From the moment President Biden appointed John Kerry as his administration’s representative for climate change, Washington foreign policy establishment types, or members of “the Blob,” started writing critical articles saying that of course climate change is important, but it must not be allowed in any way to reduce U.S. attention or expenditure on the really important threat: China.
We need to read these articles in conjunction with the news about Hurricane Ida, and of course the long series of heatwaves, wildfires, and droughts in the western United States in recent years. For national security means little in the end if it is not related to some real degree to the lives and wellbeing of ordinary citizens; and it is not China that has killed almost 60 people in the United States in recent days, deprived millions of electricity, and done untold economic damage.
In fact, for many years now, China has not killed a single American. Nor of course has America killed a single Chinese; whereas floods in China over the same period have killed thousands of Chinese citizens, while air pollution from the burning of fossil fuels kills hundreds of thousands of Chinese each year.
Seen in the context of climate change, weirdest of all has been the issue of the South China Sea — China’s obsession with building bases on the uninhabited reefs and sandbanks there, and America’s obsession with the supposed dreadful threat that this poses. Future historians will not know whether to laugh or cry. For them, this will quite literally be a non-issue — because climate change will have meant that these reefs and sandbanks will long since have disappeared beneath the rising waves.
Both the Biden administration and the Chinese government have declared climate change to be an “existential threat” and a “national priority,” but their overall strategy suggests that they have not really understood the meaning of these phrases. For the whole point about a priority is that it comes first, which means that, by definition, something else comes second in terms of importance.
And if climate change is truly an existential threat to the United States, China, and modern civilization as a whole, how can it possibly be placed in the same category of risk as a limited rivalry over geopolitical precedence in the Far East? U.S. bases in Guam and Okinawa do not threaten to invade and destroy China; nor can China eject U.S. forces from those bases without nuclear war. The two sides could very well just leave each other alone, while they concentrate desperately needed attention and resources on the efforts to limit carbon emissions and to strengthen national and international resilience against the effects of climate change.
The Biden administration also needs to take to heart the words of Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, who told Mr. Kerry during his visit to Beijing this week: “The U.S. side hopes that climate cooperation can be an ‘oasis’ in China-U.S. relations, but if that ‘oasis’ is surrounded by desert, it will also become desertified sooner or later.”
The United States should learn this from what should have been limited rivalries with other countries (for example, with Russia over Ukraine) has led Washington to break off cooperation even in areas where both sides have clear common interests. Then again, Mr. Wang should also apply his words to Chinese government approaches to the United States, and to the “Wolf Warrior” diplomats whose lack of diplomacy is approaching that of John Bolton on a bad day. This “anti-diplomacy” by both American and Chinese diplomats is also not likely to attract the respect of future historians — if there are any.
Anatol Lieven is Director of the Eurasia Program at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft. He was formerly a professor at Georgetown University in Qatar and in the War Studies Department of King’s College London.
Tape warns commuters not to enter a closed subway station at 28th street, which was heavily flooded when the remnants of Tropical Storm Ida brought drenching rain and the threat of flash floods to parts of the northern mid-Atlantic, in New York City, U.S., September 2, 2021. REUTERS/Caitlin Ochs
Top Image Credit: Rep. Pramila Jayapal (D-Wash.) holds up a copy of the U.S. Constitution as she votes yes to the second article of impeachment during a House Judiciary Committee markup of the articles of impeachment against President Donald Trump, December 13, 2019, on Capitol Hill in Washington, U.S. Patrick Semansky/Pool via REUTERS
A group of House Democrats is calling on the Trump administration to halt its unauthorized attacks on Yemen’s Houthis and present a legal justification for recent strikes on the rebel group.
In a letter to the White House, first reported by the Intercept, the group of more than 30 Democrats — led by Reps. Pramila Jayapal (D-Wash.), Ro Khanna (D-Calif.); and Val Hoyle, (D-Ore.) — argues that presidents must go through Congress for a declaration of war or adjacent authorization to wield military force.
“While we share concerns about maritime security in the Red Sea, we call on your Administration to immediately cease unauthorized use of military force and instead seek specific statutory authorization from Congress before involving the U.S. in an unconstitutional conflict in the Middle East, which risks endangering U.S. military personnel in the region and escalating into a regime-change war,” the letter states.
“Congress must have the opportunity to engage in a robust debate on the rationale for offensive force and vote on its merits before U.S. servicemembers are placed in harm’s way and additional taxpayer dollars are spent on yet another Middle East war,” the letter asserts. “No president has the constitutional authority to bypass Congress on matters of war.”
“How does the Administration claim self-defense, deterrence, or response to an imminent attack as a justification for strikes, given the President’s remarks that attacks ‘will get progressively worse,’ until the Houthis are ‘completely annihilated?’” the letter asks. “What steps, if any, are being taken to mitigate further civilian casualties?”
The letter also pushed the Trump administration to justify its response to “Signalgate,” where a government officials’ group chat on messaging app Signal, which outlined plans to strike Yemen, had included Atlantic editor Jeffrey Goldberg.
Today’s letter follows other lawmakers’ pushes for oversight regarding growing U.S. military involvement in Yemen. Previously, Sens. Rand Paul (R-Ky.) and Jeff Merkley (D-Ore.) teamed up across the political aisle in an April 1 letter, questioning the constitutionality of ongoing U.S. airstrikes in Yemen. Considering tenuous U.S.-Iran relations, they pondered whether such attacks could set the stage for further conflict with Iran.
“Congress should be briefed about the recent strikes against the Houthis and the total cost expected to be incurred by this campaign at the American taxpayer’s expense,” Paul and Merkley wrote. “The Administration must also explain to Congress and the American people its expected path forward given the failure of previous such efforts and statements from the Administration that the military campaign will continue and possibly expand to include military action against Iran.”
To date, recent U.S. military operations in Yemen have cost nearly $1 billion, all with limited impact on Houthi fighting capabilities.
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Top image credit: U.S. Vice President JD Vance tours the U.S. military's Pituffik Space Base in Greenland on March 28, 2025. Jim Watson/Pool via REUTERS
Some of President Donald Trump’s key foreign policy initiatives have not been gaining traction with most Americans, according to the results of a new survey released Tuesday by the Pew Research Center.
Majorities of the more than 3,600 respondents who participated in the poll said they opposed Trump’s suggestions that Washington should take over Greenland and Gaza, while pluralities said they disapproved of his closing of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and leaving the Paris Climate Agreement to curb greenhouse gas emissions.
A 52% majority of respondents said they also opposed Washington’s departure from the World Health Organization. Thirty-two percent said they approved of leaving both the WHO and the Paris agreement.
A 43% plurality said Trump was favoring Russia “too much” in his efforts to end the war in Ukraine, while a plurality of nearly a third of respondents (31%) said he was favoring Israel “too much” in its conflict with Palestinians. (In the latter case, 29% said Trump was “striking the right balance,” while 3% said he was favoring Palestinians. Thirty-seven percent said they weren’t sure.)
The survey, which was conducted between March 24-30, preceded the imposition by the Trump administration of across-the-board tariffs on foreign imports and the outbreak of what appears to be an escalating trade war between the United States and China. Most respondents (52%), however, predicted that tariffs on Chinese exports would have a “bad” impact on the U.S., while only 24% said the impact would be “good.”
There were major partisan differences on that question, however, with 44% of Republican or GOP-leaning respondents saying that tariffs would have a “good” impact and 24% “bad.” On the other hand, a whopping 80% of Democrats or Democratic-leaning respondents predicted the tariffs on China would have a “bad” effect on the U.S. economy, while only five percent said they would be “good” for the U.S.
Asked how the tariffs on Chinese goods would affect them personally, however, a plurality of Republicans (30%) said the impact would be “bad,” while only 17% predicted the impact would be “good.” Overall, respondents were about five times as likely to say increased tariffs on China will be bad for them as they were to say they would be beneficial.
The partisan divide also emerged with respect to the other questions raised by the survey. For example, strong majorities of Republican or Republican-leaning respondents said they approved of ending most USAID programs (64%), leaving the Paris agreement (60%), and leaving the WHO (58%). The comparable percentages for Democrats or Democratic-leaning respondents were 9%, 7%, and 8%, respectively.
Similarly, 13% of Republican or Republican-leaning respondents said the Trump administration was favoring Israelis too much, while 50% of Democrats or Democratic-leaning respondents took that position.
And while 28% of Republican or Republican-leaning respondents said they either “strongly oppose” (16%) or “somewhat oppose” the U.S. taking over Greenland, Democrats or Democratic-leaning respondents were far more hostile to the idea — 70% strongly opposed, and another 11% said they “somewhat opposed” the idea.
As for age differences, older respondents were generally more likely to approve of Trump’s early foreign policy actions than younger respondents.
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Top photo credit: Donald Trump (Shutterstock/mark reinstein) and Xi Jinping (Shutterstock/360b)
Today Trump suspended his global trade war with all countries except China. This confirms that, even as all eyes were on the chaos in the financial markets, the far bigger threat from Trump’s “liberation day” was a sharp escalation in the US–China conflict that could now plausibly turn violent within the next couple years.
Prior to Trump’s “liberation day” the two countries had an unhealthy relationship with steadily building pressures toward conflict. The Biden administration not only retained almost all of the first Trump administration’s antagonistic measures against China but expanded and intensified them. Though it eventually revived the diplomatic exchanges that the first Trump administration shut down, Biden declined to work with China to mitigate the zero-sum forces pushing the two countries against each other.
The new Trump administration quickly imposed a sharp increase on China’s already high tariffs. Yet both sides were initially willing to seek an agreement that could have at least reduced tensions. After the election, Beijing sent a series of delegations to Washington in hopes of understanding what kind of concessions Trump was seeking and how to get talks started. It informally suggested a range of issues on which it could give ground, ranging from currency valuations to guarantees on dollar centrality to industrial investment in the United States.
Trump, for his part, heaped praise on Xi Jinping — “he is an amazing guy” — and repeatedly teased an early meeting between the two. In February he suggested that the United States, Russia, and China enter nuclear arms control talks that could eventually lead to all three cutting their military spending by half. As I argued recently, far from deceit or misdirection, Trump’s whole worldview and mode of reasoning supported the potential for such dealmaking.
That potential is now gone. Instead the U.S. and China have embarked on an escalatory spiral that could lead to disaster for both.
On liberation day, Trump announced that China’s penalty for unfair trading would be an additional 34% increase in tariffs on top of the existing average 42%. At such high rates, few Chinese products would still be competitive in the U.S. market. More significantly, this latest attack convinced the Chinese leadership that the Trump administration is simply uninterested in negotiations and is instead seeking to humiliate China and wreck its economy.
In contrast to its limited response to earlier tariff increases, China has now decided to fight back. It imposed an across-the-board 34% increase on U.S. exports, hitting some $143.5 billion of revenue for American companies. It also placed new restrictions on exports of some strategically important minerals, added some U.S. companies to its list of unreliable businesses, and announced an anti-trust investigation into DuPont.
In its official response, the Chinese government positioned itself as defender of the globalization status quo. It characterized the U.S. aim as “using tariffs to overturn the existing international economic order, placing U.S. interests above the common good of the international community, and sacrificing the legitimate interests of other countries in service to American hegemonic interests.”
The government cast itself as calm and dignified but resolute in the face of an irrational and aggressive United States: “We do not start trouble, but we are not afraid of it either.” A statement placed in People’s Daily reassured the Chinese people on the economy’s resilience and promised significant fiscal support to expand domestic economic demand and government action to help businesses weather the turmoil.
Trump responded with equal resolve but with none of the calm or dignity, posting: “CHINA PLAYED IT WRONG, THEY PANICKED - THE ONE THING THEY CANNOT AFFORD TO DO!”
He then chose the nuclear option, raising tariffs on China an additional 50% starting today. China said it would match that further increase tomorrow. In his tirade postponing liberation day for other countries, Trump tacked on an additional 21% increase. In total, since the start of Trump’s term, the United States has now raised tariff rates by 125% and China by 84%.
In line with the president’s post, conventional wisdom in Washington is that China’s economy is so fragile it has no leverage in the economic conflict. Cut off from the U.S. market, they think, China will simply flood other exports markets and alienate Europe, Japan, and the Global South in the process.
Such overconfidence may lead to serious miscalculations as the fighting intensifies.
China has indeed been struggling since 2021 with a slow collapse of its huge real estate bubble and the uneven transition to a new structure of growth, leading to high youth unemployment and persistent deflationary pressures. It has a huge trade surplus that needs to find an outlet.
But Chinese economic policymakers have considerable space for fiscal stimulus to increase domestic demand if they choose to use it. Up to this point they have refrained because they were trying to maintain momentum on their agenda of structural economic reforms. Faced with the emergency of international conflict, they are likely to open the spigots.
Trump, in contrast, may have pulled back from his economic offensive on the whole world but he has not repudiated it. That means the U.S. economy and economic relations with other trading partners face a period of debilitating uncertainty that could cause considerable damage. China’s growth may surge even as the U.S. faces rising inflation and slowing growth.
The United States and China now find themselves locked in confrontation. The main force restraining economic warfare up to this point was simply the failure of American measures to undermine the Chinese economy. We have now blown past that condition.
Where might the conflict go from here? The most likely outcome of a hard decoupling between the U.S. and Chinese economies is terrible disruption to global supply chains. Many companies will simply shut down, but large smuggling networks will also emerge as Chinese producers seek access to the American market and American producers cast about for crucial inputs that are suddenly gone. Some Chinese production will move to the Latin American countries largely spared on liberation day.
That will set the stage for further escalation. The United States will seek to suppress smuggling. China will target strategically important goods to deny them to American producers. Both sides will start to lean on third countries to maintain their influence, giving rise to the possibility of proxy conflict. Most concerning, both sides increasingly will be tempted to impose pain on the other by striking more directly at their national security sensitivities.
China’s general practice is to meet each escalation from the United States with a proportionate response. It also has strong incentives to avoid unhinged reactions since it wants to use aggressive American measures against other countries to shore up diplomatic relations in the region and with Europe.
The same cannot be said of the Trump administration. Trump himself seems fixated on extracting a performance of submission to which Chinese leaders will never acquiesce. As his frustration mounts — and particularly if the Chinese economy does prove resilient to his assault — he will become more and more receptive to the national security team he built. In contrast to his own instincts, Trump’s top military and economic advisers are almost without exception committed to confrontation with China.
The reported contents of the Pentagon’s Interim National Defense Strategic Guidance suggest how easily economic warfare could slip toward military conflict. Defense Department leaders may seize on the collapse in U.S.–China relations to pursue the crash military buildup in Asia they have defined as “the cardinal objective of US grand strategy”.
Such a course was destabilizing even when the Biden administration pursued it alongside attempts to establish guardrails limiting conflict. In a context of mounting economic pain on both sides, with surging nationalism in both countries becoming a binding force on leaders, both governments are likely to choose more destructive responses to what they regard as provocations from the other side.
A single misstep around Taiwan or in the South China Sea could end in catastrophe.
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