After an earthquake reportedly killed at least 1,000 people in Afghanistan on Wednesday, the international community, including the UK and European Union, kick-started its provision of aid. Even an Indian air force jet landed in Taliban-controlled Kabul with supplies marking a potential overture by New Delhi, which was a longtime critic of any negotiations with the Taliban.
Meanwhile, Pakistan dispatched convoys of essential aid. Iran also pledged to provide assistance. Our partners around the world are engaging with reality in Afghanistan. The regionalization of aid and humanitarian relief to the country should be welcomed by Western capitals because it is far more sustainable and efficient.
But Washington’s risk averse approach to engagement with Taliban-led Afghanistan falls short despite being the largest provider of aid.
As Afghanistan reels from the loss of life, Washington continues to further “assess” its aid options, signaling a continued resistance to working with the Taliban directly. Why doesn’t the U.S. government have a clear and immediate response to a human tragedy of this scale in a country we occupied for two decades? How can Americans and the world hope for a more engaged and nuanced U.S. diplomacy if Washington cannot respond with clarity to such black-and-white situation?
The potential influence of the United States should not be exaggerated. Even the previous Afghan government would have struggled to respond to an earthquake of this magnitude despite substantial support from the United States and its allies. The Taliban also have agency and have adopted policies that make it difficult for foreign governments to engage in good faith. But the chilling effect of U.S. sanctions hinder Afghanistan’s development and frozen foreign exchange reserves prevent the economy from stabilizing.
The White House’s hand-wringing over engagement with Taliban-led Afghanistan feels contrived when one considers that in the not so recent past, U.S. diplomats posed for photo ops with the Taliban, laughed together, and ultimately excluded the Afghan government from negotiations with them.
This earthquake presents a test for the Biden administration. Will it take additional steps to engage with Afghans at a moment of crisis, or will it sit on the sidelines as our partners and foes alike lend a helping hand?
Adam Weinstein is Deputy Director of the Middle East program at the Quincy Institute, whose current research focuses on security and rule of law in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq.
A Taliban helicopter takes off after bringing aid to the site of an earthquake in Gayan, Afghanistan, June 23, 2022. REUTERS/Ali Khara
Top photo credit: Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth rides in a U.S. Army UH-60 Black Hawk en route to the New Mexico National Defense Area to assess its role in the operational control of the U.S.-Mexico border, Santa Teresa, N.M., April 25, 2025. (DoD photo by U.S. Navy Petty Officer 1st Class Alexander Kubitza)
The U.S. Army is getting ready to fight China. At least that’s how Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth and Army leaders are selling their new modernization initiative, announced on April 30.
Framed as an opportunity for “generational change,” the overhaul intends to “optimize” the Army’s force structure and equip its soldiers for the Indo-Pacific’s maritime terrain while divesting the heavy armored vehicles and helicopters that have been Army mainstays for a decade.
Like the Army’s past efforts to pivot to Asia, however, the initiative is likely to fail. The Army doesn’t have a game-changing or undiscovered role to play in a potential future conflict with China, and another expensive reboot isn’t going to help it find one. Instead, it’s time for the Army to face reality and double down on the narrow but essential core competencies it can already bring to the Indo-Pacific, including air defense, command and control, and sustainment.
Some of these new programs focused on preparing for future ground wars, but many aimed at increasing the Army’s stake in operations to counter Chinese military expansion, where most of the Pentagon’s attention and money were quickly shifting. Among these were costly and controversial long-range precision missile programs, plans to design new helicopters (future vertical lift), and the resurrected focus on the Army’s fleet of watercraft.
Even as the Army invested billions in the development and procurement of these systems, however, the service struggled to clearly define — and sell Pentagon leadership on — its role in a possible war with China. One fundamental obstacle was the lack of military access for ground forces across the Indo-Pacific region. Outside of South Korea, Japan, and the Philippines, the Army found little support for expanding its military presence. Those countries that did welcome Army forces were less enthusiastic about hosting some of its new, advanced capabilities, including its long-range missiles, and its stockpiles of equipment and materiel. This left the Army with expensive systems it could not deploy forward or might not be able to use effectively in a war.
Efforts to overcome these geographic restrictions with more advanced technologies (like longer-range drones and faster missiles) only created additional obstacles, ultimately preventing the Army from fielding planned systems in sufficient numbers to have a real operational impact.
As it tried to balance the competing requirements of geography on the one hand and firepower on the other, for example, the Army’s hypersonic program slipped well-behind its planned schedule and settled on missiles that cost so much ($41 million per missile) that the Army planned to procure only about a dozen. Worse, some programs like the Future Attack Reconnaissance Aircraft and the Strategic Long-Range Cannon were cancelled after running into questions about their viability in the Indo-Pacific.
The Army’s 2018 effort to reorient to Asia thus ran aground on the fundamental tension between the region’s immutable maritime geography and the service’s own limitations as a force that operates mostly on land. Instead of learning from these mistakes, however, Hegseth and his advisers seem intent on repeating them.
For example, Hegseth’s new initiative calls once again on the Army to “increase…forward presence in the Indo-Pacific by expanding pre-positioned stocks, rotational deployments, and exercises,” but offers no new ideas for how this will happen. Here, the Trump administration will face the same challenges as its predecessors: most countries in Asia do not want more U.S. Army forces or equipment on their soil for fear of making themselves targets of Chinese retaliation.
The DoD has, in the past, tried to increase its access by establishing facts on the ground, for example by leaving behind equipment after exercises. But this is not a long-term strategic solution. Questions of military access and basing permissions are political ones that need to be resolved at the diplomatic level, and the Army cannot plan for future roles in Asia that assume more military access than it has now.
Hegseth’s memo also accelerates Army timelines for fielding many of the technologies, including long-range missiles, drones and counter-drone systems, and AI-enabled command and control systems, that the service has been struggling to sustainably develop for years. Hegseth suggests that the problem in the past has been a broken acquisition process, but there is little evidence that this is case. Most of the setbacks faced by these programs have been technical ones exacerbated by Asia’s geography — its long distances, vast oceans, and inhospitable terrain — that a new contracting arrangement can’t change.
Finally, even if the Army succeeds in overcoming these first two challenges, the operational concepts required to guide Army use of new systems and technologies in the Indo-Pacific are missing in action. Equipping every Army unit with drones will not make the service any more relevant in Asia, for example, without a plan for how soldiers will use those drones in a theater made up mostly of water or during a conflict where they will be constantly under threat from Chinese air attacks and jamming that will make the Ukrainian battlefield look like a picnic.
Rather than launching a costly transformation — this one will reportedly cost $36 billion — in hopes of discovering newfound relevance in Asia, the Army should return to the core competencies it has developed over decades, namely, protecting American forces with advanced air and missile defense and enabling U.S. power projection with command and control, sustainment, and logistics support. Both roles will be essential for U.S. military operations in the Indo-Pacific, whether in peacetime or a war.
Here, Hegseth’s new initiative has some redeeming elements. Most importantly, it prioritizes investments in air and missile defense. The risk, however, is that attention devoted to this capability, floated only in the directive’s introduction, ends up being limited or diverted in favor of higher profile programs, such as the long-range missiles and uncrewed systems that Army leaders have been after for almost a decade or Trump’s Golden Dome for America.
Giving up the pursuit of an expanded role in Asia will likely mean larger Army force structure cuts and a smaller Army budget, but narrowing the Army’s Indo-Pacific remit will bring advantages, for instance, it will free up resources for other uses and allow the Army to concentrate its attention on doing a narrow set of tasks well, advancing combat effectiveness and the quality of support provided to the Joint Staff.
After two decades of counterinsurgency where it was the center of attention, the Army may not relish taking a backseat to its sister services. Searching for a new role in Asia, however, will be futile. The Army can do more and do better by focusing on what it already does best.
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Top photo credit: Official X Account of Transparency International Georgia
The U.S. foreign policy community is offered a generational opportunity, necessitated by crises abroad and shifting attitudes at home, to fundamentally reappraise American interests on Europe’s eastern periphery.
Georgia, a eurasian crossroads in the Caucasus, has become an unlikely focal point in the push and pull between dueling visions of U.S. priorities in the region.
The MEGOBARI Act (short for Mobilizing and Enhancing Georgia's Options for Building Accountability, Resilience, and Independence), recently passed by the U.S. House of Representatives, is a series of ultimatums on Georgia that reads as a litany of post-Cold War Atlanticism's greatest hits. The full bill is here, but its stated aim is "examining the penetration of Russian intelligence elements and their assets in Georgia, that includes an annex examining Chinese influence and the potential intersection of Russian-Chinese cooperation in Georgia." A thorough 90-day examination by USAID and relevant Congressional committees will determine who will be punished with sanctions and whether Georgia is worthy of proper U.S ties moving forward.
In other words, to remain in — or, as it were — find its way back into the West’s good graces, the ruling Georgian Dream government must not just cut any ties with Russia but adopt an overtly confrontational stance, including through its enforcement of Western sanctions on Moscow and other measures intended to counter Russian influence (also in the bill).
The legislation, in its insistence that this prescribed stance of maximum hostility to Russia is the only one consistent with the Euro-Atlantic aspirations of the Georgian people, imposes a steep conditionality not just on Georgia’s path to EU accession or NATO membership, but on its ability to support any kind of constructive relationship with the U.S. and EU.
The act additionally calls on Georgian Dream to commit to a gamut of ad hoc concessions stemming from Western criticisms over the conduct of Georgia’s 2024 parliamentary elections, up to and including the rather striking suggestion that Georgian Dream should determine “whether the elections should be judged as illegitimate.”
The MEGOBARI law, as Sen. Rand Paul (R-Ky.) observed in a March 27 Foreign Relations Committee proceeding, cannot be seen in any other light than as a direct intervention into domestic Georgian politics. It seeks, under the flimsy facade of advancing the interests of the “Georgian people,” to punish a duly elected Georgian government for pursuing a geopolitical course of which a faction within the U.S. foreign policy community disapproves.
This is ipso facto problematic insofar as it intrudes, in the name of defending democracy, on the democratic process inside Georgia to manipulate outcomes in ways that benefits perceived U.S. interests.
The second and more serious problem, from a technical perspective, is that these kinds of pressure tactics are counterproductive to any genuine sense of U.S. priorities in the region. Eleven percent of Georgia's overall trade volume comes from Russia, and the country's economy has been further entangled with Russia's after 2022 in ways that would impoverish the country if severed. Georgia, under President Mikheil Saakashvili, fought and lost a war with Russia in 2008 to establish control over two northern breakaway provinces. A reheating of that conflict at the behest of Western powers would be similarly ruinous for Tbilisi.
Demanding that the Georgians commit economic suicide and risk another war with Russia or face a flood of Western sanctions and restrictions is, as it were, not an attractive invitation. The West cannot offer anything remotely commensurate to the degree of hardship and insecurity that it is demanding from the Georgian people as the price of their Euro-Atlantic path. The 2008 crisis demonstrated that the West not only should not but will not fight Russia over Georgia.
There is a recklessness and more than a whiff of cynicism, not lost on Georgian Dream officials, to the West’s appetite for relitigating this question.
Meanwhile, Russia has signaled, in ways that have only grown more credible since 2008, that it will employ all tools at its disposal to balance against the integration of post-Soviet states into the Western security sphere. Far from an affront to democracy, it is Georgian Dream’s highest duty to the Georgian people to recognize these realities on the ground and steer Georgian foreign policy accordingly.
Furthermore, and for many of these reasons, the MEGOBARI Act will force a set of outcomes in Georgia and the region that are opposite of its intended effect. Attempting to strongarm Georgian officials into running roughshod over their own economic and security interests only incentivizes them to further insulate themselves against Western pressure by cultivating relationships with other powers, including its Russian neighbor.
American overreaction to Georgian Dream's well-founded pragmatism toward Moscow will ironically force Tbilisi into a more conciliatory posture with Russia by depriving it of an American partner with which to pursue a multivector foreign policy between East and West. Georgia will aim to soften the blow from Western punitive measures by doubling down on its trade and commercial ties not just with Russia but China, further distancing it from the U.S. and Europe in the long term.
Full diplomatic normalization between Georgia and Russia, previously inconceivable due to the outstanding territorial conflict from 2008, is now squarely within the realm of political possibility. This would clear the path for additional and deeper forms of Russo-Georgian cooperation, potentially even on security issues, with the effect of further peeling Georgia away from the West.
It is tempting to conclude from this sobering diagnosis that the MEGOBARI law's central conceit lies in its wrong-headed tactics, but that would be mistaking the symptom for the underlying disease. The deeper problem is that this law and initiatives like it proceed from a purist vision of Euro-Atlantic integration that forces not just Georgia but all post-Soviet states to pick sides between the West and Russia in ways that are harmful to these countries and do not advance any tangible American interests.
U.S. policy toward Georgia should instead proceed from the reality that America is not made more prosperous or secure by fashioning Georgia into a forward operating base against Russia whilst punishing Georgians who do not share this vision. The U.S., simply put, has no core interests that would justify the costly, dangerous, and counterproductive agenda of setting up a possible military confrontation with Russia over the right to maintain a web of de jure alliances and de facto dependencies in that part of Eurasia.
Georgia and many other post-Soviet states seek, for readily understandable reasons, robust ties with the West without being dragged into an overtly hostile footing with Russia, the dominant regional player. Washington has every reason to approach relations with countries like Georgia on exactly those terms, as they provide a low-cost, low-risk way of remaining engaged in the region while avoiding security spirals with Russia and thereby supporting regional stability.
It is clear in light of present circumstances that Tbilisi should be encouraged to pursue a multivector policy between East and West as the best course for all involved. Yet this will require part of the policymaking community to divest from the “with us or against us” mindset guiding the MEGOBARI bill in favor of a strategy that embraces, rather than dilutes, the sovereignty of local actors and their capacity to pursue strategies as nuanced as the challenges they face.
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Top photo: Presidential candidate Nicusor Dan speaks to the media after polls close for the second round of the country's presidential election redo in Bucharest, Romania, on May 18, 2025. (Photo by Alex Nicodim/NurPhoto)
Two EU countries on the front line of the war in Ukraine held presidential elections on May 18, a decisive second round runoff in Romania, and in Poland a tightly contested first round to be concluded in a June 1 vote.
In both campaigns, controversy swirled over the value of the EU, alleged Russian election interference, and whether to align with or oppose the Trump Administration’s attempts to negotiate an end to the conflict in Ukraine.
Poland: Uncertain prospects for June 1 second round
Warsaw mayor Rafał Trzaskowski, standard bearer for the centrist pro-EU, pro-Ukraine Civic Coalition (KO) of Prime Minister Donald Tusk will, as anticipated, face a runoff against Karol Nawrocki, the candidate of the main right-wing opposition Law and Justice Party (PiS) in the runoff set for June 1.
Trzaskowski’s margin of victory over Nawrocki (31.4% vs 29.4%) was much smaller than polls had forecast. Turnout was over 67%, a post 1989 high for a first round presidential race.
The difficulty for Trzaskowski’s second round prospects is that the third-place finisher in the race, Sławomir Mentzen, represents the Confederation Liberty and Independence party, which is further nationalist populist right than PiS. The prospect of Mentzen’s nearly 15% of voters rallying to Nawrocki on the second round could swing the election against Trzaskowski. Prime Minister Tusk’s government has been frustrated by vetoes from the incumbent PiS president Andrzej Duda who defeated Rafal Traszkowski to win reelection in 2020.
The Polish electorate since 1989 has shown a marked preference for electing presidents who tend to check the power of the governing majority in parliament, and this might tend to favor Nawrocki’s chances in the runoff.
While it is true that both PiS and Civic Coalition support Ukraine in its war with Russia, PiS and Mentzen’s Confederation party cultivate rural voters in Poland’s east who are unhappy with the alleged costs of supporting Ukrainian refugees in Poland, bear a grudge against Ukraine for the mass expulsions and killing of Poles by Ukrainian nationalists in western Ukraine in 1943, and oppose Ukraine’s EU accession because of its potential impact on Polish agriculture.
Cohabitation with Nawrocki as president would make it harder for Tusk to pursue his cooperation at Europe’s top table with Macron, Merz and Starmer in defense of a doubling down on the European effort to force back Russia’s ambitions for an advantageous settlement in Ukraine. The distinction between Tusk’s camp and his opponents in PiS and Confederation can be framed as a choice between pro-Americans and pro-Europeans, with Tusk and Trzaskowski seen as the latter.
Tusk’s tenure as president of the European Council and his strong acceptance in Europe allows him to be painted by opponents as pro-German and divorced from the concerns of ordinary Poles. It is not accidental that Nawrocki has made his career in the highly politicized and polarized historical debates in Poland where opposition to Russia is a constant, but where Germany and even Ukraine are also depicted as potential foes.
Romania: Calm restored?
Having won handily the first round of the Romanian presidential contest on May 5, nationalist populist George Simion lost to the liberal pro-EU mayor of Bucharest Nicosur Dan by a decisive 8 percentage point margin (54% to 46%). Turnout was much higher (65%) than the 53% garnered in the first round. Simion conceded defeat, after having at first indicated he would challenge the results.
The storm caused by the cancellation of last November’s first round won by the nationalist dark horse Calin Georgescu may now have ebbed. The rallying of Romanian voters to oppose Simion (who had pledged to appoint Georgescu as PM) was impressive but not total. Simion’s Alliance for the Union of Romanians is the second largest party in parliament and could be joined by the largest party, the Social Democrats, to become a formidable opposition.
Dan himself lies outside the mainstream parties which in coalition have disappointed many Romanians and fed the rise of Georgescu and Simion. His anti-corruption stance had at least something in common with Simion’s arguments. In the interim between the two rounds, the exchange rate wobbled and there were indications that Romania might face tougher borrowing terms for its public finances. Romania is one of the largest net recipients from the EU budget, a position that a Simion victory could have jeopardized.
Polls show that a large majority of Romanians favor the EU and NATO membership. Simion reassured the public that he did not favor leaving the EU; he only sought to restore a greater role of member state governments relative to the Commission. As for NATO, Simion approved of this as the embodiment of U.S. engagement in Romania and depicted this as challenged by figures such as Macron and Merz who sought greater independence from the U.S.
Conclusion: West vs. West?
The nationalist right sees the EU as setting itself against the U.S. and tends to elevate relations with the U.S. over the preservation of EU cohesion. They obviously and ostentatiously imitate the American president’s MAGA approach to nationalist self-assertion over the advantages of EU collective approaches to matters such as the war in Ukraine, migration, the green transition.
The pan-European scope of these elections was noteworthy. Poland’s election shadowed Romania, with Nawrocki campaigning with Simion. Former PiS PM Mateusz Morawiecki, a close associate of Simion, joined him in castigating Macron for allegedly interfering in Romania’s election. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban actually endorsed Simion, despite an abiding historical grievance about the rights of ethnic Hungarians in Romania’s Transylvania region.
Brussels, meanwhile, has shown great forbearance toward Tusk’s perceived political imperative to oppose EU positions on immigration, the Green transition, and other issues because of his stalwart pro EU and pro Ukraine policy.
The novelty of these races is the pitting of the U.S. against the EU mainstream on Ukraine, Russia, trade, climate change — “sovereigntism” versus EU solidarity. The results indicate that emulation of Trump’s appeal to voters may not be a winning tactic.
On the other hand, there is clear evidence of a reorganization of political competition across Europe setting the nationalist challenge against a mainstream consensus. This process tends to lock the parties encompassing the traditional social democratic left and the pro-business right into a single pro-establishment bloc.
This development could produce a fundamental realignment of party competition in Europe and force fundamental redesign of the European Union.
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