After an earthquake reportedly killed at least 1,000 people in Afghanistan on Wednesday, the international community, including the UK and European Union, kick-started its provision of aid. Even an Indian air force jet landed in Taliban-controlled Kabul with supplies marking a potential overture by New Delhi, which was a longtime critic of any negotiations with the Taliban.
Meanwhile, Pakistan dispatched convoys of essential aid. Iran also pledged to provide assistance. Our partners around the world are engaging with reality in Afghanistan. The regionalization of aid and humanitarian relief to the country should be welcomed by Western capitals because it is far more sustainable and efficient.
But Washington’s risk averse approach to engagement with Taliban-led Afghanistan falls short despite being the largest provider of aid.
As Afghanistan reels from the loss of life, Washington continues to further “assess” its aid options, signaling a continued resistance to working with the Taliban directly. Why doesn’t the U.S. government have a clear and immediate response to a human tragedy of this scale in a country we occupied for two decades? How can Americans and the world hope for a more engaged and nuanced U.S. diplomacy if Washington cannot respond with clarity to such black-and-white situation?
The potential influence of the United States should not be exaggerated. Even the previous Afghan government would have struggled to respond to an earthquake of this magnitude despite substantial support from the United States and its allies. The Taliban also have agency and have adopted policies that make it difficult for foreign governments to engage in good faith. But the chilling effect of U.S. sanctions hinder Afghanistan’s development and frozen foreign exchange reserves prevent the economy from stabilizing.
The White House’s hand-wringing over engagement with Taliban-led Afghanistan feels contrived when one considers that in the not so recent past, U.S. diplomats posed for photo ops with the Taliban, laughed together, and ultimately excluded the Afghan government from negotiations with them.
This earthquake presents a test for the Biden administration. Will it take additional steps to engage with Afghans at a moment of crisis, or will it sit on the sidelines as our partners and foes alike lend a helping hand?
Adam Weinstein is Deputy Director of the Middle East program at the Quincy Institute, whose current research focuses on security and rule of law in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq.
A Taliban helicopter takes off after bringing aid to the site of an earthquake in Gayan, Afghanistan, June 23, 2022. REUTERS/Ali Khara
Top image credit: Nov 16, 2024; New York, NY, USA; President-elect Donald Trump talks with Elon Musk (right) during UFC 309 at Madison Square Garden. Mandatory Credit: Brad Penner-Imagn Images TPX IMAGES OF THE DAY via REUTERS
Maybe Donald Trump really will be an anti-war president in his second term.
Trump donor and adviser Elon Musk reportedly meeting Iranian officials with the aim of defusing tensions could be a sign that the once and future president may truly buck the neocons and interventionists who have dogged Republican and Democratic efforts to engage Iran and kept the U.S. bogged down in conflicts in the Middle East for a generation. However, the efforts to stop such diplomacy from happening will be fierce.
Despite his hardline reputation and actions in imposing "maximum pressure" sanctions, exchanging strikes and threatening to blow up Iranian cultural sites, and tearing up the 2015 Iran deal — Trump has often been an outlier from the typical Republican hawkish line on Iran.
In 2015, when candidates vying for the GOP nomination were falling over themselves to denounce and pledge to "tear up" the Iran deal negotiated by the Obama administration, Trump said he would not tear up the deal but rather enforce it harshly, claiming his opponents didn't understand how the world actually works. When he finally came around to promising to tear it up, one of his main critiques was that America couldn't benefit financially from it unlike other parties to the deal — which, of course, is due to the U.S.'s own self-imposed "sanctions wall" on Iran.
When Trump made good on this promise and pulled out of the nuclear deal in 2018 — an approach his GOP opponents had endorsed but likely wouldn't have actually implemented — it sowed the seeds of disaster. Trump's surrounding himself with war hawks and neocons didn't help. He allowed the same political influences that limited Obama's ability to lift sanctions so America could benefit from the original nuclear deal; that ensured Biden would never rejoin that agreement and kept America embroiled in conflict after conflict with Tehran.
Key Trump advisers like John Bolton, Mike Pompeo, Brian Hook, and Elliott Abrams worked assiduously to prevent Trump from pursuing serious diplomatic options on Iran and delivering a "better deal." Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who has always worked to prevent anything close to U.S.-Iran rapprochement, bragged that it was he who manipulated Trump to abandon the agreement and shift to “maximum pressure.”
Yet to hear Trump tell it, he would have had an Iran deal with just one more week in office. He even said he told Biden's team to quickly seal an agreement with Iran because he "handed (the Biden administration) a country that was ready for a deal" but that they didn't know how to do it. Now, Trump will get another chance.
While Musk’s talks with Iranian officials are potentially important and could be a sign that major conflict can be avoided, progress will not come easy. Trump's concept of "deal making" heavily relies on the notion that the other side must be softened up in order to get the best deal from a "position of strength." But in his first term, the sanctions on Iran and provocative actions like the Soleimani assassination had the opposite effect and hardened Iran's position by sidelining those in Tehran interested in and capable of striking a bargain with Washington.
In Trump’s first term, French President Emmanuel Macron tried to get Iran’s president to agree to a direct meeting with Trump. Sen. Rand Paul (R-Ky.) tried to get then-Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif to come to the White House. But those efforts were ultimately rebuffed, likely by Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei himself, because hardliners did not want to reward Trump with a "photo op" after engaging in a series of escalations, with little assurance of any benefit for them.
Despite the chaos of his first term, Trump says he still wants a deal. In September 2024, Trump was asked if he would seek diplomacy with Iran in light of allegations that Iran wanted to assassinate him. “Yes, I would do that," he said. "We have to make a deal, because the consequences are impossible. We have to make a deal."
Trump’s instinct to negotiate is likely to run headlong into his elevation of hawkish advisers who don’t believe in negotiations. When Trump talks about the value of having John Bolton-types in the room to "scare" the other side, and then surrounds himself with hardliners like Secretary of State-designate Marco Rubio and hawks like national security adviser-designate Michael Waltz and Defense Secretary-designate Peter Hesgeth, it signals he may not have learned from his self-acknowledged "biggest mistake" of "picking some people I shouldn't have picked" to serve in his previous administration.
And it takes two to tango. Iran does have a reformist-minded president who campaigned on lifting sanctions and restoring the 2015 agreement, and who brought back pro-engagement diplomats to achieve that outcome. Their initial reactions to Trump appear to be open to negotiation, but guarded, emphasizing that Iran will react harshly to any escalation of pressure.
Also notable is Iran’s reported pledge in writing that it will not retaliate against Trump following threats issued after Soleimani’s assassination in 2020, and public dismissals of allegations that Iran has engaged in such plotting as fictitious.
Ultimately, however, the Supreme Leader — always cautious about engagement and eager to avoid any possible blowback from negotiations — will make the final call over whether and how to negotiate. In Trump’s first term, he was not open to talks. Now, that may change.
If Iran is serious about preventing war and pursuing diplomacy, it must be willing to test if Trump can actually deliver where others could not. Meeting with Trump's apparent emissary Elon Musk within just a week of the election suggests it could be ready to do just that.
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Top image credit: A Kenyan man reads newspapers at a shop in Nakuru following the U.S. presidential election results, where Donald Trump won against Democrat Kamala Harris in a remarkable political comeback. James Wakibia / SOPA Images via Reuters Connect
As commentators assess the implications of Donald Trump’s election victory for the United States and the world, various publications have asked what Trump’s return will mean for their continent. In one well-informed analysis, the BBC’s Wedaeli Chibelushi highlights “trade, aid, and security” as key sectors. We can also ask what might change in terms of Washington’s political relationships with various African countries, and how such changes would affect the overall balance of U.S. primacy versus restraint.
An initial caveat is necessary – of all the world’s regions, Trump and his team will likely not be thinking much about Africa. When Professor Stephen Walt recently assessed “The 10 Foreign-Policy Implications of the 2024 U.S. Election,” for example, he did not mention Africa – and that’s because the Middle East, Ukraine, NATO, and China, among other issues, will likely consume much more of Trump’s attention than the African continent will.
If Trump ignores Africa, that would be in keeping with a bipartisan neglect of the continent from the time of Barack Obama through the present. Obama and Joe Biden each held a “U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit” (in 2014 and 2022, respectively), but across the Obama, Trump, and Biden administrations, Africa was approached mostly as a theater for counterterrorism, trade, and global influence, rather than as having intrinsic importance to Washington. Vice President Kamala Harris would likely have replicated the largely performative, status quo-friendly approach of Biden. Although Harris had a deep bench of Africa hands on her campaign, that depth more reflects the long line of aspirants who line up for foreign policy jobs in Democratic administrations, more than a now-dashed promise of transformation. Biden and Harris will leave office with little to show for their Africa policy beyond the summit and a slate of high-profile but low-substance trips, including Biden’s upcoming visit to Angola.
As Trump takes office, there will be something of an opportunity for diplomatic outreach and “reset” with Africa. So far, Trump's picks for top foreign policy postings do not include anyone with a pronounced interest in African affairs and his victory has elicited more mixed reactions in Africa than one might expect. Despite his infamous “shithole countries” comment and his numerous racist and Islamophobic remarks, many ordinary Africans admire Trump’s entrepreneurial career, socially conservative platform, and outspokenness. Various African leaders were quick to congratulate the comeback candidate. Trump is, however, likely unaware of and relatively indifferent to whatever opportunity exists for engagement, and so it will probably slip by.
If “personnel is policy,” Trump’s first term did not bring any shocking or unusual appointments for civilian posts related to Africa, and his second term may not either; the true ideologues and hawks are likely to gravitate towards Iran policy, for example. During his first term, Trump appointed veteran diplomat Tibor Nagy as Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, think tanker J. Peter Pham as Special Envoy for the Sahel, and another veteran diplomat, Donald Booth, as Special Envoy for Sudan. The situation in the Sahel and Sudan was worse when Trump’s term ended than when it began: a massacre in Sudan in June 2019 brought no consequences for its perpetrators, and Mali witnessed a coup in 2020. Yet those outcomes cannot be laid solely at the feet of the Trump administration. Tellingly, the situation in the Sahel and Sudan in 2024 is also worse than it was when Biden took office, so neither administration earns high marks here.
Trump’s indifference to Africa could lead to continued inertia in Africa policymaking – meaning, concretely, that the military’s U.S. Africa Command or AFRICOM would continue to be the main face of U.S. policy on the continent. Although Trump is more dictator-friendly than Biden was, it’s notable that under Biden, AFRICOM Commander General Michael Langley has met, seemingly enthusiastically, with autocrats and would-be autocrats in Africa, including, for example, Libya’s Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar. Trump may show a friendly face to Russia, which could result in a more permissive environment for Russia – although it is not as though the Biden administration’s tough, anti-Russian rhetoric has yielded much actual success in rolling back Russian influence, particularly across the Sahel.
Politically, the biggest shifts could come in the Horn of Africa. It is possible that Trump’s team could recognize Somaliland, a breakaway territory that has been claiming independence from Somalia since 1991. With Somalia itself, the pendulum may swing back towards disengagement; Biden reversed a late Trump-era order to withdraw some troops. It is also possible that in Sudan, “the Trump administration will look to pick a winner” between the two factions – the Sudanese Armed Forces and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces – that are fighting for control.
At the same time, the White House’s absorption in other issues will likely mean that politics in the Horn (and in other regions of the continent) will only be considered “through the prism of Trump’s domestic fiscal policy and then on the political side, the Gulf and Israel.” On Somaliland, Trump may wish to avoid antagonizing Egypt, which has aligned with Somalia against Ethiopia, and whose President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi may be glad to see Trump’s return; on Sudan, Trump may defer to the United Arab Emirates, widely accused of backing the Rapid Support Forces, but may also simply let matters play out in Sudan while he focuses elsewhere.
In sum, Trump’s win brings mostly troubling implications for Africa and especially for ordinary Africans, whether because (as Chibelushi notes) key programs relating to aid and public health (above all the Presidential Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief and the President’s Malaria Initiative, both launched by President George W. Bush) may be cut, and/or because Trump may empower dictators even more than Biden did, and/or because inertia will leave AFRICOM to make the day-to-day decisions. Trump’s transactional approach may appeal to some African leaders, and Trump is interested in issues such as critical mineral access (although his previous administration’s “Critical Minerals Strategy” did not mention Africa). Overall, by the end of the decade, U.S. influence in Africa will likely have ebbed to an even lower point that where it stands today.
As President-elect Trump prepares to take office for a second time, he faces a world that has changed profoundly since 2020. While Russia’s invasion of Ukraine may be the most visible shift, two deeper changes in the international order demand America’s attention: the rise of multipolarity and the trend toward “multi-alignment.”
These realities provide an opportunity for the United States to rethink its approach to global affairs, adopting a grand strategy of “restraint.” This isn’t a call to retreat from the world. Instead, it’s an approach that prioritizes prudent balancing and selective blunting — moving beyond the ideal of maintaining U.S. hegemony by enforcing a so-called “rules-based order” and focusing instead on adapting to today’s geopolitical complexity.
Indeed, several regional powers hold significant influence, and their interests do not align neatly with those of Washington. China, India, Brazil, and Turkey have become increasingly assertive players, not just in their regions but on the global stage. These countries navigate their own complex priorities and pursue strategies that often reflect the needs of their citizens over the preferences of foreign powers. In this environment, the U.S. should not view itself as the world’s dominant force but as one player among many, working to balance power while managing relationships with rising and established nations alike.
A multipolar world doesn’t call for the U.S. to abandon its leadership entirely, but it does mean embracing a restrained approach that focuses on critical areas of interest, where American involvement can make a meaningful impact. The United States is no longer in a position to unilaterally set the global agenda or expect other countries to follow it without question. In this environment, the goal of American foreign policy should be to engage selectively in regions where its core interests are directly affected. In other words, it’s time to prioritize, not to police.
One of the greatest challenges will be managing the diffusion of power and influence to other great powers without falling victim to overreach or being drawn into unnecessary conflicts. America can meet this challenge by adopting a balancing strategy that empowers other regional actors to contribute to stability. For example, in the Indo-Pacific, countries like Japan, South Korea, and India have strong reasons to check China’s expansion. Rather than carrying the burden alone, Washington can support these countries’ efforts, providing economic, technological, and defense support that enables them to maintain a stable balance of power in the region. This approach allows the U.S. to pursue its interests without attempting to control the situation directly, a strategy that is both more realistic and more sustainable.
If multipolarity demands a recalibrated approach, the growing trend of “multi-alignment” both amplifies that demand and complicates it. Many countries are increasingly reluctant to commit exclusively to either the U.S. or its competitors. Instead, they pursue flexible partnerships with multiple powers, driven by pragmatic self-interest. Countries like India, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, for instance, are balancing their relationships with both the U.S. and China. They’re not playing both sides for the sake of confusion; they’re doing so to maximize their options and pursue a foreign policy that best serves their own needs.
Multi-alignment reflects a shift in global expectations about geopolitical relationships. In today’s world, few countries want to be tied down by the obligations of a rigid bloc. For the U.S., this means adapting to a reality where allies and partners may not always act as Washington would like. Yet multi-alignment also offers a valuable opportunity: it allows Washington to engage with countries on specific issues without requiring them to “choose sides” or abandon their own interests. Instead of pushing for full alignment, the U.S. can pursue issue-specific partnerships, where countries come together around shared goals without rigidly defined alliances.
By acknowledging and respecting the autonomy of multi-aligned countries, the U.S. can embrace restraint as a way to foster pragmatic, cooperative relationships. For example, India’s interests in balancing China align well with those of the United States, even as New Delhi maintains its defense ties with Russia. Rather than forcing a binary choice on India, the U.S. can work with Indian leaders where it matters most, supporting them in the Indo-Pacific without demanding that they abandon their relationships with other major players. Such an approach reflects a mature, realistic form of partnership that recognizes the complex interests driving many countries’ strategies today.
Restraint is not just a practical response to multipolarity and multi-alignment — it’s also a more sustainable way for America to engage in the world. The cost of maintaining extensive alliances and security guarantees has become increasingly difficult to justify, especially as other countries are willing and able to take on greater roles in their regions. By shifting from global intervention to prudent balancing, the U.S. can reduce its military footprint while still playing a constructive role where it counts. This means focusing on regions directly affecting American security, such as the North Atlantic and the Western Hemisphere, and allowing allies to assume greater responsibility elsewhere.
Under a restrained approach, America would prioritize diplomatic and economic levers over military tools, recognizing that influence can come from trade, technology partnerships, and cultural ties as much as from force. This strategy is more suited to a world where countries often seek flexible relationships rather than binding commitments. Instead of expecting nations to embrace an American-led order, the U.S. can work with them on mutually beneficial projects that respect both their interests and autonomy. In a world where influence flows from more than just military might and ideological dominance, the U.S. must work to secure its position through flexible collaboration and nuanced engagement.
Encouraging self-reliance among allies is another crucial aspect of restraint. Countries such as Japan, Australia, and Germany are more capable than ever of defending themselves and taking active roles in their regions. For too long, the U.S. has acted as the primary guarantor of their security, often at the cost of its own resources. By shifting to a supporting role and encouraging allies to bolster their defenses, the U.S. can foster stronger, more resilient partnerships. This approach doesn’t abandon allies — it acknowledges their growing capabilities and allows them to lead in their respective regions, ultimately creating a more balanced, multilateral world.
This strategy may strike some as a step back from global leadership, but in reality, it’s a strategic adaptation to the world as it is, not as it was – or was imagined to be – during the so-called unipolar moment. A restrained approach to foreign policy is not a call for isolationism or retreat; it’s a recognition that the U.S. must adapt to new geopolitical realities and pursue its interests accordingly. Trying to enforce a global order that no longer reflects the world’s power dynamics is neither feasible nor desirable – indeed, it is dangerous. Instead, America should focus on fostering global stability through strategic partnerships, blunting the efforts of other great powers to achieve regional or global hegemony, while avoiding overreach.
In a multipolar, multi-aligned world, restraint is not a loss of influence but a means of securing it more sustainably. The U.S. can lead by example, demonstrating that adapting to complexity requires flexibility and prudence, not dominance or hegemony. President-elect Trump’s new administration has a unique opportunity to embrace this restrained approach, enabling America to thrive in a world that no longer revolves around any single power. Through prudent balancing and selective blunting, the United States can continue to protect its interests and promote global stability without succumbing to the siren song of American global hegemony.
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