The Quincy Institute's Adam Weinstein, a Marine Corps veteran who served in Afghanistan, talks with "Youngblood" author and Iraq war veteran Matt Gallagher about the term "forever war" and why the foreign policy/national security establishment disdains its use — even though regular Americans know what it means, and why waging a generational war is ultimately unhealthy for the country.
The Bunker appears originally at the Project on Government Oversight and is republished here with permission.
Amid the roar of B-2 bombers and other warplanes bizarrely flying over the White House on the 4th of July, President Donald Trump signed his “Big, Beautiful Bill” increasing defense spending by $150 billion and the national debt by $3 trillion. The military hardware was a bow to the U.S. military’s successful June 21 strike on Iran’s nuclear program. Nonetheless, it was a strange way to celebrate the nation’s 249th birthday. Only in today’s Washington could one celebrate dive-bombing the national debt ever closer to $40 trillion.
About $113 billion of that $150 billion is slated for the Pentagon’s 2026 coffers (the rest would be spent later). That has allowed the Pentagon to send Congress a base budget for next year that totals $848 billion, which is actually less than this year’s $831 billion, when inflation is taken into account. But adding the base budget request to the one-time bonus, and other national-security spending, pushes proposed defense spending to roughly $1 trillion in 2026. Where such future $100+ billion annual add-ons will come from remains a mystery.
News outlets that focus on economics wasted no time citing one of the bonus bill’s big winners. “The Pentagon will budget about $150 billion over five years on big-ticket projects such as ships, munitions production and missile-defense systems, including a roughly $25 billion down payment on the planned Golden Dome antimissile shield,” the Wall Street Journal noted. Echoed Bloomberg News: “The package boosts defense spending by $150 billion, with much of the funding going to new weapons systems made by major contractors.”
The troops will get July 4th picnic-table scraps. Only 6% of the $150 billion is earmarked for improving the quality of life for troops and their families. On July 3, Stars and Stripes reported that the Army will save nearly $5 million a year by shutting down a program that for decades has provided mental-health services for children of U.S. troops based overseas. That’s happening despite a May report that said such Pentagon-run schools are overwhelmed by kids with mental health problems.
Army officials said they are eliminating the program because “similar services exist.” Funny how such logic never applies to the redundancy of the Pentagon’s nuclear triad of bombers, ICBMs, and submarines, which cost about $5 million every half hour.
A defense reform bill now slinking its way through Congress is simply the latest in military camouflage, disguising future taxpayer rip-offs as the latest and greatest good-government bromide. This new wolf-in-sheep’s-clothing is the Streamlining Procurement for Effective Execution and Delivery Act — the SPEED Act (PDF), in Capitol Hill lingo. “With the SPEED Act, Congress and industry are yet again setting the stage for another round of decimating changes that will have disastrous results,” Scott Amey here at the Project On Government Oversight said in his July 1 analysis of the proposed legislation.
Amey, a recognized expert in the admittedly wonky arena of government procurement law, warns that the bill:
The SPEED Act, Amey argues, “will take us back 60 years, to a time when companies blatantly took advantage of the federal government … which will lead to new $436 hammers and $10,000 toilet seat covers.”
Excellent! The Bunker is always on the prowl for new material.
Battlefields and blood are first cousins in combat. The Bunker has done many deep dives over the years into those who voluntarily went into harm’s way in the nation’s uniform, and didn’t get to come home. There’s generally a patriotic predisposition to want to know about these heroes, waging war in our name.
But the deaths of U.S. troops in peacetime is a murkier realm. The U.S. military trains like it fights, which means that over the past decade more troops have died while training for combat than in combat itself. Yet too little attention is paid to their sacrifice. They’re not battling a foe other than inadequate training, or a moment’s inattention that could have saved a life.
The Pentagon noted the deaths of three U.S. troops recently. Their sacrifice should not pass unnoted:
— On July 3, Task & Purpose reported on the July 1 death of Navy Special Warfare Boat Operator 2nd Class Noah Tobin after an unexplained malfunction during a California parachute jump.
— On June 27, Air & Space Forces Magazine detailed how Air Force Captain John Robertson died at a Texas base in 2024 after he failed to fully engage a safety pin on the ejection seat of his T-6 trainer after landing, sending him 100 feet into the air without a parachute.
— On July 1, Task & Purpose reported on the death of Army Specialist Matthew Perez, 20, who died in 2024 after a string of snafus beginning with “an incorrectly tied knot” doomed him while parachuting at a Louisiana post.
Your valor was not in vain.
Despite critics who argue that the U.S. Navy’s huge aircraft carriers would be sitting Peking ducks in a war with China, Commander Joshua M. M. Portzer maintained in the July issue of Proceedings that each of them is “a queen on the Pacific chess board.”
The Navy’s newest aircraft carrier faces a 20-month delivery delay because of problems with elevators designed to move munitions around the vessel, Tony Capaccio of Bloomberg News reported July 7.
The Pentagon Pizza Report, operated by an anonymous computer geek, tracks Google data flowing from pizzerias near the headquarters of the Defense Department to telegraph when the U.S. military might be preparing to strike, the Washington Post reported July 1.
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Donald Trump’s recent outburst against Vladimir Putin — accusing the Russian leader of "throwing a pile of bullsh*t at us" and threatening devastating new sanctions — might be just another Trumpian tantrum.
The president is known for abrupt reversals. Or it could be a bargaining tactic ahead of potential Ukraine peace talks. But there’s a third, more troubling possibility: establishment Republican hawks and neoconservatives, who have been maneuvering to hijack Trump’s “America First” agenda since his return to office, may be exploiting his frustration with Putin to push for a prolonged confrontation with Russia.
Trump’s irritation is understandable. Ukraine has accepted his proposed ceasefire, but Putin has refused, making him, in Trump’s eyes, the main obstacle to ending the war.
Putin’s calculus is clear. As Ted Snider notes in the American Conservative, Russia is winning on the battlefield. In June, it captured more Ukrainian territory and now threatens critical Kyiv’s supply lines. Moscow also seized a key lithium deposit critical to securing Trump’s support for Ukraine. Meanwhile, Russian missile and drone strikes have intensified.
Putin seems convinced his key demands — Ukraine’s neutrality, territorial concessions in the Donbas and Crimea, and a downsized Ukrainian military — are more achievable through war than diplomacy.
Yet his strategy empowers the transatlantic “forever war” faction: leaders in Britain, France, Germany, and the EU, along with hawks in both main U.S. parties. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz claims that diplomacy with Russia is “exhausted.” Europe’s war party, convinced a Russian victory would inevitably lead to an attack on NATO (a suicidal prospect for Moscow), is willing to fight “to the last Ukrainian.” Meanwhile, U.S. hawks, including liberal interventionist Democrats, stoke Trump’s ego, framing failure to stand up to Putin’s defiance as a sign of weakness or appeasement.
Trump long resisted this pressure. Pragmatism told him Ukraine couldn’t win, and calling it “Biden’s war” was his way of distancing himself, seeking a quick exit to refocus on China, which he has depicted as Washington’s greater foreign threat. At least as important, U.S. involvement in the war in Ukraine has been unpopular with his MAGA base.
But his June strikes on Iran may signal a hawkish shift. By touting them as a decisive blow to Iran’s nuclear program (despite Tehran’s refusal so far to abandon uranium enrichment), Trump may be embracing a new approach to dealing with recalcitrant foreign powers: offer a deal, set a deadline, then unleash overwhelming force if rejected. The optics of “success” could tempt him to try something similar with Russia.
This pivot coincides with a media campaign against restraint advocates within the administration like Elbridge Colby, the Pentagon policy chief who has prioritized China over Ukraine and also provoked the opposition of pro-Israel neoconservatives by warning against war with Iran. POLITICO quoted unnamed officials attacking Colby for wanting the U.S. to “do less in the world.” Meanwhile, the conventional Republican hawk Marco Rubio’s influence grows as he combines the jobs of both secretary of state and national security adviser.
What Can Trump Actually Do to Russia?
Nuclear deterrence rules out direct military action — even Biden, far more invested in Ukraine than Trump, avoided that risk. Instead, Trump ally Sen.Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.), another establishment Republican hawk, is pushing a 500% tariff on nations buying Russian hydrocarbons, aiming to sever Moscow from the global economy. Trump seems supportive, although the move’s feasibility and impact are doubtful.
China and India are key buyers of Russian oil. China alone imports 12.5 million barrels daily. Russia exports seven million barrels daily. China could absorb Russia’s entire output. Beijing has bluntly stated it “cannot afford” a Russian defeat, ensuring Moscow’s economic lifeline remains open.
The U.S., meanwhile, is ill-prepared for a tariff war with China. When Trump imposed 145% tariffs, Beijing retaliated by cutting off rare earth metals exports, vital to U.S. industry and defense. Trump backed down.
At the G-7 summit in Canada last month, the EU proposed lowering price caps on Russian oil from $60 a barrel to $45 a barrel as part of its 18th sanctions package against Russia. Trump rejected the proposal at the time but may be tempted to reconsider, given his suggestion that more sanctions may be needed. Even if Washington backs the measure now, however, it is unlikely to cripple Russia’s war machine.
Another strategy may involve isolating Russia by peeling away Moscow’s traditionally friendly neighbors. Here, Western mediation between Armenia and Azerbaijan isn’t about peace — if it were, pressure would target Baku, which has stalled agreements and threatened renewed war against Armenia. The real goal is to eject Russia from the South Caucasus and create a NATO-aligned energy corridor linking Turkey to Central Asia, bypassing both Russia and Iran to their detriment.
Central Asia itself is itself emerging as a new battleground. In May 2025, the EU has celebrated its first summit with Central Asian nations in Uzbekistan, with a heavy focus on developing the Middle Corridor, a route for transportation of energy and critical raw materials that would bypass Russia. In that context, the EU has committed €10 billion in support of the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route.
Though Central Asian nations seek to reduce their dependence on Moscow, Russia, however, retains leverage through security ties, energy routes, and migrant remittances. China, the region’s other major partner, would view Western overtures with suspicion.
Hawks may ultimately pin their hopes on destabilizing Russia internally. Ethnic fractures are a key pressure point: non-Russian minorities, such as Dagestanis, Buryats, Tuvans, die disproportionately in the war in Ukraine. Hence, bodies like the U.S. Congress Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (Helsinki Commission) and hawkish think-tanks like Hudson Institute fuel “colonial exploitation” narratives aimed at stirring unrest in the Caucasus and Siberia.
Exiled Russian opposition figures cheered the 2023 Wagner mutiny as a potential tipping point. But external efforts to destabilize and fragment Russia are more likely to trigger a nationalist backlash than collapse. If cornered, Putin or his successor won’t surrender but escalate, possibly to nuclear brinkmanship.
The irony is that Trump once rode to power mocking the architects of ‘forever wars.” Now, his own impulses — frustration with Putin, a craving for displays of strength — risk reviving the very policies he once condemned. The hawkish “blob” needs no grand conspiracy to hijack his agenda; it merely needs to exploit his instincts. The question is whether Trump recognizes the trap before this new cold war turns hot.
On June 30, President Trump signed an executive order terminating the majority of U.S. sanctions on Syria. The move, which would have been unthinkable mere months ago, fulfilled a promise he made at an investment forum in Riyadh in May.“The sanctions were brutal and crippling,” he had declared to an audience of primarily Saudi businessmen. Lifting them, he said, will “give Syria a chance at greatness.”
The significance of this statement lies not solely in the relief that it will bring to the Syrian people. His remarks revealed an implicit but rarely admitted truth: sanctions — often presented as a peaceful alternative to war — have been harming the Syrian people all along.
It is difficult to deny the extent of Syria's economic devastation. The size of Syria’s economy more than halved between 2010 and 2022. Around 70 percent of Syrians live in poverty, and half the population is food insecure.
Proponents maintain that sanctions are not responsible for civilian harm. “Today's actions are intended to hold the murderous Assad regime accountable. They are not directed at the Syrian people,” reads a typical White House statement. The European Parliament similarly claims its sanctions on Syria were “designed to have minimal impact on the population.”
It’s difficult to say how much of Syria’s economic collapse is due to the civil war and Assad’s governance versus Western sanctions. However, there is overwhelming evidence that broad economic sanctions cause immense harm to civilians: slowing economic growth; hindering access to food, fuel, and medicine; and contributing to mass death. In some cases, the effects of sanctions are comparable to those of war.
Sanctions on Syria impeded humanitarian efforts, fueled food inflation, and drove the collapse of the country’s healthcare system. The overthrow of the Assad government made it politically expedient to admit what many had long ignored or denied.
Two members of Congress who advocated for sanctions prior to Assad’s fall have since reversed course, arguing that easing them would “facilitate stabilization, reconstruction, international investment, [and] humanitarian recovery,” and improve “economic and financial access for ordinary Syrians.”
Following Trump’s announcement in Riyadh, Secretary of State Rubio said that lifting sanctions would “facilitate the provision of electricity, energy, water, and sanitation, and enable a more effective humanitarian response across Syria.” He similarly told a Senate hearing that “nations in the region want to get aid in, want to start helping them, and they can't because they are afraid of our sanctions.” Rubio here highlights how U.S. sanctions function as a form of economic siege — they hinder humanitarian assistance and isolate countries economically and diplomatically. U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Dorothy Shea argued this month that, “The cessation of U.S. sanctions against Syria will give the country a chance to succeed.”
It is difficult to reconcile such statements with the claim that sanctions don’t hurt civilians. If lifting sanctions will benefit the civilian population, then their imposition must have caused harm.
The dirty secret of sanctions policy is that these harms are often intentional. Many say outright that the function of sanctions is to facilitate economic collapse. It is not collateral damage — it is the mechanism of pressure.
For example, a State Department memo from the inception of the embargo on Cuba suggested “denying money and supplies to Cuba, to decrease monetary and real wages, to bring about hunger, desperation and overthrow of [the] government.” When asked about the efficacy of the first Trump administration’s sanctions on Iran, then–Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said, “Things are much worse for the Iranian people, and we’re convinced that will lead the Iranian people to rise up and change the behavior of the regime.” He spoke with similar approval of the suffering of the Venezuelan people under U.S. sanctions — a sentiment echoed by Trump, who later gloated, “When I left [office], Venezuela was ready to collapse. We would have taken it over.”
While Trump officials have been particularly candid, policymakers in both parties regularly refer to macroeconomic factors such as GDP, oil output, foreign reserves, currency stability, and the cost of food — factors that directly affect the wellbeing of a population — as metrics of sanctions’ “success.”
Rep. Jim McGovern (D-Mass.), a critic of many U.S. sanctions, once remarked that, “Economic pain is the means by which the sanctions are supposed to work.” But there is a reason that few want to admit the reality of how sanctions work; because doing so would be an admission of violating international law. As dozens of legal organizations and over 200 lawyers wrote in a letter last year, the intentional targeting of civilians with sanctions amounts to collective punishment, which violates international humanitarian law and the U.N. Charter.
Major sanctions on Syria are on their way out. That’s good news.
But the justifications for their removal are admissions of what civil society critics and researchers have long argued: sanctions are killing the same people their advocates claim to protect. While Syria serves as a case study, this is equally true wherever there are broad economic sanctions regimes, from Cuba to Venezuela to Iran.
If sanctions depend on the suffering of civilians to function, they are not a diplomatic tool — they are a weapon of economic warfare. It is long past time to treat them as such.
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