Eighty years ago, on June 26, 1945, the United Nations Charter was signed in San Francisco. But you wouldn’t know it if you listened to European governments today.
After two devastating global military conflicts, the Charter explicitly aimed to “save succeeding generations from the scourge of war.” And it did so by famously outlawing the use of force in Article 2(4). The only exceptions were to be actions taken in self-defense against an actual or imminent attack and missions authorized by the U.N. Security Council to restore collective security.
And yet, after the United States bombed Iran’s nuclear program last weekend, the leaders of the E3 countries (the United Kingdom, France and Germany) released a joint statement that made no reference to international law, let alone the U.N. Charter whose 80th anniversary was just days away. EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s post on X mentioned the risks of a nuclear Iran and the need for regional stability ahead of respect for international law, almost as if the latter were an afterthought.
When Russia launched its war of aggression against Ukraine in 2022, European leaders most certainly did not underline the need to preserve stability on the European continent above all else. Russia’s illegal invasion of its neighbor was seen as an attack on Europe itself and on everything that it stood for. A herculean effort was undertaken to punish Moscow and provide Kyiv with military assistance, financial support, and a path toward joining the West. EU leaders have even endorsed the establishment of a special tribunal to try Russia for the crime of aggression.
Due to pressure from the Trump administration, European decisionmakers have finally come around to the idea of a ceasefire in Ukraine. But after three years of war and hundreds of thousands of dead, they are still not prepared for a veritable and unavoidable compromise. Ukraine’s right to join NATO is still defended in many circles as a matter of principle, even though the administration ruling it out has rendered the entire discussion a moot point. Sanctions cannot be lifted while Russian troops remain on Ukrainian soil, even partially as a means of advancing a delicate peace process.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, we were told, left the world a binary choice: either fight to preserve the “rules-based international order” or enter a dangerous new reality defined by the “law of the jungle.”
To be fair, the “rules-based order” was always a deliberately opaque term, designed to allow a subset of states to dictate the terms of legitimate interstate behavior. But while the U.S. under Joe Biden conceived of this order as a bloc with both proponents and opponents, the Europeans seemed to view it more earnestly as a neutral description of the post-World War II global system based on multilateralism, international law, and the peaceful resolution of disputes.
Unfortunately, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine exposed — and deepened — Europe’s dependence on the United States for its security. This came after the EU’s worsening ties with Russia in the years prior to the war had already illustrated the tension between Brussels’ desire to “speak the language of power” while remaining a normative actor. As a matter of principle, no third country could exercise a veto over the EU and Ukraine pursuing mutually beneficial cooperation — but what if such cooperation exacerbated security tensions on the continent and was, therefore, of dubious strategic utility?
Three years ago, Brussels elites were patting themselves on the back over the resurgence of transatlantic unity and the EU’s newfound status as a “geopolitical actor.” Unbeknownst to them, they were actually laying the groundwork for the world to roll their eyes at any European reference to the “rules-based international order.” That European leaders continue to fall in line with the U.S. despite the major (and crudely manifested) rift that has opened up between them under Trump speaks volumes.
Going forward, appeals to international norms in the case of Ukraine will carry far less water. It has become clear as day that European governments refuse to compromise on Ukraine not to uphold universal principles, but rather because of their perceived security (and status-related) interests and fears. Ironically, this will come at the expense of Europe’s ability to get much of the rest of the world on board for its strategy of isolating Russia and increasing pressure on Vladimir Putin to compromise.
Twenty months of Israeli violations of international humanitarian law in Gaza have not prompted a significant break in relations between Jerusalem and European capitals. In that case, at least one could argue that Hamas was systematically violating the laws of war as well. But Israel’s attack on Iran was a clear-cut violation of international law — a preventive rather than pre-emptive war, aimed at averting an unfavorable security situation in the future rather than thwarting an imminent threat. In that sense, it was not entirely dissimilar from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which ostensibly aimed to halt Kyiv’s deepening ties with NATO.
All too often, we hear that the existence of a rules-based international order is the sine qua non of a European Union that itself is a rules-based organization composed of 27 equal member states. Yet Europe’s evident double standard in responding to the events of the past three years has laid bare its contradictory aspirations and the rudderlessness of its foreign policy.
With the U.S. invasion of Iraq and Russia’s more recent assault on Ukraine, the great powers have set a precedent that rising middle powers appear all too happy to emulate. To help reverse this trend, European governments will need to condemn violations of international law more consistently. They should also consider rallying a global coalition behind an effort to forge new and tighter international norms to regulate the use of force — a campaign that would also offer an opportunity to reset relations with Global South states that have been alienated by Europe’s response to the war in Ukraine.
Moreover, in recent years, countries such as Azerbaijan and Israel have succeeded in demonstrating that conflicts that high-minded internationalists insisted only had a political solution may have a military solution after all. It is imperative that Europe lead by example in sending a message to the world that diplomacy, rather than military coercion, represents the best way to achieve one’s political goals.
If Europe were more open to a genuine compromise peace with Russia — one that compartmentalizes disagreements but reaffirms key international norms — this would affirm quite powerfully that negotiations, rather than territorial gains, offer the most reliable means of guaranteeing one’s core security interests. Successful negotiations would also help to avert a decades-long cold war that risks going hot — and dealing the final blow to the world that the U.N. Charter envisioned in the process.
