In response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the West now has no choice but to impose the toughest possible economic sanctions on Russia and to seek to unite as much of the world as possible in pressing Russia to end the attack. All scholars and analysts of Russia and the countries of the former Soviet Union must add their voices to the unqualified condemnation of Russia’s action, and their support for massive economic retaliation.
Whatever may be the legitimacy of at least some Russian grievances about Western and Ukrainian policy, nothing can justify this flagrant violation by Russia of international laws and norms to which Russia itself has repeatedly appealed. And while Russia has had legitimate grounds to protest against Ukrainian discrimination against the linguistic and cultural rights of Russian-speakers in Ukraine, nothing remotely justifies President Putin’s grotesque lies about Ukrainian “genocide” and “Nazism.” Putin’s speech justifying the invasion brings to mind Secretary of State Cordell Hull’s response to the Japanese statement that accompanied the attack on Pearl Harbor:
“In all my 50 years of public service I have never seen a document that was more crowded with infamous falsehoods and distortions — on a scale so huge that I never imagined until today that any government on this planet was capable of uttering them."
Especially sinister was Putin’s reference to the “denazification” of Ukraine and the punishment of Ukrainians guilty of “atrocities” against Russian citizens in Ukraine. This would seem to hint at potentially ferocious repression in areas of Ukraine controlled by Russian forces, or even at an attempt to destroy Ukrainian nationalism as such.
Once the immediate crisis has passed, there will be a time to consider the lessons of this disaster for the formulation of U.S. global strategy, and the errors of that strategy over the past generation. For the moment, we must all support the Biden administration in its effort to punish and isolate Russia for this flagrant breach of international law.
Anatol Lieven is Director of the Eurasia Program at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft. He was formerly a professor at Georgetown University in Qatar and in the War Studies Department of King’s College London.
A resident stands in an apartment that received a shelling in Kharkiv, Ukraine February 24, 2022. REUTERS/Vyacheslav Madiyevskyy
After a more than 2 month pause, Russia has begun striking deep into Ukraine once again, sending a reported 96 missiles and drones toward civilian infrastructure in the capital this week
Following the U.S. presidential election, Vladimir Putin has stepped up Russia’s military campaigns. In addition to resuming strikes on Kyiv, Moscow has increased its drone strikes across Ukraine by 44%. Ivan Stupak, a former Ukrainian security officer, says, “In the next few months up to Jan. 20, we are expecting a significantly increasing number of launches towards Ukraine.”
“Launches” from Russia have indeed been steadily increasing. According to Stupak, there were 818 launches in August, 1,410 in September, and 2,072 in October. Ground attacks have intensified as well, especially in the border area of Kursk, which saw a partial Ukrainian occupation in August of this year.
Russia reportedly built up around 50,000 troops in Kursk to participate in a counter-offensive, with around 10,000 North Korean troops present to assist their Russian allies. Following this build-up, the fighting in Kursk this week has yielded high casualties for Russia. In addition to the 2,000 Russians killed or injured on Tuesday alone, Moscow has also lost at least 88 armored vehicles on the roads to Kursk, as counted by a Ukrainian drone operator.
Other Ukraine War News This Week:
American military contractors will be deployed to Ukraine for the first time since the conflict started. CNN reports that the Biden administration has lifted its ban on the practice, allowing the Department of Defense to contract with private citizens to perform maintenance on vehicles in Ukraine. According to a DOD official, “these contractors will be located far from the front lines and they will not be fighting Russian forces. They will help Ukrainian Armed Forces rapidly repair and maintain US-provided equipment as needed so it can be quickly returned to the front lines.”
On Wednesday, Secretary of State Antony Blinken met with NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte in Brussels. Al Jazeera reports that Blinken pledged to increase support for Ukraine before the end of Biden’s administration, saying, “President Biden fully intends to drive through the tape and use every day to continue to do what we have done these last four years, which is strengthen this alliance.” Blinken also indicated that the United States would send a “firm response” to the use of North Korean troops in Russia’s Kursk campaign.
Ukrainian officials are beginning to value security guarantees at least as much as territorial integrity in a future peace deal. According to the New York Times, future talks would not focus as much on geographic boundaries, but on assurances around a cease-fire. A Ukrainian official speaking anonymously said, “the territorial question is extremely important, but it’s still the second question, the first question is security guarantees.” The Times report says that this comes as President-elect Trump has shown an eagerness to bring a swift end to the conflict.
Deputy spokesperson Vedant Patel confirmed that the 10,000 North Korean soldiers were sent to Kursk to assist Moscow in its attempt to take the territory back from Ukrainian forces. Patel said that “Russia’s battlefield success using these DPRK troops will in large part be dictated by how well the Russians can integrate them into their military.”
When asked about the recently formalized military treaty, and the potential of joint Russian-North Korean training drills, the spokesperson said, “the United States is consulting closely with our allies and partners and other countries in the region on the implications of this, on these developments.”
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Top image credit: Hezbollah supporters carry the coffin of a victim who was killed in electronic pagers explosion, during a funeral procession in Beirut southern suburb. Marwan Naamani/dpa via Reuters Connect
As the Israeli assault on Gaza passes the 13-month mark, and as Hezbollah reels under the massive Israeli bombing campaign on its leaders and operational centers in Lebanon, it has become clear that militant political Islam has run out of steam. Concurrently, Iran’s defense strategic doctrine has been deprived of a major component; namely, its “proxy” militia groups.
As a U.S. government senior analyst, I followed political Islam and Islamic activism since the early 1990s. Now nearly 30 years later, it’s safe to judge with confidence that if this phenomenon is to survive, leaders of Islamic parties must jettison violence and militancy and return to participatory politics.
Israel’s recent military successes against Hamas and Hezbollah might give the government of Benjamin Netanyahu cause for celebration. But because of his refusal or unwillingness to address the root causes that helped create Islamic political parties and movements in Palestine, Lebanon, and elsewhere, Israeli successes in war could prove no more than a Pyrrhic victory.
Furthermore, the killing of well over 43,000 Palestinians in Gaza and several thousands more in the West Bank and Lebanon cannot and must not be justified by Israel’s spurious claims that the carnage has been inadvertently caused by the targeting of “terrorists.” The massive destruction of Gaza and parts of Lebanon gives the impression that the Israeli military views Palestinian and Lebanese civilians as legitimate targets because of Hamas' and Hezbollah's attacks on Israel.
Yet, despite the assassinations and the destruction in Gaza, the West Bank, southern Lebanon and Beirut’s southern suburbs since October 7, 2023, Hamas and Hezbollah continue to exist, clearly not as strong military forces as they were before the last year’s conflicts, but as an idea representing their peoples’ political aspirations. If that’s the case, where does political Islam go from here? A brief history might help answer this question.
The phenomenon of political Islam and Islamization has manifested itself in the past three decades through at least three different interpretations of the Muslim faith with varying degrees of operational durability and reach: a radical interpretation; mainstream political mobilization by Islamic movements; and country-specific, single-issue political movements.
Radical political Islam
Since the early 1990s, Islamic radicalism has been more closely identified with the Saudi-based Salafi Wahhabi doctrine, which was developed in the 18th century by the famedArabian Peninsula theologian Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab. Salafi Wahhabi Islam, which until recent years has been the hallmark of the Saudi state, advocates jihad in all its forms against the perceived enemies of their brand of Islam.
Unlike the other three schools of jurisprudence in Sunni Islam, the Hanbali-based Salafi Wahhabism considers jihad a central tenet of Islam. It has also pursued proselytization or da’wa to propagate the Salafi Wahhabi doctrine across the world. Whereas the concept of jihad in the other schools is mostly a personal, peaceful effort to make one a better Muslim, in Salafi Wahhabism, it can be a religiously justifiable violent act against perceived infidels, states and individuals alike.
The Taliban, al-Qaida, ISIS, ISIS-K, and their affiliated groups have been the most violent expression of Salafi Wahhabism. They have committed countless acts of terrorism against their perceived enemies across the globe. Saudi and other Salafi Wahhabi radicals in the 1990s viewed the United States as part of “Dar al-Harb” or the abode of war, which made it a justifiable target. Osama bin Ladin underscored this claim a month after 9/11. More than two decades later, the victims of the 9/11 attacks have yet to reach a closure in their quest for justice and accountability.
The threat of this radical paradigm, although still present in some corners of the Muslim world, has all but dissipated, and the scourge of global Islamic jihad has faded.
Mainstream Sunni political Islam
The establishment of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) in Egypt in 1928 was the forerunner of political Islam globally. While ostensibly, the MB was created to combat the pro-British monarchy in Egypt, its primary mission was to transform the Egyptian society into a more ethical Muslim polity.
The group’s slogan, now nearly a century later, has always been “Islam is a faith, a society, and a state” or as it’s known in Arabic, “Al-Islam Din, Dunya, Dawla.” The so-called three Ds in the MB identity became an organizing principle for other Islamic parties throughout the Muslim world. As a result, Islamic parties embedded in MB ideology were formed in Syria, Jordan, Palestine, Morocco, Tunisia, Kuwait, Indonesia, Malaysia, Turkey, Kenya, Uzbekistan, and elsewhere. Although these parties are connected to the MB ideologically, they were not connected to it organizationally and operationally.
In terms of political mobilization, the MB and its affiliated parties supported gradual political change where free elections were permitted. With a few exceptions, mainstream Islamic political parties participated in national elections and accepted the election results peacefully. Where some of these parties were banned from participating in national elections, they ran “independent” candidates with no overt party affiliations. Most of these parties shunned violence and strove to change their societies from below through civic mobilization.
I interacted with many of these parties during my government career and frequently briefed policymakers on their contributions to their societies, especially in the fields of education, health care, civil society activities, family hygiene, water resources, job creation, start-ups, and other areas. As examples of these activities in the 1980s and 1990s, the MB built and operated affordable networks of hospitals across Egypt, which primarily benefited the middle class. The Refah Party created an Islamic chamber of commerce, which supported small businesses across Turkey. PAS in Malaysia established a high-quality but affordable school system and vocational training programs for their youth.
In response to the root causes of poverty, hunger, disease, unemployment, inadequate education and health services, and youth hopelessness, Islamic parties presented a political alternative to the strongman rule prevalent in most Muslim countries. Where they were allowed to participate in national elections in the 1980s and 1990s, they received relatively large numbers of votes, from Turkey to Egypt and Malaysia. Strongmen prevailed against these parties and ultimately curtailed their political activities severely and denied them the right to participate in future national elections. Consequently, the root causes continued to fester without tangible solutions.
Country-specific Islamic parties and movements
Hamas and Hezbollah, as prime examples of these parties, were established in response to specific situations in their countries — Israeli occupation of parts of Palestine and of south Lebanon. While the two parties are similar in their objectives, they differ in their religious orientation. Hamas is grounded in Muslim Brotherhood Sunni Islamic ideology, while Hezbollah adheres to the mainstream Twelver Shia doctrine of Islam.
Despite the thousands of deaths among Hamas and Hezbollah in the current war with Israel, their leaders continue to insist that their “struggle” against Israel will continue until their nationalist goals are attained.
The way forward
Bread-and-butter concerns and job creation programs became the basis of the so-called Muslim engagement efforts of the U.S. government in the 1980s and 1990s, which were initiated in several Muslim countries, from Egypt to Uzbekistan and from Morocco to Bangladesh. Sadly, many of these programs were curtailed after 9/11 as the Bush administration shifted its resources to fund the global war on terror.
Successive American administrations have dealt with political Islam with varying degrees of success. They have rejected the radical paradigm and its violent jihad. However, Washington has engaged some of the mainstream Islamic parties through diplomacy by funding tangible social and economic programs and encouraging their democratic orientations, until October 7, that is.
As the region moves beyond October 7, the incoming Trump administration should realize that unless the root causes are addressed and Muslim youth can envision a hopeful future, Muslim countries, including America’s strongest allies, will continue to suffer from instability and chaos for years to come. And the U.S. itself could find itself under attack by radical groups and terrorist organizations.
The U.S. military has been bombing two countries in the last several days — Syria and Yemen — though details are scarce and the mainstream media has given it very little attention. U.S. forces have also been attacked again in Syria, though this additional headline also went under the radar.
The Associated Press has reported that the U.S. struck nine targets in two locations in Syria on Monday, allegedly targeting Iran-aligned parties that previously attacked U.S. military personnel. Namely, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) posted on X that the strikes were conducted to “degrade the Iranian backed groups’ ability to plan and launch future attacks on U.S. and Coalition forces who are in the region to conduct D-ISIS operations.”
The Pentagon did not provide further details about both parties’ attacks or their respective locations by Monday evening, according to AP. (Update: CENTCOM posted on X Tuesday night that the U.S. struck an Iranian-supported weapons and logistics headquarters facility in response to an attack on U.S. personnel at Patrol Base Shaddadi.)
The U.S. has struck several Syrian targets over the last year. Notably, a previous U.S. attack on Syrian government military posts near the Iraq border killed 18 Syrian fighters back in August. In February, the U.S. hit 85 Iran-aligned targets in airstrikes in Syria and Iraq to retaliate against a previous attack on American troops. And U.S. ally Israel has also increasingly targeted Syria since the start of the Israel-Hamas war last year, striking military targets in the Aleppo and Idlib regions of Syria over the weekend.
Moreover, the U.S. also struck Yemen on Sunday and Monday over Houthi strikes against Israeli forces, hitting parts of Yemeni capital Sanaa and the northern Amran governorate.
These tit-for-tat attacks in Syria and beyond could ultimately escalate military tensions in a region already burdened by two major conflict flash points in Gaza and Lebanon. And such conditions leave U.S. troops in the area vulnerable to attack.
“It would be a travesty to allow an incident like Tower 22 to repeat,” noted Quincy Institute Middle East fellow Adam Weinstein, who co-wrote a report with QI’s Steve Simon about the perils of keeping troops in Syria and Iraq. He referred to the attack that killed three U.S. soldiers stationed in Jordan to assist the efforts in Syria, in January.
“With each strike and counterstrike, the cycle of tit-for-tat in Syria endures. But one lucky strike could cost U.S. lives in a mission with shrinking gains.”
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