The Quincy Institute's Adam Weinstein, a Marine Corps veteran who served in Afghanistan, talks with "Youngblood" author and Iraq war veteran Matt Gallagher about the term "forever war" and why the foreign policy/national security establishment disdains its use — even though regular Americans know what it means, and why waging a generational war is ultimately unhealthy for the country.
The New York Times reported earlier this month that recent gains by al-Shabaab Islamist militants in central and southern Somalia has prompted a debate within the State Department about closing the U.S. Embassy in Mogadishu and withdrawing most American personnel. At the forefront of some officials’ minds, according to the Times, are memories of recent foreign policy fiascos, such as the fall of the Afghan government amid a hasty American withdrawal in 2021.
There are good reasons to question why the U.S. has been unable to defeat al-Shabaab despite nearly 20 years of U.S. military involvement in the country. But the scale of the U.S. role is drastically different than that of Afghanistan, and the U.S. cannot necessarily be described as the most significant external security actor on the ground. At the same time, the Trump administration has given no indication that it will scale down drone strikes — meaning that the U.S. will continue to privilege military solutions.
The Taliban takeover of Afghanistan in 2021 is often brought up as a potential outcome in Somalia. This analogy appears to have taken more urgency recently as al-Shabaab has regained some of the territories it had been evicted from since 2022. While the analogy is helpful in some regards — including, highlighting the stubborn pliability of al-Shabaab and the fragility of the Somali government — it is misleading in one important aspect: the American military presence in Somalia has never been comparable to the U.S. occupation of Afghanistan, which at its peak reached over 100,000 troops.
By comparison, the U.S. has about 500 to 600 military personal in Somalia, largely because it has sought to avoid the costs that come with deploying significant numbers of its own troops, instead relying on Somali and other African troops to fight al-Shabaab. For the past decade, the U.S. has trained, equipped, and financed an elite commando unit, “Danab” (lightning), numbering between 3,000-5,000 soldiers. Alongside the European Union, the U.S. was a key financial contributor to the African Union (AU) mission in Somalia, which at one point included 22,000 forces. But the U.S. has recently signaled that financial support for the AU mission will be cut, and it’s unclear how the newly mandated African Union Support and Stabilization Mission will be financed.
Consequently, it is not certain that a drawdown of U.S. diplomatic presence would significantly alter the situation on the ground given the scope of U.S. military engagement in Somalia. Moreover, there are other players who shape the political, economic, and security landscape in Somalia, including Ethiopia, the UAE, and Turkey.
Turkey is arguably Mogadishu’s most important security and diplomatic partner today. Turkey has its biggest embassy and military training center, Camp TURKSOM, in Mogadishu. Somalia and Turkey have signed a raft of military/security and economic agreements over the past decade and half. The Turkish trained “Gorgor” (eagle) regiment, along with the American trained Danab are the two most effective fighting units against al-Shabaab. As al-Shabaab made some gains over the past couple of months, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud made two trips to Ankara, where he has reportedly signed an agreement that would allow Turkish private forces to actively assist and lead Somali security forces in the fights against al-Shabaab. In light of Turkey’s increasingly prominent role in Mogadishu’s security/military calculations, the scaling back of U.S. diplomatic presence in Mogadishu may have limited impact. We could, instead, see a deepening of Turkish military/security assistance to Mogadishu, and engagement in the fight against al-Shabaab.
The discussion within the State Department appears to be debating two alternatives. The first is reduction and/or withdrawal of U.S. Embassy staff in Mogadishu with the fear that this would further undermine confidence in the Somali government and hasten its collapse. The second is staying the course and potentially increasing the drone campaign against al-Shabaab. It is not clear what U.S. policy makers hope to gain by increasing the drone campaign against al-Shabaab that has not been achieved over the past two decades of (undeclared) war with al-Shabaab. It is noteworthy that the Times failed to ask the more difficult question, namely, why is al-Shabaab on the front foot after over a decade and half of war? I offer two points for consideration.
First, alongside the military campaign against al-Shabaab, a range of foreign governments have supported a state-building project in Somalia since 2009. Theoretically, this endeavor was meant to accompany the military campaign against al-Shabaab by putting in place an accountable government. What has instead transpired over the past decade and half is the emergence of a government in Mogadishu that is dependent on external support, focused on the capture of foreign and domestic funds and contracts, and beholden to donor demands.
Rather than creating inclusive institutions and governance systems focused on service delivery, the state-building process has produced a bargain between Somali elites and the donor industry that is removed from local realities and legitimacy. The government in Mogadishu is outward looking and detached, for the most part, from the concerns of the local population, except via lineage-based patronage networks to secure indirect and corrupt electoral advantages. Thus, basic governance and service delivery has progressed very little over the past 15 years. Al-Shabaab’s resilience is, therefore, a symptom of these state-building and governance failures.
Second, it’s important to keep in mind a few things about al-Shabaab as an organization. Its rejection of the presence of foreign troops in Somalia is something that resonates with people. The fact that al-Shabaab itself has foreign fighters in its midst has been a point of contention within al-Shabaab, and in the larger society. In contrast to the Somali government, al-Shabaab has always had a more effective outreach campaign by, for instance, utilizing Somali oral poetry, a deeply-rooted cultural tradition, to reach the local population. Its outreach campaign remains potent even as its wanton violence has alienated the majority of the population.
In its recent offensive, al-Shabaab is reported to have shifted its tactics and strategies. The group has reportedly de-emphasized the use of large-scale indiscriminate bombings. Furthermore, unconfirmed reports suggest al-Shabaab is offering to forgive government soldiers they capture, and telling communities that they will be allowed to continue their lives and no revenge will be meted out to those who previously worked with the government, in exchange for abstaining from associating with the government.
The continued governance failures by the internationally backed Somali government, combined with al-Shabaab’s strategies and adaptations makes it unlikely that a continuous American drone campaign will be any more effective now than it has been in the past. Without a more thorough examination of the shortcomings of the international military engagement and state-building activities in Somalia, the discussion about closing the U.S. Embassy in Mogadishu is in some ways a smokescreen and a knee-jerk reaction. What is needed instead is a more fundamental reconsideration of military solutions to what are ultimately political problems.
The Guam headlines from the recent visit of the U.S. secretary of defense are only part of Secretary Hegseth’s maiden visit to the Pacific. It is Guam’s place in the larger picture - where the island fits into U.S. strategy - that helps us understand how the “tip of the spear” is being positioned. Perhaps overlooked, the arrangement of the “Guam piece” gives us a better sense not only of Guam’s importance to the United States, but also of how the U.S. sees the larger geopolitical competition taking shape.
Before he landed on Guam, the secretary of defense circulated a secret memo that prioritized U.S. readiness for a potential conflict with China over Taiwan. At the same time, it was reported that U.S. intelligence assessed that Guam would be “a major target of Chinese missile strikes” if China launched an invasion of Taiwan.
To put the U.S. secretary of defense’s recent regional visit in context, we need to look at the big picture, and then refocus on Guam and the region. We must not only consider what was said and done during his trip, but also what was not said, to help us understand (1) the signaling on Guam that informs the unfolding U.S. strategy in the region and (2) the increasing risk to Guam’s security.
The big picture
The Trump administration’s Asia-Pacific policy is still unfolding and may not be completely clear for some time. The secretary of defense’s claim was that the trip was to "reestablish deterrence." The “secret memo” provides context for this claim, but several elements are likely driving policy. First, containing China is of considerable focus, both militarily and economically. It is also clear that as it advances a strategy, the Trump administration will be using all elements of national power - diplomacy, information, military and economic - in this effort.
Secretary Hegseth’s visit helped set the stage for elements of this strategy. It is a well-studied assumption that without South Korea and Japan, the U.S. would struggle - and possibly lose - in a military conflict with China. In this context, it is not surprising that his visit to Japan was heralded as “reinforcing readiness, interoperability and shared resolve across the Indo-Pacific.” But beyond the well-trodden U.S. Department of Defense phraseology, the new U.S. secretary of defense was bringing the agenda of a new president to the region.
Those countries on the “frontlines of any contingency we might face in the western Pacific” are being asked to do more to advance U.S. strategy. It is no secret that the Trump administration wants regional governments to increase military spending. A fundamental element is to “rebalance burden sharing with allies and partners.” But there is more. Requests for expanded basing, pre-conflict permission for increased access, assurances of logistics and overflight use of sovereign territory in a China conflict are likely in the discussion. The Korean Ministry of Defense even preemptively denied that Washington had requested clarity on Korea’s role and commitment in a potential military conflict involving China. In the U.S. president’s words, the U.S. has treaty commitments to defend these frontline countries, but they are not committed to defending the U.S.
The Trump administration’s pressure campaign on regional allies to support U.S. warfighting contingency planning is itself a tell. The U.S. is pushing for greater commitment and clarity because today they do not have it. This tepid allied commitment makes for a weak American war plan in the event of conflict with China. But decisions about war go to the heart of a nation’s sovereignty. Even America’s closest allies in the region are unlikely to grant permission for a unilateral U.S. decision to bring their country into conflict. After all, these countries are on what the U.S. secretary of defense calls the “frontlines.”
Over the coming months, we are likely to see the Trump administration - and possibly President Trump himself - continue to push for greater commitments. A potent mix of economic levers and military strategy is already in play. In his first phone call with South Korea’s acting president (ostensibly over the issue of unilateral U.S. tariffs), President Trump linked increased payments for U.S. military presence in South Korea with the “possibility of a great DEAL.” (Emphasis in original.)
Short of capitulating to highly leveraged U.S. demands, countries will try other levels of appeasement. For example, while Secretary Hegseth was in the Philippines, it was announced that the U.S. would have another “leave-behind” missile system that could target Chinese ships. Within days of the visit, the Philippines’ request to buy F-16 fighters and related equipment - valued up to $5.6 billion - was approved by the Trump administration. Shortly after the defense secretary’s visit to Japan, the Japanese government (over the objections of Okinawa’s government) approved the year-round stationing of surveillance drones in Okinawa. Previously, these ISR assets rotated every six months from Andersen Air Force Base, Guam. These are, however, relatively small steps in relation to the commitments the U.S. is seeking.
Regional allies of the U.S. are clear about the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait and opposition to a change in the status quo by force. Authorizing the U.S. to unilaterally manage a de facto commitment to war with China on their behalf is a different matter. It remains to be seen how far sovereign governments in the region will bend to Trump’s view of containing China.
On cue - and as a reminder that the adversary always has a say - the People’s Republic of China put on an unusual show of military force during Mr. Hegseth’s visit to the region. A large air and naval presence encircling Taiwan, live-fire activity in the straits cutting through the first island chain and bomber incursions into the South China Sea were held over a six-day period. This activity was as much a message to the U.S. and its allies as it was to Taiwan.
The tip of the spear
On Guam, U.S. decision-makers already have the type of ready response to conflict they are seeking from allies on the frontlines of the region. Guam’s territorial status gives Washington all the unilateral authority it needs to use facilities and project force without encumbrances. In view of uncertain commitments from regional allies in a potential conflict with China, military planners are counting on Guam.
The U.S. military’s certainty about the use of bases and assets on Guam was a highlight of the defense secretary’s visit to the island. “These islands are the tip of America’s spear in the Pacific,” Hegseth said in a DoD release titled “Secretary of Defense Emphasizes Lethality, Deterrence on Guam.” Joint Region Marianas dutifully reported their “efforts and contributions to strategic deterrence, demonstrating U.S. strength and daily preparedness.”
There was no mention during the secretary’s visit of the “secret memo” that framed his trip. Nor was the expectation that Guam would be a major target in the event of conflict with China part of the public discourse. The coded inferences, however, were replete. "You're living in history; you're living in reality, and you're living in a dangerous neighborhood. You are America's power projection and platform," a release reported Hegseth as saying. He caveated force projection from Guam with the statement that “armed conflict in the Indo-Pacom region is the least desirable outcome of any geopolitical differences,” but his expectations were clear. When it came to the U.S. position on Guam, Hegseth’s framing was unmistakably post-attack: “Any attack against these islands is an attack against the U.S. We recognize that, we understand that and we are committed to that.” Any attack would be met with an “appropriate response.” The “secret memo” and the anticipated attack on Guam were clearly in the back of his mind, even if the magnitude of the threat did not pass his lips.
There were other indirect clues about the conflict risk to Guam. While on Guam, Hegseth reached a mutual understanding with the president of the Federated States of Micronesia over airfield and port developments in Yap State. The governor of the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands also announced after his meeting with the defense secretary that the U.S. military footprint will expand in Saipan and Rota. These developments are directly related to expectations of insecurity on Guam. As part of the U.S. “distributed and dispersed” operating model, locations along the Mariana-Belau arc are being developed in case assets on Guam are not available. Another clue came from the governor of Guam, who pitched the secretary on a new U.S.-funded hospital that was “capable of handling mass casualties - whether from conflict or natural disasters.”
If the risk of conflict on Guam was woven through Secretary Hegseth’s visit, the one thing not mentioned was preparation for protecting Guam’s civilian population. The U.S. official’s silence on this issue is particularly noteworthy given what he knew about the risks to Guam associated with his Taiwan scenario and his discussions with island officials about alternatives to Guam in a conflict. This silence was even more striking given activity in Japan and Taiwan while the secretary was on Guam. On the day Hegseth landed on Guam, the government of Japan’s Cabinet Secretariat published the outline of a plan to evacuate 120,000 people from Okinawa in the event China invaded Taiwan. On the same day, Taiwan’s agriculture minister announced a plan to provide food to the island’s population for up to one year in the event of a Chinese blockade. While the usual accolades of Guam’s value were rolled out by military officials (“Guam is strategically important to the region and ensuring a free and open Indo-Pacific”), there were no direct discussions about the conflict risks or what would be done to protect the people of the island.
Understanding the signals
The Trump administration will be ramping up pressure on frontline countries in the region to make security commitments that align with U.S. objectives and fall under unilateral U.S. decision-making. It is too early to tell how hard countries will be pushed, how far they will go in response and what they will ultimately agree to. The U.S. does not want to go it alone in an aggressive approach to China because it is unlikely to prevail if it does. But the U.S. is also unlikely to get frontline countries in the region to commit to an open-ended American decision to go to war against China. This brings the U.S. back to the importance of Guam and its ability to act unilaterally.
Secretary Hegseth’s stops in Hawaii and Guam on his way to the Philippines and Japan were meant to signal U.S. presence, force projection and the ability to act militarily on its own in the region. As frontline countries are pressured to support the aggressive U.S. strategy outlined in the “secret memo,” they may be looking at how the U.S. is acting in the places where it already has unilateral authority. High-level visits that do not directly address the risks posed by the U.S. strategy, plans that assume the spread of conflict among U.S.-controlled islands and a failure to address the most fundamental elements of population security in conflict are likely not persuasive signals about U.S. readiness and approach to war.
This article was republished with permission by The Guam Daily Post
One of the most enduring tributes to Pope Francis, who passed away this Easter, would be the appreciation for his legacy of inter-religious diplomacy, a vision rooted in his humility, compassion, and a commitment to bridging divides — between faiths, cultures, and ideologies — from a standpoint of mutual respect and tolerance.
Among his most profound contributions is his historic meeting with Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani in Najaf, Iraq, on March 6, 2021. What made this meeting a true landmark in inter-faith dialogue was the fact it brought together, for the first time, the spiritual leader of the world’s 1.2 billion Roman Catholics and one of the most revered figures in Shia Islam, with influence on tens of millions of Shia Muslims globally. In a humble, yet moving ceremony, the meeting took place in al-Sistani’s modest home in Najaf. A frail al-Sistani, who rarely receives visitors and typically remains seated, stood to greet the 84-year-old Pope and held his hand, in a gesture that underscored mutual respect.
The visit to Najaf was part of a broader Vatican diplomatic outreach to the world of Islam. Pope Francis previously engaged with Sunni leaders, signing in 2019 the Document on Human Fraternity with Sheikh Ahmed al-Tayeb from Al-Azhar University, the pre-eminent scholar of Sunni Islam. The meeting with al-Sistani extended this outreach also to Shia Islam, the second principal branch of Islam. Najaf is a spiritual center of Shia Muslims, home to the tomb of Imam Ali, the pre-eminent saint of Shia Islam, and the Hawza seminary, led by al-Sistani.
That outreach was particularly meaningful as al-Sistani represents a community often misrepresented in Western discourse as inherently menacing through vague but sticky metaphors such as “Shia Crescent,” fueled by media sensationalism and geopolitical tensions driven, in part, by evangelical groups like Christians United for Israel who often conflate Shiism, Iran and hostility to Christians and Israel.
Pope Francis took a different approach: he went to Najaf not to proselytize, not to hold theological debates, and not to issue political demands, but to engage in conversation marked by shared concern over the humanity’s future, peace, justice and dignity for all people. Francis, as a Jesuit with a history of activism against the fascist dictatorship in his own home country, Argentina (1976-1983), was particularly well-suited for this role. His meeting with al-Sistani sent a bold message: in a world scarred by conflict and bloodshed, leaders of faith should unite to reject violence and promote co-existence.
The context of that visit was particularly significant as it also sent an equally strong political message: it took place in Iraq, a nation ravaged by war, particularly the U.S. invasion in 2003, driven by neoconservative fantasies of turning the Middle East into a paragon of liberal democracy, subsequent sectarian strife and rise of ISIS which treated both Shiites and Christians as enemies and apostates.
By choosing to go to Najaf, Francis showed respect for the Shia community, and challenged the narratives that portray Shias as implacable adversaries of the West. Instead of ceaseless demand and condemnation, so prevalent in the attitude of many Western leaders to Iraq, the Pope honored the figure, al-Sistani, who used his enormous influence to advocate for a civil state in Iraq, one that respected rights and equality before the law of all religious communities, including Christians. It was a far more effective gesture of support to Iraq’s decimated Christian community (which has dwindled from 1.5 million in 2003, before the U.S. invasion, to approximately 250,000 – 300,000 in 2021) than self-righteous posturing from the comfort of far-away Western legislatures.
At the time, Francis’ choice to visit Najaf was seen by some observers as a subtle rebuke to the Iranian theocracy, by privileging the so-called “quietist” school of Shia Islam, embodied by al-Sistani. That may or may not have been the Vatican’s intention, but Francis’ message resonated positively among Shia clerics in Iran too. Ayatollah Makarem Shirazi has engaged in significant correspondence with the Pope to promote dialogue between Islam and Christianity. In 2016, he sent a letter to the Pope expressing appreciation for Francis’ stance that “Islam is not equal to terrorism.”
Makarem Shirazi emphasized that what Tehran calls “Takfiri groups” (i.e. ISIS, al-Qaida) indeed do not represent Islam. Pope Francis responded via an official letter sent through the Iranian embassy in the Vatican. He expressed gratitude for the ayatollah’s outreach and joined him in condemning violence in the name of religion as an insult to God and a grave injustice.
That exchange marked a contrast with criticisms Makarem Shirazi delivered to Francis’ predecessor, Pope Benefict XVI, for comments perceived as anti-Islamic. Of course, Makarem Shirazi’s stances are not purely faith-based, but also reflect the geopolitical orientation of the Islamic Republic, like in his implication that the “takfiri groups” prosper thanks to the support of the “arrogant powers” (read the U.S.). Overall, however, his outreach to Francis, and the Pope’s response, can be seen as a useful attempt to promote inter-religious dialogue between Christianity and Shia Islam.
Pope Francis’ efforts to engage with Muslim clerics, both Sunni and Shia, transcended religious boundaries, fostered dialogue and co-existence in a world scarred by conflict. While his visit to Najaf in particular set a powerful precedent, the sustainability of these initiatives depends on his successors’ willingness to build on his efforts. May they continue to walk this path of dialogue, proving that even the deepest divides can be bridged through vision, courage, and faith.
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