From the moment President Biden appointed John Kerry as his administration’s representative for climate change, Washington foreign policy establishment types, or members of “the Blob,” started writing critical articles saying that of course climate change is important, but it must not be allowed in any way to reduce U.S. attention or expenditure on the really important threat: China.
We need to read these articles in conjunction with the news about Hurricane Ida, and of course the long series of heatwaves, wildfires, and droughts in the western United States in recent years. For national security means little in the end if it is not related to some real degree to the lives and wellbeing of ordinary citizens; and it is not China that has killed almost 60 people in the United States in recent days, deprived millions of electricity, and done untold economic damage.
In fact, for many years now, China has not killed a single American. Nor of course has America killed a single Chinese; whereas floods in China over the same period have killed thousands of Chinese citizens, while air pollution from the burning of fossil fuels kills hundreds of thousands of Chinese each year.
Seen in the context of climate change, weirdest of all has been the issue of the South China Sea — China’s obsession with building bases on the uninhabited reefs and sandbanks there, and America’s obsession with the supposed dreadful threat that this poses. Future historians will not know whether to laugh or cry. For them, this will quite literally be a non-issue — because climate change will have meant that these reefs and sandbanks will long since have disappeared beneath the rising waves.
Both the Biden administration and the Chinese government have declared climate change to be an “existential threat” and a “national priority,” but their overall strategy suggests that they have not really understood the meaning of these phrases. For the whole point about a priority is that it comes first, which means that, by definition, something else comes second in terms of importance.
And if climate change is truly an existential threat to the United States, China, and modern civilization as a whole, how can it possibly be placed in the same category of risk as a limited rivalry over geopolitical precedence in the Far East? U.S. bases in Guam and Okinawa do not threaten to invade and destroy China; nor can China eject U.S. forces from those bases without nuclear war. The two sides could very well just leave each other alone, while they concentrate desperately needed attention and resources on the efforts to limit carbon emissions and to strengthen national and international resilience against the effects of climate change.
The Biden administration also needs to take to heart the words of Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, who told Mr. Kerry during his visit to Beijing this week: “The U.S. side hopes that climate cooperation can be an ‘oasis’ in China-U.S. relations, but if that ‘oasis’ is surrounded by desert, it will also become desertified sooner or later.”
The United States should learn this from what should have been limited rivalries with other countries (for example, with Russia over Ukraine) has led Washington to break off cooperation even in areas where both sides have clear common interests. Then again, Mr. Wang should also apply his words to Chinese government approaches to the United States, and to the “Wolf Warrior” diplomats whose lack of diplomacy is approaching that of John Bolton on a bad day. This “anti-diplomacy” by both American and Chinese diplomats is also not likely to attract the respect of future historians — if there are any.
Anatol Lieven is Director of the Eurasia Program at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft. He was formerly a professor at Georgetown University in Qatar and in the War Studies Department of King’s College London.
Tape warns commuters not to enter a closed subway station at 28th street, which was heavily flooded when the remnants of Tropical Storm Ida brought drenching rain and the threat of flash floods to parts of the northern mid-Atlantic, in New York City, U.S., September 2, 2021. REUTERS/Caitlin Ochs
Top photo credit: A supporter of Venezuela's President Nicolas Maduro wears a shirt with U.S. President Donald Trump's face that reads "Yankee Go Home" during a rally to mark the anniversary of late Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez's initial coup attempt in 1992, in Caracas, Venezuela February 4, 2025. REUTERS/Leonardo Fernandez Viloria
For successive U.S. administrations, the big region below the American southern U.S. border was considered a bit of a backwater.
Sure, there were a few internal conflicts left outstanding, a couple of old-school leftist insurgencies still in operation, and the perpetual problem of drug trafficking. But after the Soviet Union collapsed, Latin America was never thought of as an epicenter of great power competition. The United States, frankly, didn’t have to worry about a geopolitical contender nosing into its own neighborhood.
The Trump administration, however, isn’t like any other administration before it. Trump campaigned on stopping narcotics from entering the U.S., defanging the drug cartels that have proven to be almost as powerful as the Mexican state, and dealing with irregular migration. So Latin America is now a center of gravity for U.S. foreign policy. Secretary of State Marco Rubio chose the region for his first trip as America’s top diplomat.
As we speak, the USS Gravely, a guided-missile destroyer, is steaming toward the Gulf of Mexico on a mission that Gen. Gregory Guillot, the commander of U.S. Northern Command, says is intended to protect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the U.S.
If the Trump administration’s first eight weeks tell us anything, it’s that the 1823 Monroe Doctrine, which carved out the Western Hemisphere as Washington’s exclusive sphere of influence, is again at the forefront. Whether it’s threatening unilateral U.S. military action against the Sinaloa and New Jalisco Generation Cartels in Mexico, yelling about taking back the Panama Canal, or leveraging tariffs to coerce smaller states to cater to his policy priorities, Trump is treating the entire area as his own personal piñata.
To be fair, Washington has won some short-term wins. Either out of deference to a superpower or because they don’t have other alternatives in the short-term, the region’s governments have largely acceded to Trump’s wishes. Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum, for instance, has been far more aggressive against the cartels than her predecessor and mentor, Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO) ever was during his six-year presidency. Law enforcement operations, often conducted by the Mexican military, have resulted in a steep increase in arrests, the seizure of 7 tons of narcotics and the dismantling of more than 100 fentanyl labs over a 10-day period.
Trump’s erratic tariff threats, like slapping a 25% tax on Mexican goods destined for the U.S. market, compelled the Mexican government to deploy an additional 10,000 troops to the U.S.-Mexico border for counter-narcotics operations (although how successful this operation will be in the long-run is up for debate). And while the evidence is circumstantial, it’s likely Mexico’s decision to hand over 29 of the country’s senior cartel leaders to the U.S. Justice Department had something to do with the tariff cudgel Trump is so fond of yielding.
There is movement further south as well. Despite Panamanian President José Raúl Mulino’s vocal declarations that the Panama Canal will forever remain under Panama’s control, his government has nevertheless tried to mollify the Trump administration by cooperating with Washington’s deportation schemes, getting out of China’s Belt and Road Initiative earlier than anticipated, and announcing an audit of a Hong Kong-based company that owns two ports on either end of the strategic waterway.
The heavy-handed U.S. approach is also working to an extent with some of Washington’s few adversaries. Venezuelan dictator Nicolas Maduro, the same man Trump tried to dethrone during his first term by recognizing his main competitor, Juan Guaidó, as Venezuela’s rightful president and instituting a maximum pressure sanctions policy on the Venezuelan economy, is now exploring whether a detente with Trump’s second administration is possible. Despite labeling Maduro’s regime an enemy of the state and alleging that it cooperates with Venezuelan gang Tren de Aragua to destabilize the U.S, Maduro agreed last week to resume accepting flights of Venezuelans who were deported from the U.S., likely in an attempt to ensure Chevron can continue to operate in Venezuela.
The record at this early stage is clear: Trump can legitimately claim that his tactics have produced results.
U.S. policymakers, however, would be wrong to assume that these tactics will work over the long-term or don’t have costs attached to them. Today, Latin American countries might be wary of confronting the U.S. But that wariness is unlikely to last if the Trump administration continues to throw around the stick at the exclusion of the carrot. Even small states have pride, dignity and an aversion to getting mercilessly kicked in the teeth at every opportunity. Look no further than Iran and North Korea, two relatively weak states that continue to thumb their nose at Washington’s demands notwithstanding the economic vise the U.S. has put them in.
Colombia, Peru, Mexico and Panama aren’t Iran and North Korea, of course. Outside of tariffs, it’s hard to envision that even Trump would go so far as to lock these countries out of the U.S. financial system, station warships off their coasts without their consent or shut down their respective embassies on U.S. soil. Yet Trump doesn’t have to do any of this to cause resistance and antagonism in these countries. The U.S. already has a bad reputation throughout Latin America thanks to its Cold War-era history of interventions, coup plotting and support for right-wing authoritarian regimes, particularly in Central America, which were more adept at killing civilians than servicing the basic needs of their populations.
Even more significant, Latin America has other options. In the past, these states couldn’t do much of anything to register their disapproval to U.S. actions. Most of them relied on the U.S. market and didn’t want to jeopardize the hand that fed them. Others relied on U.S. aid to ensure their militaries were still functioning. Outside of Cuba, Venezuela and Nicaragua, the region was America’s domain, a place where it could afford to be dismissive precisely because near-peer competitors didn’t have the capability or intent to challenge U.S. power.
But this is no longer the case. China isn’t about to displace the U.S. in Latin America but it’s by far a more palpable alternative for the region’s states today than it was at the turn of the century, when the Chinese economy was still scraping the bottom of the barrel. The statistics bear this out; between 2002 and 2022, trade between Beijing and Latin America increased from around $18 billion to over $450 billion. China provides investment and capital for major infrastructure projects in the region, from mines in Peru and ports in Ecuador to rails in Mexico and flashy soccer stadiums in El Salvador.
The Chinese aren’t doing all of this out of the goodness of their hearts—they’re doing it to undermine U.S. power in its own neighborhood.
The U.S. would be wise not to overreact. But it shouldn’t be making China’s work easier either. There’s a substantial risk that the Trump administration’s policy could be counterproductive. Hopefully Trump will recognize this sooner rather than later.
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Top photo credit: Donald Trump (White House photo) and Vladimir Putin (Office of the Russian Federation President)
If the diplomatic overtures of the past several months were seen by some as opaque, then today’s phone call between President Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin cannot be taken as anything but proof positive that the rubber has hit the road on serious, substantive U.S.-Russia negotiations over a Ukraine peace deal.
The White House has been pushing for an all-encompassing ceasefire between Russia and Ukraine as the first step on the long road to a durable settlement. There is an obvious military rationale for doing so: the major battlefield indicators favor Russia, which is slowly overpowering Ukraine in a war of attrition and has just effectively ended the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ (AFU) high-stakes incursion into the Kursk region.
An immediate cessation of hostilities would thus prevent Ukraine’s bargaining position from further deteriorating as talks unfold. But, and precisely for this reason, Putin seeks to shape the terms of a ceasefire in Russia’s favor with stipulations that the agreement must include "the complete cessation of foreign military assistance and provision of intelligence information to Kyiv.”
The partial ceasefire on energy and infrastructure attacks, apparently agreed to by both the Russian and American sides, is a preliminary way to cut the Gordian knot as talks over a full ceasefire proceed in coming days and weeks. The energy-infrastructure truce represents substantial progress, negotiated under what is militarily a difficult situation for Ukraine, in slowly shifting from war onto a de-escalatory trajectory.
Not unimportantly, it is also a source of real succor for Ukraine’s civilian population over three years into what has been the most destructive war on the European continent since 1945.
It should not be lost on anyone that this undeniably positive momentum has been made possible by the White House’s ability — as recommend in a brief authored by me and my colleagues George Beebe and Anatol Lieven — to avoid the trap of treating this as a narrow deconfliction problem and instead demonstrating a willingness to engage Russia in a broader bilateral diplomatic track.
The Trump-Putin discussion extended far beyond Ukraine, touching on a wide spectrum of issues including cooperation in the Middle East, opportunities for economic normalization, nuclear arms control, and even a U.S.-Russia hockey series. This strategy of extending the negotiating table is not only a critical source of confidence-building to ensure compliance with any potential peace deal but gives Washington the leverage needed to mellow some of Russia’s maximalist conditions for ending the war.
Where do we go from here? Much will depend on the coming diplomatic tit-for-tat, but two things can be ascertained at the outset. It is of course crucial to maintain Ukrainian and European buy-in over the course of this process, itself no small task which will require sustained coordination with all the relevant stakeholders.
Secondly, whilst a full ceasefire remains a worthy short-term objective, the overall priority should be to engage Russia in frank, pragmatic dialogue on what the outlines of a final peace settlement can look like. Indeed, Moscow is unlikely to accept the former without a workable roadmap to the latter.
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Top Photo: A general view of the Parliament as German Bundestag President Baerbel Bas delivers words of commemoration on the occasion of the one-year anniversary of Hamas' October 7 attack, ahead of a session of the lower house of parliament Bundestag, in Berlin, Germany, October 10, 2024. REUTERS/Lisi Niesner
Germany’s Bundestag has voted to pass a constitutional amendment that would authorize increases in defense, infrastructure, and some foreign aid spending, financed through increased borrowing.
"The decision we are taking today... can be nothing less than the first major step towards a new European defense community,” said likely incoming chancellor Friedrich Merz. EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen commented that the vote “sends a very clear message to Europe that Germany is determined to invest massively in defense."
The vote comes amid pressure from the European Community (and the Trump administration) to increase its overall defense spending and begin to wean off military dependency on Washington. Over the last several weeks, Merz and France’s Emmanuel Macron have issued a clarion call regarding this and concerning Ukraine, where they have also pledged assistance in a new “coalition of the willing.”
Debt-averse Germany has had strict limits, currently only allowing for borrowing equal to .35% of its GDP. This new amendment cleared the two-thirds vote required in the Bundestag and would exempt any defense spending or foreign aid for countries “attacked in violation of international law” from borrowing restrictions.
In addition to loosening borrowing limits for defense spending and foreign aid, €500 billion will be earmarked for infrastructure borrowing, as stipulated by the Greens, whose votes were needed for the two-thirds majority.
"This historic breach of Germany's accustomed dread of incurring public debt is risky in terms of domestic politics," said university lecturer and research scholar Molly O'Neal, who is also a non-resident fellow at the Quincy Institute. "It was rushed through the outgoing parliament in order to frustrate the strong opposition of the AfD on the right and Die Linke on the left. These parties together will have a blocking minority in the new parliament. Viewed objectively and without panic, the relaxing of the debt brake allows Germany to meet the expectations of the U.S. and NATO on defense spending. The Germans are not likely to deploy peacekeepers in post-conflict Ukraine without a U.S. backstop guarantee."
The amendment is set for a vote in Germany’s second chamber, the Bundesrat, on Friday. At first, the outcome seemed uncertain as some regional governments voiced opposition to raising the debt limit. However, the head of Bavaria’s State Chancellery announced today that Bavaria’s six members in the Bundesrat would vote in favor of the amendment, ensuring that the measure will likely have enough votes to overcome the two-thirds majority requirement in that chamber.
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