Mossad chief Yossi Cohen’s memoir, in which he glowingly describes Putin as a strategic mastermind open to understanding Israel’s concerns.
For Israel, limiting Russia’s support for Iran will always be immensely more consequential than whatever marginal gains it could accrue from cultivating the Baltic states. It is a failure of Baltic diplomacy not to recognize this obvious hierarchy of interests. Tallinn and Riga are investing diplomatic capital in an actor whose own strategic necessities align it with their primary adversary — all while risking alienating partners in the EU and NATO and undermining their own moral high ground.
To be a credible champion for Ukraine, one must be a consistent champion for international law. There is no other way. If the Baltics continue down this path of selective morality and legality, they risk fracturing the very unity that constitutes their first and most important line of defense. The embrace of Israel today could pave the way for a much colder reception in the councils of Europe tomorrow — precisely when they can least afford it.
This won’t happen overnight, as credibility can erode over time, especially when it is being needlessly undermined. International law is not a menu; you cannot stand for the main course in Ukraine while treating Gaza as a dispensable side dish. And much less so when the strategic benefits of doing so are highly dubious.
keep readingShow less
Want more of our stories on Google?
Click here to make us a Preferred Source.
Click here to make us a Preferred Source.
Newsletter
Subscribe now to our weekly round-up and don't miss a beat with your favorite RS contributors and reporters, as well as staff analysis, opinion, and news promoting a positive, non-partisan vision of U.S. foreign policy.