According to the state department on Wednesday, Washington is slapping new sanctions on Iran’s petroleum and petrochemical producers, along with Hong Kong and Emirati companies accused of selling the oil on East Asia markets in violation of existing embargoes.
In a tweet, Secretary of State Antony Blinken said that “absent a commitment from Iran to return to the JCPOA, an outcome we continue to pursue, we will keep using our authorities to target Iran's exports of energy products.” But is this really the best way to get back into a deal that Washington was the first to leave, and for which talks have been on thin ice and time is ticking away? Quincy Institute's Trita Parsi, author of “Losing an Enemy: Obama, Iran and the Triumph of Diplomacy,” weighs in.
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In a surprise operation, the U.S. captured Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro and bombed military and civilian targets across Venezuela, leaving the future of the Latin American country uncertain.
Maduro is now headed to the United States to “stand trial on criminal charges,” said Sen. Mike Lee (R-Utah) after a conversation with Secretary of State Marco Rubio. In a press conference, President Donald Trump announced that the U.S. will "run the country until such time as we can do a safe, proper and judicious transition."
"We can’t take a chance that someone takes over Venezuela who doesn’t have the good of the people in mind," Trump said, adding that this could include American "boots on the ground."
The operation marks a dramatic turn of events after months of U.S.-led escalation against the Maduro regime, which included a series of attacks on drug boats and even some targets within Venezuela. Maduro’s abduction, which appears to violate international law, comes just days after the now-ousted president offered to negotiate with Washington. "I didn't want to negotiate," Trump told Fox News, adding that he may pursue a "second wave" of strikes if regime figures don't cede power.
Venezuelan Vice President Delcy Rodriguez has requested that the U.S. provide proof of life for Maduro and his wife, who was also captured. Trump claimed that Rubio has spoken with Rodriguez and that she is "willing to do what we think is necessary to make Venezuela great again."
Advocates of regime change in Venezuela have generally hoped that this year’s Nobel Peace Prize winner, Maria Corina Machado, would take over after Maduro. Machado, for her part, called for the installation of Edmundo Gonzalez, who is widely considered to be the legitimate winner of Venezuelan elections that took place in 2024.
In a scathing editorial, the New York Times editorial board described the attack as “latter-day imperialism.”
“By proceeding without any semblance of international legitimacy, valid legal authority or domestic endorsement, Mr. Trump risks providing justification for authoritarians in China, Russia and elsewhere who want to dominate their own neighbors,” the board wrote.
The attacks have drawn comparisons to the 1989 U.S. invasion of Panama, during which American forces captured and extradited then-President Manuel Noriega.
In the months leading up to the strikes, Congress repeatedly voteddown bills that would have restricted Trump’s ability to carry out today’s attacks. The administration reportedly argued that there was no need for such a law because the administration did not intend to put boots on the ground in Venezuela.
Sen. Lee initially appeared to criticize Trump for carrying out strikes without congressional approval. But, following his conversation with Rubio, Lee argued that this operation fell under the president’s authority to protect troops from an imminent threat. (This loophole in war powers is “big enough to drive a tank through,” argued Adam Isacson of the Washington Office on Latin America.)
Hawkish members of Congress cheered on the strikes, with some arguing that Trump should now set his sights on other left-wing authoritarians in the region. “Maduro has fallen, [Cuban President Miguel] Díaz-Canel and [Nicaraguan President Daniel] Ortega are next,” said Rep. Carlos Gimenez (R-Fla.). “Our hemisphere will be the hemisphere of freedom!”
Leaders from Chile, Cuba and Colombia condemned the attacks. Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum said the attacks were a violation of international law and put "regional stability at great risk." Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva called the operation "reminiscent of the worst moments of interference in Latin American and Caribbean politics." American allies in Europe have so far largely restricted their comments to calls for de-escalation and respect for international law.
Targets of the U.S. bombing campaign reportedly included military facilities as well as a civilian port and Venezuela's legislative palace.
The reasoning behind the Trump administration’s dramatic escalation remains unclear. Trump has often cited drug interdiction as the driving force of his campaign, but experts say that Venezuela has little to do with the crisis of overdose deaths in the U.S., which are largely caused by fentanyl from Mexico. The administration has also expressed interest in taking over Venezuela's oil industry, which controls some of the world's largest oil reserves.
Another explanation may be the influence of Rubio, who long advocated regime change in various Latin American countries during his time in the Senate. Coupled with the Trump administration’s focus on Latin America in its National Security Strategy, this would suggest that the military campaign against Maduro may be a preview of further efforts across the region.
It remains to be seen whether Trump will simply declare victory now that Maduro has been removed from office. A broader effort at regime change would likely require a more sustained U.S. military effort — one that may include a full-scale invasion, which could tip the country further into chaos.
As of November, 70% of Americans opposed U.S. military action in Venezuela, according to a CBS News poll.
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Top photo credit: Supporters of the UAE-backed separatist Southern Transitional Council (STC) wave flags of the STC and the United Arab Emirates, during a rally in Aden, Yemen, January 1, 2026. REUTERS/Fawaz Salman
In fact, while the Tuesday announcement of the UAE’s military withdrawal from Yemen was clearly in deference to Saudi policy there, it will not weaken the Emirates’ security role in the south, nor necessarily the prospect of secession by its armed Yemeni allies, the Southern Transitional Council (STC).
The recent territorial expansion of the STC into southeastern Yemen has already created important facts on the ground. The STC and its UAE backer can continue to leverage such territorial facts toward their shared objective of a revived state of “South Arabia” in southern Yemen. The UAE will retain its small but highly strategic coastal holdings in this aspirant state, including in Mukalla and Aden, in addition to its both direct and indirect role in those parts of the Red Sea littoral of northern Yemen not controlled by the Iranian-backed Houthi.
In the south its partly non-uniformed UAE security and intelligence presence will not be abandoned by Abu Dhabi after its announced termination of what it describes as its counterterrorism role in the Saudi-led international “coalition” in southern Yemen. Nor will the STC realistically concede to the demand of the weak but mostly internationally-recognized nominal Government of the Republic of Yemen, led by the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) to hand over its recent southeastern Yemeni territorial gains in favour of the Saudi-created “National Shield” Yemeni militia.
This latter police force currently corralled by the STC in different parts of southeastern Yemen, and part of contested but STC-dominated Aden in the southwest, is more a Saudi mercenary brigade than the claimed state force of the Republic of Yemen.
When the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC) took control of much of the south in early December, STC-aligned militias had expanded into the interior of the huge, energy-rich, southeastern Yemeni province of Hadhramawt, which runs from the border with Saudi Arabia to the Arabian Sea. This relatively easy battlefield success was coupled with STC-aligned fighters taking the neighboring and equally strategic province of Mahra, which also runs from Saudi Arabia to the Arabian Sea, but shares a long border with Oman, at which the STC claims to be countering smuggling by local tribes to the Iran-backed Houthi forces running much of the north.
With these two vital southeastern Yemeni territories in the STC’s grasp — in addition to the STC’s control of the southeastern island of Socotra, a de facto Emirati protectorate in the Indian Ocean — the southern secessionist project is on a roll. Until December, the STC existed mainly as a “shadow state,” assisted by Emirati-backed militias in much of southwest Yemen, including in its small but strategic “capital” in Aden. Amid such advances, speculation that the STC could declare independence mounted sharply.
The STC has long sought to realize its ambition to reestablish, in territorial terms, the independent southern Yemeni state that existed from 1967 to 1990 by persuading Western and regional powers that it could serve as a bulwark against the threats to maritime security in the Red Sea posed by the Houthi Zaydi Shia movement that governs much of northern Yemen. The STC’s recent expansion has made its relatively hollow counter-terrorism pitch of two years ago seem more compelling.
President Donald Trump, who is obviously open to gaining military and territorial advantage against Iran in ways that bolster both Saudi Arabia and Israel, may yet look with favor on a plausible South Arabian state whose domain runs from the Red Sea to the Indian Ocean.
The Houthi northern Yemeni regime continues to constitute a potential Iran-assisted maritime security threat to shipping it deems connected to Israel, despite a truce of sorts that was reached between the Trump administration and the Houthis last May. The agreement ended more than a year of airstrikes by U.S. and British forces against Houthi targets in retaliation for the group’s attacks on international shipping. (Israel has continued to attack Houthi targets, while the Houthis periodically hit Israel.) The Houthis had originally launched their attacks on ships plying the Red Sea in solidarity with Gaza after Israel launched its military campaign against Hamas in October 2023.
Aidarous Zubaidi, the STC leader, told Emirati media in late September 2025 that his planned new Arab state would join the U.S.-sponsored Abraham Accords. He described these peace deals with Israel as a boon to regional security, provided that Palestinian “rights” are part of the package.
A southern Yemeni secession could be backed by Israel. According to Israeli media the Israeli government is being discreetly encouraged by the STC to support its cause. Despite the fact that the UAE, the leading external proponent of southern independence, is Israel’s key regional partner, the Netanyahu government is holding back. This is in large part due to Saudi and therefore U.S. disquiet at the STC’s armed push for southern statehood at the expense of other Yemeni allies.
There had been speculation however that the recent territorial gains made by the UAE-backed STC in the southeast were secretly coordinated with Saudi Arabia. According to this account, Riyadh had become exasperated with the ongoing political and military infighting in that version of the Republic of Yemen, organized as the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC). The PLC, the power-sharing executive of the internationally recognized Yemeni government, was formed by Saudi Arabia with UAE support in 2022 under a new president, Rashad Al-Alimi. The ostensible goal was to end what had largely become a conflict between UAE-backed southern fighters and those loyal to Islah, a Yemeni party loosely affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood, and to join ranks against the Houthis in the north instead.
In reality, the “legitimate government” of Yemen continued to be as fractious politically as its components had been militarily, and this national weakness was the backdrop to the STC’s territorial expansion in December. Forces loyal to Islah were previously an important part of military authority in the Hadhramawt interior (Wadi Hadhramawt). Yet Wadi Hadhramawt is also motivated by its own separatist ambitions, embodied by its tribal leader Amr Bin Habraish, who is also a Saudi ally. In addition to the Saudis’ reserve option of Hadhramawt independence, Riyadh has previously found Islah’s brand of “tribes and technicians” Islamism useful in defense of a united Yemen, despite Islah’s historic Muslim Brotherhood associations. Islah was pivotal in crushing an attempted southern secession in 1994.
Recent events in Hadhramawt have seemingly put Islah into political and, arguably, military eclipse, not least when its position in much of the north is heavily constrained by the Houthis. In addition, the Trump administration does not seem sympathetic to Islah. In late November, Trump moved to designate as terrorists “certain” (as yet undefined) chapters of the Muslim Brotherhood, a global group the UAE portrays as an existential threat to itself and all pragmatic, Western-aligned regional leaders.
However Islah’s acting secretary-general, Abdel-Razaq Al-Hijri, stressed to this author that the group no longer has an armed wing. Islah’s supporters, he said, are part of the “legitimate government’s” Ministry of Defense, and therefore under President Al-Alimi’s command. It remains to be seen whether such claimed military discipline among “former” Islah militiamen would apply in the defense of those northern territories that the STC is now interested in liberating. After all, Al-Hijri claims that “the leaders of the army” did not issue a command to defend Hadhramawt and Mahra against the STC.
But Yemeni unionism is not yet out of favor in Riyadh or Washington. The Saudis’ own Yemeni “national” fighters, the Saudi-funded and trained tribal forces known as Daraa Al-Watan (National Shield) that had held Seiyun, the capital of Wadi Hadhramawt, until the STC fighters arrived, abandoned their nearby Tarim military base and redeployed to western Hadhramawt. At the same time, National Shield forces are still present, if likewise non-resistant to the STC, in neighboring Mahra, where Oman-backed local tribal fighters are located. As noted, Saudi-backed National Shield troops are also present in Aden province.
In other words, the Saudis have Yemeni mercenaries in the south, albeit much weaker than the UAE’s STC-aligned troops who since December have been in the ascendent there. Amid such a highly volatile situation, the emboldened STC talked of participating in an internationally agreed force to liberate northern territory from the Houthis, including areas vital to its claims of strategic international indispensability — that is, the whole of the Bab al-Mandab in the Red Sea.
The popular southern clamor for independence (and a willingness of some southerners to gamble on the STC to deliver it) may make it difficult for the secessionists to avoid declaring sovereign statehood, in the south at least.When it ambiguously declared “self-administration” in 2020, the STC did not carry the clear support of the UAE. To declare sovereignty now, it would not only need Abu Dhabi firmly on board, but also to be sure that the Saudis could find a UAE-backed state creation useful to Riyadh’s own strategic interests in what is truly for the Saudis an existential matter.
While the southern Arabian peninsula provides the UAE with useful assets, like overseas naval outposts, Saudi Arabia considers the whole of Yemen a crucial matter of national security. This was emphasized by Saudi airstrikes against the STC in Hadhramawt on December 26, albeit not admitted to by Riyadh. The next day the Saudis publicly stated that, if the STC did not withdraw from the territory it had advanced into in the southeast, then Riyadh would act to ensure it did. None of this means that Riyadh is opposed to southern statehood, just that it rejects Emirati-encouraged unilateral expansionism. The Saudi bombing of an Emirati weapons delivery to the Hadhramawt port of Mukalla on December 30, weapons which Riyadh alleged were for the STC, was in line with this.
Their tough rhetoric and armed messaging aside, the Saudis are likely to resume their traditional foreign policy equivocation when it comes to Yemen, long the site of intra-Gulf competition. Saudi tactical calculations encourage them to keep both unionist and secessionist options alive in preference to a forced new state of South Arabia. Trump, and thus his European friends, are unlikely to try to persuade Riyadh differently given the extent of intra-southern Yemeni challenges, which declaring statehood could easily exacerbate. The supposed prize of an official anti-Iranian and pro-Israeli South Arabian buffer state still seems too unpredictable for the U.S. to want to “recognize.” U.S. and Israeli gains in Syria, and seemingly in Lebanon, probably make fighting Iran via another Yemeni state unappealing — at least for now.
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Taiwan's flag is lowered during a daily ceremony as China conducts "Justice Mission 2025" military drills around Taiwan, in Taipei, Taiwan, December 30, 2025. REUTERS/Ann Wang TPX IMAGES OF THE DAY
On December 17, while much of the nation was watching President Donald Trump’s primetime “year-in-review” address to the nation, the State Department made a big reveal of its own: the approval of an $11 billion arms package for Taiwan.
According to the announcement, the sale will facilitate “[Taipei's] continuing efforts to modernize its armed forces and to maintain a credible defensive capability.”
The news was widely praised in Washington, by China hawks and supporters of the defense industry alike, for sending a strong deterrent signal to Beijing and a valuable message of U.S. commitment to Taiwan. The Washington Posteditorial board, for example, called the sale “a welcome change to Trump’s Taiwan policy” and “an overdue correction after months of policy changes that favored Beijing over Taipei.”
Celebrations are premature, however. As Chinese warships encircled the island this week as part of “Justice Mission 2025,” it seems that Taiwan’s position is more vulnerable than ever after the U.S. arms sale announcement, and Washington is partly to blame.
The problem is how the Trump administration, and those before it, has chosen to sell weapons to Taiwan — loudly, brashly, and publicly. As the United States looks to shift the burden of the island’s defense to Taiwan itself, it needs a different approach to supporting Taipei, one that is more subtle, emphasizes Taiwan’s indigenous production, and attends assiduously to context.
There are three problems with the December 17 sale, and they all have to do with timing.
For starters, although the U.S. State Department has approved the $11B weapons package, Taiwan’s legislature has blocked the special budget required to pay for it five times. Until Taiwan finds the money, the sale cannot be completed, and production of the promised weapons cannot begin.
As a result of this political fiasco, Taiwan now appears weak, indecisive, and unprepared to support its own defense. That Taiwan’s failure to approve the special budget drags on after the United States greenlit the weapons sale has made an already embarrassing situation worse by calling attention to Taiwan’s domestic divisions and lack of resolve.
Though Taipei bears much of the responsibility, poor U.S. planning is also at fault. The State Department could have averted much of the fallout by holding off on its sale announcement until Taiwanese funding was secured.
But considerations of Taiwan’s domestic politics are not the only reason the timing of the U.S. announcement was puzzling and counterproductive. Coming soon after Trump’s positive meeting with Chinese leader Xi Jinping in Busan and during a trade war truce between the two countries, the size and scope of the U.S. arms sale (for example, it included rocket artillery and long-range ATACMS missiles) took Chinese officials by surprise.
In Beijing, the Trump administration’s move was seen as a provocative reversal and even a betrayal of the U.S. president’s previous stance. Lingering regional tensions caused by Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s confrontational statements on Taiwan in November only exacerbated Beijing’s sensitivity.
In this context, China’s extensive military drills around Taiwan this week were to be expected, even still largely unjustified.
Beyond the just-completed military exercises, there could still be further repercussions on the way for Washington, including economic retaliation or roadblocks to Trump’s planned April visit to Beijing. Progress made in stabilizing the U.S.-China relationship over recent months has almost certainly been dealt a setback.
Regardless of possible future ramifications, Taiwan’s immediate security picture has darkened, as it endured several days of intense military pressure, simulated blockade, and live fire drills just off its coast. In theory, the new weapons promised by the United States should offset any increased military coercion from China. Once again, however, there is a problem of timing.
While U.S. weapons may be sold in principle to Taiwan today (or, in the coming months if they find the financing and after U.S. Congressional approval), they won’t arrive for years, possibly well into the 2030s.
Take for example, the 82 HIMARS included in the most recent sale. Though the United States can produce about 100 HIMARS a year, this total must meet global demand, including rising purchases from Europe and the needs of the U.S. military.
In 2021, Taiwan purchased 11 HIMARS from the United States. They arrived in 2024. In 2023, Taiwan purchased 18 more HIMARS. They have not been delivered but some may be completed in 2026. At this rate, completely filling an order of 82 additional HIMARS will take at least until the end of the decade — a long time to wait for an island under threat today.
The extensive lag time between the sale announcement and weapons arrival creates another problem for Taiwan: a window of vulnerability in which Beijing can exploit Taiwan’s weaknesses and prepare its own countermeasures. Ultimately, China’s near-term actions may negate any defensive value that comes from additional U.S. arms sales to Taiwan over the longer term.
Neither challenges of timing nor Beijing’s probable retribution are reasons to stop selling arms to Taiwan entirely. But they are cause to rethink how Washington plans and executes these arms sales so that they can provide the most support to U.S. interests with the fewest costs to cross-strait stability.
First, U.S. officials should reconsider how much information about arms sales to Taiwan they make public. Members of Congress should still review and approve sales, but the timing and content of public announcements might be altered to exclude information on quantities, total value, or types of weapons.
This would not be without precedent, as the United States has previously kept classified some information on arms sales to clients like Israel and Ukraine even as they have met requirements for transparency and accountability.
More discretion would have several benefits. China’s vast intelligence network would likely learn the details of a given sale before they are made public, but without a high-profile announcement, Beijing might feel less pressure to retaliate against Taiwan or the United States directly. And to the extent information on new arms packages remains private, it would buy Taipei and Washington time.
Second, U.S. policymakers should link U.S. arms sales to Taiwan directly to Taiwan’s approved defense budget, not its planned or promised one. In practice, this would mean that Washington would not approve weapons packages for Taiwan unless necessary funding is already appropriated. This might require the use of smaller and less frequent arms packages, but it would avoid embarrassing liabilities like that at present, where sales are approved before funding exists.
Another option would be to prioritize efforts to aid Taiwan’s indigenous defense production, rather than selling American weapons. This might be accomplished by incentivizing private investment in Taiwanese companies, facilitating technology sharing, or supporting co-production and joint ventures with U.S. firms. This would have the added benefit of supporting Taiwan’s self-sufficiency and resilience.
Beijing might not welcome these moves, but they should be less antagonistic than direct sales of advanced American military hardware.
Finally, Washington should consider timing more carefully when planning its military assistance to Taiwan. U.S. officials should avoid announcing new initiatives at delicate periods, when tensions are aroused or regional disagreements unresolved. They should also prioritize the health of the U.S.-China relationship above all else, safeguarding mutual understandings over regional security issues generally and Taiwan specifically.
After all, if Washington and Beijing are at odds (or worse at war), no amount of military aid in the world can protect Taiwan from the repercussions.
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