
Biden's Middle East trip: Following in Trump's footsteps
WATCH: Biden looks poised to betray his campaign promise to sideline Saudi Arabia. Does this really serve America's interests?

Responsible Statecraft
Responsible Statecraft is a publication of analysis, opinion, and news that seeks to promote a positive vision of U.S. foreign policy based on humility, diplomatic engagement, and military restraint. RS also critiques the ideas — and the ideologies and interests behind them — that have mired the United States in counterproductive and endless wars and made the world less secure.
Top photo credit: May 21, 2023, Hiroshima, Hiroshima, Japan: (From R to L) Comoros' President Azali Assoumani, World Trade Organization (WTO) Director-General Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, Australia's Prime Minister Anthony Albanese and India's Prime Minister Narendra Modi at the G7 summit in Hiroshima, Japan. (Credit Image: © POOL via ZUMA Press Wire)
Middle Powers are setting the table so they won't be 'on the menu'
February 12, 2026
The global order was already fragmenting before Donald Trump returned to the White House. But the upended “rules” of global economic and foreign policies have now reached a point of no return.
What has changed is not direction, but speed. Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney’s remarks in Davos last month — “Middle powers must act together, because if we’re not at the table, we’re on the menu” — captured the consequences of not acting quickly. And Carney is not alone in those fears.
Leaders around the world are increasingly moving from rhetorical warnings about the systemic risks of superpower dynamics to actively experimenting with new ways of navigating what Carney called “a rupture in the world order.”
One such strategy is “workarounding,” a deliberate use of flexible, issue-specific cooperation among middle powers to create strategic space outside rigid U.S.-China alignments. This approach has gained traction over the past decade as great power competition intensified. It is now expanding as Washington’s policies inject further uncertainty into the global system.

This shift in practice offers several advantages for middle powers. Small, adaptive constellations, often cross-regional, can bypass growing volatility at the global level by excluding superpowers from cooperation. They preserve room for maneuver by diversifying partnerships. And they create space to shape outcomes on issues that matter for middle powers.
Unsurprisingly, examples of workarounding abound.
Forecasting a “messy” decade of transition, Singapore’s Prime Minister Lawrence Wong warned in October 2025 that U.S. policies were undermining global trade and common interests. Rather than relying on existing institutions, he called for building new trade connections and closer cooperation with like-minded partners. Countering unilateral tariffs, Wong argued, could not be done alone.
These ideas were quickly translated into action. Middle powers Singapore and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) joined together with 12 small states to roll out an adaptive, non-traditional project promoting open trade. Dubbed the Future of Investment and Trade Partnership (FITP), it includes Brunei, Chile, Costa Rica, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Morocco, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Rwanda, Switzerland, and Uruguay. Its purpose is not to replace existing institutions, but to amplify the collective influence of its members through pragmatic coordination.
FITP-like arrangements and other agile platforms enable members to collaborate across selected trade and investment issues. Other workarounding tactics include strengthening supply chains, removing non-tariff trade barriers, facilitating investment and establishing rules around emerging technologies. These tactics are flexible, non-binding, and deliberately modular, making them attractive to middle powers adapting to an increasingly volatile environment.
One notable result of this experimentation is that middle powers are shifting from regional to cross-regional constellations, ranging from the Indo-Pacific to the Middle East, to Europe and beyond. This trend extends beyond trade. For example, the Digital Economy Partnership Agreement (DEPA) includes issues of technological interoperability and AI governance alongside digital trade rules.
Established in 2020 by Singapore, Chile, and New Zealand, DEPA’s appeal as a flexible alternative to traditional trade regimes is evident in the rapid expansion of its membership. South Korea joined in 2024, and Canada, Costa Rica, Peru, the UAE, El Salvador, and Ukraine have also formally applied.
Beyond preserving strategic space, workarounding enables middle powers to exert influence. In Latin America, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Bolivia are exploring coordination in lithium production to avoid being squeezed by dominant buyers such as the United States and China. Described as a potential “OPEC for lithium,” such cooperation symbolizes middle power efforts to translate resource endowments into collective leverage amid the global energy transition and technological competition.
Similar dynamics may soon emerge in Africa as competition over critical minerals intensifies.
Clearly, workarounding is becoming a core element of pragmatic statecraft among small states and middle powers. But this is true for larger middle powers as well. After facing a series of setbacks in 2025, including a sharp tariff hike imposed by the United States, India intensified efforts to diversify its trade relationships.
Expanding negotiations beyond traditional partners, New Delhi renewed its engagement with the Eurasian Economic Union, is pushing for a speedy deal with the Southern African Customs Union, and concluded a long-delayed trade agreement with the European Union in February 2026. This immediately accelerated the India-US trade deal that had been in a limbo for months. New agreements on trade, semiconductors, critical minerals and defense signed during German Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s recent state visit to India reinforce the capacity for workarounding to move the needle on some of the most turbulent geopolitical issues.
Taken together, these developments point to an evolving landscape of middle power statecraft that blends competition and cooperation. A Goldman Sachs report highlights the growing influence of geopolitical “swing states,” suggesting their ability to navigate superpower competition could help stabilize an increasingly fragmented order.
Another concept gaining traction is the “Fourth Pole.” This argument suggests that, alongside the United States, the European Union and China, there is room for a fourth pole comprising India, the Gulf States and other players across Asia, Africa, Southeast Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean. Linked by networks rather than formal alliances, these states could act as force multipliers, facilitating innovation, norm-setting, and strategic autonomy for themselves in a changing world.
In this sense, workarounding practices are living laboratories for new forms of statecraft, industrial policies and economic and science diplomacy. They expand the geographical reach of cooperation, connect public and private actors across regions, and embody the speed at which states are adapting to shifting political and security realities
Canadian Prime Minister Carney’s Davos statement, “We are in the midst of a rupture, not a transition,” demonstrates middle powers’ mindset has already shifted. For Washington, the implication is clear: it remains a central power, but no longer sets the agenda alone. How it engages with these middle power networks will shape whether workarounding complements U.S. strategy or bypasses it.
If ignored, workarounding may evolve in ways that gradually dilute American influence in the very systems it once anchored. Despite Trump’s bluster and hemispheric pretensions, cooperation between and among middle powers is a growing force to be reckoned with.
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U.S. Vice President JD Vance gets out of a car before boarding Air Force Two upon departure for Azerbaijan, at Zvartnots International Airport in Yerevan, Armenia, February 10, 2026. REUTERS/Kevin Lamarque/Pool
VP Vance’s timely TRIPP to the South Caucasus
February 11, 2026
Vice President JD Vance’s regional tour to Armenia and Azerbaijan this week — the highest level visit by an American official to the South Caucasus since Vice President Joe Biden went to Georgia in 2009 — demonstrates that Washington is not ignoring Yerevan and Baku and is taking an active role in their normalization process.
Vance’s stop in Armenia included an announcement that Yerevan has procured $11 million in U.S. defense systems — a first — in particular Shield AI’s V-BAT, an ISR unmanned aircraft system. It was also announced that the second stage of a groundbreaking AI supercomputer project led by Firebird, a U.S.-based AI cloud and infrastructure company, would commence after having secured American licensing for the sale and delivery of an additional 41,000 NVIDIA GB300 graphics processing units.
In addition, the Vice President and Armenia’s Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan signed a joint statement on the completion of negotiations on a 123 Agreement, which establishes a legally binding framework for peaceful nuclear cooperation between the U.S. and partner countries. The U.S. has emerged as a leading contender to replace Armenia’s aging Soviet-era nuclear power plant with small modular reactors, and this agreement helps pave the way to a decision in Washington’s favor. According to Vance, potential deals may include “up to $5 billion” in an initial agreement “plus an additional $4 billion in long-term support through fuel and maintenance contracts.”
While in Azerbaijan, Vance and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev signed a Strategic Partnership Charter between the U.S. and Azerbaijan that covers regional connectivity, economic investment, and security and defense issues. In his public remarks, the Vice President noted that the U.S. is planning to “ship some new boats to Azerbaijan” to help with the protection of territorial waters.
Vance’s visit comes some six months after President Donald Trump hosted Pashinyan and Aliyev at the White House for a historic summit last August. The results of that gathering included American MOUs (Memorandum of Understanding) with each visiting delegation and the Armenian and Azerbaijani foreign ministers initialing the already agreed text of their peace and normalization agreement.
In Washington last month, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan released a joint statement on the TRIPP (Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity) Implementation Framework, which begins to lay out the technical and regulatory components of the trade corridor which would connect Azerbaijan to Turkey through southern Armenia.
The Framework outlines a 49-year initial term for the joint development company, which will construct the transit, trade, energy and communications infrastructure for the new corridor. The U.S. will retain a 74% controlling stake and Armenia will hold the remaining 26%. A recent visit to Armenia by AECOM, an American engineering consulting firm, focused on beginning a feasibility study of the TRIPP project “to support Armenia’s long-term economic growth, connectivity, and regional integration,” according to the U.S. Embassy in Yerevan.
Since its announcement last August, the project has reinvigorated Washington’s engagements with and interests in the region. Those conversations continued during Vance’s visit to the region this week.
From Washington’s perspective, TRIPP fits into a broader strategic vision of an interconnected South Caucasus that can act as an American sponsored strategic artery linking Central Asia to Turkey and Europe—which is likely to prove an important corridor for critical trade and energy flows across Eurasia while avoiding Russian and Iranian territory.
The agreements have already brought some dividends to the region. Since last August’s meeting delivered Trump’s personal imprint onto the peace process, the likelihood of renewed war, or even violent flare ups, between Armenia and Azerbaijan has declined. Both Yerevan and Baku recognize that their countries are likely to reap significant economic and political benefit from the TRIPP project—not to mention that upsetting Washington would prove strategically unwise.
Recent shipments from Azerbaijan to Armenia via Georgia, while mostly symbolic, represents a modest breakthrough that may lead to greater dividends down the road if direct and reciprocal access to each other’s infrastructure networks is allowed. The re-opening of Armenia’s border with Turkey, closed since 1993, would also represent an important step in the direction of expanding regional interconnectedness.
For over 30 years the South Caucasus has largely been a region in name only, lacking the type of integration that could drive prosperity and help mitigate insecurity. Reincorporating Georgia, once the standard bearer of American engagement in the South Caucasus, into the budding regional economic architecture will be crucial to its long-term success. The recent Georgian delegation visit to Washington offers an encouraging signal that Tbilisi and Washington may reestablish pragmatic working relations. Last year’s trilateral meeting in Georgia’s capital Tbilisi between Deputy Foreign Ministers from Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia was a positive development—and one that ought to be continued at the level of Foreign Ministers.
On the whole, while favorable conditions had been set before returning to office in January 2025, the Trump Administration ultimately succeeded where previous administrations had failed. Transforming those earlier successes into a long-term and stable U.S. policy in the South Caucasus will be equally as important. No less crucial will be ensuring that America’s involvement in this sensitive region does not lead to further destabilization.
There will undoubtedly be numerous external pitfalls along the way that must be delicately managed, most notably Russian and Iranian interests in the South Caucasus and concerns with the TRIPP project in particular.
In contrast to some fears that Washington is preparing to “grant” Russia a sphere of influence across the former Soviet Union, the U.S. appears instead to be demonstrating that it will respect the security red lines of the other great powers without abandoning America’s economic and political interests. Indeed, as one Russian columnist wrote “There is disappointment, annoyance, and a feeling of helplessness [in Moscow]. Because it is precisely in this region…that Russia’s position has noticeably sunk in recent years.”
For the U.S., this is indeed a fine line to walk, and its success will depend on prudent statesmanship that has been largely unfamiliar to the post-Cold War generation of America’s political elites. Vance’s trip to Armenia and Azerbaijan sends a strong signal that the U.S. attaches a newfound importance to the South Caucasus and the wider region, one that may endure for years to come.keep readingShow less
Monitors at the United Nations General Assembly hall display the results of a vote on a resolution condemning the annexation of parts of Ukraine by Russia, amid Russia's invasion of Ukraine, at the United Nations Headquarters in New York City, New York, U.S., October 12, 2022. REUTERS/David 'Dee' Delgado||
We're burying the rules based order. But what's next?
February 11, 2026
In a Davos speech widely praised for its intellectual rigor and willingness to confront established truths, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney finally laid the fiction of the “rules-based international order” to rest.
The “rules-based order” — or RBIO — was never a neutral description of the post-World War II system of international law and multilateral institutions. Rather, it was a discourse born out of insecurity over the West’s decline and unwillingness to share power. Aimed at preserving the power structures of the past by shaping the norms and standards of the future, the RBIO was invariably something that needed to be “defended” against those who were accused of opposing it, rather than an inclusive system that governed relations between all states.
Burying the false RBIO narrative is an important first step. It can temper the trend toward bloc formation and de-emphasize the counterproductive “democracies vs. autocracies” discourse of recent years — something that was never an accurate description of the emerging global political landscape to begin with. But this only provides a short-term fix. Discarding the RBIO should not be used as an excuse for gradually moving away from the law-centered multilateral system for which there is no comprehensive replacement.
As great power rivalry has deepened over the past decade, international law and global cooperation have suffered. If Carney’s speech serves to build momentum for a middle-power coalition dedicated to renewing and reforming multilateralism, then this would be extremely welcome. But if the purpose of this coalition is merely to pool resources to better survive an uncertain world, then we will not have fundamentally deviated from the current path toward the law of the jungle.
Carney’s remarks provide some cause for optimism. He called for Western states to act consistently by applying “the same standards to allies and rivals.” This may signal a renewed commitment to upholding international law, assuaging fears that retiring the RBIO discourse will not serve as an excuse to pursue cynical pragmatism. Carney also argued against building a “world of fortresses” and committed to pursuing forms of international cooperation that include “the vast majority of nations.”
The “fundamental values” that Carney outlined are relatively minimalistic: respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the basic principles concerning the use of force found in the UN Charter. That said, he also gave a nod to human rights and sustainable development, suggesting that the “variable geometry” — or “different coalitions for different issues” — that he called for will not be an excuse to pursue an international order based on mere coexistence rather than shared goals.
Given how often norms surrounding the use of force have been violated since the end of the Cold War, recommitting to respecting them in word and in deed is no small matter. Moreover, after many decades in which Western countries reserved for themselves the right to set the terms of international engagement and even the very standard of civilization, variable geometry can serve as a stabilizing force. In place of lecturing others through megaphone diplomacy, forging ad hoc partnerships with not always likeminded states is the new name of the game.
However, one issue that did not feature in Carney’s remarks was multilateral reform. The prime minister asserted that his vision was not “naive multilateralism” and would not rely on “diminished institutions.” But while multilateralism may have been associated with utopia building in the post-Cold War era, for many states today it is a form of realpolitik, providing the platform and protection necessary for them to secure their sovereignty and develop their societies.
Carney’s prescriptions rest on his assertion that “we are in the midst of a rupture, not a transition.” But this is only true if we believe that Western hegemony was synonymous with the postwar international order, which it never fully was.
The Soviet Union and China were among the founding powers of the United Nations. Efforts from Third World countries were responsible for the codification of norms such as human rights and self-determination. Yes, the postwar order has gone through several phases — from confrontation to détente to globalization. But the core institutional architecture of the order, centered on the United Nations, has remained in place, even if powerful actors have sometimes preferred to work around it.
As the “Alliance for Multilateralism” during Donald Trump’s first term demonstrated, rhetorical support for global cooperation cannot, on its own, arrest the trend toward international disorder. If multilateral bodies are not reformed to become more inclusive and effective — if they do not come to resemble the world of the future rather than the world of 1945 — then their legitimacy will decline and their relevance will fade away. And contrary to conventional wisdom, with sufficient creativity and political will, rendering the UN fit for the purpose of ensuring peace and security is in fact possible.
States often shy away from the topic of multilateral reform given the difficult political compromises that are inevitably involved. Reforming critical fora such as the UN Security Council — the premier body tasked with upholding international peace and security — is often viewed as a fool’s errand given the veto power that the P5 countries can exercise over any changes to the UN Charter.
But great power rivalry may actually make multilateral reform more rather than less likely, granted that middle powers form a coalition along the lines called for by Carney. In competition with one another for influence in the Global South, the United States, Russia and China may not wish to be seen as the obstacle to a more inclusive order. And if the influence of the Security Council is allowed to decline, the biggest losers will be the P5 countries that occupy a privileged position on the Council.
Rather than P5 obstructionism, one of the main obstacles to reform has been disagreement among all UN members over whether and how to expand the permanent membership of the Council. Some are wary of a scenario in which the Council becomes even more paralyzed than it is today, or where a regional rival comes to occupy a permanent seat. This could be addressed by creating a pool of countries with longer and recurring terms, aimed at compensating those states that fail to obtain a permanent seat and rendering it easier for smaller countries to get elected to non-permanent ones.
To ensure international stability, great powers will need to establish guardrails in their relations amongst themselves. But middle powers will need to make a substantive contribution of their own. They need to secure global support for a compelling vision of multilateral reform that illustrates how a reinvigorated multilateralism can work — and then rally that coalition together to place strong collective pressure on the great powers to embrace reform.
With so much uncertainty about the future, multi-alignment or “variable geometry” may be prudent statecraft. But successfully hedging your bets also requires saving the law-centered multilateral system rather than allowing it to collapse. Taking down the sign of the “rules-based order,” as Carney described it, is one thing. But little will have been achieved unless it is replaced with a better sign.
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