According to the state department on Wednesday, Washington is slapping new sanctions on Iran’s petroleum and petrochemical producers, along with Hong Kong and Emirati companies accused of selling the oil on East Asia markets in violation of existing embargoes.
In a tweet, Secretary of State Antony Blinken said that “absent a commitment from Iran to return to the JCPOA, an outcome we continue to pursue, we will keep using our authorities to target Iran's exports of energy products.” But is this really the best way to get back into a deal that Washington was the first to leave, and for which talks have been on thin ice and time is ticking away? Quincy Institute's Trita Parsi, author of “Losing an Enemy: Obama, Iran and the Triumph of Diplomacy,” weighs in.
Responsible Statecraft is a publication of analysis, opinion, and news that seeks to promote a positive vision of U.S. foreign policy based on humility, diplomatic engagement, and military restraint. RS also critiques the ideas — and the ideologies and interests behind them — that have mired the United States in counterproductive and endless wars and made the world less secure.
The arch-cliched question about who Henry Kissinger should call to talk to Europe seemed to have found, at long last, the answer in 2009 when the EU Lisbon Treaty enshrined the post of the European Union’s high representative for foreign and security policy. Fifteen years on, the more appropriate question would be “why bother to call at all?”
Last week, EU leaders agreed that Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas would succeed senior Spanish diplomat Josep Borrell as the bloc’s foreign policy chief. The decision came, however, only as a consolation prize for quashing her ambitions to lead NATO.
It’s not difficult to see why it was considered safer to keep Kallas out of NATO: while there is a consensus in the EU that Russia is the bloc’s main security threat, Kallas went much further than most leaders in her combative rhetoric. She said Russia’s dismemberment into many smaller nation states would not be “a bad thing.” She enthusiastically endorsed NAFO (so-called North Atlantic Fellas Association) that is infamous for organizing xenophobic online harassment campaigns against anyone — including former and possibly future high-ranking American defense officials — perceived as “soft on Russia.”
There is also more than a whiff of hypocrisy about Kallas: while she called for Russia’s isolation, her husband continued profiting from his business ties with Russia well after the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. This, alongside some political missteps, has made her an unpopular figure in her native Estonia and led to calls for her resignation, which she ignored.
The fact that Berlin and other major capitals saw it less risky for someone like Kallas to be appointed as the “EU Head of Earnest Communiques,” in the words of British analyst David Blagden, rather than an actual military alliance like NATO, preferring the seasoned Dutch Prime Minister Marc Rutte for the latter job instead, speaks volumes about the regard held for the position of the high representative.
That is because despite its lofty title, the post has no real power. The high representative is not the foreign minister of the EU. He or she is a vice president of the European Commission, the bloc’s executive arm, thus technically a subordinate to its president. The European External Action Service (EEAS), with its more than 5,000 officials both in Brussels and EU delegations abroad, is at his or her disposal, but all the budgetary levers are in the hands of the Commission. Thus, the high representative and his or her team are forced to spend an inordinate amount of time in turf battles with other branches of the Brussels machinery to get anything done.
Most importantly, despite all the proclamations of a “geopolitical Europe,” the EU has no competences over the member states’ foreign and defense policies. It is the Council of the EU, i.e. the member states, who set the bloc’s foreign policy, and every single one of them holds a veto power, thus capable, in principle, to block common policies.
This is unlikely to change as national security is traditionally the most zealously guarded prerogative of a nation-state, and more so with the rise of sovereigntist political forces in Europe as attested by the results of the last elections to the European Parliament. In a way, the high representative’s job is impossible.
These structural limitations can be offset, to an extent, by the personality of the office holder. The most impactful EU top diplomat was Javier Solana who held the position from 1999 to 2009 — ironically before the Lisbon Treaty created the EEAS meant, in theory, to bolster the job. But Solana assumed the office after leading NATO which gave him extra clout, respect from the member states, and international visibility, all of which his successors lacked. Still, his successor, Federica Mogherini, can be credited with getting the Iran nuclear deal over the line, and Borrell with efforts to get that same deal revived after President Trump’s withdrawal in 2018 and taking a principled stance on Gaza.
Expectations are significantly lower with Kallas. Kristi Raik from the Tallinn-based International Centre for Defence and Security, while offering a sympathetic view of her candidacy, points to the challenge of being “a strong leader, while not being too radical for the taste of some member states, which could be counter-productive.” Yet Kallas’ consensus-building skills are yet to be tested.
Kallas has yet to offer much evidence of her interest in or understanding of how much of the world works beyond her part of Europe. Yet she will have to deal with the crises in the Middle East, Africa, Latin America, manage relations with China and Asia-Pacific. As the high representative, she will chair the joint commission on the implementation of the nuclear agreement with Iran, which her predecessors Mogherini and Borrell were strongly committed to. Her views on the subject are entirely unknown, as they are on the Israel/Palestine question. As a Brussels-based analyst Shada Islam noted, “the EU’s standing is already low over double standards in Gaza. Eager to know how Kallas intends to learn about a complex world beyond Europe.”
An advent of a new Trump administration in Washington could pose additional challenges as some of its prospective officials appear to be decidedly less interested in countering Russia than China. Navigating this relationship will require diplomatic skill more than moralistic exhortations about the need for a continued U.S. involvement in the European security.
In the end, however, none of that may matter too much. A high representative perceived as weak, a loose cannon, or both, will simply ensure that the EU external partners will gravitate even more explicitly towards the member states and the Commission, with the high representative and the EEAS mostly reduced to issuing statements of concern.
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Diplomacy Watch: A peace summit without Russia
Diplomacy Watch: What’s the point of Swiss peace summit?
The last few weeks have looked like a fast-forward version of the Biden administration’s broader approach to its support for Ukraine. At the war’s outset, Washington insisted that it was not at war with Russia and that American troops would not be deployed to defend Ukraine.
The administration laid out a series of guidelines that it hoped would allow them to support Ukraine without provoking Russia to the point that Moscow felt compelled to escalate. Little by little, however, the U.S. began loosening its policies, notably on the supply of certain weapons, greenlighting the transfer of long-range missile systems, Abrams tanks, cluster munitions, and more.
At each step, the Biden administration would wait and gauge the Russian response before making more escalatory decisions. In recent weeks, perhaps motivated by Ukraine’s deteriorating battlefield position, this process has accelerated.
In late May, Washington reversed course and gave Kyiv permission to conduct limited strikes in Russian territory using U.S. weapons. Then, on June 10, the State Department lifted a years-long ban on the neo-Nazi-linked Azov brigade’s access to American weapons. The following week, the Biden administration said that attacks using U.S. arms need not be limited to the region near the northeastern city Kharkiv, but that they could hit Russian targets “anywhere” across the border.
Now, this week, reports indicate that the president is “leaning toward” rescinding a “de facto ban” against deploying American contractors to Ukraine.
Like the earlier moves, Washington will likely wait to see how Mocow reacts, but it does make the prospect of a dangerous escalation more likely. “It is too soon to tell whether such a move, if enacted, would bring the United States closer to having its own troops participate in the war effort more directly, at least in some fashion,” the Quincy Institute’s Zachary Paikin wrote in RS on Wednesday. “Undoubtedly, the Kremlin would view a full-fledged contingent of Western troops on Ukrainian soil as intolerable, and it is difficult to assess the precise threshold at which Moscow will consider one of its red lines to be crossed.”
As Paikin notes, this kind of escalation is inevitable given that the Biden administration has defined the war as a battle for the future of democracy and the international order. Without a change in the broader U.S. strategy, policy changes are likely to continue down this path if conditions in Ukraine become increasingly desperate.
Washington is already dealing with the fallout from one of these decisions. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin spoke with his Russian counterpart for the first time in 15 months on Tuesday, after the Kremlin blamed the U.S. for a Ukrainian attack in Crimea that killed four and injured more than 150, according to Russian media. The attack was carried out using American-provided ATACMs.
“Of course, the involvement of the United States of America in hostilities, direct involvement in hostilities that result in the death of Russian civilians, this, of course, cannot but have consequences," Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said in response to the strike. "What exactly — time will tell.”
In other diplomatic news related to the war in Ukraine:
— Two former staffers on Donald Trump’s national security council released a plan on how they would bring an end to the war in Ukraine. The America First Policy Institute published Retired Lieutenant General Keith Kellogg and Fred Fleitz’s report, titled “America First, Russia, & Ukraine.”
"We tell the Ukrainians, 'You've got to come to the table, and if you don't come to the table, support from the United States will dry up,'" Kellogg toldReuters. "And you tell Putin, 'He's got to come to the table and if you don't come to the table, then we'll give Ukrainians everything they need to kill you in the field.'"
Fleitz said that they had shown the proposal to the former president, who responded favorably, according to Fleitz’s account. “"I'm not claiming he agreed with it or agreed with every word of it, but we were pleased to get the feedback we did," he said.
Kyiv, however, is reportedly not taking the proposal very seriously. “We believe it’s just the race of folks who want to make it look like they are setting new Trump’s foreign policy agenda and reminding [people] about themselves,” a source close to Zelensy’s office toldPolitico. “The perception is that nobody actually knows what Trump’s approach will be. Kyiv is quite calm with that.”
— The European Union on Monday approved the first tranche of aid for Ukraine that will be paid for with seized Russian assets. “The money won't be used for reimbursements, as is normally the case with the [Ukraine Assistance Fund], but for direct purchases of kit like ammunition and aerial defense systems. A quarter of the amount will be used for purchases from Ukrainian industries,” according toPolitico.
— NATO appointed outgoing Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte as its next secretary-general on Wednesday. Rutte won support from Hungary after agreeing that Budapest would not be forced to provide personnel or funds to NATO’s new Ukraine aid proposal.
“While he was Dutch prime minister, Rutte was a strong supporter of Ukraine and its right to defend itself after Russia’s 2022 invasion,” according toThe Washington Post. “Under his leadership, the Netherlands pledged military hardware to Kyiv including Leopard tanks and F-16 fighter jets.”
— Zelensky suggested on Thursday that Ukraine would be looking to put a plan to end the war at the next peace summit, according to The Kyiv Independent. "We don't have much time. We have a lot of injured, killed, both military and civilian,” he said. “So we do not want this war to last for years. Therefore, we have to prepare this plan and put it on the table at the second peace summit." So far, Zelensky’s conception of a settlement has been his “peace formula,” which is a non-starter for Moscow, and the first peace summit was aimed at shoring up global support for this vision.
U.S. State Department news:
In a Tuesday press briefing, State Department spokesman Matthew Miller said that Washington supports International Criminal Court investigations into Russian war crimes. This week, the ICC issued arrest warrants for former Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and the Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov.
“We have made clear that there have been atrocities committed by Russian forces in their illegal invasion of Ukraine and that there ought to be accountability for those atrocities,” Miller said. “We support a range of international investigations into Russia’s atrocities in Ukraine, including the one conducted by the ICC.”
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Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II Aircraft: Robert Sullivan/Public Domain
Twenty young Americans have died in a series of V-22 Osprey crashes over the past two years. Since the revolutionary tilt-rotor aircraft began flying in 1989, 57 Ospreys have suffered significant accidents killing a total of 62 service members and injuring another 93.
The House Oversight Committee (notably not the Armed Services Committee) held a hearing on June 12 to listen to testimony about the program’s safety concerns. Members were told the Osprey would continue to fly for short trips in spite of a known faulty part while engineers try to devise a permanent fix.
It is easy to fixate on Osprey crashes when they happen because, as a transport aircraft, they can kill a lot of people in a single instant. What has been overlooked is what the Osprey represents in a larger pattern of DoD acquisition failures.
In many respects, the Osprey led the way in a trend towards ever-increasing complex weapons programs. Instead of iterating on the tried-and-true CH-46 Sea Knight helicopter program it was meant to replace, Marine Corps leaders fully invested themselves on an untested and underdeveloped program based on entirely new and more complex technology.
The Osprey’s mission is straightforward. It is supposed to move people and things from one place to another. The Marine Corps had been doing that successfully with helicopters for decades. Rather than building another helicopter, service leaders decided to build a revolutionary aircraft that can take off and land like a helicopter but fly like a fixed-wing airplane. That may look good on paper, but the concept has come with a steep cost.
The Osprey is much more expensive than a comparable helicopter. Adjusted for inflation, the cost of a CH-46 helicopter is approximately $17 million compared to the $84 million for the Osprey that replaced it. That is a heavy premium for an aircraft that today is only allowed to fly no more than 30 minutes from a suitable airfield.
This has had a significant follow-on effect. Navy leaders had plans to retire the last 15 C2 Greyhound fixed-wing transport aircraft, but those plans have been put on hold due to the Osprey program’s flight restrictions. The Navy had to press them back into service to resupply ships again because the Ospreys couldn’t do the job. In the end we built a more costly and complex system that is not ready or even able to do the jobs of the cheaper and more reliable aircraft it was meant to replace.
Following the trail blazed by the Osprey, the other services have repeated the same fundamental mistake repeatedly with their own excessively complex programs. Navy leaders hobbled the fleet by spending nearly two decades trying to get the Littoral Combat Ship program to work. Rather than operating a fleet of 55 highly capable futuristic small surface combatant ships, the Navy ended up with a fleet of 35 ships that were faulty, undergunned and mostly unable to leave their home ports, and several of those have already been mothballed.
The Navy had an even bigger failure with the Zumwalt-class destroyer. Leaders planned on a fleet of 32 ships designed to bombard targets on shore with a specialized cannon to support amphibious landings. The design included a vast array of new technologies including new radar, sonar, and an all-electric propulsion system. Developing the new technologies took longer than expected, which increased the total cost of the program. To offset the budget overruns, leaders cut the planned fleet size down to three ships. This ultimately led to the failure of the revolutionary gun program, the whole purpose of the ship itself being scrapped, as the cost for manufacturing specialized rounds for the ships at scale skyrocketed for a fleet of three versus a fleet of 32.
The Army spent at least $8 billion between 2003 and 2009 to develop a family of armored vehicles in a program called the Future Combat Systems. Rather than pursuing individual replacements for vehicles like the Abrams tank and the Bradley Fighting Vehicle, Army leaders decided to pursue a single, highly networked family of specialized combat and support vehicles on a common chassis. It was an ambitious project that the RAND Corporation later criticized for its “overreliance on assumptions” that the defense industry would be able to develop all the envisioned revolutionary technologies.
As it turned out, the defense industry failed to deliver and the program was shelved with very little to show for the effort and considerable expense. Evidence of just how poorly conceived the Future Combat Systems effort was can be found in the estimated total costs for the program. Army leaders initially claimed the Future Combat Systems would cost $91.4 billion. Within three years, that figure had increased to $163.7 billion.
And then there’s the heavy-weight champion of poorly conceived futuristic weapons: the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. The F-35 was billed as a multi-role aircraft designed to meet the needs of three different services and those of multiple partner nations. But the idea of a one-size-fits-all aircraft has been tried in the past with poor results. The Pentagon tried it with the F-111 in the 1960s and then had to scramble to build the F-14, F-15, F-16, and A-10 to make up for the capability shortfalls. Pentagon leaders compounded the multi-role difficulties by trying to incorporate every conceivable technology into the F-35 design. This created a level of complexity that has prevented the F-35 from being an effective part of the fleet, let alone in any of its promised specialized roles.
As you can see, this is not a new problem, and space here does not permit a full listing of all the Pentagon’s acquisition failures over the past three decades. But there are very real consequences to poorly conceived weapon programs. The Navy is retiring ships faster than they can be replaced. The Air Force has less than half the number of fighter aircraft today than it did in 1990.
While the services have been shedding force structure, the American people have watched as more and more of their money goes to the Pentagon every year. The proposed defense budget for 2025 will be nearly 50% higher than what it was in 2000. What’s even worse is that even though most of these big-ticket weapons and vehicles are vastly more expensive and delivered on average three years late, they don’t work like they are supposed to. Many have abysmal readiness rates. The F-35 fleet has a full mission capable rate of only 30%. That means that the world’s most expensive weapons system is only ready to do its job less than a third of the time.
In many ways the Osprey program ushered in the era of excessively complex novelty weapons. As long as this trend continues, the services will continue to demand more money to pay for acquisition boondoggles that won’t work properly and gradually degrade the effectiveness of the U.S. military.