With Ukraine-Russia tensions reaching a boiling point, the Senate is poised to vote this afternoon on a bill championed by Senator Ted Cruz (R-TX) to sanction Russian businesses associated with the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline. If completed the pipeline would allow Russia to circumvent Ukraine and export natural gas directly to Germany, a move Ukrainian interests fiercely oppose as, amongst other issues, it will cost the country hundreds-of-millions in energy transit fees it receives every year under the current pipeline system.
While the vote and seemingly all things Ukraine-Russia have garnered front-page headlines, behind the scenes, Ukraine has launched a multi-million dollar lobbying push to steer U.S. foreign policy on this, and other issues, in its direction.
In just the past year, the Ukrainian government and other interests in Ukraine have hired nine firms that registered under the Foreign Agents Registration Act. Most prominently, Yorktown Solutions, has reportedreceiving more than $1 million from Ukraine clients in 2021 and contacted congressional offices hundreds of times on behalf of the Ukraine Federation of the Employers of the Oil and Gas Industry (UFEOGI), including at least one meeting between these lobbyists and Senator Cruz himself. Yesterday, the firm sent a “Nord Stream 2 pipeline - Facts on the Ground” brief in support of Cruz’s bill to hundreds of congressional offices.
Additionally, UFEOGI inked deals with Karv Communications and Arent Fox in the summer of 2021, which, respectively received nearly $120,000 and more than $300,000 from UFEOGI to advocate against Nord Stream 2. Karv has focused heavily on media outreach related to the pipeline, and reported meeting with journalists at the Wall Street Journal, CNN, Reuters, and others on UFEOGI’s behalf. Arent Fox has played more of an inside game for UFEOGI, focusing its efforts on influence at the State Department.
These and many more details about the Ukraine lobby in the United States will be chronicled in a forthcoming Quincy Institute report on the topic. And, as for the vote today, even if Cruz’s bill isn’t passed as is expected, it’s well worth noting that Ukraine’s lobbyists and public relations professionals were a vital reason the bill even made it this far.
Ben Freeman is Director of the Democratizing Foreign Policy program at the Quincy Institute. He investigates money in politics, defense spending, and foreign influence in America. He is the author of The Foreign Policy Auction, which was the first book to systematically analyze the foreign influence industry in the United States.
Top photo credit: Chinese President Xi Jinping and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi shake hands as they visit the Hubei Provincial Museum in Wuhan, Hubei province, China April 27, 2018. China Daily via REUTERS/File Photo
This past June marks five years since the Galwan Valley incident, when a series of tense standoffs along disputed areas of the China-India border erupted in a bloody melee that resulted in the deaths of at least 20 Indian soldiers and an unknown number of Chinese casualties.
As a result, China-India bilateral relations sank to their lowest point in decades, and many observers expressed grave concern about the potential for a wider conflict between the two nuclear-armed powers.
In the years since the clash, diplomacy aimed at easing tensions along the border has yielded positive results, leading some to believe that a thaw in China-India relations is underway. In 2024, for example, China and India struck a deal that allows for the resumption of patrols along the Line of Actual Control by military personnel from both countries. More recently, China agreed to reopen its borders to Indian pilgrims hoping to travel to holy sites in Tibet over the summer months.
At the same time, the border dispute itself remains unresolved, and geopolitical competition between China and India has escalated in other contexts, raising questions about the extent to which a true reset in relations can realistically be expected. Recent events — in particular, China's diplomatic response to the Pahalgam crisis last May — suggest that the supposed thaw may be based more on rhetoric than on any substantive paradigm shift in Beijing or New Delhi.
A reset in relations?
While peace at the border has held steady since the 2024 agreement, competition between China and India has escalated elsewhere. In the Indian Ocean region, for example, India recently conducted naval exercises alongside several countries, including South Africa, Tanzania, Mauritius, and the Seychelles. India has also concluded a landmark defense agreement with Sri Lanka to foster collaboration on military training, intelligence and technology. By significantly stepping up its engagement in these areas, India aims to become the preferred security partner in the Indian Ocean region, displacing China, which has also sought to expand its presence there in recent years.
Similar developments have also taken place in Southeast Asia, a region much closer to what China perceives as its immediate sphere of influence. Specifically, India has concluded a major arms export deal with the Philippines, increased its collaboration with ASEAN, and challenged China’s controversial territorial claims in the South China Sea. Given that India was more reluctant to take steps likely to provoke China’s ire prior to 2020, its growing interest in opportunities to counter China’s influence in its own backyard can be seen as a direct consequence of the border clashes.
India is also set to host the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue Leaders’ Summit for the first time later this year, underscoring its deepening involvement in the group, which China believes is a key component of a U.S.-led containment strategy in the Indo-Pacific. While India has consistently distanced itself from the hard security dimensions of the Quad, it recently signed onto the Quad Critical Minerals Initiative, which aims to significantly reduce reliance on China for supplies of critical minerals. At the Quad Foreign Ministers’ Meeting held in Washington D.C. in early July, Indian Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar also joined with his counterparts in reiterating support for the concept of a “free and open Indo-Pacific,” which is often interpreted as a thinly-veiled critique of China’s activities in the region.
China has also taken steps that pose a clear challenge to India. Since the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine War, for example, China has cemented closer ties with Russia in what has been dubbed a “no limits partnership.” Given that Russia has historically been a major supplier of armaments to India, this has created concern in New Delhi that Beijing could leverage its relationship with Moscow to exploit vulnerabilities in India’s defense supply chains.
Beijing has also fostered closer ties with Bangladesh since the overthrow of Sheikh Hasina last year. While Bangladesh and China have historically maintained cordial relations, Bangladesh was more closely aligned with India under the previous government, which often cooperated with New Delhi on regional security and counterterrorism. Bangladesh’s pivot towards China is thus likely to sound alarm bells for the Modi government, especially given the growing anti-India sentiment within Bangladesh and the perception that the interim government is “Islamist” in character.
During the recent row over the Pahalgam terror attack, China also gave a strong show of support for its “all-weather” ally Pakistan, further underscoring the limits of any diplomatic reset. As tensions between India and Pakistan escalated in the aftermath of the attack, for example, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi backed Pakistan’s calls for an “independent and impartial probe” into the origins of the attack, a proposal which had been firmly rejected by the Indian side from the outset.
Indian commentators also accused China of watering down the U.N. Security Council statement condemning the attack, which departed from past practice by omitting calls for cooperation with the Indian government and refraining from mentioning The Resistance Front — the terrorist organization that initially claimed responsibility for the attack — by name.
Adding to India’s frustrations, China has offered to sell Pakistan advanced military equipment (including J-35 stealth fighter jets) as the latter seeks to modernize its military capabilities. Given the mixed performance of India’s aircraft against Pakistan's Chinese-origin equipment during Operation Sindoor, this will doubtless be perceived as an affront by the Indian defense establishment.
While diplomatic support for Pakistan by China is not new, India’s perception that China hedged against it as the Pahalgam crisis unfolded could undermine the progress made along the border. Add to this the escalating strategic competition in other areas of the Indo-Pacific, and there is reason to believe that an adversarial element will continue to overshadow the China-India relationship for the foreseeable future.
The trade factor
To the extent that we can expect to see some form of rapprochement, it is likely to come in the economic sphere. Lingering political tensions notwithstanding, China remains one of India’s top trading partners (in 2024, China-India bilateral trade reached $118.4 billion), which creates powerful incentives to find common ground. Indeed, when diplomatic relations hit rock bottom in 2020, the interests of the private sector provided a justification for pursuing a de-escalatory course in China and India alike.
Even here, however, there is potential for friction, especially given attempts by the Trump administration to pressure India to decouple from China. Using the threat of increased tariff rates as leverage, Trump hopes to bring India firmly into the U.S. orbit as part of his broader Indo-Pacific strategy. Should India bend to these pressures, China has numerous ways it could retaliate, including export controls that would limit the flow of raw materials essential to various Indian domestic industries.
Of course, it is also possible that Trump’s attempt to drive a wedge between the two Asian giants could end up pushing them closer together, at least where their economic interests converge. Much will depend on whether India and the U.S. work out a viable trade deal in the weeks ahead of Trump’s August 1 deadline for higher tariffs. As with so much else in international politics these days, only time will tell.
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Residents look at the scene of an al Qaeda-linked al Shabaab group militant attack, in Mogadishu, Somalia August 21, 2022. REUTERS/Feisal Omar
Despite a number of foreign actors, including the United States, using kinetic military strikes and contributing military resources to Somalia for the past many years in an ostensible effort to improve the Somali security situation, both ISIS and al-Shabaab are expanding their territory and continuing to threaten the country’s peace and security.
Years of heavy bombardment have failed to eliminate the security threat, and have instead helped spark collaboration between these groups and the Houthis, which are now contributing resources to help the terrorist organizations advance their goals in Somalia. All the while, the conflict is turning into a diplomatic mess, creating new scuffles amongst regional actors.
During the early days of his administration, President Trump broadened the definition of who can be targeted by American airstrikes, signaling a potential increase in American counterterrorism activities overseas.
This more aggressive posture has taken hold in Somalia, where U.S. air and drone strikes have increased precipitously since Trump’s inauguration. Despite internal divisions within the Trump team on whether the United States should extend or reduce its military presence in Somalia, the administration has thus far been aggressive in its counterterrorism activities in the country.
In the first six months of 2025 alone, the United States conducted 36 official air and drone strikes in Somalia, compared to just 10 under President Biden in all of 2024. At this rate, the United States will conduct 70 airstrikes across the country by the end of the year and 288 by the end of Trump’s second term — a substantial increase from the 156 he conducted during his first term in office.
These U.S. strikes are targeting the resurgent ISIS and al-Shabaab terrorist organizations, which have continued to seize land from the Somali government in recent years.
The United States' involvement in Somalia has waxed and waned over the last decade. Although Trump conducteddozens of airstrikes a year during his first term, in 2020 the president ordered the complete withdrawal of U.S. troops from Somalia, reducing American ground presence while maintaining training and support missions from outside the country.
In 2022, the Biden administration reintroduced U.S. troops to Somalia “to maximize the safety and effectiveness of our forces and enable them to provide more efficient support to our partners.” And in 2024, the United States built five military bases to be used for training and military operations for the Somali National Army and Danab — an elite Somali special operations force.
The Somali-U.S. relationship has been further complicated during Trump’s second term. In February the administration announced a global foreign aid freeze, halting all military aid to Somalia.
Today, the United States has 500 to 600 troops spread throughout Somalia, conducting a combination of training and support missions.
The United States, though, is far from the only foreign actor engaged in the security situation in Somalia.
Turkey has maintained close relations with the government in Mogadishu since 2011. As the flame of the Arab Spring caught fire across the region and took the world’s attention with it, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan began focusing on Somalia, a country that was being forgotten in the midst of the regional tumult. It was then when Turkey began investing in the country’s humanitarian infrastructure in the wake of widespread droughts that left 12 million people facing starvation.
For Erdogan, forming a close Turkish relationship with Somalia is useful for geostrategic reasons, in part due to Somalia’s critical location on the Horn of Africa along the Red Sea, through which about 15% of the world’s maritime trade travels annually.
The two countries took a significant step toward enhancing their relationship via military cooperation in 2017, when the Turks opened a military base in Mogadishu — its largest outside Turkey. In the years since, Turkey has provided training and military equipment to Somali forces in support of the fight against jihadi groups.
This past April, the relations between the two countries expanded further with the signing of an agreement that allows Turkey access to oil and gas off Somalia’s coast in exchange for increased security support. That same month, Turkey sent an additional 500 troops to the country.
Another notable regional actor involved in Somali security operations is Egypt, which has sent weapons to the Somali government since August 2024 to use in its counterterrorism operations. The Egyptian-Somali relationship has grown over their shared animosity of Ethiopia.
For years, Ethiopia has been constructing a dam on the upstream portion of the Blue Nile River. This dam constricts the flow of water downstream through Egypt, creating water shortages for the country, angering the Egyptian government.
Somalia’s relationship with Ethiopia is no better. Landlocked Ethiopia, looking for access to the Red Sea, signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with Somaliland in early 2024 — a semiautonomous region that claims independence from Somalia. The MOU affords Ethiopia access to a Red Sea naval port on Somaliland’s coast for 50 years in exchange for formally recognizing Somaliland as an independent country, which would make Ethiopia the first nation in the world to do so.
This MOU has also strained Ethiopia’s relationship with Turkey, which controls much of the Somali coastal waters that Ethiopia is seeking to access.
Other countries have engaged with the security situation in Somalia through peacekeeping operations. The current peacekeeping force in the country is the African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM), which took over in January 2025 for the previous AU peacekeeping mission.
The countries that have provided troops to AUSSOM include Uganda with 4,500 troops, Ethiopia with 2,500, Djibouti with 1,520, Kenya with 1,500, and Egypt with 1,091 troops. After initially stating that Ethiopian forces would not be allowed to enter the new AU mission due to Ethiopia’s MOU with Somaliland, the Somali government eventually relented, agreeing to allow Ethiopia to participate in the new peacekeeping effort.
None of that has deterred U.S. military involvement in Somalia or made the security situation in the country much better. Although Trump has long decried endless wars and bottomless American military activities, his actions thus far in Somalia are engaging the U.S. in exactly that — an endless conflict that no amount of airstrikes is likely to end.
The United States should refocus its foreign policy toward conflicts where American diplomatic leadership could actually bring about a lasting peace.
After successfully brokering a peace agreement between the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Rwanda, ending — on paper, at least — a three-decades-long war between the two factions, Trump’s team is now working to achieve a diplomatic end to the civil war raging in Sudan.
The administration should drop the waste of engaging in kinetic counterterrorism activities in Somalia, and instead concentrate its foreign policy resources on ending the war in Sudan and implementing the peace deal between the DRC and Rwanda.
According to new analysis by the Climate and Community Institute (CCI), recent increases in Pentagon spending alone will produce an additional 26 megatons (Mt) of planet-heating gases — on a par with the annual carbon equivalent (CO2e) emissions generated by 68 gas power plants or the entire country of Croatia.
With the Pentagon’s 2026 budget set to surge to $1 trillion (a 17% or $150 billion increase from 2023), its total greenhouse emissions will also increase to a staggering 178 Mt of CO2e. This will make the U.S. military and its industrial apparatus the 38th largest emitter in the world if it were its own nation. It will also result in an estimated $47 billion in economic damages globally, including impacts on agriculture, human health, and property from extreme weather, according to the EPA’s social cost of carbon calculator.
Yet the Pentagon’s true climate impact will almost certainly be much worse than estimated by the CCI, as the calculation does not include emissions generated from separate supplementary U.S. military funding, such as for arms transfers to Israel and Ukraine in recent years. It also does not include the emissions from armed conflict, which are considerable when it happens.
And the CCI study only covers U.S. military spending. Military spending in European NATO countries is also surging. At the Hague Summit in June, the 32 NATO member states pledged to increase their military and security spending from 2% to 5% of GDP by 2035. As a result, NATO military spending in Europe and Canada could increase from around $500 million today to $1.1 trillion in 2035, when the combined defense budgets of the other 31 allies will essentially equal the Pentagon’s. Every dollar or euro of this military spending in preparation for NATO to fight hypothetical wars with China, Russia or anyone else has a climate and opportunity cost.
Meanwhile, U.S. military leaders want to spend more justified largely on threat inflation. During a recent meeting of military industrial leaders in Wiesbaden, Germany, for example, NATO’s recently appointed Supreme Allied Commander, U.S. Gen. Alexus G. Grynkewich, restated the flawed case for increased military spending. He called on member states to prepare for the possibility that Russia and China could launch wars in Europe and the Pacific simultaneously, with 2027 being a potential, though highly speculative, flashpoint year.
Grynkewich, who is also head of the U.S. European Command, argued that the situation meant that allies have little time to prepare. “We’re going to need every bit of kit and equipment and munitions that we can in order to beat that,” he said.
His remarks were made during a U.S. Army Europe and Africa-hosted LandEuro symposium, designed to encourage military and industry leaders to find ways to significantly increase weapons production, especially in Europe. As always during such events, the two-day program served as an opportunity for companies to showcase various weapons systems at the symposium’s so-called “Warriors Corner.”
Grynkewich also repeated a key argument used by NATO leaders to justify increased military spending: the growing cooperation among adversaries.
“Each of these threats that are out there cannot be viewed, in my estimation, as discrete challenges. We’ve got to think about how all of them are aligning,” he said.
However, evidence of such an orientation among the so-called “Axis of Upheaval” (China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia) is patchy at best and primarily bilateral rather than as a fully-formed four-way alliance. This cooperation is also driven by shared frustrations with the U.S.-led international order and a desire to counter Western dominance. Donald Trump’s systematic demolition of that “rules based international order,” illegal military attacks on Iran and constant anti-China rhetoric further shape this cooperation and risk it becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy.
At the same symposium, U.S. Army Europe and Africa Commander Gen. Christopher Donahue said that the U.S. Army and NATO have launched a new military initiative called the “Eastern Flank Deterrence Line,” which aims to enhance NATO’s ground-based military capabilities and promote military-industrial interoperability across the alliance. Donahue also warned that NATO forces could capture Russia's heavily fortified Kaliningrad region “in a timeframe that is unheard of” if necessary. Therein lies another disconnect. On the one hand NATO pleads a poverty of resources, and on the other brags about already having the capability to stop Russia’s “mass and momentum problem" and to attack and take Russian territory.
It should also be remembered that the United States currently operates over 870 overseas military bases and installations — two and a half times more than the rest of the world combined — and that NATO members already collectively account for 55% of global military spending.
The main disconnect at Wiesbaden, however, was the failure to consider the link between military spending and climate emissions. There was no “Green Corner” to remind NATO generals that the climate crisis is an existential threat, meaning it poses a danger to the fundamental existence of humanity and the planet. This blinkered approach comes right from the top.
In March this year, Trump’s Defense Secretary, Pete Hegseth, wrote on X: “The @DeptofDefense does not do climate change crap. We do training and warfighting.” This training and warfighting will have catastrophic climate consequences, including further water scarcity, sea-level rise, and desertification in vulnerable regions. In turn, this will inevitably lead to political instability and further forced migration.
NATO’s contribution to the climate crisis cannot be ignored. The alliance and its member states must be transparent about the scale of their emissions and must make serious commitments to reduce their carbon footprint.
Instead of ramping up tensions with adversaries, the top NATO generals should be calling for political leaders to invest in diplomatic and non-military solutions to today’s political crises. Then, as the authors of the CCI analysis argue, these increases in U.S. military spending could be redirected towards demilitarized climate resilience measures, such as public transit, renewable energy or green new social housing — a true investment in human security.
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