In an online talk with Washington Post opinion writer Jonathon Capehart today, Senator Bob Menendez (D-N.J.) gave an update on the status of his Defending Ukraine Sovereignty Act of 2022, or as he's calling it, the “Mother of All Sanctions” bill.
His bill would place broad sanctions on Russian banks, state-owned enterprises, energy firms, and the Nord Stream 2 pipeline if the Biden administration deems that Russia is engaged in a significant escalation of hostilities in Ukraine. Menendez who is chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, says the Senate is still in the middle of “intensive negotiations,” and that “there are a few items that we are trying to meet the challenge of finding a pathway forward to reconcile different views.”
But he was blunt about the goal of the measure, which he distinguished from previous sanctions bills: “they would be devastating to the Russian economy,” adding that “every Russian would feel it at the end of the day.”
Last week, the Biden administration announced that it would no longer use the word “imminent” when describing Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Menendez didn’t seem as convinced, though he chose his words wisely: “When you see the back-up resources that Putin has amassed along the Ukrainian border…all indications would suggest that he can invade and would be ready to do so.”
Menendez also shared that he had dinner with German Chancellor Olaf Scholz last night, along with several key senators, and is “convinced that the German chancellor is in lockstep with the United States.” However, Scholz himself has not been as explicit, specifically skirting the Nord Stream 2 pipeline issue, which the Ukraine lobby — led by the Ukraine Federation of the Employers of the Oil and Gas Industry — has tied directly to Ukrainian security. To date, Scholz has refused to publicly declare the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline dead if Russia invades Ukraine.
Nick Cleveland-Stout is a Research Associate in the Democratizing Foreign Policy program at the Quincy Institute. Previously, Nick conducted research on U.S.-Brazil relations as a 2023 Fulbright fellow at the Federal University of Santa Catarina.
Top image credit: 250410-N-FS097-1573 U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY (April 10, 2025) An F-35C Lightning II, attached to Strike Fighter Squadron (VFA) 97, launches from the flight deck of the Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70) during flight operations in the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility. (Official U.S. Navy photo)
Since October 7, 2023, the United States has quietly but significantly expanded its military presence across the Middle East, reversing the drawdown that followed its withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021.
U.S. troop numbers in the region have risen from approximately 34,000 to nearly 50,000 as of late 2024, a level not seen since the height of the anti-ISIS campaign, in addition to a rapid increase in naval and aerial deployments. This shift reflects a strategic recalibration that appears driven less by long-term planning than by an improvised response to perceived Iranian threats, instability in the Red Sea, and domestic political pressure to “do something” without committing to a full-scale conflict.
While these movements have mostly evaded public scrutiny, they mark a significant increase in the regional U.S. force posture. Among the most visible developments has been the deployment of three aircraft carrier strike groups to waters near Yemen: the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower, the USS Carl Vinson, and the USS Harry S. Truman, as part of Operation Prosperity Guardian, a multinational task force launched in response to Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping lanes.
These carriers have provided air cover for escalating strikes on Houthi targets and infrastructure following the group’s attacks on Red Sea shipping lanes in retaliation for Israel’s war in Gaza. Each carrier strike group also brings an escort of guided-missile cruisers and destroyers, layered with Aegis missile defense systems. Notably, the USS Carl Vinson brings with it a complement of 90 aircraft and 6,000 crew members, enhancing the U.S. Navy's operational capabilities in the region.
At the same time, six B-2 stealth bombers — representing nearly 30% of the U.S. Air Force's stealth bomber fleet — have been deployed to Diego Garcia, a remote but strategically located Indian Ocean base that offers a launchpad for long-range missions aimed at deterring Iran and projecting power over the Strait of Hormuz. It marks one of the largest such deployments to the base since the U.S. began building it in 1971.
There are also expanded deployments in Jordan and Cyprus that have been formalized through new agreements, as well as rotating Marine and Army units in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Approximately 13,500 U.S. forces are based in Kuwait, primarily at Camp Arifjan and Ali al-Salem Air Base, underscoring the strategic importance of these installations. Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar and Muwaffaq Salti Air Base in Jordan have served as key nodes for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) operations, as well as F-15/F-16 sorties. The intensification of ISR operations reflects a shift toward persistent surveillance as a form of deterrence, with unmanned aerial systems and signal intelligence platforms operating across the Gulf and Levant.
In March 2025, the Pentagon launched Operation Rough Rider, a significant expansion of its campaign against Houthi-controlled territories in Yemen, using the pretext of anti-piracy and maritime security to justify high-casualty airstrikes on military and logistical targets. Dozens were reported killed in an April 18 strike on the Ras Isa fuel port, drawing condemnation from humanitarian groups and accusations of strategic overreach.
Rather than reducing risk, the buildup conveys a constant readiness to escalate without a clear strategy or endgame. Washington is burning high-end military resources to intercept low-cost Houthi projectiles. Each Houthi drone may cost as little as $2,000, while a single U.S. interceptor missile — like a SM-6 or Patriot — can run over $4 million.
The result is a tactical loop: the Houthis bleed U.S. stockpiles without altering the strategic balance. In that sense, the most recent surge of U.S. power recalls the post-9/11 “presence-as-policy” paradigm, where military footprint substitutes for political strategy. Compounding the concern is CENTCOM’s growing operational autonomy with field commanders often acting ahead of or outside civilian diplomatic timelines, underscoring a dynamic in which military posture increasingly drives foreign policy, not the other way around.
What’s less clear is how long this posture can be maintained: the financial cost, logistical burden, and strategic ambiguity raise questions about sustainability, both in Washington and among increasingly anxious allies.
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Top image credit: President Donald Trump speaks to the media following the White House Easter Egg Roll in Washington, D.C., on April 21, 2025. President Trump speaks about Secretary of Defense Hegseth, the Pope's death, and the situation in Ukraine and Iran. (Photo by Andrew Leyden/NurPhoto) VIA REUTERS
Most of the peace plan for Ukraine now sketched out by the Trump administration is not new, is based on common sense, and has indeed already been tacitly accepted by Kyiv.
Ukrainian officials have acknowledged that its army has no chance in the foreseeable future of reconquering the territories now occupied by Russia. Vice President J.D. Vance’s statement that the U.S. plan would “freeze the territorial lines…close to where they are today” simply acknowledges an obvious fact.
On the other hand, by reportedly agreeing to a ceasefire along the present front line, Putin has indicated his readiness to abandon Russia’s demand that Ukraine withdraw from the parts of the provinces claimed by Russia that Ukraine still holds. This too is common sense. The Ukrainians will never agree to give those up, and, judging by the slowness of Russia’s advance to date, conquering these territories in the face of Ukrainian resistance backed by the U.S. would be a long and horribly bloody process from which Russia would gain only devastated wastelands.
Even without a U.S. veto, NATO membership for Ukraine is not realistic, both because all existing NATO members have made clear that they will not fight to defend Ukraine, and because several European countries will also veto Kyiv’s membership. Indeed, during the peace talks at the war’s outset, President Volodymyr Zelensky himself said that since all the leading NATO governments (including the Biden administration) had refused to promise NATO membership within five years, a treaty of neutrality with security guarantees was the best way for Ukraine to go.
At the same time, the Trump plan contains one big surprise: the offer to recognize Russian sovereignty over Crimea. Unlike neutrality and de facto (not de jure) acceptance of Russian control over the other territories, this really constitutes a major concession to Russia. It is not, however, as big as the Western media is suggesting, since it does not cover the other four provinces in eastern Ukraine that Russia claims to have annexed.
Nor is it clear yet whether the Trump administration is simply offering formal recognition of Russian sovereignty over Crimea itself, or whether it — and Moscow — will also insist on Ukraine doing so, which is almost certainly politically impossible for the Zelensky government. White House press spokeswoman Karoline Leavitt has said that Trump’s offer of recognition of Russian sovereignty over Crimea applies only to the U.S., and that he is not demanding that Ukraine follow suit.
Given this ambiguity, it was unwise and thoughtless of Zelensky to declare immediately that “there is nothing to talk about here.” Maybe he doesn’t need to talk about it — and this kind of public rebuff is no way to retain the Trump administration’s sympathy.
There is a certain legal, moral, and historical basis for the U.S. at least to treat Crimea differently, since Crimea was only transferred from the Russian Soviet Republic to the Ukrainian Soviet Republic by Soviet decree in 1954, and without any pretense of consultation with the local population. The Crimean majority vote to join Russia in 2014 also appears to have been generally credible, while the “referenda” held by Russia in the other four provinces in the middle of the war are rightly seen as wholly unreliable.
Will this plan bring peace? Russia appears close to accepting it — though at least as revealed so far, the plan does not appear to address other Russian demands, including the rights of Russian speakers in Ukraine, limitations on the Ukrainian armed forces, and, above all, a bar on a European “reassurance force” in Ukraine, something on which the British, French, and other governments have been working intensively.
It is possible that the Kremlin will try to load additional and genuinely unacceptable conditions onto the peace plan (for example, radical reductions in the Ukrainian armed forces). In that case, Trump should blame Moscow for the failure of the peace process, and, while walking away from it, should also continue U.S. aid to Ukraine.
A key motive for Moscow’s acceptance is that the Putin administration is indeed extremely anxious that Trump should blame Ukraine and the Europeans, not Russia, for a failure of the talks, and therefore that if, as threatened, he “walks away” from the peace process, he will also cut off military and intelligence aid to Kyiv.
For that same reason, the Ukrainians and Europeans would be insane to reject this plan outright, as initial statements suggest they may. As already noted, the formal goals set by Ukraine, for NATO membership and the recovery of its lost territories, are practically impossible to achieve. In concrete terms therefore, Ukraine loses nothing by agreeing to Trump’s plan.
Assuming that the British government sticks to Prime Minister Keir Starmer’s statement that a European “reassurance force” can enter Ukraine only if the U.S. acts as a “backstop,” then this force is also not going to happen. Trump has no intention of providing such a guarantee, which would amount to Ukrainian NATO membership by another name. Key European governments including Poland’s have also said that they would not participate in any such force.
At present and for a considerable time to come, the British and French armies simply do not seem to have the troops for such a deployment in a context of possible war with Russia. A former British army chief, General Lord Dannatt, has said that (given the need for rotation and training of troops) up to 40,000 British soldiers would need to be designated for such a force, and “we just haven’t got that number available.” Creating such a force for Ukraine would also mean ending British commitments to defend existing NATO members, notably the Baltic states and Poland.
At present, the likely response of Kyiv and most European governments to the Trump plan appears to be “no, but.” In other words, they will reject the plan as it stands, but declare their readiness to negotiate on aspects of it. This, however, would be deeply unwise, if indeed Russia is ready to accept it. Trump is waiting on them and he is not a patient man. His administration’s threat to leave Ukraine and Europe to their own devices could hardly have been clearer. As Secretary of State Marco Rubio has stated:
“The Ukrainians have to go back home, they have to run it by their president, they have to take into account their views on all of this. But we need to figure out here now, within a matter of days, whether this is doable in the short term. Because if it’s not, then I think we’re just going to move on.”
If the U.S. does indeed “move on,” Ukraine will have placed itself in a terribly precarious situation, and West European countries may face a choice between deep humiliation and immense danger. For if U.S. aid is withdrawn, Ukraine’s ability to hold its present line would be greatly reduced, and the chances of a Russian breakthrough greatly increased.
If that happened, Europeans would either have to admit that their “ironclad” promises to Ukraine were made of paper, or send their troops into Ukraine. They could of course stay in Kyiv and Odessa, far away from the actual fighting, but how would that help Ukraine? And unless this intervention were worked out as part of a deal with Moscow that ceded much additional territory to Russia, how could European air forces avoid being drawn into direct combat?
Given these acute dangers, and given that details of the Trump plan still have to be worked out, the appropriate Ukrainian and European response should be “yes, but” — certainly if they wish to have any hope of retaining Washington’s support for Ukraine.
The Trump plan would leave 80% of Ukraine independent and free to try to move towards membership in the European Union, and, in historical terms, that would be a great (albeit qualified) victory for Ukraine. A rejection of that plan can only promise Ukraine greater defeat — possibly catastrophically greater.
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Top photo credit: Michael O’Hanlon (DoD Photo by U.S. Army Sgt. James K. McCann), Ret. General Jack Keane (White House photo) and Michele Flournoy (CNAS/Flickr)
UPDATE 4/24, 5:15 PM: The Defense Policy Board website has been scrubbed, as reported by The Intercept. The list of DPB members can still be viewed on an archived version of the website.
Discussing alleged Pentagon leaks with Tucker Carlson on Monday, recently ousted DoD official and Iraq war veteran Dan Caldwell charged that there are a number of career staff in the Pentagon who oppose the current administration’s policies. He then took particular aim at the the Defense Policy Board as a potential source of ongoing leaks to the press.
Caldwell claimed “most of the [DoD] leaks” were probably coming from career staff “hostile to the secretary, to the president, vice president's worldview.” But, he also told Carlson that “there's a less obvious place” the leaks could come from: the Defense Policy Board, which advises the secretary of defense on matters related to defense policy.
There is no evidence to his claim about the leaks, nor has there been any insight into the investigation reportedly embroiling Caldwell and two others who were pushed out of the Pentagon last Friday. Statements by Caldwell, who was serving as senior adviser to Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, and others suggest the accusations against them are a setup. Caldwell’s interview with Carlson did little to shed light onto who specifically might be behind them, or why, though a Drop Site News report late yesterday underscored the fierce internal infighting that could have led to the present circumstances.
But the interview did draw fresh attention to the Defense Policy Board, which is quite unknown outside the Beltway, but does wield influence inside the Pentagon as a repository for former high level national security officials who are tasked with providing “independent, informed advice and opinions on matters of defense policy” to the E-Ring.
As Caldwell pointed out, today the current DPB is filled with Biden-era appointments like former Obama national security adviser Susan Rice, and Michele Flournoy, who also worked in the Pentagon during the Obama administration and is now a high-powered consultant working with the defense and tech industry.
It also includes Michael O’Hanlon of Brookings, an early, integral think tank supporter of the War in Iraq, and Richard Fontaine, CEO of the Center for a New American Security (CNAS), an enthusiastic proponent of the counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign during the first Obama administration. He served in various national security roles during the wars, including as Sen. John McCain’s foreign policy advisor.
The board has likely not met since Trump’s inauguration and it would be no surprise if it’s entirely replaced, as the undersecretary for policy planning oversees the panel and Elbridge Colby was just confirmed to the post two weeks ago. Trump fired the board after he lost the 2020 election and Biden fired and replaced Trump’s replacements in 2021 with the current roster.
The faces, names and political affiliations may change, but members have largely reflected the same consensus thinking about using and sustaining U.S. power abroad, whether it be for maintaining the global liberal order or confronting great power conflict. Past members have included foreign policy luminaries such as Henry Kissinger and Madeline Albright, who once famously said, “What's the point of having this superb military that you're always talking about if we can't use it?”
Many have sailed through the revolving door between government, think tanks, academia, and the defense industry and have been integral to the failed policies that led to and prolonged U.S. wars and smaller interventions abroad since 9/11.
In addition to Washington mainstay Susan Rice, for example, DPB member Kori Schake is director of foreign and defense policy studies at the American Enterprise Institute, which essentially served as the brain trust for the Iraq War. Today it is regularly pushing for further Pentagon budget increases. In a 2022 Foreign Affairs article, Schake herself called for a DoD budget exceeding $1 trillion.
Current DBP member Jack Keane, former vice chief of staff of the U.S. Army, was a key figure in pushing President Bush to “surge” U.S. troops into Iraq in 2007 and was an aggressive cheerleader for the aforementioned COIN and pushing more troops into Afghanistan in 2009.
Notably, Keane subsequently served as executive chairman of military contractor AM General, which obtained a $459 million contract in 2017 to send more than 2,000 Humvees to Afghanistan — profiting from his previous policy recommendation to Congress.
A DoD representative told RS the DBP website is “up to date.” And yet, some members’ online profiles suggest it may not be : the official website says Flournoy is a member; her bios on Council on Foreign Relations and Center for a New American Security pages, however, say she is a former one.
For now, however, the DPB’s composition is representative of a Washington highly resistant to change, particularly to the “America First” approach that questions whether the policies of the past 30 years have made the U.S. any safer or more prosperous. Again, it is not clear how much access that DPB members, together or individually, have to the Pentagon today or whether they even have access to the type of inside information that's been allegedly leaked.
But musing that his restraint-minded foreign policy views played a role in his ouster, Caldwell alleged the old establishment’s entrenchment inside could have ruptured informational leaks helping throw the DoD into disarray — mere months into the new administration.
“We had people who had personal vendettas against us, and I think they weaponized the investigation against us. I think that’s part of what’s going on here,” Caldwell alleged on Carlson’s show. “And of course, I have some views about the role of America in the world, you know, as we discussed, [a] little controversial. All of us [who were fired] in our ways threatened really established interests.”
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